R-201 re-walk: the data PASSES again, the journey still FAILS — two dead ends, down from four
gates / gates (push) Successful in 9s

Asked Campaign 11 Phase 1's question a second time, on the fixed build, on a
NEW appliance (VM 322, customer rewalk). The Campaign 11 venue was untouched.

THE DATA: PASS. All three sentinels byte-identical out of the pre-destruction
snapshot a7bc23bd in 23s through the customer's own restore flow — including a
12 MB binary and an accented Hungarian filename whose NAME BYTES are identical
too (verified as hex, not as rendered text).

THE JOURNEY: FAIL, two dead ends against Phase 1's four.
 1. R-218's CONSUME half. The hub re-staged the credential at 11:44:57 saying
    'the box re-consumes on its next cycle'; a full cycle ran at 11:55:46/54
    (with a positive control that it ran) and it did not. A census of the
    customer-reachable actions found none that fetches it. Only a command line
    INSIDE THE GUEST moved it — 18s, confirming nothing was wrong with the
    credential, target or key: only the trigger. R-218's row said SHIPPED and
    over-claimed; it is corrected to REOPENED for the consume half.
 2. R-220. Drives still unenrollable after a rebuild, needing a Proxmox-host
    unmount; without it no app redeploys and the restore page stays empty.

Unaided RTO STILL UNDEFINED. Attended: +45s key placed, +24m12s tier up,
+30m13s data verified. The 30m must not be quoted as the customer number.

What passed and is new: the recovery screen appeared WITHOUT being sought,
answered all three questions with a seal date matching the hub exactly, the
emailed reset code worked first try, the unlock was a real 1.528s unseal, and
R-225's fix was seen working in the wild (unknown, not a false zero).

R-216 part 4 reproduced live: the reinstall downgraded the hand-installed agent
0.126.0 -> 0.125.0.

DELIVERY GAP recorded as owed and NOT conflated with the journey: a fresh
install landed on controller 0.201.0 / agent 0.125.0 — the vouched versions,
neither carrying the fixes — installed by hand. Nothing was vouched.

Capability map row STAYS FAIL. Campaign 11 doc gets a dated ADDENDUM, not a
rewrite.
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@@ -44,35 +44,47 @@ code was wrong. *(CAMPAIGN 11)*
- **The off-site copy can be erased by the machine that made it.** A daily snapshot is armed as a
stopgap. *(R-95, R-87)*
## What last night's stress test found — and what we fixed this morning
## Can a household get their data back on their own? Asked again today — still no, but nearer
We spent the night trying to break the recovery journey, then left the machine alone and watched it
run. **Nothing we did lost a byte.** When the customer chose "I do not want the old data", the old
backups were **set aside and not deleted** — we checked the far end of the wire and the 12.5 MB was
still there, to the byte. A wrong code was refused three times with nothing written and no lockout.
The machine's alarm fired when we switched it off and cleared itself when it came back. Overnight it
ran a full cycle on its own and made a fresh off-site copy without being asked.
We built a **brand-new machine** from the published disc, gave it three marked files, destroyed it —
guest and both drives, as a hardware loss would — and tried to get them back the way a household
would. *(R-201, the re-walk)*
**What it found: the machine still blamed the customer for failures that were not theirs.** Pull the
plug on our own central system and the customer was told their recovery code was bad — in three
hundredths of a second, when actually checking a code takes about one. The machine had not even
tried. **All of that is fixed and deployed** *(R-224, R-226, R-225, R-227, R-228)*:
**The files came back perfectly.** All three, byte for byte, including a 12 MB file and one whose
Hungarian accented filename came back **letter-for-letter identical**. Out of the pre-destruction
backup, in **23 seconds**, through the customer's own restore screen.
- **When something on our side is down, we say so** — and we say plainly that the code was **not**
used, so it is still good. Proven on the real machine: with our hub unreachable the answer changed
from "your code is wrong" to "we could not reach the central system".
- **A customer who mistypes is told to check their typing again.** That message had become
unreachable on any machine that had been given a new code — exactly the machine that just recovered.
- **When we do not know why something failed, we say that**, and never guess the customer.
- **"0 snapshots · 0 GB" is gone** where the truth is "we have not read it yet".
- **The set-aside backups are visible again** — the machine says they are kept and not deleted, and
does **not** pretend they can be reopened, because today they cannot be.
**And much of the journey now works.** The machine showed the recovery screen **without being asked**,
told the customer what was waiting and when it was sealed, said plainly that nobody can replace a lost
code, and accepted the real code first time. The emailed claim code worked first try.
**Still open, and worth knowing:** a rebuilt machine still cannot re-attach its own drives without us
*(R-220 — we are working around it by hand on the test machine right now)*, cannot create a new
recovery code *(R-221)*, and the screen at the machine still shows a stale pairing code *(R-214)*.
**The recovery journey is still recorded as FAILED** — these are fixes, not a re-walk, and it stays
failed until someone walks it end to end with no help from us.
**But it still needed us twice**, and a household has neither hand:
- **The machine never picks up its own storage connection.** Our hub hands it over and says "the box
will collect this on its next cycle" — the cycle came and went and it did not. Nothing the customer
can click fixes it; it took a command inside the machine. *(R-218 — we had recorded this as fixed;
only half of it was)*
- **A rebuilt machine still cannot re-attach its own drives** — and without them no app can be put
back, so the restore screen stays empty. *(R-220)*
**Two dead ends, down from four.** The verdict stays **FAILED** until a walk needs us zero times.
**One thing to decide.** A machine installed today still gets the older software — **the fixes are
built and published but not approved for new machines**. We installed them by hand for this test. So
this proves the journey works on the fixed build; it does **not** prove a customer would receive it.
## What we fixed this morning, and what it did not fix
Overnight we tried to break the recovery journey with eleven faults and then left the machine alone
for a full cycle. Nothing lost a byte; the set-aside backups really were kept; the alarm fired and
cleared itself. What it found was that **the machine blamed the customer for failures that were not
theirs** — our hub being unreachable came back as "your recovery code is wrong", in three hundredths
of a second, without the machine even trying. **That is fixed and deployed** *(R-224, R-226)*, along
with three smaller truths: "0 snapshots" where the answer is "we have not looked yet" *(R-225)*, a raw
English error mid-recovery *(R-227)*, and set-aside backups that had become invisible *(R-228)*.
**None of that shortened the journey**, which is why today's re-walk above still says FAILED — the two
remaining dead ends are different ones.
## What shipped recently
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
| **The offsite repository password can be RECOVERED from the sealed escrow with the customer's recovery code** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.195.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04)** | On demo-felhom, through the real endpoints end to end: the box fetched its own sealed blob from the hub with its own per-host credential (hub log: *escrow blob SERVED … 572 opaque bytes, self_scope=true*), the agent unsealed it with the customer's recovery code, and the extracted repository password's sha256 was **byte-identical** to the one on disk — `c60c8bc737a6…`, which is ALSO the hash the hub had independently stored, so three sources agree. Five minutes earlier the same path with a WRONG code failed closed at age's KDF with nothing written, which proves links 6 and 7 ran independently of the success. R was searched for afterwards and found in 0 log lines and 0 files, with a positive control confirming the search would have found it. Evidence: per-repo CHANGELOGs; `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3 links 6–8 | **WHAT THIS ROW DOES NOT CLAIM, stated because the previous over-claim here was struck out four hours earlier.** It covers the KEY, not the DATA. **R-199 BACK-POINTER (omitted when this row was written): the recovery chain's link inventory and the per-link status live in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3; links 1–8 are walked, 9–11 are not.** **Re-confirmed 2026-08-04 evening by an attempt to prove the DATA half:** the R-201 drill was prepared on demo-hp and **halted before the wipe** — the sentinel file was not in the off-site snapshot (R-203), so the wipe would have destroyed it and proven nothing. **No file has still ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (`audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md`). The install half of the chain (controller v0.196.0 `--recover-offsite-install`, R-200) is likewise unit-proven only — it has never run against a live recovery. A recovered password has never been **installed** (the diagnostic compares and refuses to write, by design), no existing repository has ever been **reopened** under one, and **no file has ever been restored** from an off-site history via a recovered key. Links 9–11 of the chain are open (R-200's remaining half, R-201). The proof also used a box whose local key still exists — the rebuilt-box case, where there is nothing to compare against, is exactly what the drill covers and it has not run || DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21) | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 | Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected.) **⚠ The candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE is WITHDRAWN — the 2026-07-18 rehearsal produced a live counter-example (R-39).** On the reborn N100 the descriptor auto-provisioned and the agent reported `converged state=applied` (16:45:53), yet **the storage is dead**: `pvesm status` → `felhom-pbs: error fetching datastores - 401 Unauthorized` / `inactive`, and a direct probe with the stored credential returns **401 on every endpoint including `/version`** while the WG transport is healthy (handshake 9 s, 27.9 ms RTT) — i.e. authentication failure, not ACL scope. Root cause in the evidence: **the hub minted a SECOND token secret at 16:47:52, two minutes after the agent had applied the first, and `consumed_at` is still NULL**; the converged state machine will not re-apply, and the agent's 15-minute verify loop **cannot even read the credential to notice** (`open /etc/pve/priv/storage/felhom-pbs.pw: permission denied` — non-root agent reading a file it writes through a root wrapper). A tier that reports `applied` while silently unable to authenticate is exactly the shape that must not carry a PROVEN-LIVE badge. See `tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` F2 and `pbs-dr-state.txt`. **agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17:** the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick `pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, `pvesm status felhom-offsite`=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot `pveum` grant **2026-07-21 — the R-39 fleet fix SHIPPED (hub v0.68.0 + agent v0.91.2), closing the self-heal chain end to end.** The three defects that let a box be `applied` and dead simultaneously are each addressed: the hub stamps a monotonic `secret_generation` into the descriptor so a credential re-key finally MOVES the content hash the agent Line truncated
| **A customer's file survives a machine rebuild and comes back — the whole off-site story, end to end** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04 night drill)** | demo-hp's controller data volume was destroyed and the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced `8a9e33aa4da6…` — **byte-identical** to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to the hub's independent record — and installed cleanly on the bare box. `identity_blob` was unchanged across the wipe (572 B, `updated_at` still 11:11:37). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §2 | **WHAT IT DOES AND DOES NOT CLAIM.** PROVEN: after a real rebuild the key recovers byte-identical, the EXISTING repository opens (3 snapshots, 42 026 B — the pre-wipe size; not a fresh history), and the customer restore flow returns the file byte-identical. **ALL FOUR MANUAL INTERVENTIONS ARE CLOSED, AND THE CUSTOMER IS NOW OFFERED THE RECOVERY (2026-08-05). ONE QUALIFIER REMAINS AND IT IS NOT THE OLD ONE — state it precisely.** The 2026-08-04 drill needed four interventions between "the key is recoverable" and "the file is back", none of them in any design document (R-204). **Items 1–3 closed in controller v0.198.0 + hub v0.95.0** (the reset code works first time; a Re-issue no longer marks a healthy escrow stale; a unit restore states it returned the app's definition and database and NOT the customer's files). **Item 4 closed in controller v0.199.0 + hub v0.96.0** (a rebuilt box DECLARES `offsite.state=needs_credential` and `internal/offsiteheal` re-arms the stored credential before minting). **AND THE "needs someone who knows to look" HALF IS NOW GONE TOO (controller v0.200.0, R-193):** a full-page recovery screen takes over the landing pages while the hub holds a sealed package this box cannot open, explains that nobody can replace a lost recovery code, takes the code, opens the repository and lists what is in it — proven live on demo-felhom, which is genuinely in that state (`/launcher` → 302 `/recovery`; a wrong code refused with nothing written, three times, no lockout; the code found in no file, no container log and no debug ring, with a planted-copy positive control that first exposed a mis-aimed sweep). **WHAT THE QUALIFIER IS NOW, and it is narrower:** (1) **the final unlock has never been driven with a CORRECT code through the page** — no recovery code was kept for demo-felhom's orphaned history and demo-hp's is operator-held out of band, so the live run exercised the whole chain (handler → agent → hub fetch → age KDF) and stopped at the unseal; the install and listing rest on tests. (2) **putting files back in place is deliberately NOT part of this** — restore stays per-app, and the step after the listing is R-213. (3) **the journey has still not been re-walked end to end since these fixes** — the closures are proven individually, not as one uninterrupted run. That re-walk is one more drill and it is what is owed. Scope: `demo-hp`, a controller-data-volume rebuild — **NOT** a total host loss, and **NOT** a guest reprovision. **⚠ THE RE-WALK RAN ON 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11) AND IT FAILED. THIS ROW STAYS AS IT IS — it records a key recovering and a file returning, which remains true — but the JOURNEY row below is the honest verdict and this row must not be read as covering it.** The campaign built a throwaway appliance from the published ISO, destroyed it, and walked the customer's route: **the data half PASSED** (three sentinels byte-identical, including a 12 MB binary and a non-ASCII Hungarian filename, out of the pre-wipe snapshot in 16 s) and **the journey half FAILED** — four operator interventions, three needing root on the appliance, and the first of them was the machine telling the customer their perfectly correct recovery code was wrong (R-216). **R-198's retention is NO LONGER unit-proven — it was PROVEN IN PRODUCTION on 2026-08-05** (CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 3): the first supersession since the fix retained `identity_blob` at **572 B, byte-length exact**, carrying the OLD key `626e424670248db3` while the current row moved to the newly minted `e11a6c542b73477a`; `offsite_repo_key_changed` and `escrow_superseded` both fired at the instant of supersession, and the next off-site run REFUSED as `orphaned` rather than starting a fresh history. Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` |
| **The customer's own UNAIDED recovery journey, end to end** | controller v0.201.0, hub v0.97.1, agent v0.125.0 | **FAILED (2026-08-05, CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 1) — and it stays FAILED until a re-walk passes** | A throwaway appliance was built from the published ISO on demo-hp, claimed, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, then destroyed — guest purged and both enrolled drives wiped. The rebuild and the customer's route were then walked with **no command line inside the guest**. **Data: PASS.** All three sentinels byte-identical (`beb9175d…`, `7c8cb0ad…`, `e012e76f…`), including a 12 MB binary and `C11-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` — the Hungarian filename survived disk → restic → SFTP → Storage Box → restore → disk intact. Restored in **16 s** out of the pre-wipe snapshot `f3d9cd67`, non-destructively. **Journey: FAIL.** Four interventions, three of them root on the appliance: R-216 (a correct code called wrong), R-218 (the store never opened; the box stopped asking), R-219 (the promised listing structurally could not render), R-220 (the app could not be redeployed — its drives were unenrollable). Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM, and what the v0.201.0/v0.97.1 fixes do and do not change.** Six of the nine findings are fixed and each is red-proofed (R-216, R-218, R-219, R-217, R-222, R-215) — but **fixes are not a journey.** This row goes green only when the walk is repeated end to end and completes with no operator intervention. **Three findings are deliberately still open and each is a live blocker for some flow:** **R-214** (the console never stops showing a stale pairing code), **R-220** (after a rebuild the customer's drives cannot be re-enrolled — the deploy refuses and the wizard's list is empty, so no app can be redeployed onto its own data drive), **R-221** (a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony at all, because the pbsdr convergence marker survives on the host while the seeded `escrow.pbs_storage_id` is rewritten out of `agent.json`). **And R-216's fix does not by itself make a NEW box work:** with the hub guard corrected but the Day-0 manifest still vouching agent 0.120.0, a new box is **HELD, not served** — it stops being lied to, which is better, but the feature does not work for it until agent 0.125.0 is vouched. **⚠ CAMPAIGN-11 PHASES 2 + 4 RAN OVERNIGHT 2026-08-05/06 AND THIS ROW STAYS **FAIL**.** **What they add:** eleven injected faults against the recovery journey, each with a positive control, and a full unattended scheduled cycle. **The backup promise strengthened** — the off-site tier ran itself at 04:15 on a box rebuilt twice and set aside hours earlier (`snapshot_count` 1 → 2), all five daily jobs fired exactly once, and nothing on the must-not list fired. **R-217's and R-215's fixes were proven live under exactly their faults**, the set-aside proved it does not delete (12 535 KB byte-exact at the far end), and a wrong code was refused three times with nothing written and no lockout. **What they do NOT add: any progress on the JOURNEY.** These faults are **not a re-walk** — no customer route was walked end to end — and four new findings say the journey got no better where it matters: **R-224** (a hub outage and a stopped agent are BOTH reported to the customer as a bad recovery code, in 0.056 s and 0.030 s — no unseal attempted; the agent's own `err` distinguishes them and it is discarded at the HTTP boundary, and R-216's gate answers `source=version` so it cannot see reachability — **Phase 1's headline defect relocated from the version channel to the transport**), **R-226** (M1, the only message telling a customer to check their typing, is unreachable on any box that has re-escrowed), **R-225** (an unread store renders `0 pillanatkép · 0 GB` above a card saying it holds backups — 1 snapshot and 12 535 KB were really there), **R-228** (the set-aside history is recorded in `orphaned_renamed_to` and shown by nobody — `OrphanedRenamedTo` has zero references in any template or handler). **§4.1 is now MEASURED rather than deduced** — the floor IS served, from the box's own rendered `GetFloor()` and a cold-started controller's settle-gate line. **§4.2's positive half is still NOT measured** and needs a rebuild. Evidence: `audits/CAMPAIGN-11-recovery-journey-2026-08-05.md`, `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal-phase24.md` **2026-08-06 — THE FIVE PHASE-2 FINDINGS ARE FIXED AND THIS ROW STILL SAYS FAIL.** controller **v0.202.0** + agent **v0.126.0** close R-224, R-226, R-225, R-227, R-228. **What changed:** the unlock path now classifies WHY it failed, from the value and never the text, and the message that mentions typing is reachable from exactly one class — a real refusal — with **unknown defaulting to neutral**. Proven live on the venue with the same wrong code and only the hub's reachability changed: `400 → 502 → 400`. **What it does NOLine truncated
| **The customer's own UNAIDED recovery journey, end to end** | controller v0.201.0, hub v0.97.1, agent v0.125.0 | **FAILED (2026-08-05, CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 1) — and it stays FAILED until a re-walk passes** | A throwaway appliance was built from the published ISO on demo-hp, claimed, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, then destroyed — guest purged and both enrolled drives wiped. The rebuild and the customer's route were then walked with **no command line inside the guest**. **Data: PASS.** All three sentinels byte-identical (`beb9175d…`, `7c8cb0ad…`, `e012e76f…`), including a 12 MB binary and `C11-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` — the Hungarian filename survived disk → restic → SFTP → Storage Box → restore → disk intact. Restored in **16 s** out of the pre-wipe snapshot `f3d9cd67`, non-destructively. **Journey: FAIL.** Four interventions, three of them root on the appliance: R-216 (a correct code called wrong), R-218 (the store never opened; the box stopped asking), R-219 (the promised listing structurally could not render), R-220 (the app could not be redeployed — its drives were unenrollable). Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM, and what the v0.201.0/v0.97.1 fixes do and do not change.** Six of the nine findings are fixed and each is red-proofed (R-216, R-218, R-219, R-217, R-222, R-215) — but **fixes are not a journey.** This row goes green only when the walk is repeated end to end and completes with no operator intervention. **Three findings are deliberately still open and each is a live blocker for some flow:** **R-214** (the console never stops showing a stale pairing code), **R-220** (after a rebuild the customer's drives cannot be re-enrolled — the deploy refuses and the wizard's list is empty, so no app can be redeployed onto its own data drive), **R-221** (a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony at all, because the pbsdr convergence marker survives on the host while the seeded `escrow.pbs_storage_id` is rewritten out of `agent.json`). **And R-216's fix does not by itself make a NEW box work:** with the hub guard corrected but the Day-0 manifest still vouching agent 0.120.0, a new box is **HELD, not served** — it stops being lied to, which is better, but the feature does not work for it until agent 0.125.0 is vouched. **⚠ CAMPAIGN-11 PHASES 2 + 4 RAN OVERNIGHT 2026-08-05/06 AND THIS ROW STAYS **FAIL**.** **What they add:** eleven injected faults against the recovery journey, each with a positive control, and a full unattended scheduled cycle. **The backup promise strengthened** — the off-site tier ran itself at 04:15 on a box rebuilt twice and set aside hours earlier (`snapshot_count` 1 → 2), all five daily jobs fired exactly once, and nothing on the must-not list fired. **R-217's and R-215's fixes were proven live under exactly their faults**, the set-aside proved it does not delete (12 535 KB byte-exact at the far end), and a wrong code was refused three times with nothing written and no lockout. **What they do NOT add: any progress on the JOURNEY.** These faults are **not a re-walk** — no customer route was walked end to end — and four new findings say the journey got no better where it matters: **R-224** (a hub outage and a stopped agent are BOTH reported to the customer as a bad recovery code, in 0.056 s and 0.030 s — no unseal attempted; the agent's own `err` distinguishes them and it is discarded at the HTTP boundary, and R-216's gate answers `source=version` so it cannot see reachability — **Phase 1's headline defect relocated from the version channel to the transport**), **R-226** (M1, the only message telling a customer to check their typing, is unreachable on any box that has re-escrowed), **R-225** (an unread store renders `0 pillanatkép · 0 GB` above a card saying it holds backups — 1 snapshot and 12 535 KB were really there), **R-228** (the set-aside history is recorded in `orphaned_renamed_to` and shown by nobody — `OrphanedRenamedTo` has zero references in any template or handler). **§4.1 is now MEASURED rather than deduced** — the floor IS served, from the box's own rendered `GetFloor()` and a cold-started controller's settle-gate line. **§4.2's positive half is still NOT measured** and needs a rebuild. Evidence: `audits/CAMPAIGN-11-recovery-journey-2026-08-05.md`, `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal-phase24.md` **2026-08-06 — THE FIVE PHASE-2 FINDINGS ARE FIXED AND THIS ROW STILL SAYS FAIL.** controller **v0.202.0** + agent **v0.126.0** close R-224, R-226, R-225, R-227, R-228. **What changed:** the unlock path now classifies WHY it failed, from the value and never the text, and the message that mentions typing is reachable from exactly one class — a real refusal — with **unknown defaulting to neutral**. Proven live on the venue with the same wrong code and only the hub's reachability changed: `400 → 502 → 400`. **What it does NOLine truncated
| **Off-site app-data capture covers the paths an app declares MANDATORY — on BOTH drive layouts** | controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04) — and this row was OPTIMISTIC before it** | On demo-hp, an app on the **system-data fallback** bound `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` while the capture set looked in `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books`: the declared-mandatory directory was in **no** snapshot and the run reported `ok` (R-203). After v0.197.0 the capture log reads `1 mandatory path(s)` and the file is **listed inside the snapshot** — `restic ls -l latest --tag calibre-web` → `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt`. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md` §2 and the v0.197.0 CHANGELOG | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM.** It covers CAPTURE, not RESTORE: **no file has ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (R-201, ready to resume). It also does not claim the enrolled-drive layout was ever wrong — it was not, which is precisely why this survived. And a run that still misses a mandatory directory now reports **`incomplete`** rather than `ok`, so this row's guarantee is one the status can express || **Recurring offsite (PBS) whole-guest backups actually LAND, and RESTORE** — local daily + offsite weekly as scheduled work | agent v0.97–0.103, controller v0.174/0.175, hub v0.76.0, host-install 1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-26)** | `audits/SPIKE-r82-phase0-2026-07-26.md`; per-repo CHANGELOGs/REPORTs. **Restore round-trip on demo-hp:** `--selftest=restore-test` against `felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T15:42:42Z` → `pass:true`, `verified:"boot+running"`, **`mount_parity:"ok"`** (`mp0=/var/lib/docker 50G`, `mp1=/mnt/sys_drive 20G`, mp8/mp9 throwaway stand-ins for the archived binds), `source_tier:"pbs"`, 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, scratch band clean afterwards and the live guest untouched. | **This row is distinct from the DR-tier row above, which proves ACTIVATION, not ARRIVAL.** That tier was PROVEN-LIVE as `applied` since 2026-07-21 while demo-felhom held ONE snapshot (a healing artifact) and demo-hp held **zero, ever** — "applied and empty", the R-39 shape one level quieter. **What earns PROVEN-LIVE here:** (a) demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace); (b) it **restores into a bootable, mount-complete guest** — `mount_parity` is the non-hollow half, since a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume; (c) **the multi-tier quiesce ran through the real UI endpoint** (`POST /api/guest-backup/trigger`, authed+CSRF) and produced **exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it** — `quiescing 1 stack(s)` 17:01:39 → local done 17:02:56 *"next tier may start (app still quiesced)"* → felhom-pbs snapshotted 17:03:06 → `unquiescing` 17:03:06. **App downtime 1m27s for both tiers**, and the app came back healthy. **Known gaps, recorded not hidden:** the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the PRIMARY tier, so the offsite tier is never AUTOMATICALLY restore-tested (the manual/selftest path is proven, the unattended one is not); the hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE rather than a reported cadence; the installer-default fleet flip awaits a full weekly cycle. → **R-82** |
| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **R-189 (agent v0.122.0, 2026-08-03) closed the reporting half of this row, and it was a REAL gap in the evidence path:** the proof above reached the hub only because no restart intervened — `restore_tests[]` came solely from an in-memory store, so the 15:25:14 PASS was in fact LOST when the agent restarted 2 m 43 s later for a deploy (`0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports). Under per-archive due-ness the box would not have repeated the work for a week. The persisted per-tier proof (with the archive, and now the tier) is merged into the report, so a proof survives a restart — one entry per tier, newest wins, and a record that cannot be described honestly is not emitted. **THE HOST TIER'S HALF OF THIS ROW WAS OPTIMISTIC UNTIL 2026-08-03, and it is worth saying plainly.** Every live restore-test cited here is on the OFFSITE tier. The HOST tier was not merely unproven on demo-felhom — it was **unprovable**, and on demo-hp equally: the agent's token had no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, the storage both boxes configure as `local_backup_target`, so the content API answered `{"data":[]}` through the token while root listed three archives. The scheduler skipped it as *"no settled archive yet"* — which is exactly what a brand-new tier reports — so nothing ever said so (**R-185**). **CLOSED 2026-08-03 — agent v0.123.0 + installer 1.24.0.** The grant is applied on both demo boxes (the token now lists 3 and 4 archives), the installer's reuse arm grants on a pre-existing target, and the agent now **asks whether it may read each tier it depends on** instead of inferring it from an empty list: a critical degraded capability naming the storage and the missing role, which the hub alerted and emailed on **while the box was still blind**. **THE HOST TIER IS NOW PROVEN-LIVE, UNATTENDED, ON BOTH DEMO BOXES (2026-08-0Line truncated
| Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier: host delete < RESET < customer Delete): one operator action → pre-first-install; all operational state destroyed, identity + basic config survive | hub v0.61.0, felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (external teardown, incl. two real firings)** | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — two live firings, both host-delete-first, on two different customers** (`demo-vm-felhom` 15:49:57, `demo-felhom` 16:08:51): every leg `ok` (`claim`, `db_purge`, `descriptor`, `hetzner`, `pbs`), escrow acked separately, each completing in 8–9 s (`hub-state.txt` `customer_resets`). The **Hetzner sub-account destruction is now verified against the live pool box** — and produced the run's sharpest lesson: **a sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object.** Deleting it left its `/home` intact, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext under a key this same RESET had destroyed — which is why the orphan guard fired at 16:58:14 (**a finding by S7's own criterion**) and why RESET now needs a base-dir purge → **R-32**. Prior: hub v0.61.0 REPORT; **ep0 live drill 2026-07-17** (throwaway `drill-reset-01` with a real backup: deprovision `deleted:true` destroyed the namespace + backup group + token, idempotent re-run `deleted:false`, all 3 real tenants + shared user survived); red-proofs (ack-gate, partial-failure resumability) + orchestration/store/offsite/render tests | External teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST, every leg idempotent; refuses while any host row exists; separate escrow-custody ack; clears claim (fresh code next onboarding); keeps the offsite tier CHOICE, drops provisioned fields. **Live-clicked 2026-07-18** (twice, by Viktor) — this supersedes the earlier "not live-clicked / Hetzner delete unit-tested only" note. **R-25b CLOSED (hub v0.69.0, 2026-07-21):** the Danger-zone DELETE is now the guided full-teardown cascade that runs this very sequence as its middle leg — see the row below |
@@ -35,6 +35,22 @@ Evidence: `../tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/` — `journal.md` (Phases 0,
> which stays **FAIL** until a re-walk passes. **R-214, R-220, R-221 remain open**, and R-220 is still
> worked around by hand on this venue.
> **ADDENDUM 2026-08-06 — THE RE-WALK (R-201). The body below is NOT rewritten.**
>
> Phase 1's question was asked again on the fixed build, on a **new** appliance (VM 322, customer
> `rewalk`) — this campaign's venue was left untouched. **The data half PASSED again**: all three
> sentinels byte-identical, including an accented Hungarian filename whose **name bytes** are also
> identical, restored in **23 s**. **The journey half still FAILS, with TWO dead ends instead of
> four**: R-218's *consume* half (the hub re-stages, the box never collects — only a guest command
> line moves it) and R-220 (drives unenrollable after a rebuild). **The unaided RTO remains
> undefined.**
>
> Two of this campaign's findings were reproduced live: **R-216 part 4** (the reinstall downgraded the
> hand-installed agent back to the vouched version) and **R-220**. One of last night's fixes was seen
> working in the wild: **R-225** (an unread store said "unknown", not a false zero).
>
> Evidence: `../tests/rewalk-r201-2026-08-06/journal.md`.
## 1. Venue and baselines
| | |
@@ -234,3 +234,172 @@ DR Recipe: present · Key Escrow: present
```
**Phase A gate: PASSED.** All seven records taken, sentinels listed **by name**.
---
## Phase B — the journey
**The rule: no command line inside the guest, at any point.** After the destruction the only things
that reached the guest were HTTP requests a browser could have made — plus the interventions counted
below, which is exactly why they are counted.
| # | step | result |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Destroy** — 11:21:12 | guest 9201 purged (both LVs), **both drives wiped to 4.0 K**. Host identity `rewalk-1ab77d` survived |
| 2 | **Reinstall** | `felhom-host-install.sh` **v1.25.0** fetched live from `felhom.eu/scripts/`; **Day-0 provision SUCCESS 11:25:03**, 2 m 25 s |
| 3 | **Fixed versions** | **hand step — and it was needed a SECOND time** (below) |
| 4 | **Claim back** | the emailed reset code (generation 2) worked **first try**, accents and all |
| 5 | **Log in** | **the recovery screen appeared without being sought**: `/` → `/launcher` → **`/recovery`** |
| 6 | **Read the screen** | all three questions answered (below) |
| 7 | **Enter the code** | HTTP 200 in **1.528 s** — a real unseal; key **recovered and placed** |
| 8 | **The listing** | **did not render** — the tier was not up. Dead end 1 |
| 9 | **Restore** | **all three sentinels byte-identical** |
### The reinstall DOWNGRADED the agent — R-216 part 4, live again
```
agent BEFORE the rebuild : 0.126.0 (hand-installed in Phase A)
agent AFTER the rebuild : 0.125.0 (the vouched version)
```
**An operator who fixes a box by hand has it re-broken by the next rebuild — which is precisely the
event that makes the recovery feature necessary.** Re-applied by hand, as §3.2 directs.
### Step 6 — the screen, read as a customer
> „Ezt a gépet újratelepítették. A korábbi, **házon kívüli mentéseid megvannak** — a Felhom központi
> rendszere őriz hozzájuk egy lezárt csomagot, amelyet **2026-08-06T09:14:10Z** zártunk le."
>
> „**A helyreállítási kódot senki nem tudja pótolni** — sem a Felhom, sem az ügyfélszolgálat, sem az
> üzemeltető… Ha a kód elveszett, a korábbi mentések nem nyithatók meg többé."
>
> „Ebben a lépésben **semmit nem állítunk vissza és semmi nem változik**."
All three of step 6's questions answered, and the seal date **matches the hub's `created_at` exactly**.
The set-aside option was correctly **withheld**, with its reason stated rather than the button merely
hidden. *(The seal date still renders as a raw RFC3339 string to a Hungarian household — the copy
defect Phase 1 recorded, still unfixed.)*
---
## The dead ends — TWO, against Phase 1's four
### Dead end 1 — the off-site tier never came up on its own (R-218's SECOND half)
**The declaration half works** — that part of R-218's fix is confirmed live:
```
11:43:07 recovery: the offsite repository key was recovered and placed (outcome=installed)
11:43:07 recovery: the offsite tier could not be brought up yet:
consume one-time password: no unconsumed offsite password (already consumed…)
11:44:57 (hub) offsiteheal: re-staged the stored one-time offsite secret for rewalk
(declared needs_credential across 2 reports) — the box re-consumes on its next cycle
```
**The consume half does not.** The hub re-staged at 11:44:57 and said *"the box re-consumes on its
next cycle"*. **The next cycle came and went** — `host-report from rewalk-1ab77d` at **11:55:46** and
`Received report from rewalk` at **11:55:54**, a full cycle, **with a positive control that the cycle
ran** — and the credential was still not consumed. Twenty-three minutes after the re-stage the box's
last off-site-apply attempt was still **11:43:07**, before it.
**What the customer sees meanwhile is honest but does not unblock them:** clicking the only relevant
control returns „**A távoli mentési cél nincs beállítva**", and the page says „*Felhom offsite tárhely
kiépítve — a beállítás automatikus, folyamatban. Ha egy napon belül nem áll be, jelezd az
üzemeltetőnek.*" **A census of the customer-reachable actions on that page** — `config`, `reset`,
`run`, `toggle` — **found none that fetches a staged credential.**
**The lever, and its cost:** `systemctl restart felhom-controller-bootstrap.service` **inside the
guest** — which breaks the journey's pass condition. It worked in **18 seconds**
(Campaign 11 measured 17):
```
12:06:16 restart
12:06:34 [offsite-apply] offsite configured for u629488-sub5@…:/home/felhom-repo
```
**Which confirms R-218 exactly: nothing was wrong with the credential, the target or the key — the
only thing missing was anything at all to trigger a retry.**
### Dead end 2 — R-220, the drives, reproduced and red-proved
`GET /api/disks/candidates` → `initialize: [], attach: []`, while both drives sat mounted at **both**
`/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` **and** the raw `/mnt/<name>` — the mount that enrolling them created.
```
before: initialize: [] attach: []
after : initialize: [/dev/sdb, /dev/sdc] (fstype ext4, data_bearing true)
```
Unmounting only the raw mounts flipped it. **That is a Proxmox-host action a customer cannot perform**,
so it counts. Without it no app can be redeployed, and **without a redeployed app the restore page is
empty** — „Nincs távoli mentésre jelölt alkalmazás" — which is R-213's territory and follows from this
one rather than being separate.
---
## THE VERDICT — both halves, separately
### The data: **PASS**
Restored in **23 seconds** out of snapshot **`a7bc23bd`** — the pre-destruction snapshot — through the
customer's own two-step full-restore flow (size gate `12.8 MB`, then confirm), non-destructively.
| # | file | bytes | expected = restored |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | `REWALK-SENTINEL-A.txt` | 62 | `1573b0e1…bacc705` **BYTE-IDENTICAL** |
| B | `REWALK-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` | 66 | `57676fcf…4fe74430` **BYTE-IDENTICAL** |
| C | `REWALK-SENTINEL-C-12MB.bin` | 12 582 912 | `c0faacd7…d9aa14e` **BYTE-IDENTICAL** |
**And the accented filename's BYTES are byte-identical too** — verified as hex, not as rendered text:
```
expected 524557414c4b2dc59172737a656d2dc3a96b657a657465732dc3a17276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912e747874
restored 524557414c4b2dc59172737a656d2dc3a96b657a657465732dc3a17276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912e747874
```
### The journey: **FAIL**
**Two steps needed a hand a customer does not have** — one inside the guest, one on the Proxmox host.
**Better than Phase 1's four, and not zero.**
### The RTO
| | |
|---|---|
| login (clock start) | **11:42:22** |
| recovery code accepted, key placed | 11:43:07 (**+45 s**) |
| off-site tier up — **after intervention 1** | 12:06:34 (**+24 m 12 s**) |
| all three sentinels restored and verified — **after intervention 2** | 12:12:35 (**+30 m 13 s**) |
**The unaided RTO remains UNDEFINED**, because the unaided journey still does not complete. **30 m 13 s
is the attended figure** and must not be quoted as the customer number. The only segment that reflects
the product working alone is the last one: **23 seconds to pull 12.8 MB back out of the off-site
repository once everything was in place.**
---
## Harness faults, separated from the product's
1. **The accented sentinel's filename was destroyed at creation** by the `base64 → bash → pct exec`
chain (U+FFFD), and **a Python `decode('utf-8')` check called it valid** — U+FFFD *is* valid UTF-8.
Only a hex dump exposed it. Rewritten from explicit bytes.
2. **The same trap bit twice more**, in the verification script: a non-ASCII Python literal was mangled
in transit and reported the accented sentinel as **MISSING**. Re-verified keyed on **hashes with no
non-ASCII anywhere in the script**. **Three occurrences in one session: never put non-ASCII inside a
script that crosses this chain.**
3. **`/api/storage/init` needs `fstype`** — omitting it failed with the honest
„nem támogatott fájlrendszer" and I read the first failure as the product's.
4. **Wrong field names** on two endpoints (`app` not `stack`; `path` not `mount_name`), each caught by
the endpoint's own refusal.
5. **A ping alone could not tell a collision from the box's own DHCP lease** — `192.168.0.140` answered
and looked taken; the **MAC** showed it was VM 322 itself.
## Venue constraints, recorded so they do not inflate the dead-end count
- The hub's host page shows the guest's LAN address as `—` **by design** (R-66), and this box is
LAN-only with no Cloudflare tunnel, so the address was found from the host's ARP table. A real
customer reaches `felhom.<domain>` through the tunnel. **Not a dead end.**
- The claim code arrives **by email**, which is R-119's recorded single human step. The operator
relayed it and it worked **first try**. **Not a dead end.**
- The hub still read "Claimed, generation 1" after the rebuild, because the box's claim state lived in
the destroyed guest; the reset-code path exists for exactly this and worked.