132 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	9657334fb7	R-241 FIXED: registers, capability map, STATUS, hub CHANGELOG v0.98.0 ... R-241 closed against controller v0.206.0 + hub v0.98.0, following the spike's ruling rather than the obvious reading. The row records what the fix does AND the two real bugs the tests caught rather than review - a missing t.Enabled (caught by an EXISTING test) and a missing falling-edge sync that reintroduced the very defect the epoch exists to fix. R-243 UPDATED, not closed: the STATE it describes can no longer be entered (the mint guard), and what replaces it is VISIBLE rather than silent - the box declares awaiting_recovery_key and the customer is offered the screen. But the ALARM GAP is untouched, for the same three reasons, so a box whose customer never acts still stops backing up with no operator signal. The remaining work is an operator-side signal for a box held past some age, deliberately not bundled into R-241's fix. R-245 NEW - WAITING-ON-OPERATOR, recorded and NOT built: should an undecided customer be auto-abandoned after 30 days? The operator's proposal is recorded WITH the reasoning against it, so the decision can be revisited properly: a reinstall implies a person, so nobody is absent; a customer who cannot find their code gets in touch, which is why the operator LEVERS were the thing worth building; the cost is the customer's own storage allowance; and the real harm is QUOTA, which is a condition, not a calendar. If it is ever built, build it to trigger on the harm with a dated warning, never on a date alone. The capability map's recovery-journey row STAYS FAIL. These are fixes, not a walk - nothing here walked a customer end to end, and the row goes green only when one completes with no operator intervention AND a byte-identical sentinel. R-214, R-202 and R-240 are still open. STATUS compressed rather than extended, per its own one-screen rule, and the "rebuilding throws away the off-site history" line corrected: the cause is fixed, so leaving it as a live defect would be false. hub CHANGELOG v0.98.0 for the superseded-package purge. Highest register ID moves R-244 -> R-245.	2026-08-07 12:13:09 +02:00
admin	db578cd44d	R-239 CLOSED (golden 0.205.0 vouched); R-241 ruling into the map and STATUS ... R-239: the operator approved the vouch this session. golden_version 0.203.0 -> 0.205.0 (+ derived sha); agent_version and min_agent both stayed 0.127.0, because the new golden's MinAgent is also 0.127.0 - so in the event it was a ONE-field change, not three. wrapper_sha256 was carried through explicitly: the handler reads it from the form and CLEARS it when omitted. Verified from the stored hub_settings (WAL-aware copy), not from the flash. The R-120 gate passed exactly - the newest controller the fleet reports is 0.205.0, so a 0.204.0 golden would have been refused. R-241: the capability map's recovery-journey row and STATUS carry the spike's ruling - a MINTING defect, not a screen-predicate defect. The row stays FAIL: delivery is not a journey, and R-241 is diagnosed, not fixed. R-242 and R-243 surfaced in STATUS in plain language.	2026-08-07 09:27:22 +02:00
admin	2228c0bff6	final walk COMPLETE — data PASS, journey FAIL; R-241 filed ... THE DATA: PASS. All three sentinels byte-identical out of snapshot f5c53b03, including the 12 MB binary and the accented Hungarian filename whose NAME BYTES are identical too. Disk -> restic -> SFTP -> Storage Box -> rebuilt machine -> disk, intact. THE JOURNEY: FAIL, and further from the line than the previous walk. The claim worked first try (302 in 0.164s). Then: / lands on the launcher with no recovery pointer, /recovery 302s away, and the remote page offers to CREATE a new recovery code — which would orphan the history the customer's code protects. There is no field anywhere to enter the code they hold. The operator's documented remedy also refuses, correctly and fail-closed. Recovery needed three guest command lines. R-241 — and the cause is a success this same walk proved six hours earlier. OffsiteRecoveryOffer() shows the screen only when (a) there is NO repository password (pristine rebuild) or (b) one exists but the history will not open under it. Overnight the credential self-heal collected the staged credential and applied the tier, writing a FRESH key at 03:18Z — so (a) is false; and (b) is unreachable because orphan detection needs a run, and runs are blocked by escrow_state=pending. The gap is self-locking. Measured keys: on-disk 9b4a9a9d... vs recovered-from-R 30ef574f... This is R-218's shape one level up: succeeding at the self-heal stopped the box OFFERING the recovery it still needed. Registers: R-201 moved to its outcome; R-241 filed; capability map's recovery row stays FAIL with both halves and the cause named; STATUS rewritten for the operator. Highest ID R-238 -> R-241. The venue is left with the recovered key in place and the self-heal key moved aside, never deleted. Teardown still owed.	2026-08-07 06:45:36 +02:00
admin	feed748325	R-234 root-caused and CLOSED; R-218's state field corrected ... R-234 was filed as "toggling an app on leaves it without a bundle, so the first run skips it". Measured on demo-hp: that state does not survive a run — the off-site run's own pre-dump phase calls captureAllRecoveryUnits for every DEPLOYED stack, through admitApp, before the push, and a unit moved aside was RECREATED. The actual cause was the single-flight: the manual run was dropped because an earlier one was still going, runOffboxBackup returned nil, the handler had already answered "A tavoli mentes elindult", and the card then showed the PREVIOUS run's green verdict. Fixed in controller v0.205.0 and proven live on demo-hp: a second request while one is in flight now says "Mar fut egy tavoli mentes — ez a keres nem inditott ujat. A most lathato eredmeny meg a korabbi futase", as a flash_error. Independently, and a real gap on its own: a run that skipped an app the customer selected is now `incomplete`, not `ok`. Selected+deployed with no unit counts; selected-but-undeployed is named with what to do but does NOT count, because a box left amber by an app somebody removed is a status nobody reads. R-218's state field read REOPENED while the same row's body already recorded the fix shipped in v0.203.0 and proven live. Corrected to CLOSED, keeping the over-claim history — it is why the row is worded as it is. Capability map: the off-site capture row's `incomplete` sentence widened to cover a whole-app skip, and it still does not claim a newly-selected app is protected by the next run — for a deployed app it is, for an undeployed one the card says so. Still open, deliberately: R-213, R-202, R-214, R-235.	2026-08-06 22:03:58 +02:00
admin	190c432f3a	capability map: the recovery journey stays FAIL, with the two dead ends closed and vouched ... R-218 and R-220 shipped (controller v0.203.0 / agent v0.127.0) and are proven live on a genuinely rebuilt box; golden 0.203.0 + agent 0.127.0 + min_agent 0.127.0 are vouched, so the delivery gap the re-walk recorded is gone. The row stays FAIL because the walk did not finish: it stopped at R-237 (the restore list was keyed on installed-and-toggled apps), now fixed in v0.204.0 and proven live — but no sentinel was restored, so the data half is unproven in either direction for that venue. R-238 reclassified (harness artifact, real residue fixed); R-236 withdrawn.	2026-08-06 17:02:55 +02:00
admin	0c4411e54b	R-201 re-walk: the data PASSES again, the journey still FAILS — two dead ends, down from four ... Asked Campaign 11 Phase 1's question a second time, on the fixed build, on a NEW appliance (VM 322, customer rewalk). The Campaign 11 venue was untouched. THE DATA: PASS. All three sentinels byte-identical out of the pre-destruction snapshot a7bc23bd in 23s through the customer's own restore flow — including a 12 MB binary and an accented Hungarian filename whose NAME BYTES are identical too (verified as hex, not as rendered text). THE JOURNEY: FAIL, two dead ends against Phase 1's four. 1. R-218's CONSUME half. The hub re-staged the credential at 11:44:57 saying 'the box re-consumes on its next cycle'; a full cycle ran at 11:55:46/54 (with a positive control that it ran) and it did not. A census of the customer-reachable actions found none that fetches it. Only a command line INSIDE THE GUEST moved it — 18s, confirming nothing was wrong with the credential, target or key: only the trigger. R-218's row said SHIPPED and over-claimed; it is corrected to REOPENED for the consume half. 2. R-220. Drives still unenrollable after a rebuild, needing a Proxmox-host unmount; without it no app redeploys and the restore page stays empty. Unaided RTO STILL UNDEFINED. Attended: +45s key placed, +24m12s tier up, +30m13s data verified. The 30m must not be quoted as the customer number. What passed and is new: the recovery screen appeared WITHOUT being sought, answered all three questions with a seal date matching the hub exactly, the emailed reset code worked first try, the unlock was a real 1.528s unseal, and R-225's fix was seen working in the wild (unknown, not a false zero). R-216 part 4 reproduced live: the reinstall downgraded the hand-installed agent 0.126.0 -> 0.125.0. DELIVERY GAP recorded as owed and NOT conflated with the journey: a fresh install landed on controller 0.201.0 / agent 0.125.0 — the vouched versions, neither carrying the fixes — installed by hand. Nothing was vouched. Capability map row STAYS FAIL. Campaign 11 doc gets a dated ADDENDUM, not a rewrite.	2026-08-06 12:18:29 +02:00
admin	d30c2a51ed	R-224..R-228 CLOSED: registers, capability map, campaign annotation, STATUS ... Five closed in controller v0.202.0 + agent v0.126.0, each with its live or red-proof evidence in the row. Five explicitly still open and named as such rather than left to inference: R-214, R-220, R-221, R-213, R-202 — and R-220 is flagged as currently worked around BY HAND on the campaign venue, which is the only reason an app could be deployed there. The capability map's recovery row STAYS FAIL and says why: fixes are not a re-walk, nothing walked a customer end to end, and the customer-facing messages were NOT re-driven live because /recovery correctly retires itself once the old data is set aside — restoring that state is the reconfiguration the task forbade. The campaign document is ANNOTATED, not rewritten: it records what was true when it ran, and that is its value. workspace-CLAUDE.md gains comment-vs-code entry 9 — the escrow header said the errors were 'DISTINCT on purpose' and named THREE situations while a fourth was folded into one of them, and a green test named the defect and did not prevent it because it asserted a STRING one layer below the merge. ROADMAP needed no collapse — it carries no rows for these IDs.	2026-08-06 08:34:04 +02:00
admin	453e4503a9	capability map: the recovery row stays FAIL — what Phases 2+4 add, and what they do not ... Says explicitly that these faults are NOT a re-walk, so the row cannot go green on them. What they add: the BACKUP promise strengthened (the offsite tier ran itself at 04:15 on a twice-rebuilt box, snapshot_count 1->2; all five daily jobs fired once; nothing on the must-not list fired), R-217 and R-215 proven live under exactly their faults, and the set-aside proved not to delete (12 535 KB byte-exact at the far end). What they do NOT add: any progress on the JOURNEY. R-224 is Phase 1's headline defect relocated from the version channel to the transport — a hub outage and a stopped agent are both reported as a bad recovery code, in 0.056s and 0.030s, with no unseal attempted. Plus R-225, R-226, R-228. Also records that §4.1 is now MEASURED rather than deduced, and §4.2's positive half still is not.	2026-08-06 04:33:27 +02:00
admin	1a0f7db92f	docs: CAMPAIGN-11 — the journey FAILED, R-198's retention PROVEN, six findings fixed ... Registers and evidence for the campaign and its fix pass. OPEN-ITEMS: R-214..R-223. Six SHIPPED (R-215/216/217/218/219/222); three deliberately still open and each blocks a real flow (R-214 console banner, R-220 drives unenrollable after a rebuild, R-221 a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony); R-223 minted and WAITING-ON-OPERATOR (vouch agent 0.125.0). R-213 and R-202 untouched. Capability map: a new row for the customer's UNAIDED journey, recorded FAILED and staying failed until a re-walk passes — fixes are not a journey. The existing rebuild row is corrected where it said R-198's retention was unit-proven only: it was proven in production on the first supersession since the fix, identity_blob retained at 572 B byte-length exact. CLAUDE.md comment-vs-code table: eighth entry — ResolveManagedFloor, the first where the false invariant was a GUARD rather than a comment alone. STATUS: the headline is now "the backup promise is proved, the recovery journey is not", and the one thing waiting on the operator.	2026-08-05 18:04:13 +02:00
admin	f45b1f6761	docs: R-193 CLOSED (the recovery screen); R-213 minted for the put-back ... - OPEN-ITEMS: R-193 CLOSED with both 2026-08-05 rulings (unlocking and restoring are separate; 'I do not want the old data' moves the store aside after a double confirmation), and the shape-(b) reasoning — WriteOffboxSecrets auto-generates a repository password on re-apply, so the literal 'fresh data area' trigger would have opened a window that closes by itself. - R-213 MINTED (R-212 was and still is the highest, re-checked for the second writer): putting files back in place, with the live-versus-backup comparison named as its requirement. Not started, deliberately. - capability map: the 'needs someone who knows to look' qualifier is GONE; what remains is stated narrowly — no correct-code run through the page, the put-back is out of scope, and the journey has not been re-walked end to end. - 07-backup-architecture 7.0: a fifth row, and where the screen deliberately stops. - CONTEXT: standing ruling S-34. - STATUS: the headline change and the two things still owed as proof. No hub change and no hub bump.	2026-08-05 12:56:55 +02:00
admin	4faebe2926	docs: R-204 ALL FOUR items closed; R-193 credential half; R-192 by replacement; R-212 filed ... - OPEN-ITEMS: R-204 all four CLOSED with both 2026-08-05 rulings recorded (the declared-state trigger and its four-meanings-of-absence reasoning; the recovery preview's dashboard-password exposure accepted as metadata, not content). R-193's credential half CLOSED, screen + deletion still open. R-192 CLOSED by REPLACEMENT. R-202 untouched. - R-212 MINTED (R-211 was the highest, grepped): the orphaned-ciphertext deletion HALTED at its STOP because the measured paths do not match the register — three set-aside stores totalling ~1.45 GB, and the thing that is exactly 1.2 GB is demo-felhom's LIVE repo. Nothing was deleted. - capability map: all four interventions closed; the row KEEPS a qualifier for a new reason — no step needs an operator, but there is no customer-facing recovery screen, and the journey has not been re-walked end to end. - 07-backup-architecture 7.0: the four-step table updated; the declaration-vs- inference reasoning and the credential-automatic/key-customer-present split. - CONTEXT: standing ruling S-33. - STATUS: the headline change and the deletion STOP. - REPORT-r204-item4.md rather than REPORT.md: a parallel session is active in this shared clone.	2026-08-05 11:06:41 +02:00
admin	0dbd954fec	docs: R-196 closed, R-204 items 1-3 closed, item 4 open (R-193) ... - OPEN-ITEMS: R-196 CLOSED; R-204 items 1-3 CLOSED with item 4 named and its dependency stated. Header restates that R-202, the 1.2 GB ciphertext deletion and R-198's still-unit-proven retention all REMAIN OPEN. - capability map: the recovery row keeps its 'with a person present' qualifier, names which crutch remains, and cites the three now gone. - 07-backup-architecture: new 7.0 - what a customer can and cannot do ALONE, the four steps in a table with status. This is the section a future reader will use to answer that question. - CONTEXT: standing ruling S-32, superseding S-31 steps 2-5. - STATUS: rewritten to one screen per its own header; removes a corrupted half-overwritten section left from the drill session. - ROADMAP: R-196 and R-204 collapsed.	2026-08-05 07:37:35 +02:00
admin	2a7ac03c47	R-201 PASSED: a customer's file survived a machine rebuild and came back byte-identical	2026-08-04 23:18:47 +02:00
admin	b228fd102d	R-201 night run: the off-site key IS recoverable after a real rebuild (proven); the verdict is blocked by R-204	2026-08-04 22:33:01 +02:00
admin	73fb595e38	R-203 shipped: the app and its backup agree, and 'ok' means it — R-201 unblocked	2026-08-04 18:52:14 +02:00
admin	a0c4b607a6	drill R-201: prepared and HALTED before the wipe — a mandatory data directory was missing from the off-site snapshot while the run said ok (R-203)	2026-08-04 15:00:06 +02:00
admin	846253baa8	docs: the offsite key is proven recoverable (R-199 closed, R-200 half, R-201 scoped)	2026-08-04 13:55:25 +02:00
admin	91cabdde1b	hub v0.93.0: the retention keeps the key it was built to keep (R-198) + three honesty fixes (R-197, R-192, R-196) ... R-198 — host_escrow_superseded shipped with `blob` (the K-escrow / PBS datastore key) and identity_blob was added to host_escrow LATER, never here. The offsite restic REPOSITORY password lives in identity_blob. So demoteCurrentEscrowTx -- whose own comment calls it "THE ONE escrow row-copy routine" -- retained the whole-guest key and silently dropped the off-site data key, which is the secret the retention was built to preserve. And because the copy happens as the new blob overwrites the old, the destroying act was the ESCROW CEREMONY: the exact thing a rebuilt box tells its customer to run, on a card promising in Hungarian that the old backups stay recoverable. Both demo boxes crossed that line on 2026-08-04. - identity_blob added to the table (CREATE + additive ALTER) and carried in the shared copy routine, so BOTH callers are fixed at once: re-escrow and host-delete demotion. - ListSupersededEscrow reads it back; store.HostEscrow gains IdentityBlob. - CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity is the census of who the fix protects. - Nothing is backfillable: pre-v0.93.0 retained rows have no blob and their sources are gone. - Tests assert the CONSEQUENCE (a retained row can still yield a repo password), which is why the pre-existing retention test stayed green for two months asserting the mechanism. R-197 — SaveHostEscrow returns the hash it replaced; the escrow PUT raises offsite_repo_key_changed (warning, operator-only, edge-triggered) when both hashes are known and differ. No hash value travels. Severity chosen for the world v0.93.0 creates: with the identity blob retained, a changed key is "this history now depends on an older recovery code", not a loss. R-192 (half) — the stuck alert now reports the two shapes it actually covers, burned and regressed, each stating its own measurement; the regressed text withdraws the Re-issue recommendation. Every self-heal refusal leaves a notification_log row with its reason. The guard's logic is unchanged; its 500-oldest-reports scoping stays OPEN and the window is named in the alert text so the limitation travels with the number. offsite_delivery_stuck and offsite_credential_restaged are added to operatorOnlyEvents -- neither was registered and neither has a customerMessages entry, which is not a block. R-196 — five comments (not the three the spec expected) claimed ReissueCredentials rotates the restic repo password. It resets the PROVIDER password and cannot touch the repo password, which is generated on the box. All five corrected; the staleness mark documented as precautionary. The BEHAVIOUR stays open. Not in this release: R-199, R-200, R-201 remain open -- the chain that hands the key back is still unassembled. Part 5 hit its gate; the orphan card is untouched (R-202).	2026-08-04 12:56:58 +02:00
admin	3f2b7bc023	RECON: trace the offsite DR chain link by link — it does not join up (R-198..R-201) ... Read-only recon of the escrow -> recovery chain, from a dead node to an open repository. No production code, no build, no version bump. Headline: the hub's superseded-escrow retention does NOT retain the offsite repository password. host_escrow_superseded has no identity_blob column and demoteCurrentEscrowTx copies only the K-escrow blob, so what survives a supersession is the PBS datastore key, not the restic repo password. The next escrow ceremony -- which the system tells a rebuilt box's customer to run -- destroys the last copy. Both demo boxes crossed that line on 2026-08-04. Also established: - the hub's blob-serving endpoints (re-enroll / restore-directive) have zero callers anywhere: agent, hub UI, scripts, runbooks (R-199) - POST /backup/offbox/inject-password is routed and handled but no template contains the form (R-200) - nothing in the recovery path has ever been exercised; the one live round-trip proof (2026-06-10) predates the ResticRepoPassword field (R-201) - a fail-closed mint refusal IS implementable: the report ACK already carries escrow{identity_blob_present, restic_pw_sha256} and the controller discards it whenever no offbox target exists Corrections: yesterday's spike annotated (candidate (b) overturned in part -- unattended recovery is impossible, customer-present is not); capability-map retention claim struck through and replaced with what the code does. Deliverable: documentation/audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md Register: new R-198..R-201; R-193 and R-192 updated; STATUS.md refreshed.	2026-08-04 12:16:04 +02:00
admin	7fff45d688	R-195: a customer with no machine ever bound does not alarm (hub v0.92.0) + R-193/R-192 spike ... Part 4 (ships): `david` — a prospective customer with hosts=0, host_deletions=0, reports=0 — e-mailed an expected_dbdump_missed ERROR at 03:00 UTC three mornings running. The existing down-skip could never cover it: it reads the staleness checker's state, which is seeded from a query over the `reports` table, so a customer that never reported has no state at all and GetState() returns "" rather than "down". store.HasEverBoundHost (hosts row OR host_deletions tombstone) is consulted once per customer at the top of the deadline loop. The discriminator is "was a host EVER bound", never "has a report arrived" — a box installed and never heard from is a real fault and keeps alarming. Fail-OPEN on a read error. Red-proof observed: removing the guard fails with `got [expected_dbdump_missed]`, verbatim the event david sent. Parts 0-3 (spike, NO production code for R-193/R-192): audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md establishes that the one-shot provider password is the RECOVERABLE secret and the restic repository password is the irreplaceable one — and that a guest rebuild mints a fresh one, orphaning the previous off-site history. Measured without touching a box, by comparing host_escrow.restic_pw_sha256 against host_escrow_superseded: BOTH demo boxes changed (demo-hp 15 snapshots / 40.9 MB, demo-felhom 36 snapshots / 1.14 GB). demo-felhom's "lucky" 76-second recovery restored delivery and not the repository, silently, for 13h. ReissueCredentials does NOT rotate the restic password (R-39's record and two hub comments are wrong -> R-196); candidate (b) is not implementable against a zero-knowledge escrow; candidate (a) already exists as F3 and is wired to the wrong event. Ends in ranked options and an unanswered question for the operator. R-195 SHIPPED; R-196 + R-197 filed; R-192 + R-193 updated, neither closed.	2026-08-04 11:04:39 +02:00
admin	a684a81796	docs: R-191 closed, R-190 mitigation shipped (mechanism open), R-194 filed ... R-191: the gate was run first and it mattered — ep0's prune jobs have run daily since 2026-07-27 (18 tasks, all OK). THREE of my own queries said the opposite and all three were broken instruments (worker-type vs worker_type, prune vs prunejob, proxmox-backup vs proxmox-backup-proxy); acting on any would have disabled the only pruning attempt while reporting that nothing prunes. R-190: the row now reflects the MITIGATION, not the cause, and says so. Includes that v0.124.0's transition record failed in production while every unit test passed, and Part 3's single pass — the token-rotation class is real and documented in our own installer but does not fit this box (same token still authenticates, the other three grants survived, no installer run evidenced); ruled out on this box, not fleet-wide. R-194: PVE caches permissions (~40s and ~16min measured), so a single permission read is a lagging indicator and may explain when R-190's refusal surfaced. 07-backup-architecture: the offsite retention row was RIGHT and the configuration disagreed with it — noted, since a doc that states a contract does not enforce it.	2026-08-04 10:04:25 +02:00
admin	d692c46db0	RUNBOOK: the host tier is restore-PROVEN unattended on both demo boxes ... Four SCHEDULED runs, none triggered by hand: demo-felhom host 83.8s / offsite 540.4s; demo-hp host 109.3s / offsite 300.1s. Each restored into a scratch guest, booted, verified and destroyed itself; zero 990000 guests or volumes afterwards and both local-lvm figures returned to their pre-run values. Both boxes had BOTH tiers due at once, so R-86's ordering was observed live for the first time: never-proven sorted first, each box took its HOST tier, deferred the offsite one, and picked it up on the next evaluation six hours later. The host-tier proofs reached the hub through R-189's merge — demo-felhom's report carries two tiers, and the local one can only have come from disk. The capability map's optimistic half is cashed, with its scope stated: these two boxes, not the fleet. Surfaced and filed rather than fixed: - R-190: a storage ACL that demonstrably worked at 04:44 was gone by 09:24, with a reinstall, any logged pveum activity and any cluster-log entry ruled out. - R-191: every weekly offsite backup uploads successfully and then fails the job on a prune the box is deliberately not allowed to do (R-89 moved it server-side; both boxes still arm keep_last=2). Two corrections to yesterday's record: the R-185 drift DID surface as 403s on the write path (six, with the hub raising whole_guest_backup_failed at the first), and my earlier "no restore_test_* events" was produced by grepping a 404 page.	2026-08-04 08:13:43 +02:00
admin	e3187c86d5	docs: R-185 closed — the silence as well as the grant ... - OPEN-ITEMS: R-185 closed with the measurement, the corrected root cause (the installer's Scenario-F reuse arm, not PVE_STORAGES), and the live sequence. Records that demo-hp carried the same drift and was fixed too. - capability map: the whole-guest row's HOST-tier half was OPTIMISTIC and now says so — that tier was not merely unproven, it was unprovable on both demo boxes, and every live proof cited was on the offsite tier. - vzdump-target-move runbook: its item 5 predicted this; annotated (not rewritten) with what actually happened — the create arm did grant, the reuse arm did not, and it surfaced as a silent unreadable tier rather than the 403 the item expected, because vzdump writes through a root path. - CONTEXT: S-21 (an empty listing cannot distinguish forbidden from newborn; the measured trap that an ungranted path answers with INHERITED privileges) and S-22 (the Scenario-F arm must finish the job). - STATUS: rewritten for the operator, back to one screen.	2026-08-03 19:02:25 +02:00
admin	81d4438630	docs: R-189, R-188 and R-186 closed (agent v0.122.0); R-185 stays open ... - OPEN-ITEMS: all three rows closed with their measurements. R-189 records the migration consequence seen live (a pre-R-189 record has no tier and is not reportable, so upgrading does not retroactively make an old proof visible). R-188 records both directions demonstrated and the fixture cleaned up. R-186 carries the before/after sha values including the CGO_ENABLED discrepancy. The priority list states explicitly that R-185 is the one left open from that group and that this session did not touch it. - capability map: the restore-proof row now says the evidence path itself had a gap — the proof reached the hub only because no restart intervened — and what closed it. - CONTEXT: S-19 (a proof is durable and reportable, a failure is neither, and why) and S-20 (the release ordering, what each step protects, and how a binary is verified). - STATUS: rewritten for the operator, back to one screen.	2026-08-03 16:46:49 +02:00
admin	c102832892	docs: R-86 closed and proven live; ep0 recorded as protected; R-185/186/187 filed ... - OPEN-ITEMS: R-86 CLOSED with the trap in its own wording recorded (the literal reading is never true on a daily tier); R-87 re-ranked UP because R-86 built most of what it waited for; R-185 (the agent cannot list demo-felhom's host backup tier — a missing storage ACL, pre-existing), R-186 (a released binary's sha is not reproducible from its tag), R-187 (R-115's publish leg had never actually run) filed. R-184 was the highest ID in use. - ROADMAP: R-86 collapsed, keeping the reasoning and correcting the shape the row itself proposed — which would have been the never-fires version. - 07-backup-architecture: new contract section — restore-testing is per ARCHIVE GENERATION, with the trap and what did not change (S-1). - 00-capability-map: the unattended restore-proof row upgraded to PROVEN-LIVE on the 635 s due-triggered offsite run, with the restart and teardown evidence. - CONTEXT: S-17 (the rule, the trap, the config key, the hub's derivation) and S-18 (ep0 is Tier 2 — extends D-d's protected list to three machines). Numbered 17/18 because S-14 and S-15 were already duplicated in the file. - STATUS: rewritten for the operator, trimmed back to one screen.	2026-08-03 15:28:32 +02:00
admin	e34b614e5b	docs: R-182 closed, R-90 closed on measurement, R-86 unblocked, ep0 record corrected ... R-182 CLOSED (controller v0.194.0 + hub v0.90.0/.1), proven live on demo-hp. The hub's notification_log for the run reads: two per-app failures RECORDED, one digest SENT naming both, and the customer channel SKIPPED with operator_only. Against the measured previous behaviour — two failures, one email naming one app, one leaving no trace anywhere. Scenario D proved itself on an event I had not planned: disk_critical alarmed on two filesystems, the second was collapsed by the cooldown, and that collapse is now visible WITH ITS KEY. Yesterday it would have left nothing at all. A gap the spec did not anticipate is recorded with its fix: the per-app event also fires from the periodic sweep, outside any run, so making it record-only would have created a NEW silence. The sweep emits a digest too, with no run_id, so it stays under the ordinary hourly cooldown. ep0: MEASURED on the box — 7757 MB (8 GB), 4 vCPU, and the 4 GiB swapfile SURVIVED the resize and is active (checked, because a resize is a stop/start). The 40 GB local disk is UNCHANGED, so no disk figure was touched anywhere. Five documents corrected — three of which the task's list did not name, found by searching. Two audit/evidence documents ANNOTATED, body untouched: they record what was true when written and that is their value. R-90 CLOSED. R-86 unblocked and re-ranked, stated honestly: 8 GB is comfortable, not unbounded — the original OOM was a 14.46 GB restore — so the restore-test cadence should still be paced, just not by fear of the endpoint. target-selection.md's "D-d did not name ep0 either way" is deliberately left standing. It is the operator's question, not CC's. STATUS.md 127 -> 83 lines, items rather than sentences.	2026-08-03 14:00:54 +02:00
admin	b0b269b28d	docs: R-110 + R-115 closed, R-182 re-scoped by measurement, R-183/R-184 filed ... R-182's direction REVERSED by Part 0's measurement. Filed yesterday as "the reserve re-alerts on every status refresh" — too many alerts, seen at the sending end. Measured at the receiving end: 9 events received today, 2 operator emails sent. When two apps are refused in the same second the operator is told about ONE; the other is dropped before LogNotification, so it leaves no row on any channel and cannot be audited. The operator cooldown key is customerID:eventType(+tier) and the capture-failed event carries `app` but no `tier`, so the key has no app identifier. Same failure mode as R-97a, in a second event type that never opted into the narrow fix. Nothing changed — Part 0 was investigation only. Correction owed: yesterday's report said "one recovery_unit_capture_failed per app, HTTP 200". True of what the CONTROLLER pushed; a reader would take it as "the operator was told about each app", which is false. R-110 CLOSED (installer v1.23.0). Both channels moved. The spec's mechanism for channel 2 rested on a factual error — the run-time fetches are sixteen, not nine, and come from felhom-agent, not this repo — so no tag here could cover them; pinned to the agent version being installed instead, on the operator's ruling. Channel 3 needed no change: the URL never carried a ref, so no hub change and no hub bump. R-115 CLOSED. release-agent.sh builds, tags, publishes and verifies by an independent download; check-published-versions.py refuses a tag with no package; CI now runs the full gate set so it actually runs. R-183 NEW+CLOSED: a fresh install fetched the vouched agent binary and its sixteen config files from two different refs, and nothing compared them. R-184 NEW: nothing stops the hub vouching a version that was never released. The R-115 gate cannot see it — measured, the hub manifest and Gitea's package listing are both 401 anonymously. capability map: new PROVEN-LIVE row for the published installer channel. STATUS.md 138 -> 127 lines.	2026-08-03 12:44:08 +02:00
admin	fb652024ea	docs: R-181 closed, R-156 closed, R-110 + R-115 rulings recorded, R-182 filed ... R-181 CLOSED (controller v0.193.0 + v0.193.1) and proven live on demo-hp for BOTH reserve terms. The reserve is now a per-app, per-run ADMISSION decision taken before the app's first write and covering all three write legs, and it gained a size term. The refusal's wording was not weakened; the behaviour moved so it became true, verified by sha256 tree fingerprint. R-156 CLOSED — papra's template mounts the app's own data root. Precondition re-measured rather than inherited (both boxes were wiped today). Part 4, documentation only, nothing built: - R-110 WAITING-ON-OPERATOR -> READY. Ruling: option (b), the installer's publish channel moves to a TAG. Recorded with the condition that decides whether it works at all — it must cover BOTH the /scripts/ git-sync and the nine files the installer fetches from raw/branch/main. - R-115 WAITING-ON-OPERATOR -> READY. Ruling: mechanism (b), a build-side gate refusing to deploy or vouch an unpublished version. The third instance (agent v0.120.0) would have silently downgraded both demo boxes while succeeding. R-182 NEW: the periodic status refresh has no admission scope, so a refused app re-alerts on every poll (measured: a second alert pair 13s after the run's). Pre-existing in v0.192.0; deliberately not fixed in the R-181 task. capability map: the local-backup row moves to PROVEN-LIVE in BOTH halves. ROADMAP: R-165 collapses to CLOSED; R-181 collapsed into it. 07-backup-architecture.md: the reserve's contract stated as what the code provides (S-1 — an architectural contract changed in the same session). STATUS.md trimmed 150 -> 111 lines, "What's broken" no longer holds shipped work, and the stale "After:" line (pointing at work that shipped on 2 August) is fixed.	2026-08-03 11:36:16 +02:00
admin	aa62449694	R-178 CLOSED: both demo boxes reinstalled from the merged golden and proven ... Two boxes, two DIFFERENT supply paths, so the session proved the disk shape and the delivery route rather than one of them twice. demo-hp (layout proof, --golden <local volid>): mp0 at /var/lib/felhom, backup=1, 70G, no mp1; /var/lib/docker and /mnt/sys_drive both real mounts of its subdirectories via fstab; one df figure and one device id (64519) on all three paths; reboots 3/3 with the binds surviving each. demo-felhom (pipeline proof, --force-gitea-golden): fetch_verify succeeding against the vouched manifest for BOTH artifacts -- 'verified sha256 54e2a4c431daf580... matches the hub manifest' for the golden, a7763d31... for the agent. 250G single volume, grep -c '^mp1:' = 0, reboots 3/3. Journey proven on both, endpoint-level: claim -> deploy -> back up -> restore, with a planted marker returning byte-identical on each box. Ceiling measured gone: 65 GiB and 233 GiB available to a recovery unit, against 19 and 45. R-165 -> IMPLEMENTED, not PROVEN-LIVE, on the operator's ruling. B2, which that row records as the bulkhead's replacement, fired live for the first time and does refuse per app, delete nothing and alert -- but it is checked only in captureAllRecoveryUnits while runVolumeDumps writes the bulk unguarded, and its 'the previous unit is untouched' claim was measured false (182,272 B dump replaced by 2,147,666,432 B under a manifest still dated 06:34:26). -> R-181. New: R-179 (uninstall leaves NAS network-storage units), R-180 (--archive-storage not cross-checked against the ACL grant; 403 at step 8/8 after root@pam is rotated), R-181. Third instance of R-115 recorded (agent 0.120.0 unpublished). No code written, no version bumps -- this was a runbook.	2026-08-03 09:34:15 +02:00
admin	14d8c00781	docs: R-165 merge built and proven at the bake; R-163 + R-175 closed, R-178 filed ... 07-backup-architecture.md gains §7.5.1 (S-1: the contract changed in the same session): the ceiling §7.5 describes no longer exists for a box built from golden >= 0.192.0, the bulkhead's replacement is recorded, and R-175 is FIXED here rather than left standing — the bound is restated as a function of mp1 and scoped to split-layout boxes, naming all three real shapes. Capability map: new row as IMPLEMENTED, deliberately NOT proven-live, with the missing leg named — no box has been reinstalled from the golden, and "the golden baked" is not "a box built from it works". R-163 CLOSED: the ceiling it recorded stops existing. R-176(a) answered by P1; (b) WITHDRAWN, since every node is reinstalled rather than migrated. R-178 filed for the reinstalls, which were not done this session. CONTEXT S-13 (the variant chosen on measurement; pruning rejected with its reason) and S-14 (prove first, then vouch — the golden is published but deliberately unvouched, because vouching is what makes a fresh install pick up a layout no box has been proven from). STATUS: plain-language section; both operator questions now answered, so the waiting-on-you item is cleared. Two older entries trimmed so the page did not grow.	2026-08-03 07:16:15 +02:00
admin	41dbecb264	docs: R-167 + R-158 CLOSED, R-165 SPIKED, R-174..R-177 filed ... R-167/R-158 shipped and proven live (controller v0.191.x, hub v0.89.0): two new capability-map rows PROVEN-LIVE with live citations, and 07-backup-architecture.md §7.5's closing claim "nothing warns when an app crosses the line" is now false and rewritten (S-1: an architectural contract changed in the same session). §7.5 also gains the caveat that its size bound is ONE BOX'S, not the fleet's. Part 3 SPIKE (audits/SPIKE-r165-mp1-merge-2026-08-02.md): M1-M5 measured, NO layout touched. Three findings the merge session must not re-derive: "the layout" is not one thing (200G/50G vs 50G/20G vs 16G/8G); mp1 is a BULKHEAD and not only a ceiling, so after the merge an overflow reaches /var/lib/docker; the golden fails closed on the split in four places. D-a's condition (1) is currently SATISFIED — no external box is in the hub's register, and both demo boxes are Tier 0 and reinstallable. Recommendation given, choice NOT made — it ends at the operator's ruling. CONTEXT.md S-11 (D-c's routing, and why R-158's own backup_failed proposal was overruled) and S-12 (the monitoring landed BEFORE the merge). STATUS.md gains the plain-language section and the merge decision, with two older entries trimmed so the page did not grow. New rows R-174 (closed same session), R-175, R-176, R-177; each ID grepped free before minting.	2026-08-02 23:56:16 +02:00
admin	0fc54e0122	hub v0.88.0 — the WAL that never was (R-172) ... store.New opened the DB with `?_journal_mode=WAL&_busy_timeout=5000`, which is mattn/go-sqlite3 syntax. The driver is modernc.org/sqlite, whose applyQueryParams reads only _pragma/_time_format/_time_integer_format/_txlock/_inttotime and IGNORES anything else WITHOUT AN ERROR. So the hub ran in rollback-journal mode with busy_timeout=0 for its entire life while its own source said otherwise. Surfaced as a false HOST STALE banner: in rollback-journal mode a reader excludes a writer, so rendering an operator page blocks a host report; the hub 500s, the agent waits its full 15-minute interval without retrying, and staleness fires at 30 minutes — two collisions is a false alarm plus an operator email. 13 collisions in one pod lifetime; the alarm fired twice on 2026-08-02 for a host that was up two days and reconciling throughout. The observable that proved it: a 128 MB /data/hub.db with no -wal/-shm beside it while the DB was open. Fix: ?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)&_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)&_txlock=immediate. _txlock=immediate is not optional — database/sql's Begin() is DEFERRED, so a read-then-write tx must upgrade its lock and a failed upgrade is SQLITE_BUSY_SNAPSHOT, which busy_timeout does NOT retry; this store has 10+ db.Begin() sites and they are all write paths. Every test asserts what the DATABASE reports, never the DSN string — a string test would have passed for the whole life of the bug. Red-proof: restoring the shipped DSN reproduces journal_mode="delete", the missing -wal, and the live "database is locked (5) (SQLITE_BUSY)". Operational consequence handled: a WAL DB cannot be copied by taking hub.db alone — a bare `cat` opens cleanly and silently omits the newest writes. The break-glass retrieval in operations/nodes.md used exactly that; it and the recovery-inventory note are now WAL-aware.	2026-08-02 21:06:29 +02:00
admin	ad28699761	docs: R-157 A / R-170 / R-171 closed — boot recovery finished ... Controller v0.190.0. Docs only here; no hub change, no hub version bump. - audits/DIAG-bootrecon-drive-absent-2026-08-02.md — NEW. The Part 0 diagnosis, including the run that produced a FALSE NEGATIVE and the mechanism behind it (the agent re-binds an unmounted drive within ~60s, so the drive gate's startup reconcile restarted the apps one second before the sweep looked). Records that the write hazard was blocked only by an ACCIDENTAL filesystem permission that no code owns and no test pins. - architecture/02 §0a — the boot-recovery contract (S-1): both gates read desired state; the sweep observes a SETTLED fleet and each sample must refresh first; nothing is started without asking, fail-safe. Plus the durable warning: Manager.StartStack has no gate of its own. - 00-capability-map — the boot-recovery row, with the repeat count cited per N.5 (6 of 6 hard resets) rather than a bare PROVEN-LIVE. - OPEN-ITEMS / ROADMAP — R-157 CLOSED (both mechanisms), R-170 CLOSED, R-171 NEW and closed the same session, marked a regression from v0.189.0. - STATUS.md — the power-cut line moved from "What's broken" to "What works right now" with its repeat count; one dated bullet in the change log. - CONTEXT.md S-13 — the lessons worth carrying: "it didn't happen this time" is not a disproof; widening a window makes previously-unreachable overlaps reachable; and a settle detector is only as good as the freshness of what it samples — the fix's own defect, found live rather than by review.	2026-08-02 20:38:21 +02:00
admin	5c97fbc397	docs: R-166 SHIPPED — the desired/in-flight/observed split (D-b) ... Controller v0.189.0 implements operator decision D-b. Docs only here; no hub change and no hub version bump. - architecture/02-controller-module-map.md §0a — NEW, and it is the S-1 contract: desired (app.yaml) / in-flight (own marker file) / observed (not persisted), with the rule that ties them — never derive one from another. Absent desired state means UNKNOWN, never "running". One file, one writer. D-b's binding safety rule quoted verbatim. - 00-capability-map.md — the boot-recovery row now rests on a recorded signal, with the three live flows from 9201. The interrupted-operation half is marked IMPLEMENTED, not PROVEN-LIVE: nobody killed the controller mid-backup on metal. - OPEN-ITEMS/ROADMAP — R-166 SHIPPED with both blocking facts and their answers; R-157 mechanism B CLOSED and A restated as the whole item; R-170 NEW (the drive-backed boot gate still infers a Stop from a container count). - STATUS.md — the "an app can stay switched off and nothing says so" line rewritten to what is actually left: timing. - CLAUDE.md — end-of-session checklist gains: confirm your own last push's CI run went green, BY RUN ID. The failure email is a push signal; this is the pull check. - CONTEXT.md S-12 — the rulings, and the two lessons worth carrying: a test that constructs the thing it should prove the caller constructs is hollow (its red-proof will say so), and a field-by-field struct rebuild in a save path is a defect on sight.	2026-08-02 18:58:27 +02:00
admin	b06ea9c877	register: file R-156..R-164 in one pass, ranked; and record what mp1 is actually for ... Nine rows into OPEN-ITEMS.md and ROADMAP.md, matching each file's column shape. R-156 and R-157 had lived only in audit documents - the identical "minted in a spike doc and never carried across" failure the register already records for R-153/R-154/R-155, caught by the catalog sweep's own section 8.0 while it was happening. R-158 was minted by a second session the same day for an unrelated finding, which is why the sweep's proposals were renumbered R-159..R-162 at filing time. All nine IDs verified free in BOTH backlog files before use. Part 0 settled the question the sizing item depended on, by reading: mp1 is RETENTION, not staging, and neither of the two framings was right. A unit is the KEPT copy on the app's OWN drive (backup.go:245-255); for an app with no HDD_PATH the namespace falls back to the system SSD - "the SSD-only system-data fallback" (appbackup/paths.go:26-27). There is no post-copy deletion: the only prune is F5 residue-on-old-drives when an app MOVES (backup.go:1053-1112). So mp1 retains the units of driveless apps only - not every app, but not transient either. Confirmed against the spike: sys_drive held exactly the four driveless apps and not calibre-web, which had a drive and was still backed up. A unit is volume tars + DB dumps only, never mp8 userdata (recovery_unit.go:20-25), so a 1 TB photo library can never overflow one. And mp1 gates the WHOLE chain, not just Tier 1: Tier-2 mirrors the unit "(always)" from RecoveryUnitPath (tier2.go:302,368) and Tier-3 carries it, so a unit that cannot be written leaves both with nothing to copy. Part 2 fired on both triggers - retention, and the fallback undocumented - so 07-backup-architecture.md gains section 7.5. Section 6.1 said a unit lives "on the app's own drive", which is true and was the whole story only for drive-resident apps; the no-drive case was undocumented, as was the sizing constraint. 7.5 records the mp0-50G-vs-mp1-20G mismatch, the measured ratios (DB app up to ~2x, 21.1GB -> 40.2GB; file-only 1.00x), and the bound this puts on D5's Lane-1 independence: restorable from the drive alone only while the unit still fits - about 19 GB file-only, about 10 GB DB-backed. No number proposed; the ratio is the operator's ruling (R-163). R-159/R-160 marked SHIPPED only after verifying the template changes are in app-catalog origin/main, and R-156's gate likewise (check-volume-persistence.py present). papra is NOT fixed - referred - so R-156 stays open on that one app. Ranked, with one line of reasoning each: R-157 first (an app can stay down indefinitely with mechanism B silent on every channel), then R-161 (the gate exists and nothing runs it, which is why R-156's class recurs - R-29's record is three orphaned gates and one enforced), R-156, R-163, R-158, R-164, R-162.	2026-08-02 12:33:12 +02:00
admin	5825ceeabf	docs: v0.86.0 copy-without-reveal + the break-glass credential leg is now proven (PVE ticket minted)	2026-07-31 09:24:24 +02:00
admin	eb5d05f496	docs: host-addresses audit + capability-map row + REPORT (agent 0.119.0 / hub 0.85.0)	2026-07-31 08:55:53 +02:00
admin	1956e5d390	hub v0.84.0 — break-glass console credential on the host page ... The credential existed and was not reachable when it was wanted. Every box has had a strong random root@pam password since TASK G1, vaulted in the hub at day 0 and used for real during the sshd incident — but the only way to read it back was a hand-written curl carrying the global operator key, a secret kept out-of-band. In practice the PVE web console on a demo box felt locked. The host page grows a Console access card: presence + username + set_at by default, Reveal fetches the plaintext on demand for 60 s with a Copy button. Masking clears the JS variable, and also fires on a second click and on visibilitychange. A host with nothing vaulted says so, and says why. The secret is NEVER rendered into the page, and that constraint shapes the change. The render path uses a new store.GetHostRecoveryMeta whose struct and SELECT both omit the secret column, so it is structurally incapable of carrying one. The plaintext crosses the wire only in the response to POST /hosts/{id}/reveal-recovery-credential (Cache-Control: no-store, CSRF-gated at the ServeHTTP level; POST precisely so that gate applies and so no secret is retrievable by URL alone). Deliberately NOT the customer page's data-secret widget, which embeds the plaintext on every load. A delivered reveal writes one recovery_credential_revealed event on the host's customer timeline (info, source hub, Hungarian) via SaveEvent alone — no dispatcher, nobody emailed, the log_tail_requested shape. Two reveals write two events: the register records accesses, not states. A 404 is not an access. An unbound host reveals fine and writes no event; the [INFO] hub line, carrying the username and a length only, is then the record. The global-key API path is untouched by design — it is the route for when the hub UI itself is broken, and coupling it to the session layer would delete the independence that makes it a fallback. Recorded as a real trade: the hub session password alone now unlocks console root fleet-wide, where retrieval previously also needed the global key. Accepted for a single-operator, HU-geo-fenced hub that already stores these passwords in plaintext at rest (CONTEXT.md ruling S-4). The plaintext-at-rest half is filed as R-133 — every hub DB backup is a fleet-wide console-credential dump. Tests 550 -> 559; four red-proofs (page leak, audit event, CSRF gate, route order) each run, observed failing, and reverted. The route-order proof is a seam test driving ServeHTTP: a handler-level test cannot see that defect, because the handler is correct and simply never runs.	2026-07-31 08:19:36 +02:00
admin	0a9bd3829d	D5 SHIPPED: Tier-1/2 restore no longer depends on the whole-guest tier ... Records controller v0.188.0 across the four coupled artifacts. 07-backup-architecture.md is the owning doc: - new 7.4 = the recovery chain AFTER D5 (7.1 leg 1 superseded; leg 2, the living-app dependency, explicitly unchanged so this is not read as more than it is) - 7.3 collapsed to history, with the correction that the target as written (data_key-only) was tested in Part 0 and rejected - 3 records that the two-lane split is now real, not just intended - matrix rows 3 / 3c (new) / 13; 10.1 D5 itself shipped Also: new capability-map row, D5 collapsed in ROADMAP + OPEN-ITEMS, and R-127 filed in both (data_key flag unreliable; O4 can regenerate a DB password that no longer matches the restored data directory). The audit is named D5-drive-alone-restore rather than "...secrets..." because .gitignore blocks *secret* -- a guard worth respecting, not forcing past.	2026-07-30 16:58:06 +02:00
admin	d42d90fed7	R-108 CLOSED — D5's precondition is met (controller v0.187.0) ... Four-artifact update per the coupling rule, plus the audit. 07-backup-architecture.md: §10.1 retitled CLOSED with the ruling and the D5 sentence; the FileBrowser network-share row flipped YES->NO, closed at the PLACEMENT rather than at the bind; the exposure chain annotated with the fifth surface (decommission-with-migrate guarded only its source) and the correction that the boundary is the deploy POST, not the dropdown; §7.3 retitled UNBLOCKED; register row collapsed; open question F answered. 00-capability-map.md: new §D row PROVEN-LIVE, with the un-exercised legs named — the deploy-POST and decommission refusals are unit-tested, not live-fired. OPEN-ITEMS.md: R-108 dispositioned; D5 given its OWN row as READY/UNBLOCKED (it had existed only inside other rows' prose — the R-123 thread-loss pattern); R-126 registered. ROADMAP.md: R-108 collapsed to a shipped one-liner; R-126 added. R-126 filed not fixed: a .fab bundle (plaintext secrets, optional password) can be exported ONTO a NAS. Split out of R-108 rather than folded in — it is an explicit customer-chosen export destination, not a browsing surface reaching a backup tree, so it was never part of D5's precondition. Live evidence: same-box before/after on demo-felhom through the real authenticated endpoint, the network-specific refusal on demo-hp, non-effect verified in the registry, and R-67's share-root bind diffed byte-identical across the deploy.	2026-07-30 14:21:44 +02:00
admin	772956d214	docs(R-116): CLOSED — proven live; capability row F to PROVEN-LIVE; R-120 filed ... The events leg the previous commit reported as not-reached is now done. The operator relayed the claim code (the only route: bcrypt-hashed hub-side, emailed only), the two storage paths were registered through the real POST /api/storage/register, and the cycle ran on the fresh box: 07:20:04 backup_target_absent (error) Cel meghajto <- TARGET, specific 07:22:34 backup_target_restored (info) Cel meghajto <- its matching pair 07:24:04 storage_disconnected (error) Adat meghajto <- NON-target, generic 07:25:34 storage_reconnected (info) Adat meghajto All four at the hub; gate fired in 3 s. Two matched pairs, correctly discriminated -- and discrimination is proven NON-trivially for the first time, since both prior runs had the target itself emit the generic event. Over-correction passes on a positive observable, with two RETURNED lines proving the gate was ticking. 00-capability-map row F: PARTIAL -> PROVEN-LIVE with the evidence and the caveat. R-120 filed: the golden bakes controller 0.185.1, which PREDATES R-114 + R-112, so a freshly installed box shows the customer the WRONG absent-target message -- observed live on the drill box: the generic "the backup is on the same disk as the system" copy (false; the target is a drive that vanished) plus an offer of the other drive as the remedy. That is E2D 5.3's exact payload, still reachable on any new install. R-115's class one layer up -- R-111 closed by re-baking the golden, 0.186.0 then shipped, the golden did not move, and the gap reopened silently; this time the stale artifact carries a customer-facing falsehood in exactly the state R-116 now alarms about correctly. Teardown recorded for all three layers, hub layer gate-blocked with the command.	2026-07-30 09:34:08 +02:00
admin	c3ce4c7b20	R-116 Part 5 FAILED: the fix shipped, C5 still fails, mechanism NOT isolated ... A fresh box running the fully shipped stack -- agent 0.115.0 from the Day-0 manifest plus controller 0.185.1 from the vouched golden, no hand-deploy -- still fired the GENERIC storage_disconnected on detach and the SPECIFIC backup_target_restored on return. backup_target_absent count 0. Identical to Session C. The v0.115.0 fix changed nothing observable. Part 4's three positive observables were all obtained before the run (registry newest 0.115.0, hub vouches 0.115.0, felhom-pve running 0.115.0 clean), so the publish step forgotten twice was not forgotten a third time, and the box demonstrably installed the fix under test. Discrimination FAILS: the target itself produced the generic event, so the two cannot be told apart regardless of the non-target leg -- which was therefore not staged. Reported as a fail, not as Session C's trivial pass. Over-correction guard PASSES: 0 ABSENT lines with the drive present, target degraded:false. THE HONEST PART. The fix targets a shape that does not occur live, and which shape does occur is NOT ISOLATED. With the drive detached PVE reports the storage inactive with zeroed fields -- a shape the unit fixture did not model. Three attempts to read the real /disks payload failed on token extraction across the ssh -> guest -> container layers, and a present-drive CONTROL query also returned 0 rows, proving the query was broken rather than the payload. Without that control this run would have recorded a third false mechanism, after "the union row writes false" (wrong, corrected yesterday) and "no row carries the guest path" (unverified). The leading hypothesis -- an inactive storage reaching Observe with an empty MountPath, so StablePathForRaw returns "" -- is consistent with the pvesm output but is NOT evidence and is recorded as such. Next session's first job is a working /disks read, with a present-drive control run FIRST, before any further code. agent v0.115.0 is published, vouched and INERT. Not reverted: reverting is itself a change, the runbook forbids fixing mid-run, and the code is tested and harmless. Capability-map row F stays PARTIAL, now citing the re-test. Teardown clean: pvesm status after == before (local-lvm 38.83%), guest 9201 and drill-r50 untouched. Customer sess-d pending the usual ONLINE-ages-to-DOWN gate.	2026-07-30 07:15:31 +02:00
admin	952ebf4862	Record work, banked first: shrink the E-2d row, create the missing capability-map rows ... Unconditional and three sessions overdue, so it commits before any code is touched — E-2d itself stopped at Phase 0 and banked nothing. E-2d row: 822 words -> 121, and the contradiction resolved. Its State read CLOSED — PARTIALLY PROVEN while the cell's final sentence read "This row stays OPEN only for the residue"; a reader could not tell which. It is CLOSED, with R-116 the single named open leg. Nothing unique was binned. Three facts existed ONLY in that cell and are moved into audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md as a new §1a: the local-lvm fence figures with the 888 GB nvme alternative, the exactMount subdirectory caveat and why the subdirectory is nonetheless the safe placement (no durable_id collision), and the ISO/PAIRING -> DIRECT fall-through derived at source with its line citations. drill-r50's blocked status was already in both audits. Capability map: it had ZERO rows for the backup-target work — grep gives 0 hits for backup_target and one for "E-2" that is a campaign date string. Three scenario rows added, at today's honest status, not the value hoped for later: C. Protection & recovery — installer Case A/B, DEGRADED recorded not hidden PROVEN-LIVE, cites E2D-fresh-vm C1+C2 D. Storage & devices — the offer, and that registration confers no role PROVEN-LIVE, cites SESSION-C C4 + the decline path F. Notifications & monitoring — the absent-target alarm and its pairing PARTIAL, cites SESSION-C C5, leg named, -> R-116 Row F is PARTIAL today per the doc's own strict enum (a leg not exercised live is PARTIAL with the leg named, never PROVEN-LIVE). A later session may flip it; this commit must not.	2026-07-29 23:34:06 +02:00
admin	070b0ce2dc	07-backup-architecture: rewrite as the recovery model (D1-D6); D5 BLOCKED by R-108 ... Replaces the 2026-07-14 DRAFT entirely - it was verified against controller v0.132.0, 51 versions stale, while being cited as authoritative. Now verified against controller 0.183.0 / agent 0.110.0 / hub 0.80.0 / catalog 4252121. NOT ratified. Every statement is labelled [DESIGN] (a decision from the architecture discussion) or [FACT] (file:line, live output, or a citation to _recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md). Phase 0 verified D5's premise and it FAILED. Ten read surfaces were checked; nine are clean (SMB under both namespace shapes, FileBrowser for local drives, .fab import and download, /api/debug/*, all three ServeFile sites, registering the backup dir as a drive). One is not: FileBrowser binds a NETWORK share at its ROOT while local drives are userdata-scoped, and no IsNetwork() filter guards the deploy dropdown, the per-app migrate targets, or handleStorageMigrateApp. So an app namespace - and under D5 its plaintext secrets - can land somewhere a browsing surface serves with download:true. Not a leak today (the unit's app.yaml is secret-stripped); it becomes one under D5. D5 is therefore written as a BLOCKED target, not as settled. -> R-108 Core artifact is the failure -> recovery matrix (15 rows). RTO cells carry only measured durations; 12 are blank and each blank is listed explicitly as a finding. RPO cells carry the configured cadence that bounds RPO, labelled as such - no RPO has ever been measured from an incident and none is invented. The 7/53 vs 9/43/1 Tier-2 coverage counts are both recorded, unresolved; neither adopted. Coupling (S-1): capability map section C now cites the matrix instead of restating routes; ROADMAP gains R-102..R-108; OPEN-ITEMS gains only the in-flight R-108 plus C9-F1b/F3/F4 -> R-n cross-references; CONTEXT records D1-D6 as standing ruling S-3. No code, no version bump, no deploy, no box touched.	2026-07-28 20:50:41 +02:00
admin	0d1cf0f732	Recovery baseline inventory (read-only): every restore path, tier coverage, key custody, host/hub state, failure domains, measured RTOs ... Data document, no design. Parts A-G plus Unknowns/Contradictions/Observations. Headlines: - A: 12 restore paths. 7 are customer-unassisted (all app-level); every whole-guest and host-level path is operator-SSH-only. - B: independent catalog enumeration gives Tier-2 file-leg coverage 7/53 and Tier-3 mandatory coverage 4/53; does not reproduce the shipped C9-F1 figure of 9/53. Tier-3 captures named-volume tars on every run and no offsite action unpacks them. - C: three circular dependencies, incl. app-tier restore being conditioned on the whole-guest tier (encryption.key), and break-glass credentials reachable only through the hub that DooPlex hosts. - D1: host state is in no backup of any kind; no host has ever been rebuilt as itself. - D2: hosts.dr_record_json, host_escrow.directive_json and dr_recipe drives[] are all empty on the live fleet, and dr_recipe records the PBS namespace as 'root'. - E: local vzdump shares its physical disk with the guest it backs up (both hosts); hub.felhom.eu resolves straight to DooPlex's own public IP, not a CF tunnel. - F: every measured RTO extracted; the unmeasured ones listed, none estimated. Nothing was changed, deployed or restarted; peti-felhom untouched.	2026-07-28 20:00:06 +02:00
admin	2b24c70536	docs(ep0): hub PBS-DR capacity gauge verified correct after the volume move ... The last open item from the datastore relocation. Hub operator UI (Offsite -> PBS DR) reports felhom-offsite (ep0) at 97.9 GB capacity, 12.6 GB used, 13% full - agreeing with the on-box df (98 G / 13 G / 13%). The gauge follows the datastore's CONFIGURED PATH, so the relocation required no hub-side change. RUNBOOK section 10.3 warned that a stale 37.2 GB reading would mean the gauge reads the wrong filesystem and would be a real bug worth a roadmap item - it does not, and there is no bug. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018ARoadHBf8rHoscfiqeVZn	2026-07-27 09:39:44 +02:00
admin	ad8057c4e3	docs(ep0): relocate the felhom-offsite PBS datastore onto the 100 GB volume ... Supervised runbook execution. No code change, no version bump. felhom-offsite moved from ep0's 40 GB root disk (/srv/pbs-felhom) to a dedicated 100 GB Hetzner Cloud Volume (/mnt/pbs-datastore, ext4 -m 0, by-id fstab, relatime). Datastore NAME unchanged, so the PBS-DR descriptors, per-box storage ids, ACLs and namespaces are untouched. Capacity: 37.2 GB -> 98 GB total, 28.9% -> 13% used, headroom to the 80% warn 19 GB -> ~65 GB. This CLEARS the R-82 Phase 0 P0.3 STOP. Per-tenant encryption still precludes cross-customer dedup, so the slope is unchanged - the volume buys runway, not a better cost model. Verified: byte totals and chunk counts identical (9748), 7/7 snapshots across all three namespaces, backup:backup ownership, clean itemised dry-run, full verify job TASK OK with 0 errors, and a restore round-trip (source_tier pbs, pass true, mount_parity ok, clean teardown). Nothing deleted - the original 13 GB stays at /srv/pbs-felhom as the rollback until a new weekly backup lands. GC deliberately not run. Three findings recorded: - the `scratch` datastore points at a non-existent path (pre-existing; now logs ENOENT every start) - operator decision - the runbook's S6 guard test proves the wrong proposition: RequiresMountsFor re-mounts rather than refusing, so the test only bites when the device is genuinely unavailable (re-run that way, and the refusal was observed) - amendment recommended - S11: storage box u629193 has no live backup path, BUT ep0 carries an enabled sshfs mount unit against it that must be removed before the box is deleted Deviations: the volume arrived pre-formatted and mounted; S8 ran on demo-felhom rather than demo-hp (no SSH key for demo-hp); the window was contended by a stale in-memory 10-minute restore-test cadence whose config had already been reverted on disk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018ARoadHBf8rHoscfiqeVZn	2026-07-27 09:36:11 +02:00
Claude Code	57ba3c7c8c	R-85 Phase 4: docs — the UNATTENDED path is documented as unproven ... - ROADMAP: R-85 row. Code SHIPPED; rotation NOT YET OBSERVED LIVE, stated as such rather than written as done. - Capability map: a new row for UNATTENDED restore-proof, IMPLEMENTED not PROVEN-LIVE, kept distinct from the R-82 row that a MANUAL selftest earned. That distinction is the same one the activation-vs-arrival split made. - 03-host-agent §8: the scheduler covers every tier, oldest-proven first; the spec is per-run; a restore-test joins the one-heavy-op gate. The safety properties that must not be re-derived are listed. - 07: restore-proof recorded as a per-tier property. Doc still NOT ratified. - 06: corrects S4.1's 'the offsite restore-test now runs unattended' — it silently stopped being true when local_backup_target was retargeted to 'local', the SECOND time in that doc that a correct mechanism was broken by its input changing underneath it. - CONTEXT + REUSE. Hub gate green (17 packages, rc=0).	2026-07-27 07:33:40 +02:00
Claude Code	c74d752a9a	R-82: restore round-trip PASSED + multi-tier quiesce proven live -> PROVEN-LIVE ... Restore round-trip on demo-hp: pass=true, verified=boot+running, mount_parity=ok, source_tier=pbs (the v0.100.0 fix — the earlier attempt said 'local' and died at 600s), 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, clean teardown with no 403 and no leak. That last point confirms 06's reading that the teardown 403 was a phantom, and corrects my earlier framing of it as a standing privilege gap. Multi-tier quiesce driven through the REAL UI endpoint (authed+CSRF): exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it, local-first/PBS-last, app quiesced through the non-last tier, early resume on the last tier's snapshot. Total downtime 1m27s for both tiers; app healthy after. Capability map row upgraded IMPLEMENTED -> PROVEN-LIVE, kept distinct from the DR-tier row above which proves ACTIVATION not ARRIVAL. Remaining gaps recorded: the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the primary tier (manual path proven, unattended not), and the hub infers cadence from storage type.	2026-07-26 19:04:47 +02:00
Claude Code	adf1d1e619	R-82 Slice D/E: installer default 1.20.0 + architecture docs brought current ... Slice D.1 — host-install 1.20.0: a FRESH box defaults to local-daily + offsite-weekly (felhom-pbs, 604800s, keep_last=2). setdefault semantics proven both ways: fresh gets the tier, an UPGRADE preserves the existing backup block verbatim — so an in-place upgrade can never silently start writing to an offsite datastore. Existing boxes are migrated explicitly. Slice E: - 07-backup-architecture.md: honest status header per CONTEXT ruling S-2, with an explicit STALE-outside-the-PBS-tier verdict (the controller tiers were last verified 41 controller versions ago). The PBS row claimed 'PBS on DooPlex' (the retired spike store) with no cadence; it now names felhom-pbs -> felhom-offsite on ep0 over wg-felhom, weekly, keep_last=2. NOT marked ratified — that is Viktor's review of the section 10 list. Discharges R-83. - 06-offsite-connectivity.md: the target-split remaining-work note collapsed (shipped), and records HOW S4.1's tier-aware timeout silently regressed — the mechanism was never removed, its INPUT changed when local_backup_target was retargeted to 'local'. Also notes S4.1 already diagnosed the teardown 403 as a phantom (a timeout consequence, not an ACL gap). - capability map: new row for recurring offsite backups actually LANDING, as distinct from the existing row proving ACTIVATION. IMPLEMENTED, not PROVEN-LIVE — the restore round-trip has not completed under the fixed code. - ROADMAP: R-82 SHIPPED with its remaining gate named, R-83 DISCHARGED, R-84 left open. - CONTEXT + REPORT: the arc, including the mid-arc correction I had to make.	2026-07-26 17:54:10 +02:00