docs: CAMPAIGN-11 — the journey FAILED, R-198's retention PROVEN, six findings fixed
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Registers and evidence for the campaign and its fix pass.

OPEN-ITEMS: R-214..R-223. Six SHIPPED (R-215/216/217/218/219/222); three deliberately
still open and each blocks a real flow (R-214 console banner, R-220 drives unenrollable
after a rebuild, R-221 a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony); R-223 minted and
WAITING-ON-OPERATOR (vouch agent 0.125.0). R-213 and R-202 untouched.

Capability map: a new row for the customer's UNAIDED journey, recorded FAILED and staying
failed until a re-walk passes — fixes are not a journey. The existing rebuild row is
corrected where it said R-198's retention was unit-proven only: it was proven in production
on the first supersession since the fix, identity_blob retained at 572 B byte-length exact.

CLAUDE.md comment-vs-code table: eighth entry — ResolveManagedFloor, the first where the
false invariant was a GUARD rather than a comment alone.

STATUS: the headline is now "the backup promise is proved, the recovery journey is not",
and the one thing waiting on the operator.
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@@ -15,41 +15,46 @@ who sets their own password. They install apps from a catalogue of fifty-three,
home network, and open apps from a launcher or a shared link. Backups run on their own to three
places — the machine's drive, a second drive, and an encrypted off-site copy.
**And the whole backup promise is now proved.** On 4 August we destroyed a machine on purpose and
deleted a marked file from its disk. Using the recovery code you saved: the backup key came back
**identical, character for character**; the existing off-site store **opened** rather than starting
over; and the file was restored **byte for byte identical**. *(R-201)*
**The backup promise is proved. The recovery JOURNEY is not.** On 5 August we built a brand-new
machine from the published disc, gave it three marked files, destroyed it, and tried to get them back
**the way a household would** — no shortcuts, no command line. The files came back **byte for byte
identical**, all three, including one with Hungarian accents in its name. But **the journey needed us
four times**, and the very first thing the machine did was tell the customer their correct recovery
code was wrong. *(CAMPAIGN 11)*
## What's broken
- **A customer can now get their backups open on their own — but not yet put the files back.** Every
step from a rebuilt machine to an open backup store is done, and today the last piece landed: a
**full screen** meets the owner of a rebuilt machine, explains that the backups are still there,
says plainly that **nobody can replace a lost recovery code**, takes the code, and shows what is in
the store — which apps, from when, how big. Nothing needs you, and nothing needs a command line.
**What it deliberately does not do is put files back.** That is per-app, in the backups area, and
the piece that would guide it — showing what would change before anything is overwritten — is not
built yet. *(R-193 closed; the put-back is R-213)*
- **Two things still owed as proof.** The final unlock has never been done with a **correct** code
through the new screen: no recovery code was kept for the N100 machine's orphaned history, and the
HP machine's is in your hands, not ours — so the live test ran the whole chain and stopped at the
last step. **And the whole journey has not been re-run end to end since these fixes** — the pieces
are proved one at a time, not as a single walk. That re-run is one more drill. *(R-201)*
- **A machine installed today would tell its owner their correct recovery code is wrong.** The
recovery screen needs a newer in-house service than a new machine is given; when it asked and got
nothing, it blamed the customer's typing. **We fixed the lie today** — it now says plainly that the
*machine* cannot do this yet, and never accuses anyone. **It still needs one click from you to
actually work on new machines** (below). *(R-216, R-223)*
- **Three things a rebuilt machine still cannot do by itself.** Its owner cannot re-attach their own
drives, so no app can be put back on its data; it cannot create a new recovery code at all; and the
screen at the machine itself never stops showing a stale pairing code. Each is understood, measured
and written down — none is fixed yet. *(R-220, R-221, R-214)*
- **Rebuilding a machine still throws away its off-site backup HISTORY.** The machine invents the key
that encrypts its own off-site backups, and a rebuilt machine invents a brand-new one. Both demo
machines did this on 3–4 August — 51 backups (~1.2 GB) between them. The old key now survives the
recovery ceremony, and a changed key now raises an alarm the same day, but **the rebuild itself
still starts a fresh history**. *(R-193)*
- **One screen still tells the customer something we cannot yet promise.** The „elárvult tároló" card
says the old backups may later be restorable with the matching recovery code. That is true for
machines that re-seal from now on and **false for anything already orphaned** — and the machine
cannot tell which case it is in. We deliberately did **not** patch the sentence: a conditional
promise that can still be wrong is worse there than a vague one. *(R-202)*
- **The off-site copy can be erased by the machine that made it.** The credential that writes it can
also delete it. A daily snapshot is armed as a stopgap. *(R-95, R-87)*
that encrypts its own off-site backups, and a rebuilt machine invents a new one. **The good news:
the old key really is kept now — we proved it on a real machine today, for the first time**, and a
changed key raises an alarm the same day. *(R-193, R-198)*
- **The kept older backups cannot be opened yet.** We keep the previous sealed package, and there is
no way to open it. A customer holding exactly the right code for it used to be told they had
mistyped; today the screen names the situation honestly instead — but it still cannot open it, and
it does not pretend otherwise. *(R-222, R-202)*
- **The off-site copy can be erased by the machine that made it.** A daily snapshot is armed as a
stopgap. *(R-95, R-87)*
## What shipped recently
- **2026-08-05 (evening)** — **Four sentences where there was one, and none of them blames you.**
"We did not accept your recovery code" used to appear when the code was wrong, when the machine
could not ask, when the store could not be read, and when the customer held the code for an older
backup we still keep. Only the first is the customer's doing. Also today: succeeding at recovery no
longer switches off the machine's own request for the thing it still needs; the screen now finishes
the job and shows what is in the backups instead of promising a list it could never produce; and the
recovery page can no longer be reached on a machine that never had backups.
*(R-216, R-217, R-218, R-219, R-222, R-215)*
- **2026-08-05** — **The recovery screen: a customer whose machine was rebuilt is now told, and shown
how.** Until today they had everything needed to get their data back and no way to find out — the
only route was a command line. The screen unlocks the backups and lists what is in them; it does
@@ -113,6 +118,14 @@ over; and the file was restored **byte for byte identical**. *(R-201)*
## Waiting on you
- **One click, and it is the most valuable one available: approve host-service version 0.125.0 for new
machines.** Hub → Configuration → Day-0 artifacts → agent. Today new machines get 0.120.0, which
**cannot** open a recovery package — and a reinstall actively puts the older one back over a machine
we fixed by hand, so every rebuild re-breaks the very thing a rebuild needs. 0.125.0 has run on both
demo machines since 4 August and through the entire campaign. **Until you do this, new machines are
correctly held back rather than lied to — which is better, but the feature does not work for them.**
*(R-223)*
- **One thing to read after the machine next restarts — and nothing to do until then.** You told me
not to restart DooPlex, so I did not, and the move to the second SSD has therefore never been
through a restart. It works right now and nothing was lost, but a restart is the one test that
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@
| **The offsite repository password can be RECOVERED from the sealed escrow with the customer's recovery code** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.195.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04)** | On demo-felhom, through the real endpoints end to end: the box fetched its own sealed blob from the hub with its own per-host credential (hub log: *escrow blob SERVED … 572 opaque bytes, self_scope=true*), the agent unsealed it with the customer's recovery code, and the extracted repository password's sha256 was **byte-identical** to the one on disk — `c60c8bc737a6…`, which is ALSO the hash the hub had independently stored, so three sources agree. Five minutes earlier the same path with a WRONG code failed closed at age's KDF with nothing written, which proves links 6 and 7 ran independently of the success. R was searched for afterwards and found in 0 log lines and 0 files, with a positive control confirming the search would have found it. Evidence: per-repo CHANGELOGs; `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3 links 6–8 | **WHAT THIS ROW DOES NOT CLAIM, stated because the previous over-claim here was struck out four hours earlier.** It covers the KEY, not the DATA. **R-199 BACK-POINTER (omitted when this row was written): the recovery chain's link inventory and the per-link status live in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3; links 1–8 are walked, 9–11 are not.** **Re-confirmed 2026-08-04 evening by an attempt to prove the DATA half:** the R-201 drill was prepared on demo-hp and **halted before the wipe** — the sentinel file was not in the off-site snapshot (R-203), so the wipe would have destroyed it and proven nothing. **No file has still ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (`audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md`). The install half of the chain (controller v0.196.0 `--recover-offsite-install`, R-200) is likewise unit-proven only — it has never run against a live recovery. A recovered password has never been **installed** (the diagnostic compares and refuses to write, by design), no existing repository has ever been **reopened** under one, and **no file has ever been restored** from an off-site history via a recovered key. Links 9–11 of the chain are open (R-200's remaining half, R-201). The proof also used a box whose local key still exists — the rebuilt-box case, where there is nothing to compare against, is exactly what the drill covers and it has not run || DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21) | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 | Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected.) **⚠ The candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE is WITHDRAWN — the 2026-07-18 rehearsal produced a live counter-example (R-39).** On the reborn N100 the descriptor auto-provisioned and the agent reported `converged state=applied` (16:45:53), yet **the storage is dead**: `pvesm status` → `felhom-pbs: error fetching datastores - 401 Unauthorized` / `inactive`, and a direct probe with the stored credential returns **401 on every endpoint including `/version`** while the WG transport is healthy (handshake 9 s, 27.9 ms RTT) — i.e. authentication failure, not ACL scope. Root cause in the evidence: **the hub minted a SECOND token secret at 16:47:52, two minutes after the agent had applied the first, and `consumed_at` is still NULL**; the converged state machine will not re-apply, and the agent's 15-minute verify loop **cannot even read the credential to notice** (`open /etc/pve/priv/storage/felhom-pbs.pw: permission denied` — non-root agent reading a file it writes through a root wrapper). A tier that reports `applied` while silently unable to authenticate is exactly the shape that must not carry a PROVEN-LIVE badge. See `tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` F2 and `pbs-dr-state.txt`. **agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17:** the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick `pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, `pvesm status felhom-offsite`=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot `pveum` grant **2026-07-21 — the R-39 fleet fix SHIPPED (hub v0.68.0 + agent v0.91.2), closing the self-heal chain end to end.** The three defects that let a box be `applied` and dead simultaneously are each addressed: the hub stamps a monotonic `secret_generation` into the descriptor so a credential re-key finally MOVES the content hash the agent Line truncated
| **A customer's file survives a machine rebuild and comes back — the whole off-site story, end to end** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04 night drill)** | demo-hp's controller data volume was destroyed and the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced `8a9e33aa4da6…` — **byte-identical** to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to the hub's independent record — and installed cleanly on the bare box. `identity_blob` was unchanged across the wipe (572 B, `updated_at` still 11:11:37). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §2 | **WHAT IT DOES AND DOES NOT CLAIM.** PROVEN: after a real rebuild the key recovers byte-identical, the EXISTING repository opens (3 snapshots, 42 026 B — the pre-wipe size; not a fresh history), and the customer restore flow returns the file byte-identical. **ALL FOUR MANUAL INTERVENTIONS ARE CLOSED, AND THE CUSTOMER IS NOW OFFERED THE RECOVERY (2026-08-05). ONE QUALIFIER REMAINS AND IT IS NOT THE OLD ONE — state it precisely.** The 2026-08-04 drill needed four interventions between "the key is recoverable" and "the file is back", none of them in any design document (R-204). **Items 1–3 closed in controller v0.198.0 + hub v0.95.0** (the reset code works first time; a Re-issue no longer marks a healthy escrow stale; a unit restore states it returned the app's definition and database and NOT the customer's files). **Item 4 closed in controller v0.199.0 + hub v0.96.0** (a rebuilt box DECLARES `offsite.state=needs_credential` and `internal/offsiteheal` re-arms the stored credential before minting). **AND THE "needs someone who knows to look" HALF IS NOW GONE TOO (controller v0.200.0, R-193):** a full-page recovery screen takes over the landing pages while the hub holds a sealed package this box cannot open, explains that nobody can replace a lost recovery code, takes the code, opens the repository and lists what is in it — proven live on demo-felhom, which is genuinely in that state (`/launcher` → 302 `/recovery`; a wrong code refused with nothing written, three times, no lockout; the code found in no file, no container log and no debug ring, with a planted-copy positive control that first exposed a mis-aimed sweep). **WHAT THE QUALIFIER IS NOW, and it is narrower:** (1) **the final unlock has never been driven with a CORRECT code through the page** — no recovery code was kept for demo-felhom's orphaned history and demo-hp's is operator-held out of band, so the live run exercised the whole chain (handler → agent → hub fetch → age KDF) and stopped at the unseal; the install and listing rest on tests. (2) **putting files back in place is deliberately NOT part of this** — restore stays per-app, and the step after the listing is R-213. (3) **the journey has still not been re-walked end to end since these fixes** — the closures are proven individually, not as one uninterrupted run. That re-walk is one more drill and it is what is owed. Scope: `demo-hp`, a controller-data-volume rebuild — **NOT** a total host loss, and **NOT** a guest reprovision. R-198's retention is still unit-proven: nothing has superseded a key in production |
| **A customer's file survives a machine rebuild and comes back — the whole off-site story, end to end** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04 night drill)** | demo-hp's controller data volume was destroyed and the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced `8a9e33aa4da6…` — **byte-identical** to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to the hub's independent record — and installed cleanly on the bare box. `identity_blob` was unchanged across the wipe (572 B, `updated_at` still 11:11:37). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §2 | **WHAT IT DOES AND DOES NOT CLAIM.** PROVEN: after a real rebuild the key recovers byte-identical, the EXISTING repository opens (3 snapshots, 42 026 B — the pre-wipe size; not a fresh history), and the customer restore flow returns the file byte-identical. **ALL FOUR MANUAL INTERVENTIONS ARE CLOSED, AND THE CUSTOMER IS NOW OFFERED THE RECOVERY (2026-08-05). ONE QUALIFIER REMAINS AND IT IS NOT THE OLD ONE — state it precisely.** The 2026-08-04 drill needed four interventions between "the key is recoverable" and "the file is back", none of them in any design document (R-204). **Items 1–3 closed in controller v0.198.0 + hub v0.95.0** (the reset code works first time; a Re-issue no longer marks a healthy escrow stale; a unit restore states it returned the app's definition and database and NOT the customer's files). **Item 4 closed in controller v0.199.0 + hub v0.96.0** (a rebuilt box DECLARES `offsite.state=needs_credential` and `internal/offsiteheal` re-arms the stored credential before minting). **AND THE "needs someone who knows to look" HALF IS NOW GONE TOO (controller v0.200.0, R-193):** a full-page recovery screen takes over the landing pages while the hub holds a sealed package this box cannot open, explains that nobody can replace a lost recovery code, takes the code, opens the repository and lists what is in it — proven live on demo-felhom, which is genuinely in that state (`/launcher` → 302 `/recovery`; a wrong code refused with nothing written, three times, no lockout; the code found in no file, no container log and no debug ring, with a planted-copy positive control that first exposed a mis-aimed sweep). **WHAT THE QUALIFIER IS NOW, and it is narrower:** (1) **the final unlock has never been driven with a CORRECT code through the page** — no recovery code was kept for demo-felhom's orphaned history and demo-hp's is operator-held out of band, so the live run exercised the whole chain (handler → agent → hub fetch → age KDF) and stopped at the unseal; the install and listing rest on tests. (2) **putting files back in place is deliberately NOT part of this** — restore stays per-app, and the step after the listing is R-213. (3) **the journey has still not been re-walked end to end since these fixes** — the closures are proven individually, not as one uninterrupted run. That re-walk is one more drill and it is what is owed. Scope: `demo-hp`, a controller-data-volume rebuild — **NOT** a total host loss, and **NOT** a guest reprovision. **⚠ THE RE-WALK RAN ON 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11) AND IT FAILED. THIS ROW STAYS AS IT IS — it records a key recovering and a file returning, which remains true — but the JOURNEY row below is the honest verdict and this row must not be read as covering it.** The campaign built a throwaway appliance from the published ISO, destroyed it, and walked the customer's route: **the data half PASSED** (three sentinels byte-identical, including a 12 MB binary and a non-ASCII Hungarian filename, out of the pre-wipe snapshot in 16 s) and **the journey half FAILED** — four operator interventions, three needing root on the appliance, and the first of them was the machine telling the customer their perfectly correct recovery code was wrong (R-216). **R-198's retention is NO LONGER unit-proven — it was PROVEN IN PRODUCTION on 2026-08-05** (CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 3): the first supersession since the fix retained `identity_blob` at **572 B, byte-length exact**, carrying the OLD key `626e424670248db3` while the current row moved to the newly minted `e11a6c542b73477a`; `offsite_repo_key_changed` and `escrow_superseded` both fired at the instant of supersession, and the next off-site run REFUSED as `orphaned` rather than starting a fresh history. Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` |
| **The customer's own UNAIDED recovery journey, end to end** | controller v0.201.0, hub v0.97.1, agent v0.125.0 | **FAILED (2026-08-05, CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 1) — and it stays FAILED until a re-walk passes** | A throwaway appliance was built from the published ISO on demo-hp, claimed, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, then destroyed — guest purged and both enrolled drives wiped. The rebuild and the customer's route were then walked with **no command line inside the guest**. **Data: PASS.** All three sentinels byte-identical (`beb9175d…`, `7c8cb0ad…`, `e012e76f…`), including a 12 MB binary and `C11-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` — the Hungarian filename survived disk → restic → SFTP → Storage Box → restore → disk intact. Restored in **16 s** out of the pre-wipe snapshot `f3d9cd67`, non-destructively. **Journey: FAIL.** Four interventions, three of them root on the appliance: R-216 (a correct code called wrong), R-218 (the store never opened; the box stopped asking), R-219 (the promised listing structurally could not render), R-220 (the app could not be redeployed — its drives were unenrollable). Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM, and what the v0.201.0/v0.97.1 fixes do and do not change.** Six of the nine findings are fixed and each is red-proofed (R-216, R-218, R-219, R-217, R-222, R-215) — but **fixes are not a journey.** This row goes green only when the walk is repeated end to end and completes with no operator intervention. **Three findings are deliberately still open and each is a live blocker for some flow:** **R-214** (the console never stops showing a stale pairing code), **R-220** (after a rebuild the customer's drives cannot be re-enrolled — the deploy refuses and the wizard's list is empty, so no app can be redeployed onto its own data drive), **R-221** (a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony at all, because the pbsdr convergence marker survives on the host while the seeded `escrow.pbs_storage_id` is rewritten out of `agent.json`). **And R-216's fix does not by itself make a NEW box work:** with the hub guard corrected but the Day-0 manifest still vouching agent 0.120.0, a new box is **HELD, not served** — it stops being lied to, which is better, but the feature does not work for it until agent 0.125.0 is vouched. That is an operator decision |
| **Off-site app-data capture covers the paths an app declares MANDATORY — on BOTH drive layouts** | controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04) — and this row was OPTIMISTIC before it** | On demo-hp, an app on the **system-data fallback** bound `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` while the capture set looked in `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books`: the declared-mandatory directory was in **no** snapshot and the run reported `ok` (R-203). After v0.197.0 the capture log reads `1 mandatory path(s)` and the file is **listed inside the snapshot** — `restic ls -l latest --tag calibre-web` → `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt`. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md` §2 and the v0.197.0 CHANGELOG | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM.** It covers CAPTURE, not RESTORE: **no file has ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (R-201, ready to resume). It also does not claim the enrolled-drive layout was ever wrong — it was not, which is precisely why this survived. And a run that still misses a mandatory directory now reports **`incomplete`** rather than `ok`, so this row's guarantee is one the status can express || **Recurring offsite (PBS) whole-guest backups actually LAND, and RESTORE** — local daily + offsite weekly as scheduled work | agent v0.97–0.103, controller v0.174/0.175, hub v0.76.0, host-install 1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-26)** | `audits/SPIKE-r82-phase0-2026-07-26.md`; per-repo CHANGELOGs/REPORTs. **Restore round-trip on demo-hp:** `--selftest=restore-test` against `felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T15:42:42Z` → `pass:true`, `verified:"boot+running"`, **`mount_parity:"ok"`** (`mp0=/var/lib/docker 50G`, `mp1=/mnt/sys_drive 20G`, mp8/mp9 throwaway stand-ins for the archived binds), `source_tier:"pbs"`, 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, scratch band clean afterwards and the live guest untouched. | **This row is distinct from the DR-tier row above, which proves ACTIVATION, not ARRIVAL.** That tier was PROVEN-LIVE as `applied` since 2026-07-21 while demo-felhom held ONE snapshot (a healing artifact) and demo-hp held **zero, ever** — "applied and empty", the R-39 shape one level quieter. **What earns PROVEN-LIVE here:** (a) demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace); (b) it **restores into a bootable, mount-complete guest** — `mount_parity` is the non-hollow half, since a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume; (c) **the multi-tier quiesce ran through the real UI endpoint** (`POST /api/guest-backup/trigger`, authed+CSRF) and produced **exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it** — `quiescing 1 stack(s)` 17:01:39 → local done 17:02:56 *"next tier may start (app still quiesced)"* → felhom-pbs snapshotted 17:03:06 → `unquiescing` 17:03:06. **App downtime 1m27s for both tiers**, and the app came back healthy. **Known gaps, recorded not hidden:** the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the PRIMARY tier, so the offsite tier is never AUTOMATICALLY restore-tested (the manual/selftest path is proven, the unattended one is not); the hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE rather than a reported cadence; the installer-default fleet flip awaits a full weekly cycle. → **R-82** |
| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **R-189 (agent v0.122.0, 2026-08-03) closed the reporting half of this row, and it was a REAL gap in the evidence path:** the proof above reached the hub only because no restart intervened — `restore_tests[]` came solely from an in-memory store, so the 15:25:14 PASS was in fact LOST when the agent restarted 2 m 43 s later for a deploy (`0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports). Under per-archive due-ness the box would not have repeated the work for a week. The persisted per-tier proof (with the archive, and now the tier) is merged into the report, so a proof survives a restart — one entry per tier, newest wins, and a record that cannot be described honestly is not emitted. **THE HOST TIER'S HALF OF THIS ROW WAS OPTIMISTIC UNTIL 2026-08-03, and it is worth saying plainly.** Every live restore-test cited here is on the OFFSITE tier. The HOST tier was not merely unproven on demo-felhom — it was **unprovable**, and on demo-hp equally: the agent's token had no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, the storage both boxes configure as `local_backup_target`, so the content API answered `{"data":[]}` through the token while root listed three archives. The scheduler skipped it as *"no settled archive yet"* — which is exactly what a brand-new tier reports — so nothing ever said so (**R-185**). **CLOSED 2026-08-03 — agent v0.123.0 + installer 1.24.0.** The grant is applied on both demo boxes (the token now lists 3 and 4 archives), the installer's reuse arm grants on a pre-existing target, and the agent now **asks whether it may read each tier it depends on** instead of inferring it from an empty list: a critical degraded capability naming the storage and the missing role, which the hub alerted and emailed on **while the box was still blind**. **THE HOST TIER IS NOW PROVEN-LIVE, UNATTENDED, ON BOTH DEMO BOXES (2026-08-0Line truncated
| Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier: host delete < RESET < customer Delete): one operator action → pre-first-install; all operational state destroyed, identity + basic config survive | hub v0.61.0, felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (external teardown, incl. two real firings)** | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — two live firings, both host-delete-first, on two different customers** (`demo-vm-felhom` 15:49:57, `demo-felhom` 16:08:51): every leg `ok` (`claim`, `db_purge`, `descriptor`, `hetzner`, `pbs`), escrow acked separately, each completing in 8–9 s (`hub-state.txt` `customer_resets`). The **Hetzner sub-account destruction is now verified against the live pool box** — and produced the run's sharpest lesson: **a sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object.** Deleting it left its `/home` intact, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext under a key this same RESET had destroyed — which is why the orphan guard fired at 16:58:14 (**a finding by S7's own criterion**) and why RESET now needs a base-dir purge → **R-32**. Prior: hub v0.61.0 REPORT; **ep0 live drill 2026-07-17** (throwaway `drill-reset-01` with a real backup: deprovision `deleted:true` destroyed the namespace + backup group + token, idempotent re-run `deleted:false`, all 3 real tenants + shared user survived); red-proofs (ack-gate, partial-failure resumability) + orchestration/store/offsite/render tests | External teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST, every leg idempotent; refuses while any host row exists; separate escrow-custody ack; clears claim (fresh code next onboarding); keeps the offsite tier CHOICE, drops provisioned fields. **Live-clicked 2026-07-18** (twice, by Viktor) — this supersedes the earlier "not live-clicked / Hetzner delete unit-tested only" note. **R-25b CLOSED (hub v0.69.0, 2026-07-21):** the Danger-zone DELETE is now the guided full-teardown cascade that runs this very sequence as its middle leg — see the row below |
+26
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@@ -55,6 +55,32 @@ v0.93.0 made the key survive. v0.94.0/v0.125.0/v0.195.0 make it come back. v0.19
the snapshot and the drill got it out again. **v0.198.0/v0.95.0 remove three of the four crutches the
drill needed — the fourth is R-193, and until it goes the recovery is still operator-assisted.**
## CAMPAIGN 11 — the recovery journey, 2026-08-05
**The whole journey was walked end to end for the first time, on a throwaway appliance built from the
published ISO. The data came back byte-identical; the journey did not exist.** Nine findings, R-214 …
R-222. Six are fixed in controller **v0.201.0** + hub **v0.97.1**; **three are deliberately still
open** and each blocks a real flow. Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md`.
| ID | What | State |
|---|---|---|
| **R-216** | **A correct recovery code was reported to the customer as wrong.** The unseal needs agent v0.125.0; on an older agent the route 404s and the unlock was attempted anyway, producing *„…nem fogadtuk el. Ellenőrizd, hogy mind a tíz szót pontosan…"* in 0.134 s. **The default state** — the Day-0 manifest vouches 0.120.0, and a reinstall actively DOWNGRADES a hand-fixed box back to it. The hub's own guard could not catch it: `ResolveManagedFloor` compared against the GOLDEN's MinAgent while serving a FLOOR that pointed elsewhere (the 8th entry in `CLAUDE.md`'s comment-vs-code table, and the first where the false invariant was a guard) | **SHIPPED** (controller v0.201.0 + hub v0.97.0/0.97.1) — **but see R-223**: the feature does not work on a NEW box until the manifest vouches agent 0.125.0. Until then such a box is correctly HELD, not lied to |
| **R-218** | **Succeeding at recovery stopped the box asking for what it still needed.** `needsOffsiteCredential` short-circuited on a repository password existing — and installing one is the recovery screen's whole job. 32 s after the hub re-staged the credential, the customer's success switched the mechanism off; the hub held an unconsumed credential the box had no reason to collect, and nothing ever asked again | **SHIPPED** (controller v0.201.0) — the declaration now stops when the TIER WORKS, not when a key exists |
| **R-219** | **The listing the screen promises could never render on the shape it exists for.** Listing needs a target; a target cannot exist without a repository password; shape (a) is defined by having none. And placing the key flipped the offer false, so the unlock response was the only chance and was guaranteed not to contain it | **SHIPPED** (controller v0.201.0) — the unlock now places the key, brings the tier up, then lists |
| **R-217** | **An unreadable store reported as "opened, with unattributable content".** The failure path passed `backup.OffsiteInventory{}`, whose `Empty=false` the template read as `InvUntagged`. The field built to prevent exactly this names the hazard in its own doc comment | **SHIPPED** (controller v0.201.0) — opened / empty / unreadable are three distinguishable states |
| **R-222** | **Reaching for a RETAINED earlier package read as a wrong code.** The engine is right (it fails closed against the current package); the message was not. Proven live: the correct code for the orphaned history got *„check your ten words"* | **SHIPPED** (controller v0.201.0 + hub v0.97.0) — the ACK carries `superseded_present`/`superseded_at` and the screen names the situation. **It states what the hub knows and promises nothing** — the read path is still unbuilt (R-199's inventory) |
| **R-215** | **`GET /recovery` rendered the recovery story on a box that never had off-site backups.** The predicate was right and the page never asked it; the POST sibling and the backups-area template both gated the same sentence correctly | **SHIPPED** (controller v0.201.0) |
| **R-214** | **The physical console never stops asking to be paired.** Half an hour after `Day-0 provision SUCCESS`, with the host ONLINE, the console still showed the pairing banner and a stale code — on a screen whose own text promises *„Ez a képernyő magától frissül"*. Census: exactly two `/dev/console` writers in the whole day-0 path, both in the pairing loop; `felhom-host-install.sh` writes to the console not at all | **OPEN — NOT FIXED** |
| **R-220** | **After a rebuild the customer's drives cannot be re-enrolled, and the refusal names an impossible action.** The deploy refuses (*„Válasszon a listából csatlakoztatott meghajtót"*) and the list is empty: `claim.go:84` treats a device mounted outside `/mnt/felhom-drives` as claimed, and the raw `/mnt/<name>` mount that enrolment itself creates survives the guest rebuild while the controller's registry does not. **Red-proved**: unmounting only the raw mounts flipped `attach: []` → both drives. **This is the state Campaign 10 reached by hand and recorded as its own harness error; the product's rebuild path now arrives there.** Breaches I3 | **OPEN — NOT FIXED** |
| **R-221** | **A rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony at all.** The preflight refuses on `escrow.pbs_storage_id`, which the pbsdr bridge seeds into `agent.json` only via `finishConverged`. The convergence marker lives on the HOST and survives a guest rebuild; `agent.json` is rewritten by the installer. Unchanged descriptor → same hash → early return → the seed never runs into a config that no longer has it. **Red-proved**: moving only the marker aside seeded it instantly (`grep -c escrow`: 0 → 1). A real blocker for re-escrow, which is exactly what a rebuilt box must do | **OPEN — NOT FIXED** |
| **R-223** | **The Day-0 manifest vouches agent 0.120.0 while the recovery feature needs 0.125.0 — and a reinstall DOWNGRADES a box that was fixed by hand.** Verbatim from the second reinstall: `agent (existing): felhom-agent 0.125.0` → `manifest: agent v0.120.0` → `installed /usr/local/bin/felhom-agent (felhom-agent 0.120.0)`. So every rebuild re-breaks the recovery path — the one event that makes the feature necessary | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** — vouch agent 0.125.0 in Day-0 artifacts. One dropdown; it has run on both demo boxes since 2026-08-04 and through the whole campaign |
**Untouched by this session, stated so nothing is presumed closed by association:** **R-213** (putting
files back — the half the recovery screen deliberately does not do) and **R-202** (the orphan card's
unconditional promise, which CAMPAIGN-11 §7 step 7 measured the customer-facing cost of).
| ID | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **R-213** | **Putting files back in place — the half the recovery screen deliberately does not do.** The screen (R-193, controller v0.200.0) unlocks the repository and LISTS what is in it; restoring is per-app and lives in the backups area, and the operator ruled the two separate on 2026-08-05: *a screen that unlocks and then offers to overwrite is two decisions wearing one button*. What is missing is the step after the listing — a customer who can now SEE their files still has to work out, per app, which restore to choose. **The operator named its requirement: a live-versus-backup comparison** — the customer must be able to see what would change before anything is overwritten | **OPEN — not started, deliberately** | the comparison design (nothing exists for it yet) | Design the live-vs-backup comparison, then the put-back flow on top of it. Do NOT fold it into the recovery screen | Operator + CC |
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@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ turns a true alarm into one the operator dismisses.
### A comment asserting an invariant needs a test pinning it, or it is a wish
**Seven instances in this project have shipped guarantees the code did not provide** — each survived
**Eight instances in this project have shipped guarantees the code did not provide** — each survived
review because the comment read as settled:
| # | Comment | What it claimed | What the code did |
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ review because the comment read as settled:
| 5 | `inflight.go` | *"a caller that cannot acquire DEFERS"* | the backup caller recorded a failure and paged the operator (F-A1) |
| 6 | `quiesce.go` | the agent's 409 *prevents* "a spurious failure" | on the start path it produced one (F-A1) |
| 7 | `recovery_unit.go` B2 refusal (R-181) | *"the previous unit is untouched and NOTHING was deleted"* | *nothing deleted* held; **untouched was measured false** — the floor was checked ONLY in `captureAllRecoveryUnits`, while the two dump legs wrote the bulk into the same tree first and unguarded, so a 182,272 B tar became 2,147,666,432 B under a manifest that had not moved |
| 8 | `ResolveManagedFloor` (R-216) | *"never push a controller past the agent it depends on"* | it compared the box's agent against the **golden's** MinAgent while serving a **floor** that could point elsewhere. Raise a floor above the vouched golden — which the day-0 runbook recommends and a per-customer override makes trivial — and the guard checks a version it is not serving. Measured live 2026-08-05: golden 0.192.0/MinAgent 0.113.0, floor 0.200.0, agent 0.120.0 → served, and the box landed on a controller needing 0.125.0. Its customer was then told their correct recovery code was wrong. **The first entry in this table where the false invariant was a GUARD, not a comment alone.** Fixed hub v0.97.0: a floor above the vouched golden is HELD, with its own reason |
Three of these (4, 5/6 and 7) were found **on live hardware**, not by review or unit tests — #4 had a
green, red-proofed test suite over a production path that was broken two independent ways, and #7
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff