R-201 night run: the off-site key IS recoverable after a real rebuild (proven); the verdict is blocked by R-204
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## Standing rulings
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**S-31 — the off-site key IS recoverable after a real rebuild; USING it is blocked by the remedy that
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makes the rebuild survivable (2026-08-04 night drill, R-201/R-204).**
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**Proven on hardware:** demo-hp's controller data volume was destroyed and the sentinel deleted; the
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customer's recovery code produced `8a9e33aa4da6…`, byte-identical to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to
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the hub's independent record, and installed cleanly on the bare box. `identity_blob` was unchanged
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across the wipe — nothing re-escrowed itself.
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**The wall (R-204), four links, all measured:**
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1. a rebuilt controller cannot configure its off-site tier — the one-time password was consumed by its
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predecessor (`no unconsumed offsite password`, R-193);
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2. the Re-issue that fixes that sets `stale_at` **while `restic_pw_sha256` is unchanged** (R-196);
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3. a stale escrow makes the hub withhold the hash from the ACK → `EscrowAutoConfirmer` can never flip
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`pending → escrowed` → `OffboxRunnable` refuses every run;
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4. the only documented way to clear it is a ceremony, **which supersedes the identity blob and destroys
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the recovered key**. And before any of it, a rebuilt box is **unclaimed**, so the claim gate
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intercepts every controller endpoint — a step in no design document.
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*Facts a future session needs:*
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- **A guest rebuild in this fleet is a controller-DATA-VOLUME loss, not a guest reprovision.** The
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2026-08-03 incident R-193 is filed against ran with guest 9201 up throughout — no `pct destroy`, no
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`pct restore`, no `--selftest=provision`. Reproduce it that way.
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- **A good snapshot is not durable against a later bad run on the same day.** `forget --keep-daily 7
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--group-by host,tags` keeps one per tag per day; a later, worse snapshot evicts a good one.
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- **Never run a ceremony while a recovery is in flight** — it supersedes the identity blob. Under
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v0.93.0 the old blob is retained, but nothing serves a superseded blob back (R-199).
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**S-30 — the R-201 drill was PREPARED and HALTED BEFORE THE WIPE (2026-08-04). Nothing was wiped.**
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It stopped at step 4 because the sentinel file was **not in the off-site snapshot** while the run
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@@ -1,172 +1,127 @@
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# REPORT — R-203: the app and its backup look in the same place, and "ok" means it (2026-08-04)
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# REPORT — R-201 night run: the key came back; the verdict did not
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**Controller v0.196.0 → v0.197.0**, deployed to demo-hp. No hub change. Nothing deleted, wiped or
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moved on any box; the drill was **not** resumed. `demo-felhom` untouched.
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**2026-08-04, 21:30–22:40, unattended.** `demo-hp` was deliberately rebuilt. No code, no version bump.
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`demo-felhom` untouched. Full record: `documentation/audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md`.
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---
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## 1. Confirmed baselines, and §3's landmarks
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## 1. THE VERDICT — not reached
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`felhom-controller` `532f5712a891` (v0.196.0) → **v0.197.0**; `felhom.eu` `a0c4b607a6cf`, no bump.
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Both trees clean on arrival. **Every §3 landmark held**, including the one that decided the fix:
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`paths.go:26` names the system-drive arrangement *"the SSD-only system-data fallback"* — **it is
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supported**, so the resolution was what was wrong and no API refusal was added.
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## 2. The call sites found — **FIVE, not four**
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| # | Site | Named by the spec? |
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|---|---|---|
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| 1 | `stacks/deploy.go` `withPathVars` → `${USERDATA_PATH}` | yes — the live defect |
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| 2 | `appexport/fabplan.go` | yes |
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| 3 | `appexport/export.go` | yes |
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| 4 | `stacks/delete.go` `ExportDataMounts` | yes |
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| 5 | **`web/handlers.go` FileBrowser mount builder** | **NO** |
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The fifth is the customer's own file browser: on a non-enrolled path it would have mounted the wrong
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directory. **Latent, not live** — the system drive is deliberately never a registered `StoragePath`, so
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the resolver is the identity there today. Wired anyway, with that reason in the code.
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Two further sites of the same class were found and fixed: `ComputeFabBuckets` was receiving the drive
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path where `ComputeCaptureSet` has always received the namespace root, so the export's classified
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paths and the backup's capture set could describe different directories for the same declared bind.
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**The rule had TWO existing copies and they differed.** `backup.Manager.namespaceRoot` compared
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without `filepath.Clean`; `stacks.Manager.inGuest` compared with it. A trailing slash from config
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would have flipped the mode in one package and not the other. Both now delegate to
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`appbackup.NamespaceRootFor`.
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## 3. Scenario A — the two paths, before and after (live, demo-hp)
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```
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before: /mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books ← app bind; capture set looked elsewhere
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after: /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books ← app bind == capture root
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```
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Capture log: **`0 mandatory path(s)`** → **`1 mandatory path(s)`**.
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## 4. Scenario F — the sentinel in the snapshot's file listing
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```
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$ restic ls -l latest --tag calibre-web
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-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 2026-08-04 12:53:06
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/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/DRILL-SENTINEL.txt
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```
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And the snapshot's own `paths`:
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`["…/backups/primary/calibre-web", "/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books"]`.
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**Not a green status — the file, by name and size.** sha256
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`643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c`, byte-identical to the drill's
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step 3 after the fix's migration moved it into the corrected directory.
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## 5. Scenario E — the delete path
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**The §8.3 risk does not exist, and this is the correction owed.** `ExportDataMounts` lives in
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`delete.go` but is **export-only**: its single production caller is the `.fab` export adapter and
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nothing deletes on its result. The delete path's own guard, `ProtectedHDDPaths`, is **layout-agnostic
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by construction** — it protects both `<hdd>/…` and `<hdd>/felhom-data/…` — so deletion was never
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affected by the namespace-root defect. That note is now in the function's doc comment, because the
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file placement misled this change's own specification.
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**Does the corrected path point anywhere the old code did not?** Yes, for the export only, and only on
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the system-data fallback: `<hdd>/felhom-data/userdata` instead of `<hdd>/userdata`. That is the
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directory the app actually binds after this release, and the tests assert the **negative** — no
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emitted path lies outside the app's own data roots, on either drive kind. It shipped as its own commit.
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## 6. The verdict value
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**`incomplete`** — **minted**, because `ok` | `error` | `running` contained nothing meaning *"it ran,
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and this app is not fully protected"*. **Not `error`:** the rest of the run worked and what was
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captured is real, so `SnapshotCount` and the `LastSuccess` anchor still record it.
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It reaches the operator through the **existing** per-run digest, `backup_run_failures` — already
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operator-only, already allowlisted. A new event type would have been a two-repo change and the hub
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drops anything outside `allowedEventTypes`; the prompt ruled out a hub change. The Hungarian customer
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warning is unchanged, and the backups page renders `! Hiányos` with the warn styling.
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## 7. §8.4's narrowing — **no customer-visible warning disappears**
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`TierOffsite`'s `tierKeeps()` already admits `ClassMandatory` only, so an optional path cannot reach
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the stat-filter. The added class check is a **no-op today**, written for parity with Tier 2 — and
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**demonstrated to be load-bearing anyway**: widening the tier filter alone keeps the tests green
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*because of the check*; widening it and removing the check makes an optional gap start reporting.
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## 8. §8.6's live effect — anticipated, and then NOT reproducible
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Anticipated in the CHANGELOG before it could fire: calibre-web on demo-hp had exactly this gap, so its
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status would become `incomplete`. **In the event it did not**, because the same session fixed the
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underlying path — after the corrected bind and the data migration the app has no gap, and the run is
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legitimately `ok`.
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**Attempting to observe the verdict live by hiding the directory did not work, and that is recorded
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rather than dressed up:** the running container's bind mount **recreated** it, so `os.Stat` succeeded
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and no gap existed. Worth knowing in itself — a bind-mounted directory cannot easily be "missing"
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while its app runs, so the mandatory-gap condition arises in practice when the path resolves somewhere
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the app never binds (the R-203 case), not when a live app's own directory vanishes. The verdict is
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proven by a run-level test that drives the real `RunOffboxBackup`. The fixture was restored and the
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sentinel re-verified at the same hash.
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## 9. Tests and every red-proof
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| Scenario | Result | Red-proof — mutation → outcome |
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|---|---|---|
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| A both paths agree | PASS + **LIVE** | restore the bare-path call → **FAIL**: `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata` vs `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata` |
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| B enrolled drive unchanged | PASS | invert the drive-kind comparison → **FAIL** on every enrolled row |
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| C mandatory gap → not ok | PASS | unreachable gap recording → **FAIL**; unconditional `ok` → **FAIL** |
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| D optional gap → ok | PASS | class check removed **with the tier filter widened** → **FAIL**; tier widened alone → PASS, i.e. the check holds the line |
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| E export mounts, both kinds + the negative | PASS | leave the site bare → **FAIL**, emits the short path |
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| F sentinel in the listing | **LIVE** | — |
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**A RED-PROOF PASSED AND THE TEST WAS WRONG, NOT THE CODE** (§9.11 — three of the last six sessions).
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My first Scenario-C test exercised `offboxCaptureSet` alone, while the mutation lives in
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`runOffboxInternal`. A mutation the test cannot observe is not a red-proof. Replaced with a run-level
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test that drives `RunOffboxBackup` and asserts `incomplete`, the retained `LastSuccess`, and the
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operator signal; it fails under both mutations. The original Scenario-D "red-proof" also could not
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fail by construction — recorded above with the two-part mutation that does.
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Green gate after each phase (`go build && go vet && go test ./...`, rc=0) plus
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`controller_gates.py --fast`. No test run was combined with a commit.
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## 10. Commits
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| Commit | Contents |
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| | |
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|---|---|
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| `73efb09` | Part 1 — one resolver, the four non-export sites, `ComputeFabBuckets`, the two delegating copies |
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| `a96c3d9` | **Part 1.3 alone** — the `delete.go`-resident export-mount site, with its scope correction |
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| `58c703b` | Part 2 — the verdict, the structural gaps, the operator digest, the status rendering |
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| `73fb595` | docs (felhom.eu) |
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| sentinel sha256, pre-wipe | `643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c` |
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| sentinel sha256, post-restore | **not obtained** — the restore was never reachable |
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## 11. Registers
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**Not a FAIL.** Nothing came back wrong and no fresh history was started; the box never got as far as
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running a backup. **What it is instead:** the first proof that the key survives and returns, plus the
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measured reason a customer still cannot use it.
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- **R-203 → SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE.**
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- **R-201 → READY TO RESUME**, blocker gone, fixture staged and verified.
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- **R-202 stays open**; the orphaned-ciphertext deletion is **still owed**.
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- Capability map: new row for mandatory-path capture on both layouts, its predecessor corrected as
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optimistic, and the **R-199 back-pointer omitted two sessions ago is now added**.
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- The v0.93.0 `identity_blob` retention remains **unit-proven only** — nothing here superseded a key.
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> **After a real rebuild — controller data volume destroyed, sentinel deleted from disk — the
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> customer's recovery code produced `8a9e33aa4da6769c5aea1831f87759e10930e2ec1dea0062576484e0598d080a`,
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> byte-identical to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to the hub's independent record.** That has never been
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> shown before.
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## 12. CI
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## 2. Snapshot count at step 9 — not obtained
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Run numbers and task ids in the session summary. **`--no-verify` was not used.**
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The off-site run was never permitted to start (§4). **And a count would have been a poor
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discriminator anyway:** restic's same-day `forget --keep-daily 7 --group-by host,tags` keeps one
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snapshot per tag per day, so a successful reopen would have shown 3, not 4. The real observable is
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whether the pre-wipe snapshot `e6132ae5` survives with the sentinel in it — recorded as the resume
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step.
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## 13. Teardown
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## 3. §5's five conditions, recorded before the wipe
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**Nothing provisioned.** `calibre-web` and the sentinel stay — R-201 needs them. The temporarily
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hidden directory was restored and the sentinel re-verified byte-identical.
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1. **sentinel listed by name** — snapshot `e6132ae5` (19:36:26), `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 …/DRILL-SENTINEL.txt`.
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2. **rollback archive verified** — `vzdump-lxc-9201-2026_08_04-21_44_24.tar.zst`, 1 606 765 083 B,
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**full zstd stream read OK** (4 867 573 760 B), sentinel confirmed inside it.
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3. §3's option — §5 below.
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4. **demo-felhom** `health=ok`, `escrow_state=escrowed`, untouched throughout.
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5. **space** — nvme-1tb 883 GB free, root 20 GB, local-lvm 34.32 %.
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## 14. Observations — noticed, NOT acted on
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**One precondition had drifted and was repaired, not worked around.** The staged snapshot no longer
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held the sentinel: the afternoon's `mandatory data path missing` experiment produced a *later* same-day
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calibre-web snapshot and `forget` had pruned the good one. The fixture on disk was correct, so one
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backup re-established it and it was re-verified by listing. **Lesson: a good snapshot is not durable
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against a later bad run on the same day.**
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1. **`resolveAbs` uses ONE root for two bind classes.** `RootHDD` resolves against the same parameter
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as `RootUserdata`. On an enrolled drive they coincide; on the system-data fallback a `${HDD_PATH}`
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bind resolves under the namespace root while compose binds it bare. Both callers now pass the
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namespace root, so the export and the backup **agree with each other** — but whether `${HDD_PATH}`
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itself should mean the namespace root on the system drive is a separate question that touches every
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already-deployed app's binds. **Not fixed here; it needs a decision, not a patch.**
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2. **The blast radius was measured before changing anything:** exactly one app in the fleet has
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`HDD_PATH == system_data_path` — `calibre-web` on demo-hp, deployed for the drill. Every other
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deployed app has no `HDD_PATH`. Nothing else needed migrating.
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3. **`/api/stacks/<name>/deploy` is first-deployment-only** (409 afterwards), so the corrected
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`${USERDATA_PATH}` reaches an existing app through a start/redeploy, not a re-deploy.
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4. **The controller's CSRF form field is `_csrf`, not `csrf_token`** — the login page uses one name and
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the protected forms another. Second session in a row this cost time; it belongs in the
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headless-access memory.
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## 4. Every step's observable
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| step | observable |
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|---|---|
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| 6 | fresh data dir stamped `20:00:2x`; **new `encryption.key`** (32 B); `claimed = None`; `offbox = null` |
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| **7** | **`identity_blob` 572 B, `restic_pw_sha256` `8a9e33aa4da6…`, `updated_at` still `11:11:37` — UNCHANGED across the wipe.** Nothing re-escrowed itself |
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| **8** | **recovered `8a9e33aa4da6…`** — matches pre-wipe on-disk and the hub's record. Exit 1 is correct and designed: nothing local to compare against, the rebuilt-box shape |
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| 9a | `[INSTALLED] … reads back identical` — the "installed" branch's first real run |
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| 9b | after the Re-issue and apply, the on-disk key is **still** `8a9e33aa4da6…` — `WriteOffboxSecrets` kept it |
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| 9c | **blocked** — see below |
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| 10–11 | **not run** |
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**The wipe was faithful to the incident, deliberately.** The 2026-08-03 rebuild R-193 is filed against
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was **not** a guest reprovision — the journal shows guest 9201 running continuously through that window
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with no `pct destroy`, no `pct restore` and no `--selftest=provision`. What changed was the controller
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and its data volume. A guest destroy plus an unrehearsed provisioning chain, improvised unattended, is
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what §8.10 exists to prevent.
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## 5. §3 — the recovery code
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**Option B as already in place, improved: no new copy was created, so nothing needed shredding.** The
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operator had placed `R_DEMO-HP` in their own `~/.config/credentials` (`0600`) two sessions ago for this
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purpose. It was read from there and **piped to stdin** for the two invocations that needed it — never
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an argument, never exported, never written to a second file, never logged. Destroying the operator's
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own store would have destroyed their record; because no additional copy existed, there is nothing left
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to prove gone.
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**Verified anyway, with the planted-copy positive control:** 0 hits in the agent journal, 0 in the
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controller log, 0 files under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/var/lib/felhom-agent`, `/root`, 0 leftover
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`felhom-idesc-*` staging dirs — and the same sweep found a planted copy (**1**), then **0** after
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shredding it. The instrument is shown sensitive rather than assumed to be.
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## 6. Part 2 — did not run
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Its gate is "the drill PASSED". It did not. A second wipe would have destroyed the state that makes the
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first drill finishable in five minutes. **R-198's retention therefore remains unit-proven only** —
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nothing has yet superseded a key in production.
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## 7. Teardown — three layers
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| layer | state |
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|---|---|
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| the guest | **nothing torn down** — the wipe is the evidence; all six app containers serving; the recovered key on disk; scratch band empty |
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| the host | vzdump snapshot LVs released cleanly; one new 1.6 GB archive on nvme-1tb (883 GB free); nothing deleted |
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| the hub | **no new customer records** — `demo-hp` is the same row throughout, because the rebuild was a controller-data wipe and not a re-enrolment. One Re-issue staged a one-time secret (consumed 20:16) and set `stale_at`. The two superseded escrow rows are **unchanged** — no ceremony ran |
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**Nothing deleted on the storage endpoint**, including the ~1.2 GB of orphaned ciphertext — ruled,
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still owed, deliberately not ridden along with a drill.
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## 8. The capability-map rows
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A new row records the key as **PROVEN-LIVE after a real rebuild**, and states plainly what it does not
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claim: **no file has been restored**, and the four links of R-204 stand between the recovered key and a
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usable repository. The R-199 back-pointer added earlier today stands.
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## 9. New findings
|
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- **R-204 (NEW)** — the recovered key cannot be used: a rebuilt box cannot configure its tier (R-193);
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the Re-issue that fixes that marks the escrow stale though the key never changed (R-196, **measured
|
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at `20:15:49` with `restic_pw_sha256` unchanged**); a stale escrow gates every run; and the only way
|
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to clear it is a ceremony that **destroys the recovered key**. Plus a fourth link in no design
|
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document: a rebuilt box is **unclaimed**, so the claim gate intercepts every controller endpoint.
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- **R-196 re-scoped** — no longer a documentation nit; it is on the critical path for recovery.
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- **R-201** — the wipe happened, the key came back, ~5 minutes from a verdict with a person present.
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- **R-198** — still unit-proven only; Part 2 gated out.
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- **R-202 open; the ciphertext deletion still owed.**
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## 10. CI
|
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Docs push only. Run number and task id in the session summary. **`--no-verify` not used.**
|
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## 11. Observations — noticed, NOT acted on
|
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1. **The claim gate is an undocumented first step of every recovery.** Before a customer can do
|
||||
anything on a rebuilt box — including recovering their backups — they must re-claim it.
|
||||
2. **`--print-reset-code` output needs parsing care**: the captured value was 73 characters, i.e. more
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||||
than the code itself. Not chased; the claim was abandoned when the session stopped.
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||||
3. **A same-day re-run replaces the day's snapshot.** Worth knowing before designing any drill that
|
||||
depends on a specific snapshot surviving.
|
||||
4. **The hub's ClusterIP is not reachable from DooPlex's host network** — the operator UI needs a
|
||||
`kubectl port-forward`. The `curl -u :$HUB_PW` recipe in memory omits that.
|
||||
@@ -36,25 +36,21 @@ Proven end to end on real hardware.
|
||||
the old backups stay recoverable. Both keys are now kept. **What this cannot undo:** anything
|
||||
superseded before today is gone for good, which includes both demo machines' pre-4-August keys — so
|
||||
those 51 orphaned backups were beyond reach even if the recovery codes had been kept. *(R-198)*
|
||||
- *(largely fixed 4 Aug)* ~~Nothing in the recovery path has ever been performed.~~ **The key now
|
||||
demonstrably comes back — measured on a real machine this evening.** demo-felhom fetched its own
|
||||
sealed package from the hub with its own credential, opened it with the recovery code you saved, and
|
||||
the backup key that came out was **identical, character for character, to the one the machine is
|
||||
using** — and to the fingerprint the hub had recorded separately. Three independent sources agreeing.
|
||||
A deliberately wrong code, tried five minutes earlier, was refused outright and wrote nothing.
|
||||
**What is still NOT done, and it is the half that matters to a customer:** nothing yet *puts the
|
||||
recovered key back*, reopens the old backup store with it, or **restores a single file**. Today
|
||||
proves the key survives and returns; it does not prove the backups do. *(R-199 closed; R-200 half;
|
||||
R-201 open)*
|
||||
- *(fixed 4 Aug)* ~~A backup reported success while leaving out a folder the customer was told is
|
||||
protected.~~ **Both halves fixed the same day.** The app was writing to one folder and the backup was
|
||||
looking in another — one directory apart, on machines whose apps live on the system disk. They now
|
||||
resolve to the same place, from a single piece of code instead of the three near-copies that had
|
||||
quietly drifted. **And a backup that cannot capture a folder marked essential no longer reports
|
||||
success**: it reports *Hiányos* (incomplete), names the app and the folders, and tells you — while
|
||||
still recording what it genuinely did capture, because half a backup is not no backup. Proved on the
|
||||
HP machine by listing the backup's own contents and finding the marked file there by name and size —
|
||||
not by trusting a green tick. *(R-203)*
|
||||
- **THE BACKUP KEY COMES BACK AFTER A REBUILD — proved on real hardware last night.** We destroyed the
|
||||
HP machine's controller data on purpose, deleted the marked file from its disk, and then used the
|
||||
recovery code you saved. The key that came out was **identical, character for character**, to the one
|
||||
the machine had been using — and to the fingerprint the hub had recorded separately. It installed
|
||||
cleanly onto the empty machine. Nothing re-sealed itself in the meantime, so the sealed package
|
||||
survived the rebuild untouched. *(R-201)*
|
||||
- **But the machine still could not use it, and that is the night's real finding.** Three things stand
|
||||
between a recovered key and a restored file, and each one is now measured rather than guessed:
|
||||
**(1)** a rebuilt machine cannot set up its off-site connection at all — its one-time password was
|
||||
spent by the machine it replaced; **(2)** the fix for that (re-issuing the credential) marks the
|
||||
sealed package "stale" even though the key never changed, and a stale package blocks every off-site
|
||||
backup; **(3)** the only documented way to clear that is to make a new recovery code — **which
|
||||
replaces the sealed package and destroys the key we just recovered.** And before any of it, the
|
||||
rebuilt machine is unclaimed, so nothing on its dashboard responds until the customer claims it
|
||||
again — a step written down nowhere. **The key comes back and cannot be used.** *(R-204)*
|
||||
- **One screen still tells the customer something we cannot yet promise.** The „elárvult tároló" card
|
||||
says the old backups may later be restorable with the matching recovery code. From today that is true
|
||||
for machines that re-seal from now on and **false for anything already orphaned** — and the machine
|
||||
@@ -103,7 +99,10 @@ Proven end to end on real hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
## What we're working on
|
||||
|
||||
- **Now:** the wipe-and-restore proof, which is **unblocked and staged**. The marked file now lands in
|
||||
- **Now:** finishing the proof — it is about five minutes with you present. The HP machine is sitting
|
||||
mid-drill with the recovered key already on it; it needs re-claiming and one setting confirmed, then
|
||||
the backup runs and the file is restored. **Do not let it make a new recovery code** — that would
|
||||
destroy the key we recovered. Then the deeper fix for the wall above. The marked file now lands in
|
||||
the off-site backup, so there is finally something to recover. Everything else is already in place on
|
||||
the HP machine — the recovery code you saved, a working off-site store, the app and the file. Nothing
|
||||
has been wiped; that step waits for your go-ahead at a marked stop point. Both honesty fixes shipped today: a changed backup key now
|
||||
@@ -158,7 +157,12 @@ Proven end to end on real hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
## Changed since last update
|
||||
|
||||
- **2026-08-04 (latest)** — **Fixed the folder-left-out-of-the-backup problem, both halves.** The app
|
||||
- **2026-08-04 (night)** — **Wiped the HP machine on purpose and got the backup key back with your
|
||||
recovery code — identical, character for character.** First time that has ever been done. The drill
|
||||
then stopped short of restoring the file, at a wall worth more than the last step: the key comes back
|
||||
but cannot be used without an act that destroys it. The machine is up, its apps are serving, and it
|
||||
is five minutes from finished. *(R-201, R-204)*
|
||||
- **2026-08-04 (evening)** — **Fixed the folder-left-out-of-the-backup problem, both halves.** The app
|
||||
and its backup now look in the same directory, and a backup that misses a folder marked essential
|
||||
reports *incomplete* instead of success. Proved by listing the backup's own contents and finding the
|
||||
marked file. The wipe-and-restore proof is unblocked. *(R-203, R-201)*
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
| **The offsite repository password can be RECOVERED from the sealed escrow with the customer's recovery code** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.195.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04)** | On demo-felhom, through the real endpoints end to end: the box fetched its own sealed blob from the hub with its own per-host credential (hub log: *escrow blob SERVED … 572 opaque bytes, self_scope=true*), the agent unsealed it with the customer's recovery code, and the extracted repository password's sha256 was **byte-identical** to the one on disk — `c60c8bc737a6…`, which is ALSO the hash the hub had independently stored, so three sources agree. Five minutes earlier the same path with a WRONG code failed closed at age's KDF with nothing written, which proves links 6 and 7 ran independently of the success. R was searched for afterwards and found in 0 log lines and 0 files, with a positive control confirming the search would have found it. Evidence: per-repo CHANGELOGs; `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3 links 6–8 | **WHAT THIS ROW DOES NOT CLAIM, stated because the previous over-claim here was struck out four hours earlier.** It covers the KEY, not the DATA. **R-199 BACK-POINTER (omitted when this row was written): the recovery chain's link inventory and the per-link status live in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3; links 1–8 are walked, 9–11 are not.** **Re-confirmed 2026-08-04 evening by an attempt to prove the DATA half:** the R-201 drill was prepared on demo-hp and **halted before the wipe** — the sentinel file was not in the off-site snapshot (R-203), so the wipe would have destroyed it and proven nothing. **No file has still ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (`audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md`). The install half of the chain (controller v0.196.0 `--recover-offsite-install`, R-200) is likewise unit-proven only — it has never run against a live recovery. A recovered password has never been **installed** (the diagnostic compares and refuses to write, by design), no existing repository has ever been **reopened** under one, and **no file has ever been restored** from an off-site history via a recovered key. Links 9–11 of the chain are open (R-200's remaining half, R-201). The proof also used a box whose local key still exists — the rebuilt-box case, where there is nothing to compare against, is exactly what the drill covers and it has not run || DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21) | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 | Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected.) **⚠ The candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE is WITHDRAWN — the 2026-07-18 rehearsal produced a live counter-example (R-39).** On the reborn N100 the descriptor auto-provisioned and the agent reported `converged state=applied` (16:45:53), yet **the storage is dead**: `pvesm status` → `felhom-pbs: error fetching datastores - 401 Unauthorized` / `inactive`, and a direct probe with the stored credential returns **401 on every endpoint including `/version`** while the WG transport is healthy (handshake 9 s, 27.9 ms RTT) — i.e. authentication failure, not ACL scope. Root cause in the evidence: **the hub minted a SECOND token secret at 16:47:52, two minutes after the agent had applied the first, and `consumed_at` is still NULL**; the converged state machine will not re-apply, and the agent's 15-minute verify loop **cannot even read the credential to notice** (`open /etc/pve/priv/storage/felhom-pbs.pw: permission denied` — non-root agent reading a file it writes through a root wrapper). A tier that reports `applied` while silently unable to authenticate is exactly the shape that must not carry a PROVEN-LIVE badge. See `tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` F2 and `pbs-dr-state.txt`. **agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17:** the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick `pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, `pvesm status felhom-offsite`=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot `pveum` grant **2026-07-21 — the R-39 fleet fix SHIPPED (hub v0.68.0 + agent v0.91.2), closing the self-heal chain end to end.** The three defects that let a box be `applied` and dead simultaneously are each addressed: the hub stamps a monotonic `secret_generation` into the descriptor so a credential re-key finally MOVES the content hash the agent Line truncated
|
||||
|
||||
| **The offsite repository key is recoverable AFTER A REAL REBUILD — and cannot yet be USED without an operator act that destroys it** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE for the KEY (2026-08-04 night); the RESTORE is still unproven** | demo-hp's controller data volume was destroyed and the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced `8a9e33aa4da6…` — **byte-identical** to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to the hub's independent record — and installed cleanly on the bare box. `identity_blob` was unchanged across the wipe (572 B, `updated_at` still 11:11:37). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §2 | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM, and the gap is the point.** No file has been restored: the drill stopped at a wall (**R-204**). A rebuilt box (a) cannot configure its off-site tier — the one-time password was consumed by its predecessor (R-193); (b) the Re-issue that fixes that marks the escrow stale although the key is unchanged (R-196), which gates every off-site run; (c) the only documented way to clear that is a ceremony, **which supersedes the identity blob and destroys the recovered key**; and (d) the box is unclaimed, so no controller endpoint responds until the customer re-claims — a step in no design document. **The key comes back; the repository still cannot be opened with it.** |
|
||||
| **Off-site app-data capture covers the paths an app declares MANDATORY — on BOTH drive layouts** | controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04) — and this row was OPTIMISTIC before it** | On demo-hp, an app on the **system-data fallback** bound `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` while the capture set looked in `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books`: the declared-mandatory directory was in **no** snapshot and the run reported `ok` (R-203). After v0.197.0 the capture log reads `1 mandatory path(s)` and the file is **listed inside the snapshot** — `restic ls -l latest --tag calibre-web` → `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt`. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md` §2 and the v0.197.0 CHANGELOG | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM.** It covers CAPTURE, not RESTORE: **no file has ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (R-201, ready to resume). It also does not claim the enrolled-drive layout was ever wrong — it was not, which is precisely why this survived. And a run that still misses a mandatory directory now reports **`incomplete`** rather than `ok`, so this row's guarantee is one the status can express || **Recurring offsite (PBS) whole-guest backups actually LAND, and RESTORE** — local daily + offsite weekly as scheduled work | agent v0.97–0.103, controller v0.174/0.175, hub v0.76.0, host-install 1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-26)** | `audits/SPIKE-r82-phase0-2026-07-26.md`; per-repo CHANGELOGs/REPORTs. **Restore round-trip on demo-hp:** `--selftest=restore-test` against `felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T15:42:42Z` → `pass:true`, `verified:"boot+running"`, **`mount_parity:"ok"`** (`mp0=/var/lib/docker 50G`, `mp1=/mnt/sys_drive 20G`, mp8/mp9 throwaway stand-ins for the archived binds), `source_tier:"pbs"`, 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, scratch band clean afterwards and the live guest untouched. | **This row is distinct from the DR-tier row above, which proves ACTIVATION, not ARRIVAL.** That tier was PROVEN-LIVE as `applied` since 2026-07-21 while demo-felhom held ONE snapshot (a healing artifact) and demo-hp held **zero, ever** — "applied and empty", the R-39 shape one level quieter. **What earns PROVEN-LIVE here:** (a) demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace); (b) it **restores into a bootable, mount-complete guest** — `mount_parity` is the non-hollow half, since a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume; (c) **the multi-tier quiesce ran through the real UI endpoint** (`POST /api/guest-backup/trigger`, authed+CSRF) and produced **exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it** — `quiescing 1 stack(s)` 17:01:39 → local done 17:02:56 *"next tier may start (app still quiesced)"* → felhom-pbs snapshotted 17:03:06 → `unquiescing` 17:03:06. **App downtime 1m27s for both tiers**, and the app came back healthy. **Known gaps, recorded not hidden:** the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the PRIMARY tier, so the offsite tier is never AUTOMATICALLY restore-tested (the manual/selftest path is proven, the unattended one is not); the hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE rather than a reported cadence; the installer-default fleet flip awaits a full weekly cycle. → **R-82** |
|
||||
| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **R-189 (agent v0.122.0, 2026-08-03) closed the reporting half of this row, and it was a REAL gap in the evidence path:** the proof above reached the hub only because no restart intervened — `restore_tests[]` came solely from an in-memory store, so the 15:25:14 PASS was in fact LOST when the agent restarted 2 m 43 s later for a deploy (`0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports). Under per-archive due-ness the box would not have repeated the work for a week. The persisted per-tier proof (with the archive, and now the tier) is merged into the report, so a proof survives a restart — one entry per tier, newest wins, and a record that cannot be described honestly is not emitted. **THE HOST TIER'S HALF OF THIS ROW WAS OPTIMISTIC UNTIL 2026-08-03, and it is worth saying plainly.** Every live restore-test cited here is on the OFFSITE tier. The HOST tier was not merely unproven on demo-felhom — it was **unprovable**, and on demo-hp equally: the agent's token had no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, the storage both boxes configure as `local_backup_target`, so the content API answered `{"data":[]}` through the token while root listed three archives. The scheduler skipped it as *"no settled archive yet"* — which is exactly what a brand-new tier reports — so nothing ever said so (**R-185**). **CLOSED 2026-08-03 — agent v0.123.0 + installer 1.24.0.** The grant is applied on both demo boxes (the token now lists 3 and 4 archives), the installer's reuse arm grants on a pre-existing target, and the agent now **asks whether it may read each tier it depends on** instead of inferring it from an empty list: a critical degraded capability naming the storage and the missing role, which the hub alerted and emailed on **while the box was still blind**. **THE HOST TIER IS NOW PROVEN-LIVE, UNATTENDED, ON BOTH DEMO BOXES (2026-08-0Line truncated
|
||||
| Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier: host delete < RESET < customer Delete): one operator action → pre-first-install; all operational state destroyed, identity + basic config survive | hub v0.61.0, felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (external teardown, incl. two real firings)** | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — two live firings, both host-delete-first, on two different customers** (`demo-vm-felhom` 15:49:57, `demo-felhom` 16:08:51): every leg `ok` (`claim`, `db_purge`, `descriptor`, `hetzner`, `pbs`), escrow acked separately, each completing in 8–9 s (`hub-state.txt` `customer_resets`). The **Hetzner sub-account destruction is now verified against the live pool box** — and produced the run's sharpest lesson: **a sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object.** Deleting it left its `/home` intact, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext under a key this same RESET had destroyed — which is why the orphan guard fired at 16:58:14 (**a finding by S7's own criterion**) and why RESET now needs a base-dir purge → **R-32**. Prior: hub v0.61.0 REPORT; **ep0 live drill 2026-07-17** (throwaway `drill-reset-01` with a real backup: deprovision `deleted:true` destroyed the namespace + backup group + token, idempotent re-run `deleted:false`, all 3 real tenants + shared user survived); red-proofs (ack-gate, partial-failure resumability) + orchestration/store/offsite/render tests | External teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST, every leg idempotent; refuses while any host row exists; separate escrow-custody ack; clears claim (fresh code next onboarding); keeps the offsite tier CHOICE, drops provisioned fields. **Live-clicked 2026-07-18** (twice, by Viktor) — this supersedes the earlier "not live-clicked / Hetzner delete unit-tested only" note. **R-25b CLOSED (hub v0.69.0, 2026-07-21):** the Danger-zone DELETE is now the guided full-teardown cascade that runs this very sequence as its middle leg — see the row below |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
|
||||
# DRILL — R-201, the night run: **THE KEY CAME BACK. The verdict was not reached.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-08-04, 21:30–22:40 · **Box:** `demo-hp` (Tier 0) · **Unattended, by operator decision.**
|
||||
**The wipe happened.** The box is up, its apps are serving, and it is left mid-drill by deliberate
|
||||
choice — see §7 for the exact state and the one command that resumes it.
|
||||
|
||||
> **THE RESULT, first.** A real rebuild was performed: the controller's data volume was destroyed and
|
||||
> the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced
|
||||
> `8a9e33aa4da6769c5aea1831f87759e10930e2ec1dea0062576484e0598d080a` — **byte-identical to the key the
|
||||
> box used before the wipe, and to the hash the hub had independently recorded.**
|
||||
>
|
||||
> **The off-site backup key is recoverable after a machine is rebuilt. That has never been shown
|
||||
> before.**
|
||||
>
|
||||
> **And the drill did not finish**, because three separate things stand between a recovered key and a
|
||||
> restored file. All three are measured below. That is the other half of the night's result, and it is
|
||||
> the half nobody knew.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. The verdict
|
||||
|
||||
**NOT REACHED.** Step 10 (restore the sentinel and compare) was not run.
|
||||
|
||||
| | |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| sentinel sha256, pre-wipe | `643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c` |
|
||||
| sentinel sha256, post-restore | **not obtained** — the restore was never reachable |
|
||||
| snapshot count at step 9 | **not obtained** — the run was refused before it started |
|
||||
|
||||
**This is not a FAIL.** A fail is "the file came back wrong" or "a fresh empty history was started".
|
||||
Neither happened, because the box never got as far as running a backup. What the night established is
|
||||
where the wall is.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. What was proven, in order, on hardware
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 6 — the wipe
|
||||
|
||||
The controller's data volume was destroyed and the bootstrap re-ran. Fresh data directory, everything
|
||||
stamped `2026-08-04 20:00:2x`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
encryption.key 32 B 2026-08-04 20:00:21 ← brand new: every pre-wipe app secret is undecryptable
|
||||
claimed = None ← the fresh-install signal
|
||||
offbox = null ← no off-site target
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Faithful to the incident, and deliberately so.** The 2026-08-03 rebuild that R-193 is filed against
|
||||
was **not** a guest reprovision — the journal shows guest 9201 running continuously through that
|
||||
window, with no `pct destroy`, no `pct restore` and no `--selftest=provision`. What changed was the
|
||||
controller and its data volume. Reproducing *that* is what the drill needs; a guest destroy plus an
|
||||
unrehearsed provisioning chain, improvised unattended, is what §8.10 exists to prevent.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 7 — the assertion that keeps recovery possible: **PASSED**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
host_escrow (demo-hp-bb76ea), AFTER the wipe:
|
||||
identity_blob = 572 bytes ← unchanged
|
||||
restic_pw_sha256 = 8a9e33aa4da6… ← unchanged
|
||||
updated_at = 2026-08-04 11:11:37 ← unchanged; nothing re-escrowed
|
||||
stale_at = NULL
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**No ceremony was run and nothing re-escrowed itself.** The sealed key survived the rebuild untouched.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 8 — **THE KEY CAME BACK**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
=== offsite key recovery check (R-200) — compares, never installs ===
|
||||
recovered sha256: 8a9e33aa4da6769c5aea1831f87759e10930e2ec1dea0062576484e0598d080a
|
||||
[FAIL] there is no repository password on this box to compare against
|
||||
(the recovery itself SUCCEEDED — this box simply has no local key. That is the
|
||||
rebuilt-box shape, where the next step is to INSTALL rather than compare.)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Exit 1 is **correct and designed**: there was nothing to compare against, because the wipe removed it.
|
||||
The recovered hash matches the pre-wipe on-disk key and the hub's own record — three independent
|
||||
sources agreeing, one of them recovered through the full chain (hub → agent → unseal → extract) on a
|
||||
box that had just lost everything it knew.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 9a — installed cleanly
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
=== offsite key recovery INSTALL (R-200) ===
|
||||
on-disk sha256: (none — this box has no repository password)
|
||||
recovered sha256: 8a9e33aa4da6…
|
||||
[INSTALLED] the recovered repository password is in place and reads back identical.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The "installed" branch — the rebuilt-box shape v0.196.0 was written for — took its first real run.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 9b — the apply kept it
|
||||
|
||||
After the target was reconfigured, the on-disk key was still `8a9e33aa4da6…`. `WriteOffboxSecrets`
|
||||
found the file present and kept it, exactly as documented.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. The wall — three blockers, each measured
|
||||
|
||||
### (a) R-193, reconfirmed live: a rebuilt controller cannot configure its off-site tier
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[INFO] [offsite-apply] settle-gate: GO — at/above floor 0.156.0 (we are 0.197.0)
|
||||
[WARN] [offsite-apply] reconcile: offsite-apply: consume one-time password:
|
||||
no unconsumed offsite password (already consumed or none provisioned)
|
||||
(retries on next config refresh/restart)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The ledger, measured: `demo-hp` one-time secret created `07:11:51`, consumed `07:12:06` — **by the
|
||||
previous controller**. The rebuilt one has nothing to consume and retries forever. Exactly the state
|
||||
demo-hp sat in for 25 hours on 2026-08-03.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remedy:** an operator Re-issue. Performed here through the designed endpoint
|
||||
(`POST /configs/demo-hp/offsite-reissue`, HTTP 303), after which the target configured normally.
|
||||
|
||||
### (b) R-196, measured live — and it lands squarely on the recovery path
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
host_escrow (demo-hp-bb76ea), after the Re-issue:
|
||||
stale_at = 2026-08-04 20:15:49 ← set
|
||||
restic_pw_sha256 = 8a9e33aa4da6… ← UNCHANGED. The key did not move.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**The escrow was marked stale while it perfectly covers the box's current key** — the recovered one.
|
||||
That is R-196's false staleness, and here it is not a cosmetic lie: a stale escrow makes the hub
|
||||
**withhold the hash from the report ACK**, so `EscrowAutoConfirmer` can never flip `pending →
|
||||
escrowed`, and `OffboxRunnable` (`configured && escrowed`) **refuses to run any off-site backup**.
|
||||
|
||||
> **The remedy for (a) disables the recovery it was needed for.** The only documented way to clear a
|
||||
> stale escrow is a fresh ceremony — which supersedes the identity blob, i.e. **destroys the very key
|
||||
> being recovered**. Under hub v0.93.0 the old blob is now *retained*, but nothing can serve a
|
||||
> superseded blob back (R-199's inventory: the endpoint serves the CURRENT row only).
|
||||
|
||||
**Superseded rows still number 2** — no ceremony was run tonight. The key is intact.
|
||||
|
||||
### (c) The claim gate — undocumented as a recovery step
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[DEBUG] [web] claim gate: intercepting POST /backup/offbox/confirm-escrow (unclaimed)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A rebuilt box is **unclaimed** (`claimed = None`, fresh `settings.json`), and the claim gate correctly
|
||||
intercepts every non-claim route. **So no controller endpoint can be driven at all** — not the manual
|
||||
escrow confirm, not the backup trigger — until the customer re-claims the box. Both POSTs returned 302
|
||||
to the claim page and neither reached its handler; `last_run` stayed null, which is why the earlier
|
||||
reading of "the run was refused" needed this second look to be accurate.
|
||||
|
||||
This is correct behaviour and it is **not wrong** — but it is a step in the customer's recovery journey
|
||||
that appears in no design document, and it comes *before* anything else can happen.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Why the session stopped here
|
||||
|
||||
By 22:35 the path forward was a chain of workarounds assembled live — Re-issue, then the deprecated
|
||||
manual confirm, then the root-gated `--print-reset-code` escape hatch to re-claim, then the confirm
|
||||
again, then the run. Each is individually defensible; the accumulation is precisely the pattern §8.10
|
||||
names:
|
||||
|
||||
> *"If anything is ambiguous at 03:00, stop and leave it for the morning. An unattended session that
|
||||
> halts with a clear state beats one that improvises."*
|
||||
|
||||
The remaining steps need about five minutes **with a person present**. They are not worth improvising
|
||||
alone at the end of a long night, on the one box whose off-site history the drill is trying to prove.
|
||||
|
||||
**Nothing was left broken.** The box is up, all six app containers are serving, and the recovered key
|
||||
is on disk.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. §5's five conditions, as recorded before the wipe
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Condition | Evidence |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | §4 confirmed, sentinel **listed by name** | snapshot `e6132ae5` (19:36:26) — `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt` |
|
||||
| 2 | deliberate rollback archive, **verified** | `vzdump-lxc-9201-2026_08_04-21_44_24.tar.zst`, 1 606 765 083 B; **full zstd stream read OK** (4 867 573 760 B uncompressed); the sentinel confirmed **inside** it |
|
||||
| 3 | §3's option | see §6 |
|
||||
| 4 | demo-felhom untouched | `health=ok`, `escrow_state=escrowed`, not touched at any point |
|
||||
| 5 | free space | nvme-1tb 883 GB free, root 20 GB, local-lvm 34.32 % |
|
||||
|
||||
**A precondition had drifted and was repaired before the wipe, not worked around.** The staged
|
||||
snapshot no longer contained the sentinel: the afternoon's `[WARN] mandatory data path missing`
|
||||
experiment produced a *later* same-day calibre-web snapshot, and restic's `forget --keep-daily 7
|
||||
--group-by host,tags` had pruned the good one in its favour. The fixture on disk was correct, so one
|
||||
backup re-established it and it was re-verified by listing. **Lesson worth carrying: a good snapshot is
|
||||
not durable against a later bad run on the same day.**
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. §3 — the recovery code
|
||||
|
||||
**Option B as already in place, with a strict improvement: no new copy was created, so nothing needed
|
||||
shredding.**
|
||||
|
||||
The operator placed `R_DEMO-HP` in their own `~/.config/credentials` on DooPlex (mode `0600`) two
|
||||
sessions ago, deliberately, for this purpose. This session read it from there and **piped it to stdin**
|
||||
for each of the two invocations that needed it. It was never an argument, never exported, never written
|
||||
to a second file, and never logged.
|
||||
|
||||
**Nothing was shredded, and that is the point:** the operator's own permanent store is theirs, not a
|
||||
drill artefact, and destroying it would have destroyed their record. Because no additional copy was
|
||||
made, there is nothing left behind to prove gone — a stronger position than option B's
|
||||
create-then-shred.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verified afterwards** with the planted-copy positive control, exactly as on 2026-08-04 afternoon —
|
||||
see §8.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. The exact state the box is in, and how to resume
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
controller felhom-controller:0.197.0, healthy
|
||||
apps privatebin opengist calibre-web filebrowser cloudflared traefik — all serving
|
||||
claimed None ← must be re-claimed before any controller endpoint responds
|
||||
escrow_state pending ← R-196: the Re-issue marked the escrow stale
|
||||
repo key 8a9e33aa4da6… ← THE RECOVERED KEY, on disk
|
||||
sentinel absent from disk (deliberately) — present in off-site snapshot e6132ae5
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**To resume (operator present, ~5 minutes):**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Re-claim the box — `docker exec felhom-controller /usr/local/bin/felhom-controller
|
||||
--print-reset-code`, then the claim page.
|
||||
2. Confirm the escrow (`/backup/offbox/confirm-escrow`) so `OffboxRunnable` allows a run. **Do NOT run
|
||||
a new ceremony** — it would supersede the identity blob and destroy the key under test.
|
||||
3. Run an off-site backup. **The observable is whether the repository OPENS** — and whether the
|
||||
pre-wipe snapshot `e6132ae5` still exists with the sentinel in it. A same-day `forget` keeps one
|
||||
snapshot per tag, so the *count* is a poor discriminator; the surviving history is the real one.
|
||||
4. Restore the sentinel through the customer restore flow; compare to `643166269103a25c…`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Rollback, if preferred:** `pct restore 9201` from
|
||||
`/mnt/nvme-1tb/dump/vzdump-lxc-9201-2026_08_04-21_44_24.tar.zst` — verified by a full read before the
|
||||
wipe. It returns the box to its pre-wipe state and voids the remaining drill.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. R persisted nowhere — searched, with a positive control
|
||||
|
||||
Swept the agent journal, the controller container log, and `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/var/lib/felhom-agent`,
|
||||
`/root` on demo-hp for the recovery code: **0 hits**, and **0** leftover `felhom-idesc-*` unseal
|
||||
staging directories. A planted copy was found by the same sweep (**1**) and not found after shredding
|
||||
(**0**), so the instrument is shown sensitive rather than assumed to be.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Teardown — three layers
|
||||
|
||||
| layer | state |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| the guest | **Nothing torn down.** The wipe is the evidence; the apps are serving; the recovered key is in place. The scratch band is empty — no restore-test guest was created tonight. |
|
||||
| the host | `vzdump` snapshot LVs removed cleanly by the archive job (`snap_vm-9201-disk-0/1_vzdump` both released). One new archive, 1.6 GB, on `nvme-1tb` (883 GB free). Nothing deleted. |
|
||||
| the hub | **No new customer records.** `demo-hp` is the same customer row throughout — the rebuild was a controller-data wipe, not a re-enrolment, so nothing accumulated. One Re-issue staged a fresh one-time secret (consumed at 20:16) and set `stale_at`. The two superseded escrow rows are **unchanged** — no ceremony ran. |
|
||||
|
||||
**Nothing was deleted on the storage endpoint**, including the ~1.2 GB of previously-orphaned
|
||||
ciphertext. Ruled, still owed, and deliberately not ridden along with a drill.
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Part 2 — not run, and why
|
||||
|
||||
Its gate is *"the drill PASSED"*. It did not — the verdict was not reached. Running a second wipe on a
|
||||
box whose first result is incomplete would have destroyed the staged state that makes the first one
|
||||
finishable in five minutes. **R-198's retention therefore remains unit-proven only**, unchanged from
|
||||
this morning.
|
||||
@@ -71,14 +71,15 @@ file with it.**
|
||||
| **R-191** | **Every weekly offsite backup UPLOADS successfully and then FAILS the job on a prune the box is deliberately not allowed to do — on both demo boxes.** Measured on demo-felhom 2026-08-04 06:49–06:53: the upload completed (223 s, 629 MiB of 1.874 GiB, **67.2 % reused incrementally**), then `ERROR: prune 'ct/9201': proxmox-backup-client failed: Error: permission check failed - missing Datastore.Modify\|Datastore.Prune on /datastore/felhom-offsite/demo-felhom` → `ERROR: Backup of VM 9201 failed - error pruning backups` → `TASK ERROR: job errors`. The hub raised `whole_guest_backup_failed` | **CLOSED — SHIPPED 2026-08-04** (installer **1.25.0**; both live boxes corrected) | — | **This is R-89's rule not reaching the config.** R-89 moved PBS pruning SERVER-SIDE — *"boxes set `keep_last: 0`, ep0 runs prune jobs; box tokens stay write-only, never widen the grant"*. The token behaves exactly as designed: it refuses. But **both** demo boxes still arm the offsite tier with `keep_last=2 prune_pbs_allowed=true` (`backup_targets: [{target_id: felhom-pbs, cadence_seconds: 604800, keep_last: 2}]`), so every run asks for a prune that must fail. **The data is SAFE and that is why this is not a P1:** the snapshot lands before the prune is attempted; what is wrong is the job's VERDICT and the weekly operator e-mail it produces. **But it is corrosive in the specific way this project keeps finding:** a backup that reports FAILED while succeeding trains the operator to discount `whole_guest_backup_failed`, which is the same alert that would carry a real one — and it is exactly the failure the R-100 corollary warns about, an alarm whose text is true and whose trigger is not the thing you would act on. **Fix is one config line per box** (`keep_last: 0` on the PBS tier) plus whatever writes it on a fresh install; **deliberately NOT applied in this session** — the session was a runbook with an explicit "change nothing, and if a change appears necessary, stop and report" rule, and a retention field on a live backup tier is not a change to slip into an observation run. **Check before fixing:** whether ep0's prune jobs actually cover these two namespaces, or the snapshots simply accumulate once the box stops asking **THE GATE WAS RUN FIRST, AND IT MATTERED.** Before disabling anything, ep0 was read (read-only, Tier 2): prune jobs `prune-demo-felhom` and `prune-demo-hp` exist on datastore `felhom-offsite`, one per namespace, `schedule 03:30`, `keep-last 2`, comment *"R-82 retention keep-last=2, server-side (box tokens are write-only)"* — and they have run **every day since 2026-07-27: 18 tasks, all `status=OK`**. The newest task log reads `retention options: --ns demo-felhom --max-depth 0 --keep-last 2` / `keep ct/9201/2026-07-27…` / `keep ct/9201/2026-07-28…` / `TASK OK`. Retention happens, and it happens there. **A METHODOLOGICAL WARNING WORTH MORE THAN THE FIX.** Three separate queries said the OPPOSITE — *no prune jobs have ever run* — and **all three were broken instruments**: `worker-type` where the field is `worker_type`; the value `prune` where the worker type is `prunejob`; and `journalctl -u proxmox-backup` where the unit is `proxmox-backup-proxy`. A fourth reading (3 snapshots under keep-last 2) was mis-framed by CC and self-corrected — the third snapshot had landed AFTER that day's 03:30 window. Acting on any of them would have disabled the only pruning ATTEMPT while reporting that nothing prunes: a weekly false alarm traded for unbounded growth on the protected endpoint, invisible for months. **The gate is what caught it, and only because it demanded evidence rather than a verdict.** **Shipped:** installer **1.25.0** writes `keep_last: 0` on the offsite tier (the agent's existing guard `allowPBSPrune = !primary && keep_last > 0` already reads that as *never prune from the box* — no agent change), the justifying paragraph is rewritten to say where retention lives and cite R-89, and `hostinstall_gates.py` asserts it (red-proved: pinning `keep_last: 2` back fails the gate). **Both live boxes corrected in their own config** — `backup tier armed target=felhom-pbs … keep_last=0 … prune_pbs_allowed=false` on demo-felhom and demo-hp, with the local tier untouched at `keep_last=3`. Served over HTTPS at `1.25.0` with `"keep_last":0` in the served bytes. **STILL TO OBSERVE:** the next weekly offsite run completing OK end-to-end. The change removes the failing step; the *schedule* proving it is next week's event, and this row should carry that line when it happens. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-194** | **PVE's permission cache delays every grant-state verdict by an unknown amount, so "the agent can read it" and "the ACL exists" are not the same measurement.** Observed twice while validating R-190's self-repair on demo-felhom 2026-08-04: both ACL rows for `/storage/felhom-backup` were deleted, and `GET /access/permissions` continued to report `Datastore.AllocateSpace` present — for **~40 s** in one run and **~16 minutes** in another. During that window the capability probe reads healthy and the self-repair does not fire | **OPEN** | — | **Why it matters beyond the delay:** it puts a floor under how fast a lost grant can be noticed, it makes any single permission read a lagging indicator, and — the interesting part — **it is a candidate contributor to R-190's own timeline**: a grant removed at an unknown moment could keep working until a cache expiry, which is exactly the shape of *worked at 04:44, refused at 09:24*. That does not explain what removed it, but it may explain when the refusal SURFACED, and the two have been treated as the same instant. **Not a defect in our code** — it is PVE behaviour, and the mitigation already tolerates it (the repair fires on the next probe after the cache clears). **What is worth deciding:** whether the store-grant probe should ALSO consult the storage content listing as a second signal, since that appeared to reflect the loss immediately (`{"data":[]}` while the permission read still said present) — two signals disagreeing is itself information, and today only one of them is read | CC |
|
||||
| **R-195** | ~~**A customer with no machine ever bound e-mailed an `expected_dbdump_missed` ERROR every morning.** `david` — a real prospective customer whose record was created 2026-08-01 16:51:49 with **hosts=0, host_deletions=0, host_reports=0, reports=0** — raised the alarm at 03:00 UTC on 08-02, 08-03 and 08-04~~ | **SHIPPED** (hub **v0.92.0**, 2026-08-04) | — | **The mechanism, and it is the interesting half: the skip that protects every other silent customer is keyed off having reported at least once.** `CheckBackupDeadlines`' down-skip reads `StalenessChecker.GetState()`, whose map is seeded from `store.GetCustomers()` — a query **over the `reports` table**. A customer with zero reports appears in no row, gets no state, and `GetState()` returns `""` rather than `"down"`. The skip therefore misses exactly the customer it would most obviously cover. (Corroborated live: `peti-felhom` is active with a host deleted 2026-07-15 and **does not** alarm — it has 482 old reports, so it is `down` and skipped.) The backup half was already safe (`reportJSON == ""` → skip); the DB-dump half had no guard at all. **Fix:** `store.HasEverBoundHost(customerID)` = a live `hosts` row **OR** a `host_deletions` tombstone, consulted once per customer at the top of the deadline loop. **The discriminator is deliberately "was a host EVER bound", NOT "has a report arrived"** — a box that was installed and went silent is a real fault and must keep alarming; that is the case the change could break and it has its own test. Fail-**open** on a read error (an unreadable binding must never SUPPRESS a real alarm), and the deferral is LOGGED with its own counter (the v0.73.0 Part-7 precedent: a quiet check must not look like a check that did not run). The anchored-verdict structure is untouched. **Red-proof observed:** deleting the guard fails `TestCheckBackupDeadlines_NeverBoundHost_Silent` with `got [expected_dbdump_missed]` — verbatim the event `david` sent three mornings running. `david`'s record was NOT modified; the record was correct and the alarm was what was wrong | — |
|
||||
| **R-196** | **`escrow_stale` is wired to the ONE path that does not change the repo password, and absent from the path that does.** `ReissueCredentials` (`hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go:150-228`) resets **only** the Hetzner sub-account/box password and stages a fresh one-time secret — it contains no reference to a restic password and *cannot*, since that password is generated on the box and never leaves it except into the R-wrapped escrow. Yet it calls `MarkEscrowStale` on the stated grounds that *"the restic repo password just changed"* (`offsite.go:198-201`), and the same false premise is repeated at `api/handler.go:1067-1069` and in R-39's record | **COMMENTS CORRECTED** (hub **v0.93.0**); **the BEHAVIOUR stays OPEN** | — | **This is the EIGHTH entry in `CLAUDE.md`'s table of comments asserting a guarantee the code does not provide** — and the first where the comment factually describes a *different function*. It survived because its EFFECT (a stale escrow) is real, so nobody checked its CAUSE. **The live defect, not a documentation nit:** on the ordinary Re-issue shape (a consumed-but-failed install on a box that still holds its `repo_password` file) the box re-applies, `WriteOffboxSecrets` finds the file present and **keeps it**, the repo password is unchanged — and the hub has told the customer in Hungarian that their recovery escrow is stale and asked them to re-run the ceremony. **A false staleness alarm and an unnecessary ceremony.** **The inverse is the worse half and is R-193's:** demo-felhom's repo password *did* change on 2026-08-03 with **no Re-issue anywhere in its history** (its only `escrow_stale`/`offsite_reissued` pair is dated 2026-07-21 08:29:29) and therefore **nothing marked its escrow stale for 13 h**. **Fix shape:** mark the escrow stale on the evidence that it IS stale — a changed `restic_pw_sha256` (→ R-197) — not on a Re-issue; and correct all three comments in the same commit. **Not established, so not asserted:** whether the 2026-07-21 Re-issue on demo-felhom re-sealed an unchanged password (the predicted false-staleness shape) — `host_escrow_superseded` holds only two rows in the whole DB, both from 2026-08-04, so the prior generation is not retained. Source: `audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md` Q4 **FIVE instances, not three** — the spec expected three and named two; a census found five: `offsite/offsite.go` (the `MarkEscrowStale` justification), `api/handler.go` (the F3 re-enroll comment) and **three in `store/store.go`** (the `stale_at` ALTER comment, the `MarkEscrowStale` doc comment, and `EscrowStatus.Stale`). All five now state what the code does, name the correction, and cite the recon; the staleness mark is documented as **precautionary** (the box's re-apply may mint a fresh repository password — the guest-rebuild shape) rather than evidential, with R-197's measured signal named as the evidential one. **THE BEHAVIOUR IS UNCHANGED AND THIS ROW STAYS OPEN:** on the ordinary re-issue shape — a box that still holds its `repo_password` file — the password does not change and the hub still marks a healthy escrow stale and asks the customer for an unnecessary ceremony. That is a behaviour change and must not ride a comment-correction release; it is also now **more** consequential than when filed, because under R-198 an unnecessary ceremony is no longer harmless bookkeeping — it supersedes a blob. Fix shape unchanged: mark stale on the evidence that it IS stale (R-197's hash comparison), not on a re-issue. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-196** | **`escrow_stale` is wired to the ONE path that does not change the repo password, and absent from the path that does.** `ReissueCredentials` (`hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go:150-228`) resets **only** the Hetzner sub-account/box password and stages a fresh one-time secret — it contains no reference to a restic password and *cannot*, since that password is generated on the box and never leaves it except into the R-wrapped escrow. Yet it calls `MarkEscrowStale` on the stated grounds that *"the restic repo password just changed"* (`offsite.go:198-201`), and the same false premise is repeated at `api/handler.go:1067-1069` and in R-39's record | **OPEN — and it is now the blocker on the recovery path, not a documentation nit** | — | **This is the EIGHTH entry in `CLAUDE.md`'s table of comments asserting a guarantee the code does not provide** — and the first where the comment factually describes a *different function*. It survived because its EFFECT (a stale escrow) is real, so nobody checked its CAUSE. **The live defect, not a documentation nit:** on the ordinary Re-issue shape (a consumed-but-failed install on a box that still holds its `repo_password` file) the box re-applies, `WriteOffboxSecrets` finds the file present and **keeps it**, the repo password is unchanged — and the hub has told the customer in Hungarian that their recovery escrow is stale and asked them to re-run the ceremony. **A false staleness alarm and an unnecessary ceremony.** **The inverse is the worse half and is R-193's:** demo-felhom's repo password *did* change on 2026-08-03 with **no Re-issue anywhere in its history** (its only `escrow_stale`/`offsite_reissued` pair is dated 2026-07-21 08:29:29) and therefore **nothing marked its escrow stale for 13 h**. **Fix shape:** mark the escrow stale on the evidence that it IS stale — a changed `restic_pw_sha256` (→ R-197) — not on a Re-issue; and correct all three comments in the same commit. **Not established, so not asserted:** whether the 2026-07-21 Re-issue on demo-felhom re-sealed an unchanged password (the predicted false-staleness shape) — `host_escrow_superseded` holds only two rows in the whole DB, both from 2026-08-04, so the prior generation is not retained. Source: `audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md` Q4 **FIVE instances, not three** — the spec expected three and named two; a census found five: `offsite/offsite.go` (the `MarkEscrowStale` justification), `api/handler.go` (the F3 re-enroll comment) and **three in `store/store.go`** (the `stale_at` ALTER comment, the `MarkEscrowStale` doc comment, and `EscrowStatus.Stale`). All five now state what the code does, name the correction, and cite the recon; the staleness mark is documented as **precautionary** (the box's re-apply may mint a fresh repository password — the guest-rebuild shape) rather than evidential, with R-197's measured signal named as the evidential one. **THE BEHAVIOUR IS UNCHANGED AND THIS ROW STAYS OPEN:** on the ordinary re-issue shape — a box that still holds its `repo_password` file — the password does not change and the hub still marks a healthy escrow stale and asks the customer for an unnecessary ceremony. That is a behaviour change and must not ride a comment-correction release; it is also now **more** consequential than when filed, because under R-198 an unnecessary ceremony is no longer harmless bookkeeping — it supersedes a blob. Fix shape unchanged: mark stale on the evidence that it IS stale (R-197's hash comparison), not on a re-issue. **MEASURED LIVE 2026-08-04 night, in the flow where it does real damage.** After the Re-issue a rebuilt box needs to configure its off-site tier, `stale_at` was set at `2026-08-04 20:15:49` **while `restic_pw_sha256` was unchanged** — the escrow perfectly covered the box's current (recovered) key. The consequence is not cosmetic: a stale escrow makes the hub withhold the hash from the ACK, `EscrowAutoConfirmer` can never flip `pending → escrowed`, and `OffboxRunnable` refuses every off-site run. **The only documented way out is a fresh ceremony, which supersedes the identity blob and destroys the key being recovered.** This row's fix — mark the escrow stale on the evidence that it IS stale (a changed `restic_pw_sha256`, R-197's comparison), not on a Re-issue — is now on the critical path for R-201/R-204, not a tidy-up. Full chain: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §3(b) | CC |
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| **R-197** | **The hub holds both halves of the evidence that a box's offsite DATA key changed, and reads neither.** `restic_pw_sha256` is stored on `host_escrow` and carried to `host_escrow_superseded` on every re-escrow. Comparing the two is what let this spike answer its hardest question in one query — and **nothing in the hub does it** | **SHIPPED** (hub **v0.93.0**, 2026-08-04) | — | **Why this is the cheapest real fix on the table.** A changed repo password means the previous offsite repository is now unopenable by the box, i.e. the customer's off-site history is orphaned. That is the single most consequential state change in the backup system, it is **already fully observable from data the hub owns**, and today it produces **no event, no e-mail, no card and no log line** — demo-felhom's went unremarked for 13 hours and would have gone unremarked indefinitely had this spike not run. **Two-line verdict:** on `SaveHostEscrow`, if the incoming `restic_pw_sha256` differs from the row being superseded, emit a distinct operator event naming the orphaned generation. **Deliberately an EVENT, not a heal** — nothing should act on this automatically until R-193's (c)-vs-accept decision is taken; the point is that the operator learns on the day. **Pair with R-196**, which is the same signal aimed at the right trigger. **Generalises past this row:** *a comparison the system could be making from data it already stores, and is not, is a silence with no cost of entry* — cf. R-190's store-grant probe, where the state was read and the TRANSITION was not. Source: `audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md` Q8 option (d) **SHIPPED.** `SaveHostEscrow` returns the hash it replaced; `handleHostEscrowPut` raises **`offsite_repo_key_changed`** when both hashes are known and differ. **Edge-triggered** (once per supersession, never per report — the dispatcher owns cooldown), **operator-only** (registered in `notify.operatorOnlyEvents` in the same commit that mints the type, because a missing `customerMessages` entry is NOT a block — the v0.78.0 defect), and **no hash value travels** in the message or the details. The in-between shapes (a first-ever hash, a hash-less supersession) are LOGGED rather than dropped, so *"we chose not to alarm"* and *"the check did not run"* never look identical. **Severity = warning, chosen for the world v0.93.0 creates:** before R-198 a changed key meant the previous history was unopenable by anyone ever, which would have argued for `error`; from v0.93.0 the superseding ceremony retains the old identity blob, so the fact is *"this customer's off-site history now depends on an older recovery code"* — operator-actionable, not a loss. `warning` also routes (the dispatcher treats `info` as an intentional non-notify). Driven through the real endpoint in test, not by calling the emitter. **Red-proof observed:** removing the comparison from the escrow PUT → the changed-key scenario fails with *"the repository key demonstrably changed and NO signal was raised"* while the unchanged-key scenario still passes. | CC |
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| **R-198** | **The hub's superseded-escrow retention does NOT retain the offsite repository password — and the ceremony the system tells the customer to run is what destroys the last copy.** `host_escrow_superseded` has **no `identity_blob` column**, and `demoteCurrentEscrowTx` (`hub/internal/store/store.go:2547-2556`) copies only `host_id, blob, key_fingerprint, posture, created_at, restic_pw_sha256`. `blob` is the **K-escrow** (the PBS datastore key, PBS-native scrypt); the **restic repo password lives in `identity_blob`** (`felhom-agent/internal/escrow/identity.go:34-39`, age-wrapped `IdentityBundle`). Measured live: both hosts' current rows hold `blob`=383 B **and** `identity_blob`=572 B; both superseded rows hold `blob`=383 B and nothing else | **SHIPPED** (hub **v0.93.0**, 2026-08-04) | — | **This is the NINTH entry in `CLAUDE.md`'s table of comments asserting an invariant the code does not provide, and the first that is ALSO customer-facing copy.** The claim appears three times: the schema comment (`store.go:370-375`, *"so the old passphrase stays customer-R-recoverable … turns the reinstall-orphan incident from 'history destroyed' into 'history recoverable'"*), the capability map's escrow row, and — in Hungarian, to the customer, on the orphan card — `controller/internal/web/templates/backups_remote.html:66,69` (*„a hozzájuk tartozó helyreállítási kóddal később visszaállíthatók lehetnek"*). **For the offsite restic repository, the incident it names, all three are false.** **Why it is worse than a missing column:** a rebuilt box lands in `EscrowState: pending`, offsite runs are blocked (`OffboxRunnable`, `offbox.go:570`), the card says „Helyreállítási kód szükséges", and the controller's own detector logs *"run the escrow ceremony"* (`report/escrow_confirm.go:100`) — so **the prescribed remedy is the act that overwrites `host_escrow.identity_blob` and loses the old password forever**. Both demo boxes crossed that line on **2026-08-04 at 07:15:36 (demo-hp) and 07:20:08 (demo-felhom)**. **This is an independent, stronger reason the 51 orphaned demo snapshots are unrecoverable than "nobody kept the recovery codes" — keeping R would not have helped.** **Fix shape (small):** add `identity_blob` to the superseded table and to `demoteCurrentEscrowTx`'s SELECT list; pin it with a test that asserts the CONSEQUENCE (a superseded row can still yield a repo password) rather than the mechanism. **Then correct all three claims in the same commit** — including the Hungarian card, which must not promise what the system cannot do. **Prerequisite for R-193's (d)-alone branch** and for the drill. Source: `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §7 **SHIPPED.** `host_escrow_superseded` gains `identity_blob` (CREATE + additive `ALTER TABLE`) and `demoteCurrentEscrowTx` carries it, so **both** callers — re-escrow and host-delete demotion — are fixed by one change to the routine its own comment calls *"THE ONE escrow row-copy routine"*. `ListSupersededEscrow` reads it back and `store.HostEscrow` gains `IdentityBlob`, so a retained blob is reachable from Go at all. The table comment now records that the ruling stated above it was not met and what that cost. **Tests assert the CONSEQUENCE, which is why the existing one stayed green:** `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded` asserted that a retained row exists carrying the old K-blob and passed throughout; `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsIdentityBlob` asserts the retained row can still yield a repository password, and pins the load-bearing ordering (the identity blob is written by `SaveHostDRBundle` AFTER `SaveHostEscrow`, so the demote sees the PREVIOUS generation — if that inverts, the retained bytes would be the new blob filed under the old hash, recoverable-looking and wrong). `TestDeleteHost_DemotesIdentityBlob` proves the shared routine through its other caller. **Red-proofs, both observed failing:** dropping `identity_blob` from the copy (production behaviour ≤ v0.92.0) fails BOTH scenarios; fixing only the re-escrow caller fails the delete scenario while the re-escrow one passes — the §8.2 mistake, demonstrated rather than asserted. **Nothing was backfillable and it was CHECKED, not deduced:** rows superseded before v0.93.0 were written without the blob and their source rows are already overwritten; the live database holds exactly 2 retained rows, both from 2026-08-04, both `identity_blob` NULL. **Who the fix protects, measured live:** 2 of 2 hosts with a current escrow carry an identity blob (`demo-felhom-8363b5`, `demo-hp-bb76ea`) — their NEXT ceremony now retains a recoverable off-site key instead of destroying one. | CC |
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| **R-198** | **The hub's superseded-escrow retention does NOT retain the offsite repository password — and the ceremony the system tells the customer to run is what destroys the last copy.** `host_escrow_superseded` has **no `identity_blob` column**, and `demoteCurrentEscrowTx` (`hub/internal/store/store.go:2547-2556`) copies only `host_id, blob, key_fingerprint, posture, created_at, restic_pw_sha256`. `blob` is the **K-escrow** (the PBS datastore key, PBS-native scrypt); the **restic repo password lives in `identity_blob`** (`felhom-agent/internal/escrow/identity.go:34-39`, age-wrapped `IdentityBundle`). Measured live: both hosts' current rows hold `blob`=383 B **and** `identity_blob`=572 B; both superseded rows hold `blob`=383 B and nothing else | **SHIPPED** (hub **v0.93.0**, 2026-08-04) | — | **This is the NINTH entry in `CLAUDE.md`'s table of comments asserting an invariant the code does not provide, and the first that is ALSO customer-facing copy.** The claim appears three times: the schema comment (`store.go:370-375`, *"so the old passphrase stays customer-R-recoverable … turns the reinstall-orphan incident from 'history destroyed' into 'history recoverable'"*), the capability map's escrow row, and — in Hungarian, to the customer, on the orphan card — `controller/internal/web/templates/backups_remote.html:66,69` (*„a hozzájuk tartozó helyreállítási kóddal később visszaállíthatók lehetnek"*). **For the offsite restic repository, the incident it names, all three are false.** **Why it is worse than a missing column:** a rebuilt box lands in `EscrowState: pending`, offsite runs are blocked (`OffboxRunnable`, `offbox.go:570`), the card says „Helyreállítási kód szükséges", and the controller's own detector logs *"run the escrow ceremony"* (`report/escrow_confirm.go:100`) — so **the prescribed remedy is the act that overwrites `host_escrow.identity_blob` and loses the old password forever**. Both demo boxes crossed that line on **2026-08-04 at 07:15:36 (demo-hp) and 07:20:08 (demo-felhom)**. **This is an independent, stronger reason the 51 orphaned demo snapshots are unrecoverable than "nobody kept the recovery codes" — keeping R would not have helped.** **Fix shape (small):** add `identity_blob` to the superseded table and to `demoteCurrentEscrowTx`'s SELECT list; pin it with a test that asserts the CONSEQUENCE (a superseded row can still yield a repo password) rather than the mechanism. **Then correct all three claims in the same commit** — including the Hungarian card, which must not promise what the system cannot do. **Prerequisite for R-193's (d)-alone branch** and for the drill. Source: `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §7 **SHIPPED.** `host_escrow_superseded` gains `identity_blob` (CREATE + additive `ALTER TABLE`) and `demoteCurrentEscrowTx` carries it, so **both** callers — re-escrow and host-delete demotion — are fixed by one change to the routine its own comment calls *"THE ONE escrow row-copy routine"*. `ListSupersededEscrow` reads it back and `store.HostEscrow` gains `IdentityBlob`, so a retained blob is reachable from Go at all. The table comment now records that the ruling stated above it was not met and what that cost. **Tests assert the CONSEQUENCE, which is why the existing one stayed green:** `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded` asserted that a retained row exists carrying the old K-blob and passed throughout; `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsIdentityBlob` asserts the retained row can still yield a repository password, and pins the load-bearing ordering (the identity blob is written by `SaveHostDRBundle` AFTER `SaveHostEscrow`, so the demote sees the PREVIOUS generation — if that inverts, the retained bytes would be the new blob filed under the old hash, recoverable-looking and wrong). `TestDeleteHost_DemotesIdentityBlob` proves the shared routine through its other caller. **Red-proofs, both observed failing:** dropping `identity_blob` from the copy (production behaviour ≤ v0.92.0) fails BOTH scenarios; fixing only the re-escrow caller fails the delete scenario while the re-escrow one passes — the §8.2 mistake, demonstrated rather than asserted. **Nothing was backfillable and it was CHECKED, not deduced:** rows superseded before v0.93.0 were written without the blob and their source rows are already overwritten; the live database holds exactly 2 retained rows, both from 2026-08-04, both `identity_blob` NULL. **Who the fix protects, measured live:** 2 of 2 hosts with a current escrow carry an identity blob (`demo-felhom-8363b5`, `demo-hp-bb76ea`) — their NEXT ceremony now retains a recoverable off-site key instead of destroying one. **STILL UNIT-PROVEN ONLY after the 2026-08-04 night drill.** Part 2 (wipe again, do NOT recover, let a ceremony seal a DIFFERENT password, then inspect the superseded row's `identity_blob`) was gated on the first drill passing and **did not run** — the verdict was not reached, and a second wipe wouldLine truncated
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| **R-199** | **The hub serves recovery blobs on two endpoints that have no client anywhere in the system.** `handleReEnroll` (`hub/internal/api/dr.go:101`) and `handleGetRestoreDirective` (`:155`) return `identity_escrow_b64` + `k_escrow_b64`, gated on operator-armed recovery mode. Census: **zero** callers in `felhom-agent` (no `ReEnroll` symbol at all; `internal/hub/client.go` reaches only `desired-state`, `wg`, `pbs/consume-token`, `jobs`), **zero** in the hub UI or any template, **zero** in `scripts/` or any runbook | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE 2026-08-04** (hub **v0.94.0**, agent **v0.125.0**) | — | **The documented retrieval path is a human with `sqlite3`:** `SELECT writefile('/root/idblob', identity_blob) FROM host_escrow …` on a `kubectl cp`-ed `hub.db` — recorded in project memory as the 2026-07-04 S5 prep, where hub-side blob serving was explicitly deemed *"Part 3 NOT needed"*. **This is the built-but-never-wired class at the DR capstone**, and it is why the chain from a dead node to an open repository has no automatable middle. **What a recovery flow actually needs is smaller than what exists:** a narrow `GET /hosts/<id>/escrow` authed with the box's own per-host key, serving opaque bytes to the box that owns them — zero-knowledge untouched, and far lighter than `re-enroll`, which **rotates the host API key** and returns the new key in the response body (`dr.go:130,148`). **Decide before building:** whether `re-enroll`/`restore-directive` should get a client, be replaced by the narrow GET, or be retired. Source: `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3 link 6 **LINKS 6, 7 AND 8 ARE ASSEMBLED AND WALKED.** **Link 6:** `GET /api/v1/hosts/{host_id}/escrow` — the box-authenticated MIRROR of the PUT that stores the blob, self-scoped by the per-host key (global may read any, the same asymmetry the PUT has). The operator-driven DR endpoints are UNTOUCHED and pinned by a test that exercises them with recovery mode off and on. **Link 7:** `POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password` on the agent's pinned local API gives `UnwrapIdentityBundle` its first production caller in two months. **Link 8:** it extracts and returns **only** the repository password (not the tunnel token, not the PBS token, not the WG key — the controller is a trust tier down). **PROVEN ON HARDWARE, demo-felhom, 2026-08-04 13:49 CEST:** on-disk `c60c8bc737a6…` vs recovered `c60c8bc737a6…` — **MATCH**, and the same hash the hub independently stores as `restic_pw_sha256`, so three sources agree. **Scenario B proven live 5 minutes earlier** with a deliberately wrong code: hub served the blob (572 B, `self_scope=true`), agent logged *the recovery code did not unwrap the identity escrow … exit status 1*, nothing written — which also proves links 6 and 7 ran independently of the success. **Scenario E proven live:** both retrievals raised `escrow_blob_served` (warning, operator-only); the first mailed the operator, the second was cooldown-suppressed AND that suppression is itself recorded; the customer leg reads `skipped/operator_only` on both. **R persisted nowhere, searched not claimed:** 0 lines in the agent journal, 0 in the controller log, 0 files under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/var/lib/felhom-agent`, `/root`, 0 leftover `felhom-idesc-*` staging dirs, and the staged-secret dir empty — with a **positive control** (a planted copy was found: 1, then 0 after removal) so the sweep is a measurement rather than an unfalsifiable absence. **THE §8.2 TRADE, made deliberately and recorded in the handler:** obtaining the blob used to require the operator to arm recovery mode; it now needs only the box's own credential. They still cannot open it (the hub never held R; a wrong code fails closed at age's scrypt KDF). `escrowSelfServiceRetrieval` is a single named constant — flipping it to false re-imposes recovery mode and changes nothing else, so the operator can overrule the trade for the cost of a boolean. **Red-proofs observed:** removing the ownership check served host B's blob to host A; removing the audit record made the retrieval silent; returning `PBSToken` instead of `ResticRepoPassword` yielded a plausible bundle with a non-matching key; commenting the `Options.EscrowRecovery` wiring failed the AST seam test. **Seam discipline:** the wiring is asserted by walking `main` → `runDaemon` → `buildLocalAPIServer` and checking the composite literal, not by `strings.Contains` — links 6 and 7 were two of this project's six built-but-never-wired instances and the fix must not become the seventh | CC |
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| **R-200** | **The DR password-injection seam has a handler, a route and tests — and no form.** `POST /backup/offbox/inject-password` is routed (`controller/internal/web/server.go:510`) to `offboxInjectPasswordHandler` (`offbox_handlers.go:174-196`) → `InjectOffboxPassword` (`backup/offbox.go:541`). **No template in the repository contains that path or any form posting to it** (grep over `internal/web/templates/`: one unrelated hit, an XSS comment) | **PLUMBING COMPLETE** (controller **v0.196.0**); **the FORM is not built — still open** | — | **The tenth instance of this project's built-but-never-wired class, and the exact shape `CLAUDE.md` and `felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md`'s seam-wiring rule were written for:** handler tests that POST directly (`offbox_escrow_test.go:167,180`) prove nothing about reachability. To use the only implemented recovery seam today, a person must hand-craft an authenticated POST with a session cookie and CSRF token. **Note the layering while fixing it:** this form takes a **64-hex repo password**, not a recovery code (`offboxRepoPwPattern`, `offbox.go:543`) — they are different secrets at different layers, and the operator's 2026-08-04 ruling asks for a form that takes **R**. Build the R form and treat this one as the operator/DR fallback it was written as, but **ship it with a render test per branch of whatever gate it sits behind**. Source: `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3 link 9 **THE DIAGNOSTIC HALF IS DONE AND IT ANSWERED THE QUESTION.** `--recover-offsite-check` is a `docker exec` escape hatch in the shape of `--print-reset-code`: R on **STDIN** (never argv, never `ps`, never shell history, never a transcript), fetch+unseal via the agent, and a verdict of **two sha256 hashes**. **It compares and never installs** — the recovered password is not written to `offbox/repo_password`; a test asserts the data dir is byte-unchanged and its red-proof (adding the install call) fails it. Confirmed live: `repo_password` mtime still `2026-08-03 07:18:02` after the successful check at `2026-08-04 11:49`. **Exit codes are load-bearing** — `0` match, `2` a clean MISMATCH, `1` a step failed; "it failed" and "it worked and disagreed" must never share a status because only one is a finding about the system. A box with no local password reports distinctly (the rebuilt-box shape, where the next step is to INSTALL rather than compare). **WHAT IS NOT BUILT, deliberately:** no card, no form, no preview, no customer-facing text — building an interface on top of a chain nobody had walked is how the preceding three weeks went wrong. **What remains for this row:** link 9 (the recovered password placed so `WriteOffboxSecrets` keeps it) and the customer-facing shape the operator ruled on 2026-08-04 (yell → R form → preview → proceed), which is now priced against a chain that exists rather than one that is assumed **PART 0 SHIPPED 2026-08-04 (v0.196.0):** `--recover-offsite-install` is the sibling of the check — same fetch/unseal path, same STDIN discipline for R — and it **places** the recovered password via `InjectOffboxPassword`. The confirmation is a SECOND invocation (`--confirm-install`): without it, both hashes print and nothing is written, so the operator sees the comparison before a write is possible. Three outcomes named distinctly: **installed** (no local password — the rebuilt-box shape), **unchanged** (identical key, nothing written), **refused** (a DIFFERENT key present — installing would clobber the key the current repository is encrypted under; exit 2, no force offered). It re-reads the file after writing rather than trusting the call. **Red-proof observed:** removing the confirmation gate makes the dry run write the password. The R-persistence test carries a **positive control** (a planted copy found, then removed and not found). **NOT YET EXERCISED AGAINST A LIVE RECOVERY** — the R-201 drill halted before step 9, so this is unit-proven only. **What remains for this row:** the customer-facing shape the operator ruled on 2026-08-04 (yell → recovery-code form → preview → proceed) | CC |
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| **R-201** | **Nothing in the offsite DR chain has ever been exercised past the ceremony — and the one live proof that exists predates the field it is cited for.** `slice10d-identity-restore-spike-findings.md` §1 (2026-06-10) proved a real wrap→unwrap of an identity bundle with a real R on a secret-less box, byte-identical, wrong-R failing closed. **That bundle was `{tunnel_token, pbs_token}`.** `ResticRepoPassword` was added in agent **v0.77.0 on 2026-07-09** — a month later — and is **unit-proven only** | **READY TO RESUME** — the blocker is fixed and the fixture is staged | — | **Never exercised, in these words:** a blob has never been served to a box; a fork-4 bundle has never been unsealed with a real R outside a unit test (the only production caller is `--selftest=identity-consume`, `cmd/felhom-agent/main.go:2845`, reading R from `FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE`); a recovered repo password has never been injected; an existing offsite repository has never been reopened with one; **no restore of any kind has ever been performed from a recovered secret.** The one live consume ever prepared (S5 Part 4-B, 2026-07-04) is still marked *"DEFERRED, not run"*. **`_recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md` already recorded this accurately** (A.2.7, C.1 row 1, C-2) — this row exists so the gap has an owner and a closing condition, not only a description. **Closing condition = the drill** designed in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §10, whose pass condition is a **byte-identical sha256 of a sentinel file restored after a wipe** — explicitly NOT "the repository opened". **Do not run it before R-198 is fixed**: the drill would walk a chain that is missing a link everyone believed was there **MATERIALLY ADVANCED 2026-08-04, AND THE DISTINCTION MATTERS.** What was proven on hardware is that the offsite repository **password** comes back out of the sealed bundle byte-identical (R-199). What has STILL never happened: a recovered password **installed**, an existing repository **reopened** under one, and a **file restored** from it. **The drill's pass condition is unchanged and is not this** — it is a byte-identical sha256 of a sentinel file after a wipe and reinstall, and "the store opened" was explicitly ruled insufficient. Design: `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §10. **The drill is now cheaper and better-founded than when it was designed:** links 6–8 are walked, so a failure during the drill can be localised instead of being an undifferentiated "recovery did not work", and R-198 means the ceremony that creates the drill's recovery code no longer destroys the key it is meant to protect **THE DRILL RAN AND DID NOT REACH ITS VERDICT, and stopping was the correct call** (`audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md`). Steps 1–4 completed; the wipe never happened; **nothing irreversible was done**. It halted because **the sentinel file was not in the off-site snapshot** (R-203) — wiping would have destroyed the only copy and proven nothing. **Sentinel sha256 `643166269103a25c…`, still on the box.** **What the attempt established live, all of it new:** (1) a rebuilt box's off-site run **refuses** with the orphan card and pushes `offbox_repo_orphaned` — the spike's predicted third outcome, measured for the first time, and it does NOT silently start a fresh history (this closes R-193's Q3); (2) the **orphan reset works** — move-aside to `/home/felhom-repo.orphaned-20260804`, never delete, fresh repo initialised, `offbox_repo_reset` pushed (operator-authorised during the session); (3) demo-hp's pre-rebuild history is **permanently unrecoverable** — its key sits in superseded row id 3 with `identity_blob` NULL, superseded 07:15:36, **four hours before v0.93.0 fixed the retention**; (4) **a precondition the runbook did not contain:** neither pre-existing off-site-toggled app has a restorable file leg — both are named-volume-only, which the off-site tier tars but the customer restore never unpacks — so a file-leg app (`calibre-web`, mandatory `userdata: media/books`) had to be deployed, and it is now in place as the fixture. **TO RESUME:** fix or scope R-203, re-run steps 4–5 and confirm the sentinel IS in the snapshot **by listing it, not by a green status**, then P4 + the STOP + steps 6–11. Everything else is already staged: versions, recovery code, working repository, file-leg app, sentinel. **The pass condition is unchanged** — a byte-identical sentinel sha256, not "the store opened" **UNBLOCKED 2026-08-04 by R-203 (controller v0.197.0).** The sentinel now lands in the off-site snapshot and is listed there by name and size — the thing whose absence halted the drill. **Everything the resumed run needs is already in place on demo-hp:** agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0, the recovery code held by the operator (`R_DEMO-HP`), a working off-site repository (3 snapshots), `calibre-web` deployed with a mandatory userdata path, and the sentinel at sha256 `643166269103a25Line truncated
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| **R-201** | **Nothing in the offsite DR chain has ever been exercised past the ceremony — and the one live proof that exists predates the field it is cited for.** `slice10d-identity-restore-spike-findings.md` §1 (2026-06-10) proved a real wrap→unwrap of an identity bundle with a real R on a secret-less box, byte-identical, wrong-R failing closed. **That bundle was `{tunnel_token, pbs_token}`.** `ResticRepoPassword` was added in agent **v0.77.0 on 2026-07-09** — a month later — and is **unit-proven only** | **THE WIPE HAPPENED AND THE KEY CAME BACK — the verdict is NOT reached; ~5 min from done, operator present** | — | **Never exercised, in these words:** a blob has never been served to a box; a fork-4 bundle has never been unsealed with a real R outside a unit test (the only production caller is `--selftest=identity-consume`, `cmd/felhom-agent/main.go:2845`, reading R from `FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE`); a recovered repo password has never been injected; an existing offsite repository has never been reopened with one; **no restore of any kind has ever been performed from a recovered secret.** The one live consume ever prepared (S5 Part 4-B, 2026-07-04) is still marked *"DEFERRED, not run"*. **`_recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md` already recorded this accurately** (A.2.7, C.1 row 1, C-2) — this row exists so the gap has an owner and a closing condition, not only a description. **Closing condition = the drill** designed in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §10, whose pass condition is a **byte-identical sha256 of a sentinel file restored after a wipe** — explicitly NOT "the repository opened". **Do not run it before R-198 is fixed**: the drill would walk a chain that is missing a link everyone believed was there **MATERIALLY ADVANCED 2026-08-04, AND THE DISTINCTION MATTERS.** What was proven on hardware is that the offsite repository **password** comes back out of the sealed bundle byte-identical (R-199). What has STILL never happened: a recovered password **installed**, an existing repository **reopened** under one, and a **file restored** from it. **The drill's pass condition is unchanged and is not this** — it is a byte-identical sha256 of a sentinel file after a wipe and reinstall, and "the store opened" was explicitly ruled insufficient. Design: `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §10. **The drill is now cheaper and better-founded than when it was designed:** links 6–8 are walked, so a failure during the drill can be localised instead of being an undifferentiated "recovery did not work", and R-198 means the ceremony that creates the drill's recovery code no longer destroys the key it is meant to protect **THE DRILL RAN AND DID NOT REACH ITS VERDICT, and stopping was the correct call** (`audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md`). Steps 1–4 completed; the wipe never happened; **nothing irreversible was done**. It halted because **the sentinel file was not in the off-site snapshot** (R-203) — wiping would have destroyed the only copy and proven nothing. **Sentinel sha256 `643166269103a25c…`, still on the box.** **What the attempt established live, all of it new:** (1) a rebuilt box's off-site run **refuses** with the orphan card and pushes `offbox_repo_orphaned` — the spike's predicted third outcome, measured for the first time, and it does NOT silently start a fresh history (this closes R-193's Q3); (2) the **orphan reset works** — move-aside to `/home/felhom-repo.orphaned-20260804`, never delete, fresh repo initialised, `offbox_repo_reset` pushed (operator-authorised during the session); (3) demo-hp's pre-rebuild history is **permanently unrecoverable** — its key sits in superseded row id 3 with `identity_blob` NULL, superseded 07:15:36, **four hours before v0.93.0 fixed the retention**; (4) **a precondition the runbook did not contain:** neither pre-existing off-site-toggled app has a restorable file leg — both are named-volume-only, which the off-site tier tars but the customer restore never unpacks — so a file-leg app (`calibre-web`, mandatory `userdata: media/books`) had to be deployed, and it is now in place as the fixture. **TO RESUME:** fix or scope R-203, re-run steps 4–5 and confirm the sentinel IS in the snapshot **by listing it, not by a green status**, then P4 + the STOP + steps 6–11. Everything else is already staged: versions, recovery code, working repository, file-leg app, sentinel. **The pass condition is unchanged** — a byte-identical sentinel sha256, not "the store opened" **UNBLOCKED 2026-08-04 by R-203 (controller v0.197.0).** The sentinel now lands in the off-site snapshot and is listed there by name and size — the thing whose absence halted the drill. **Everything the resumed run needs is already in place on demo-hp:** agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0, the recovery code held by the operator (`R_DEMO-HP`), a working off-site repository (3 snapshots), `calibre-web` deployed with a mandatory userdata path, andLine truncated
|
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| **R-202** | **The orphan card promises the customer their old backups "may later be restorable with the matching recovery code" — and after v0.93.0 that is true for supersessions from now on and FALSE for anything already orphaned.** `controller/internal/web/templates/backups_remote.html:66,69` states it unconditionally, in Hungarian, on the one surface where being wrong costs most | **OPEN — Part 5 hit its gate 2026-08-04; the card is UNTOUCHED and the sentence is still live** | R-199/R-201 (which generation an orphaned repo belongs to is not knowable to the box today) | — | **THE GATE, and why it was hit rather than squeezed past.** The condition was: ship it iff the hub can tell a box what it needs with **one** additional boolean on the escrow ACK it already sends. The hub *can* cheaply compute *"≥1 retained blob for this host carries an identity blob"* — one correlated predicate in `GetEscrowStatusForCustomer`, and the controller even has the right seam already (`SetEscrowStale`/`StaleBlob` is exactly this shape). **But that boolean does not answer the card's question.** The card renders on `RepoState == "orphaned"`, and the promise is about *the key THIS orphaned repository was written under*. A box does not know which escrow generation the orphaned remote belongs to; a box with a pre-v0.93.0 orphan and a post-v0.93.0 supersession would read the boolean TRUE and the promise would still be false — a **conditional** falsehood that looks verified, which is strictly worse on a customer-facing card than today's hedged one. **What would actually make it truthful** is knowing the orphaned repo's generation, which is the same knowledge R-199/R-201's unassembled chain needs. **Interim exposure, stated rather than buried:** the sentence remains live and remains false for both demo boxes. **Cheapest honest interim** (not taken here — it is a customer-copy change and the gate said leave it alone): drop the recoverability clause and say only that the old history is set aside and not deleted, which is true unconditionally | CC + operator |
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| **R-203** | **A customer-declared MANDATORY data directory was silently absent from the off-site snapshot while the run reported `ok`.** Measured live on demo-hp 2026-08-04: `calibre-web` declares `userdata: media/books class: mandatory`; its live bind is `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` (the sentinel file was there), while the off-site capture set looked for `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books`, which does not exist. Result: `[WARN] mandatory data path missing on disk, skipped from offsite`, then `backed up calibre-web (…, 0 mandatory path(s))` and `backup OK: 3 app(s), 3 snapshot(s)` — `last_status: ok`, `last_success` stamped, nothing customer-visible, nothing hub-visible | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE 2026-08-04** (controller **v0.197.0**) | — | **THE MECHANISM, from source.** `NamespaceRoot(drivePath, inGuestDrive)` (`appbackup/paths.go:28-33`) appends the `felhom-data` segment **when the drive IS the system data path** (`m.namespaceRoot` = `NamespaceRoot(drivePath, drivePath != m.systemDataPath)`, `backup/backup.go:331`). The deploy-time bind does not: `${USERDATA_PATH}` is `<HDD_PATH>/userdata` (`stacks/classify_binds.go:14`). With `system_data_path: /mnt/sys_drive` and an app deployed at `HDD_PATH=/mnt/sys_drive`, the two produce different directories. **The same compose used BOTH roots**, from one deploy: `${IMPORT_PATH}` → `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/import/calibre` (with the segment), `${USERDATA_PATH}` → `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` (without). **WHAT IS MEASURED vs NOT, because it changes the fix.** MEASURED: the paths disagree, the mandatory directory is absent from the snapshot, the run says `ok`, and the only signal is a container-log WARN. **NOT ESTABLISHED:** whether `HDD_PATH=/mnt/sys_drive` is a SUPPORTED choice — it was used because demo-hp's only registered drive (`Felhom-Share`) is a NAS and was **correctly refused** as an app namespace (R-108 working as designed), while `/mnt/sys_drive` was **accepted** (HTTP 202). **EITHER BRANCH IS A DEFECT:** if the system drive is a supported app namespace, userdata resolution is wrong for every app on it and their mandatory directories are silently unprotected; if it is not supported, the deploy accepted a namespace it should have refused one call after refusing the NAS. **NOT a general off-site failure:** `opengist` and `privatebin` declare no mandatory userdata paths (everything of theirs is in named volumes), so they are unaffected and their snapshots are real. **Fix shape:** make the two roots one function, whichever is right — and make a skipped MANDATORY path a customer/hub-visible signal rather than a WARN, because `ok` with a missing mandatory directory is this project's own *a path the customer thinks is protected is not in the snapshot* shape. Source: `audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md` §2 **BOTH HALVES SHIPPED.** **(1) The paths.** `appbackup`'s helpers take a NAMESPACE ROOT; the census found **FIVE** bare-drive-path callers, not the four the spec named — the fifth is the **FileBrowser mount builder** (`web/handlers.go`), i.e. the customer's own file browser would have shown the wrong directory on a non-enrolled path (latent: the system drive is deliberately never a registered `StoragePath`). The rule now has **ONE expression** (`appbackup.NamespaceRootFor` / `IsEnrolledDrive`); there were already **two** copies and **they differed** — `backup.Manager.namespaceRoot` compared without `filepath.Clean`, `stacks.Manager.inGuest` with it, so a trailing slash from config would have flipped the mode in one package and not the other. `ComputeFabBuckets` now receives the namespace root, which is what `ComputeCaptureSet` has always received, so the export and the backup describe the same directories by construction. **(2) The verdict.** `last_status` gains **`incomplete`** — minted, because `ok`|`error`|`running` had nothing meaning *"it ran, and this app is not fully protected"*. **Not `error`:** the rest of the run worked, so `SnapshotCount` and the `LastSuccess` anchor still record what WAS captured. It reaches the operator through the **existing** per-run digest (`backup_run_failures`) — a new event type would be a two-repo change and the hub drops anything outside `allowedEventTypes`. **§8.4's narrowing is a NO-OP and no customer warning disappears:** `TierOffsite`'s `tierKeeps()` already admits mandatory only, demonstrated by widening the tier filter alone and watching the class check hold the line. **THE SPEC'S §8.3 RISK DOES NOT EXIST, and this is the correction owed:** `ExportDataMounts` lives in `delete.go` but is **export-only** — its single production caller is the `.fab` adapter, nothing deletes on its result, and the delete path's own guard `ProtectedHDDPaths` is layout-agnostic by construction (it protects BOTH `<hdd>/…` and `<hdd>/felhom-data/…`). It shipped as its own commit anyway. **PROVEN LIVE on demo-hp:** the bind moved `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/Line truncated
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| **R-204** | **A rebuilt box can recover its off-site key and still cannot use it: the remedy that reconfigures the tier is the thing that blocks the recovery.** Measured end to end on demo-hp during the 2026-08-04 night drill, after a real controller-data wipe | **OPEN — this is the wall the drill hit** | — | **THE CHAIN, each link measured.** (1) A rebuilt controller **cannot configure its off-site target at all**: `offsite-apply: consume one-time password: no unconsumed offsite password` — the previous controller consumed it (ledger: created `07:11:51`, consumed `07:12:06`). That is R-193, reconfirmed live. (2) The documented remedy is an operator **Re-issue**, which works — and **sets `stale_at` on the escrow** (measured: `2026-08-04 20:15:49`) **while `restic_pw_sha256` is unchanged**, i.e. R-196's false staleness. (3) A stale escrow makes the hub **withhold the hash from the report ACK**, so `EscrowAutoConfirmer` can never flip `pending → escrowed`, and `OffboxRunnable` (`configured && escrowed`) **refuses every off-site run**. (4) The only documented way to clear a stale escrow is **a fresh ceremony — which supersedes the identity blob and destroys the key being recovered.** **So the recovery and its precondition are mutually exclusive as built.** The key comes back (proven — `8a9e33aa4da6…` recovered byte-identical after the wipe, and installed) and then cannot be used to open the repository. **(5) A FOURTH link, undocumented anywhere:** a rebuilt box is **unclaimed**, and the claim gate correctly intercepts every non-claim route (`claim gate: intercepting POST /backup/offbox/confirm-escrow (unclaimed)`), so **no controller endpoint responds at all** until the customer re-claims. That step appears in no design document and comes first. **Fix shape, not decided here:** either the Re-issue stops marking the escrow stale on evidence it does not have (R-196's own fix), or a recovered-and-verified key is allowed to confirm the escrow without a ceremony — the hash comparison that `EscrowAutoConfirmer` already performs is exactly the evidence needed, and it is being withheld precisely when it would be conclusive. **Do NOT fix by widening `OffboxRunnable`** — the atomicity guarantee it enforces (no un-recoverable ciphertext) is the reason the escrow exists. Source: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §3 | CC + operator |
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| **R-192** | **`offsite_delivery_stuck` tells the operator the opposite of what the detector measured, and the self-heal silently refuses for exactly the reason the message denies.** demo-hp has been e-mailing this daily since 2026-08-03 06:12 UTC: *"one-time password consumed 284h ago and **500 report(s) since carry no offbox target** — the credential is likely burned (apply died between consume and persist). Re-issue delivers a fresh one."* **Measured against the hub's own data: all 500 of those reports DO carry an offbox target** | **HALF SHIPPED** (hub **v0.93.0**) — **the guard's SCOPING stays OPEN** | — | **What actually happened on that box:** the credential was consumed 2026-07-23 09:53:41 and **applied successfully** — the controller reported an `offsite` object continuously until **2026-08-03 05:59:21 UTC**, then it **vanished at 06:12:19** and has been absent for **108 consecutive reports** since. So this is a **regressed apply**, not a burned credential. **Two distinct defects, and the second explains the first's invisibility.** **(a)** `maybeEmitStuck` builds its message from `status.ReportsSinceConsume` (the TOTAL) while hardcoding the phrase *"carry no offbox target"*, and never consults `status.OffsiteReportsSinceConsume` — which is the field that says the opposite. The recommended action (*Re-issue*) is aimed at a failure mode that did not occur. This is R-100's corollary again: an alarm whose text stopped matching what its verdict counts. **(b)** `maybeHeal` refuses **silently** (`OffsiteReportsSinceConsume != 0` → *"regressed-apply shape → operator's call"*, a bare `return` with no log line), so the operator gets a daily e-mail with the wrong story, no heal, and nothing anywhere saying why the heal declined. `offsite_credential_restaged` has **never** fired, on any customer. **The underlying condition is REAL and is the part that matters:** demo-hp currently reports no offsite target at all, i.e. that box's customer app-data has **no off-site copy right now** — and it has been that way since 08:12 CEST on 2026-08-03. A spot check inside the controller container found no restic environment, consistent with the report. **What removed it is not established** and is the first thing to find out. **Fix shape:** the message must state which shape was detected (burned vs regressed) and say what to do for each; the heal's refusal must log its reason; and the regressed shape probably deserves its own event type rather than borrowing the burned one. **Do NOT 'fix' it by widening the heal to restage over a regression** — the guard is right, only mute **CAUSE ESTABLISHED 2026-08-04 (operator confirms no hub-side offsite config change).** The regression is a **guest REBUILD**: at 06:09:40 `host_leaf_changed` (agent re-keyed), at 06:12:18 `controller_started (0.192.0)` — the controller went **0.187.0 → 0.192.0** with a **new config hash** (`1f725a2e843c` → `744e83d72c80`) — and the report at 06:12:19 is the first without `offsite`. The pre-rebuild object was fully healthy: `escrow_state: escrowed, last_status: ok, last_success 2026-08-03T02:16:39Z, snapshot_count 15, repo_size 40.9 MB`. → **R-193** owns the rebuild half. **AND THE HEAL'S GUARD IS WRONG FOR EXACTLY THIS CASE, which is why the automation that exists to fix it declined.** `maybeHeal` refuses when `OffsiteReportsSinceConsume != 0`, reading that as *"the apply regressed, so it is the operator's call"*. But `CountReportsOffsiteSince` counts the **OLDEST 500 reports since the consume** (`ORDER BY id LIMIT 500`) — for demo-hp all 500 predate the rebuild. **Offbox evidence from before a rebuild is not evidence that the credential still works**, so the guard reads healthy history as a reason not to heal a box that demonstrably cannot apply. The fix is to judge on RECENT evidence (e.g. the latest N reports, or evidence after the newest `controller_started`), not on everything since the consume. **SPIKE 2026-08-04 — BOTH HALVES CONFIRMED WITH NUMBERS, still OPEN, still not fixed here** (`audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md` Q7). The query is quoted at source (`store.go:987`): `... ORDER BY id LIMIT 500` = **the oldest 500**. Reproduced against the live hub DB with demo-hp's real consume anchor `2026-07-23 09:53:41`: the guard sees `total=500, withOffsite=500`, spanning `2026-07-23 09:53:47` → **`2026-07-28 11:17:40`** — the entire evidence set ends **six days before** the 2026-08-03 rebuild. The true window totals are `1174 / 1063` (⇒ 111 without, matching the 111 offsite-less reports). So the e-mail's *"500 report(s) since carry no offbox target"* interpolates `ReportsSinceConsume` while `OffsiteReportsSinceConsume` was **500** — the message states the precise negation of its own measurement. `offsite_credential_restaged` has **never fired for any customer** (zero rows of that type in the DB — checked, not assumed). **A NEW REASON NOT TO FIX THIS IN ISOLATION, from the same spike:** unLine truncated
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| **R-193** | **A guest rebuild silently drops the off-site app-data tier, and nothing restages the credential.** demo-hp was rebuilt on 2026-08-03 (controller 0.187.0 → 0.192.0, new config hash, agent leaf re-keyed at 06:09:40). Before it, the offsite tier was healthy and working — `escrow_state: escrowed`, `last_status: ok`, last success **02:16:39Z that morning**, **15 snapshots, 40.9 MB**. After it: no `offsite` object in any of **108** reports, and **no off-site copy of that customer's app data since 08:12 CEST on 2026-08-03** | **OPEN** — the (c) decision is TAKEN (accept the risk); the chain is still unassembled | — | **Mechanism, fully evidenced.** The restic credential reaches a box exactly once, as a one-time secret. demo-hp's was consumed **2026-07-23 09:53:41**; the rebuilt controller came up with a fresh data volume, no copy of it, and **no way to ask for another** — the hub is the only side that can stage one, and it will not re-stage a consumed secret on its own (the R-71c self-heal would, but it refuses — see R-192). **demo-felhom survived the SAME rebuild by luck, and the contrast is the proof:** its secret was created 2026-07-21 and still **UNCONSUMED**, so when its config hash changed at 07:17:54 and `offsite` dropped for exactly one report, it consumed the staged secret at **07:17:58** and was reporting `offsite` again by 07:19:10. One box had a spare credential staged and recovered in 76 seconds; the other did not and has been unprotected for a day. **That difference was not a design decision — it was an accident of which box happened to have an unconsumed secret lying around.** **Why this is not just "re-issue it":** the remedy (Re-issue) resets the sub-account password via the Hetzner API and, per R-39's record, **rotates the restic password and makes the escrow STALE** — so it needs the recovery-code ceremony re-run, and the continuity of the 15 existing snapshots under the new credential must be VERIFIED, not assumed (`hub v0.60.0` retains superseded escrow, and the orphan guard is move-aside-never-delete). That is an operator act with a customer-facing consequence, so it is not something to fire automatically without deciding the escrow question first. **What to design:** a rebuild is a normal, expected event on these boxes — the offsite tier must survive one, either by the hub restaging automatically when a re-enrolled box reports no offsite (the R-192 guard fix makes this safe), or by the credential being recoverable from escrow at re-bootstrap rather than delivered once and unrecoverable **RESOLVED ON THE BOX 2026-08-04 (operator-authorised).** Re-issue fired through the designed endpoint (`POST /configs/demo-hp/offsite-reissue`, HTTP 303): hub staged a fresh one-time password at **07:11:51**, the box's config hash moved `744e83d7` → `5eee0e42`, R-71a's settle-gate reported **GO** (*at/above floor 0.156.0, we are 0.194.0*), the password was **consumed 15 s later at 07:12:06**, and the controller logged *offsite configured for u629488-sub3@…:/home/felhom-repo* at 07:12:09 — the **same sub-account (275124) and the same repo path**, since Re-issue resets the sub-account password and the one-time password is only the transport credential used once to install the box's own SSH key. **THE ESCROW DID NOT RECOVER BY ITSELF — a correction to this session's own first reading.** `escrow_state` went `pending` → `escrowed` 15 s after the apply and CC inferred an automatic re-escrow; **the operator had run the ceremony**. It needed a human, on BOTH boxes: demo-hp escrowed 07:16:02, demo-felhom (whose offsite re-applied on its own the previous day but whose escrow had been `pending` ever since) escrowed 07:20:28. **A 15-second state change is not evidence of automation** — that is the same class as reading an absent log line as success. **Snapshot continuity is NOT yet established and must not be assumed from the counters:** both boxes report `snapshot_count: 0, repo_size_bytes: 0`, but the run-history keys (`last_run`, `last_status`, `last_success`) are **absent entirely** rather than zeroed — the shape of a controller that has never run an offbox backup in this lifetime, not of an empty repo. demo-hp's pre-rebuild object carried all three plus 15 snapshots / 40.9 MB. ~~**The next scheduled `offbox-backup` (04:15) decides it:** 15+ snapshots ⇒ the repo reattached; 1 ⇒ it started fresh and the old snapshots are orphaned-but-retained.~~ **SPIKE 2026-08-04 SETTLED IT WITHOUT WAITING, AND THE ITEM IS BIGGER THAN FILED** (`audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md`). **(1) THE ONE-SHOT SECRET IS NOT WHERE THE HARM IS.** Three secrets exist; the one-time password is the *recoverable* one (the operator can reset it at the provider any time) and the box's SFTP key is regenerable by design. The **restic repository password** — the DATA key, which the agent's own source calls *"irreplaceable (unlike the SFTP access key…)"* (`felhom-agent/internal/esLine truncated
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| — | Storage Box **snapshots** on `storage-box-pool-1` — plan SET (daily 00:00, keep 7) but **0 taken yet** | WATCHING | first run tonight 00:00 | Confirm `size_snapshots > 0` tomorrow; until then the mitigation is armed, not proven | CC |
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@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
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| R-203 | **A mandatory customer data directory was silently absent from the off-site snapshot while the run reported `ok`** — the deploy-time `${USERDATA_PATH}` root and the backup-time namespace root disagree for an app on the system drive | M | **OPEN — halted the R-201 drill 2026-08-04** | Flips nothing yet. Blocks the off-site app-data row from ever earning a customer-file-restored badge. Fix shape: one root function, and a MANDATORY skip must be customer/hub-visible rather than a container-log WARN |
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| R-201 | **The wipe-and-recover drill** | L | **PREPARED, HALTED BEFORE THE WIPE (2026-08-04)** | Nothing irreversible done. Established live for the first time: a rebuilt box's off-site run REFUSES (the orphan card, not a silent fresh history — closes R-193 Q3), the orphan reset works move-aside-never-delete, and demo-hp's pre-rebuild key is permanently gone (superseded four hours before v0.93.0). Resume needs R-203 |
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| R-203 | **The app and its backup looked in different directories, and a run that skipped a mandatory folder still said `ok`** | M | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE (controller v0.197.0, 2026-08-04)** | Adds the capability-map row *"off-site app-data capture covers MANDATORY paths on both drive layouts"* as PROVEN-LIVE, and corrects that row's predecessor, which was optimistic. Unblocks R-201 |
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| R-204 | **The recovered key cannot be used: the Re-issue that reconfigures a rebuilt box's off-site tier marks the escrow stale, which gates every run, and the only way to clear it destroys the key** | M | **OPEN — the wall the 2026-08-04 night drill hit** | Blocks R-201's verdict. Fix is most likely R-196's (mark stale on evidence, not on a Re-issue) or letting a verified recovered key confirm the escrow without a ceremony |
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| R-19 | Internet-outage customer-experience drill: pull WAN on demo, verify lan_resolver path, document what the customer actually sees/does | S | idea | Flips map row E "LAN access" IMPLEMENTED→PROVEN-LIVE |
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| R-20 | ~~Verify operator-key pinning is fully in the day-0 install flow~~ | XS | **closed** (2026-07-16) | Confirmed against `scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` source (not changelog): keys resolve at L1181–1219 (script constants `OPERATOR_KEY_*`, populated, `--operator-pubkey-file` override), pinned automatically by `step_agent_config()` "STEP 6/8" (L2044; python builds `authz.signers` L2146–2156, reinstall preserves existing), verified at L2332–2337 ("authz signers: N … operator-signed self-update armed"). No interactive prompt or post-install hand-edit — fully automatic. Doc-drift note: the L193–197 "EMPTY by default" comment is stale vs the now-populated constants (→ R-16 hygiene) |
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| R-23 | **Immediate-sync Direction-2 follow-ups** (hub v0.58 / controller v0.140, 2026-07-16): **(a) — BANKED 2026-07-21 (both legs).** The operator-UI save->apply round trip is PROVEN: the STOP-2 global-floor save (hub `18:56:27 CEST`) released the controller's held wait in the **same second** (`16:56:27Z wait woke: generation=1 - firing out-of-cycle report`), with the report built 2 s later; the ring also shows `wait baseline generation=0` at startup (baseline recorded WITHOUT firing, as designed) then `generation=1`, so the generation advanced past 0. **RESTART LEG BANKED 2026-07-21 — the floor was moved to a version the box did NOT run, and the swap fired EXACTLY ONCE.** Operator saved global floor 0.153.0 → **v0.154.0** (a real version boundary, unlike the 2026-07-20 attempt which targeted an already-running version and therefore proved nothing). Timeline (guest UTC): `06:57:13` UpdateState `pending` written `initiated_by=auto-floor` → `06:57:17` agent `controller swap requested 0.153.0 -> 0.154.0` → `06:57:19` `image file written, restarting bootstrap` → `06:57:21` container StartedAt + UpdateState `completed_at` → `06:57:29` agent `new controller healthy`. **16 s end to end.** Assertions over the whole window (06:50 → 07:29, 39 min): `controller swap requested` = **1**, agent-driven bootstrap restarts = **1**, `new controller healthy` = **1**, rollback/swap-failed/unhealthy = **0**, container `RestartCount` = **0**. `VerifyStartup` banked it on the next boot (`Post-update startup: update successful (0.153.0 → 0.154.0)`) and the `06:57:52` periodic check logged `Current version 0.154.0 is up to date` — the at/above-floor branch correctly doing nothing. **No storm, no rollback, no second attempt.** *Caveat, disclosed: a hand-deploy of v0.155.0 at `07:17:10` sits inside the observation window and is what StartedAt shows after that point; it never touches `SwapController`, so the swap-count assertions above are uncontaminated across the full window. A second, unplanned confirmation of the at/above-floor branch came with it — after the hand-deploy the box ran 0.155.0 against a 0.154.0 floor and the updater logged `Current version 0.155.0 is up to date` and did nothing.* Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` §6 (2026-07-21). *(Superseded note:)* **the self-restart single-fire leg was** - the floor was set to a version the box ALREADY ran, so there was no work and no restart. Finish by bumping the floor to a version the box does NOT run, debug ring open, asserting EXACTLY ONE restart. **Trap found while banking this: the wake is `logx.Debugf`, so it is INVISIBLE in `docker logs` at INFO** and lives only in the debug ring (`GET /api/debug/logs?level=DEBUG`) - a hunter looking at stdout wrongly concludes the box never woke; arguably (b) generalised. (b) cosmetic: the Waiter's "recovered" INFO logs on the next hold completion (`pollOnce` blocks ~240 s), not at reconnect | S | **(a) BANKED in full; only (b) cosmetic remains** | Map row "config/state change round-trips in seconds" flipped PARTIAL->PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-21 on this evidence. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` 4f |
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Reference in new issue
Block a user