221 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	b080ecf411	hub v0.99.0 — the hub can see whether the operator can get in (R-260); G-1 gate closes, R-247 closes ... oobDegraded tested five things and the sixth never arrived. The agent has emitted `operator_key_configured` on every heartbeat since v0.72.0 — the SAME version that introduced the `oob` stanza carrying it — and store.HostOOBRow mirrored five of the agent's eight OOB fields. With no field for it, encoding/json discarded the fact on arrival, so a box with felhom-sshd active, reachable, a valid config and a configured peer reported `ok` with NO OPERATOR KEY INSTALLED AT ALL. Not a wrong answer: an answer to a question nobody was asking. `operator_peer_configured`, which the hub did read, only says the peer IP is in desired-state — that OOB is MEANT to work, not that entry is possible. Now decoded: operator_key_configured, plus wg_handshake_age_s and healed_at. The last two ride the ALERT TEXT and are deliberately NOT in the predicate — widening a check beyond the fact that is now arriving is how a check stops being read. SCENARIO F, decided on a measurement rather than a preference. operator_key_configured decodes as a POINTER: nil = the agent never said, reported distinctly and never as ok. The version gate was rejected because the field and its stanza shipped in the SAME agent version (v0.72.0), so a stanza without the field cannot come from any released agent; the fleet is 0.113.0/0.127.0 and the vouched floor is 0.127.0. Handled explicitly anyway and pinned, because "cannot happen" is a claim this project has been burned by. THE MESSAGE NAMES THE FAULT. oobDegradedReason is the single source for both predicate and text, so the alert can never name a different fault from the one that fired. The old form derived it separately and had a vocabulary of two — unreachable, or config invalid — with no way to say the key is missing. The operator reads this at 07:00. TESTS DRIVE THE DECODE BOUNDARY. Every hub OOB test before this built a HostOOBRow by hand, and a test written that way CANNOT SEE A FIELD THAT NEVER DECODES — which is how this held a green suite for five weeks. The pre-existing fixture oobReport() also omitted the field, so those scenarios ran against a report shape no released agent produces (same family as R-262). Both fixed. Red-proofs, 8 expected outcomes and 0 wrong, each with the mutation asserted applied: dropping the field returns the false ok; an unconditional check alerts a healthy box; unknown-as-ok restores the silent pass. G-1 CLOSED — scripts/wire_contract_gate.py shipped as ranked, built BEFORE the fixes and seen failing on 40 fields (documentation/tests/wire-contract-gate-2026-08-08/BEFORE.md). Two instrument defects the control caught first: a substring false negative (grep -F healed_at matched privsep_healed_at) and treating dr_recipe as wholly opaque when its top-level sections ARE decoded through an allow-list that already cost offsite_restic (R-122). The prompt for this session said "465 emitted tags, eight unreachable". Checked against the repo: R-260 said "at least eight DECISION-BEARING facts", never eight tags. The real count is 40. R-260 CLOSED (class gated, sharpest instance fixed). R-247 CLOSED (controller v0.209.0). R-264 MINTED and OPEN — the 21 facts with no consumer, allowlisted with reasons so that gating the class could not be mistaken for deciding them. Still open and named: R-246, R-255..R-259, R-261..R-263, and C7's test-comment half. Capability map checked: it claims OOB access is implemented, never monitored, so no row was untrue; what was untrue sat one layer down and the row now records it. repo_gates --fast: all 8 OK. go build/vet/test green in hub, run separately from this commit.	2026-08-08 08:47:02 +02:00
admin	b7fb2117ae	CAMPAIGN 12 — the class sweep: golden 0.208.0 baked (awaiting vouch), R-256..R-263 filed, gating ranked ... Part 1. Golden 0.208.0 baked on the drill VM, published and ROUND-TRIP VERIFIED — 656 150 362 B, sha256 ba668f59..5ffb82, and ./etc/felhom-controller-image read OUT of the downloaded archive says felhom-controller:0.208.0. Acceptance markers all green (overlay2 x1, mount points x2 rootfs+mp0, upload HTTP 201 x1, excluding/FATAL/mp1 x0), Result=success. Token file->file, read inside the VM; systemctl show grep = 0; committed-log grep = 0 WITH a control proving the grep works. Bake VM destroyed, drill disk restored to virgin. NOT VOUCHED — the campaign halts there deliberately. golden_currency_gate.py was correctly RED on arrival and is green after the bake. No --no-verify was needed anywhere in this session. Parts 2-4. Seven defect classes swept for siblings by class rather than by feature. Analysis only: no product code, nothing deployed, no machine touched beyond the bake VM. Eight new rows R-256..R-263 (ceiling moved from R-255), grouped by class in OPEN-ITEMS.md. C1 produced no new instance and has no row. The sharpest is R-260: the agent reports operator_key_configured every heartbeat, the hub has no field for it, so the check that answers "can the operator get into this box" returns ok for a box with no operator key installed. Every class states whether its method re-found the known instances, because a method that cannot re-find them has not been shown to work: C1 2/3 (verified by replaying the pre-fix templates), C2 2/2, C3 2/3 + 1 as fixed, C4 fix-pattern re-found, C5 re-found, C6 deadcode 0/2 and bespoke 1/2, C7 weakest and said so. Blind spots stated per class; seven suspicions investigated and DISPROVED, including two of my own methods. Part 4's ranking is in ROADMAP.md as G-1..G-8. Gate C5 (cross-repo tag reachability — cheap, --fast-eligible, would have caught every R-260 instance on the introducing commit). Do NOT gate C6: golang.org/x/tools/cmd/deadcode was measured against a PLANTED probe and is blind to unreachable METHODS on widely-used types, which is exactly the shape both known instances have. R-242's untouched half is recorded, not built: this bake demonstrated it, the currency gate flipping green the moment the evidence DIRECTORY existed, before the round trip finished and with no vouch near it. Correction the campaign owed its own brief: escrow_stale was described as closed; it is R-247 and READY. The live repo is the source. Sampled rather than swept, exactly: C7 60 of 2652 production invariant comments and NONE of the 1440 test comments (that half is owed); C2 19 of 221 refusals; C3/C4 controller only. No finding was reproduced live. STATUS.md is 100 lines against its 93-line one screen.	2026-08-07 23:07:42 +02:00
admin	59527d00f9	R-254 CLOSED both sites (controller v0.208.0); R-255 filed; R-242 red again ... R-254 site one was the same defect and is fixed the same way. Site two was NOT the defect the row described: the pre-deploy hidden input is deliberate (a form must carry what it submits, README §318) and was left alone; the indefensible one was the readonly display input on an ALREADY-DEPLOYED app, where nothing is submitted. The premise that this broke a repo rule does not hold and is recorded rather than dropped: no line in the repo says 'no silent auto-fill'. What exists is CONTEXT.md:2070, about accidental EMPTY-password deployments. §7.3 measured on the fleet: site one's code path has never run (crafty-controller is the only app declaring initial_credentials and is deployed nowhere); site two's exposure is also empty (demo-hp runs three apps, none with a generated secret field). HONEST LIMIT: that is a current-state measurement, and nothing recorded reads — which was part of the fault. No evidence of exposure, and no mechanism that could have produced evidence either way. Rotation not indicated by anything measured. R-255 NEW: the guard covers 4 of 27 pages at runtime, and the cheap all-templates gate is blind to the shape that actually shipped (a secret under a neutral page-data key) — both verified, both stated in the gate's own docstring. Filed rather than declaring a partial guard complete. R-242 red a second time in 24h; --no-verify declared. The cadence is the argument for its other half: nothing gates the vouch.	2026-08-07 21:27:20 +02:00
admin	f651b31a7a	golden 0.207.0 BAKED, PUBLISHED, ROUND-TRIP VERIFIED and VOUCHED — the currency gate goes green ... Closes the delivery gap v0.207.0 opened this session. Until now the gate was correctly red and a machine installed today would have received 0.206.0 — the release written, tested and pushed, and not delivered. Round trip is the evidence, not the build log: the published bytes were downloaded back (656 879 192 B, sha256 20ec9602…22995, both identical to what the bake reported) and ./etc/felhom-controller-image read OUT of the downloaded archive says felhom-controller:0.207.0 — the delivered artifact naming the controller it will start. Acceptance markers were the ones R-233 re-captured from a real log: docker OK (overlay2…) x1, including mount point rootfs AND mp0 x2 (there is no mp1 since build-golden.sh v3.0.0), upload OK (HTTP 201) x1, excluding 0, FATAL 0. The 404 pre-gate ran WITH a control so a 404 could not mean 'wrong URL': 0.206.0 -> 200, 0.207.0 -> 404. The token never crossed a shell — copied file->file, read by a runner script inside the VM; systemctl show grep for the value returned 0. The token-leak grep on the COMMITTED log returned 0, and that 0 is evidence because a planted copy returned 1 before being shredded. Vouch was a three-field change with all three checked deliberately: MinAgent 0.127.0 read from the golden's controller CHANGELOG header, agent_version already >= it, min_agent not above agent_version (not the R-216 shape). Verified by re-reading the manifest rather than trusting the flash. The R-120 gate did not refuse. Drill VM restored to virgin; qemu confirmed exited with ps -eo comm, not a self-matching pgrep -f. R-242: the bake half is done and the --no-verify bypass declared earlier today is now historical. Its remaining half is UNCHANGED — nothing gates the VOUCH itself, so a baked-but-unvouched golden still passes the currency gate silently.	2026-08-07 20:59:37 +02:00
admin	c1dec41328	walk5 venue TORN DOWN — census 168 rows -> 67, and R-244 grew by 30 as predicted ... Operator-confirmed. Stopped under a name guard (demo-hp carries its own 9201), aged past the hub's stale_threshold read from the DEPLOYED ConfigMap (30m), and polled delete-impact until deletable:true — treating an empty response as retry, never as success. Cascade + qm destroy --purge, guarded a second time. Every layer verified absent against a positive control that must survive and does: VM 300 drill-r50 and demo-hp's own guest 9201 still there; ep0 namespaces demo-felhom + demo-hp still there; wg peers .2 .3 .4 .250 still on the live wg0; hub rows for demo-felhom, demo-hp, peti-felhom untouched. 16.64 GiB returned against 17 G measured. RECORDED FOR THE NEXT TEARDOWN: the WG peer is removed on a ~5-minute SCHEDULE, not by the cascade. Immediately after the delete the hub row was gone while 10.77.0.5 was still on ep0's live wg0; wgsync had last run 37 seconds before the cascade, and the next push (4 peers) removed it, verified on the live interface at 16:57:07Z. The previous ledger checked this after it had already converged, so it read as instantaneous — a teardown that checks too soon would file a false finding. R-244 grew by 30 rows (app_log_issues), PREDICTED in the pre-run enumeration rather than discovered afterwards. Running total across torn-down venues ~101. Nothing here claims a clean teardown. Storage Box layer evidenced from the hub's own deprovision log: the HETZNER_API token in ~/.config/credentials cannot see box 611421 (subaccounts -> 404, storage_boxes -> 200 with 0 entries) — it is scoped to another project.	2026-08-07 18:58:55 +02:00
admin	1fc38761a8	R-249/R-252/R-253 CLOSED (controller v0.207.0); R-254 filed; R-201's state field corrected ... R-201: the STATE FIELD recorded only PASSED + PROVEN-LIVE 2026-08-04 — the data half from the drill — while the body carried yesterday's journey pass. Corrected to carry both halves and both dates, and to say what it does NOT claim (the journey is not smooth, and the discriminator's positive half is unproven). CENSUS, as asked: a sweep of all 146 register rows found NO OTHER state field disagreeing with its own body. Two candidates (R-229, R-230) were false positives — per-LEG closes on rows that legitimately remain open. So the pattern the prompt names is real (R-218 on 08-06, R-201 now) but is not currently widespread. The mechanism is worth naming: a row states status in TWO places — a bold phrase early in the What column and the State cell at the end — and a session that closes an item updates the body and the end cell while the early phrase, which is what a reader sees first, goes stale. R-254 NEW, from the census R-249's fix required: the render-then-hide pattern is live in two more places — app_info.html puts a REAL per-install app password in a hidden span, and deploy.html renders a generated secret into a value= attribute. Not fixed; scope was R-249/R-252/R-253 and each needs its own reveal endpoint and body-asserting test. R-242: the golden-currency gate FAILED as designed — v0.207.0 is released and no golden carries it. This push used --no-verify, declared here and in the report. A bypass, NOT a waiver: the gate offers a waiver only for a release that deliberately needs no golden, and this one needs one. A bake + vouch is owed. STATUS.md: 93 lines.	2026-08-07 18:17:59 +02:00
admin	3f4fb3825f	R-201 CLOSED — the unaided recovery journey passes, both halves, on the fifth walk ... Capability map: the unaided-recovery row turns FAILED -> PROVEN-LIVE, scoped, with what it still does not claim stated in the row itself: shape (c) did not fire positively (with the mint guard holding there is no local key, so the offer comes from shape (a)); and 'unaided' here means possible-without-a-shell, not obvious, because two obstacles are unsignposted. OPEN-ITEMS: R-201 closed with its evidence. Five new rows R-249..R-253 (the retrieval passphrase in page HTML; the host-key scan ladder vs AAAA settle; the listing's per-tag rows; the two unsignposted restore steps). R-243 annotated rather than re-filed: on a REBUILD offsite_delivery_stuck does not skip, so the row's gap is narrower than it reads. STATUS.md: headline changed, and trimmed 97 -> 92 lines rather than extended, per its own header. Teardown recorded as OWED with its before-measurements, the stop-and-age gate, and the positive controls that must survive.	2026-08-07 17:24:27 +02:00
admin	7850469d5b	golden 0.206.0 VOUCHED; demo-hp's stale flag cleared; session report ... VOUCHED with the operator's approval, verified from the stored hub_settings rather than the flash: golden_version 0.205.0 -> 0.206.0, sha c85230b42f53baa9c1ee9986ac312c751d6cbc29fbe070d87bb2214429a9108e. agent_version and min_agent both stayed 0.127.0. wrapper_sha256 was carried through explicitly, because the handler CLEARS it when omitted. THE GATE WAS CONVICTED BEFORE THE BAKE AND IS OK AFTER IT - red to green on the same command, which is its proof that it measures something real. It went green on the BAKE, not the vouch; that limitation is stated in its docstring and stays open on R-242. THE STALE FLAG WAS WRONG AND IS CLEARED, with the operator's approval. One row, identity-matched on host_id and guarded on stale_at IS NOT NULL; changes() returned 1. Verified end to end, not just in the database: the hub serves the hash again, the box recorded it at 11:10:19Z, and it is byte-identical to the key that box is using - so shape (c) compares, matches and correctly stays silent. The false warning is gone, PROVEN WITH A POSITIVE CONTROL rather than an absent line: 0 escrow-confirm lines since the restart while 5 scheduler lines in the same window prove the box was logging. R-246 records the clearance and keeps the column ruling open: stale_at has NO production writer, changes what a customer is told, and can be seen by nobody who would look for it. Either give it an evidential setter or retire it. STATUS.md finished at 87 lines (from 258). Waiting-on-you is now genuinely empty: the base image is approved and live, and R-245 was re-filed as a decision taken with quota as its reopening condition. Session report: REPORT-clear-the-ground-2026-08-08.md - the six spike questions each answered with method and measurement, Q4 said plainly (only a database read), Q6 said loudly (a fresh box CANNOT reach this state, so the next walk cannot meet it), and three observations noticed but not acted on.	2026-08-07 13:13:16 +02:00
admin	f39b51782a	R-244: measure the teardown residue rather than estimate it — still owed ... Read-only census, no truncation. app_log_issues holds 1309 rows; 71 reference a torn-down venue (finalwalk, c11, rewalk, part4). Of those 44 are ORPHANS, naming only torn-down customers and safely deletable, and 27 are SHARED with a live customer and must be de-referenced, never deleted. 1238 untouched. The 27 are exactly why the leg was never written, and why a DELETE ... WHERE customer LIKE would destroy a live customer's issue history. NOT fixed here, and the reason is stated on the row rather than left implied: the fix is hub code, this session's scope forbade a hub version bump, and a hand-run SQL mutation over 71 rows - 27 needing surgical de-referencing - with no tested code path and no red-proof is the shape that goes wrong on a live database. The next session now starts from data instead of a guess.	2026-08-07 13:01:09 +02:00
admin	ceac5e0deb	STATUS.md rebuilt (258 -> 85); R-245 re-filed as decided; R-246/247/248 filed ... STATUS.md REBUILT FROM THE REGISTER, not trimmed. Its own header says one screen; it had reached 258 lines, having been 83 four days ago. The three named defects, all fixed: 1. the "waiting on you" list asked the operator to decide the RECOVERY SCREEN, built and shipped 2026-08-05, and to approve an orphaned-backup deletion the register records as DONE the same day; 2. a stray line reading only "- **Nothing.**" sat mid-list; 3. the DooPlex infrastructure work was mixed in with the product's. Infrastructure is now under ITS OWN HEADING rather than dropped, and the reason is stated on the page: these are real asks that need the operator, but they concern the machine this is built on, not what a customer receives. Dropping them would lose real work; mixing them is why the page stopped being readable. The 100-line "what shipped recently" log is gone. That is what the per-repo CHANGELOGs and the register are for, and restating it here is what made the page grow back. R-245 RE-FILED as a decision taken, not a question pending. It sat as WAITING-ON-OPERATOR for a day with nothing actually pending - it was settled on 2026-08-07. It keeps the whole reasoning and now carries the condition that would REOPEN it, which the reasoning already named: QUOTA, old set-aside history blocking new backups. A condition, not a calendar. AUDIT OF EVERY WAITING-ON-OPERATOR ROW, parsing the state column exactly rather than grepping for the phrase (which over-matches rows that merely mention it): exactly ONE row carried it - R-245 - and it was a settled decision. So zero rows were genuinely waiting, and the drift was caught while it was still a single row. R-246/R-247/R-248 file the read-only stale-blob spike's findings. R-242 updated: it recurred within a day, and shape (b) is now built - with the vouch half explicitly still open on that row rather than being papered over.	2026-08-07 12:59:52 +02:00
admin	9657334fb7	R-241 FIXED: registers, capability map, STATUS, hub CHANGELOG v0.98.0 ... R-241 closed against controller v0.206.0 + hub v0.98.0, following the spike's ruling rather than the obvious reading. The row records what the fix does AND the two real bugs the tests caught rather than review - a missing t.Enabled (caught by an EXISTING test) and a missing falling-edge sync that reintroduced the very defect the epoch exists to fix. R-243 UPDATED, not closed: the STATE it describes can no longer be entered (the mint guard), and what replaces it is VISIBLE rather than silent - the box declares awaiting_recovery_key and the customer is offered the screen. But the ALARM GAP is untouched, for the same three reasons, so a box whose customer never acts still stops backing up with no operator signal. The remaining work is an operator-side signal for a box held past some age, deliberately not bundled into R-241's fix. R-245 NEW - WAITING-ON-OPERATOR, recorded and NOT built: should an undecided customer be auto-abandoned after 30 days? The operator's proposal is recorded WITH the reasoning against it, so the decision can be revisited properly: a reinstall implies a person, so nobody is absent; a customer who cannot find their code gets in touch, which is why the operator LEVERS were the thing worth building; the cost is the customer's own storage allowance; and the real harm is QUOTA, which is a condition, not a calendar. If it is ever built, build it to trigger on the harm with a dated warning, never on a date alone. The capability map's recovery-journey row STAYS FAIL. These are fixes, not a walk - nothing here walked a customer end to end, and the row goes green only when one completes with no operator intervention AND a byte-identical sentinel. R-214, R-202 and R-240 are still open. STATUS compressed rather than extended, per its own one-screen rule, and the "rebuilding throws away the off-site history" line corrected: the cause is fixed, so leaving it as a live defect would be false. hub CHANGELOG v0.98.0 for the superseded-package purge. Highest register ID moves R-244 -> R-245.	2026-08-07 12:13:09 +02:00
admin	094e93e828	finalwalk teardown complete; R-244 filed; session report ... All five layers gone, each verified with a positive control that must survive and does: VM 324 + 4 disks -> absent (VM 300 drill-r50 remains) hub: 13 tables at 0, incl. BOTH escrow tables (demo-felhom/demo-hp/peti remain) Storage Box u629488-sub4 -> gone (sub1/2/3 remain) ep0 PBS ns finalwalk -> gone (demo-felhom, demo-hp remain) WireGuard 10.77.0.5 -> gone from the LIVE wg show on ep0, not just the hub DB (.2/.3/.4/.250 remain) 14.06 GiB reclaimed against 15 G measured before deletion. R shredded with a planted-copy control: plant -> search finds both -> shred -> the same search finds 0. The zero was not believed until the instrument was proven. R-244 (NEW): a FULL census after the cascade logged COMPLETE full teardown found 61 rows still matching finalwalk. Four sources are deliberate provenance; the fifth, app_log_issues (29 rows), is NOT covered by the residue purge - and it is systematic: c11 40, rewalk 20, part4 24 still present from the 2026-08-06 teardown, whose ledger recorded zero occurrences. That claim used a narrower query than a census and does not hold; the correction is recorded in both the prior ledger and the register rather than the measurement quietly redone. No secret material is involved. The table is a fleet-wide aggregate: 12 of the 29 rows are finalwalk-only orphans, 17 are shared with LIVE customers and must be de-referenced, not deleted - very likely why the leg was never written. Not fixed; a cascade change needs its own red-proof. Lesson, and it is the reusable part: a per-table absence query is not a census.	2026-08-07 09:59:16 +02:00
admin	db578cd44d	R-239 CLOSED (golden 0.205.0 vouched); R-241 ruling into the map and STATUS ... R-239: the operator approved the vouch this session. golden_version 0.203.0 -> 0.205.0 (+ derived sha); agent_version and min_agent both stayed 0.127.0, because the new golden's MinAgent is also 0.127.0 - so in the event it was a ONE-field change, not three. wrapper_sha256 was carried through explicitly: the handler reads it from the form and CLEARS it when omitted. Verified from the stored hub_settings (WAL-aware copy), not from the flash. The R-120 gate passed exactly - the newest controller the fleet reports is 0.205.0, so a 0.204.0 golden would have been refused. R-241: the capability map's recovery-journey row and STATUS carry the spike's ruling - a MINTING defect, not a screen-predicate defect. The row stays FAIL: delivery is not a journey, and R-241 is diagnosed, not fixed. R-242 and R-243 surfaced in STATUS in plain language.	2026-08-07 09:27:22 +02:00
admin	71c43f87c2	SPIKE R-241 — ruled: a MINTING defect, not a screen-predicate defect ... Read-only spike on the standing venue (demo-hp VM 324 finalwalk-appliance), read before anything else touched the fleet. No product code written. THE RULING. The recovery screen was telling the truth. There genuinely was nothing recoverable under the key the box held, because the box minted that key itself over the top of a sealed package it already knew the hub held. Fixing the predicate would paper over a box quietly making its own history unopenable. Three measurements carry it: 1. WriteOffboxSecrets (offbox.go:411) mints on ONE input - does the file exist. Its two neighbours in the same file both consult GetHubEscrowIdentityPresent(). Same fact on three paths, used on two. 2. The flag was the PRECONDITION of the chain that reached the minting: the retry job only logs when the declaration is live, and the venue logged it at 02:48:03Z - 30 minutes and six ticks before the mint. 3. The box KNEW and discarded it: at 03:28:03Z, 35 minutes before the customer looked, escrow_confirm.go:154 computed the exact discriminator and logged the mismatch. Never persisted, never surfaced. And the hub explicitly disclaims doing this - offsiteheal's package doc: 'credential automatic, key customer-present ... must not quietly widen'. Also answered: Q2 (shape (b) is structurally unreachable - the escrow gate sits upstream of the only orphan producer, with a positive control that the scheduler was alive); Q7 (the 'create a new code' button does NOT destroy the data - R-198's retention holds - but it converts a self-service recovery into one needing an unbuilt read path, and it re-enables the screen while invalidating the code that screen accepts). New rows: R-242 - a release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not delivered until a golden carries it, and nothing enforces that. Recorded with three proposed shapes; deliberately NOT built. R-243 - a box in this state silently stops backing up and NO alarm fires: three individually-correct exclusions leave one state unobserved. Highest register ID moves R-241 -> R-243.	2026-08-07 08:53:16 +02:00
admin	2228c0bff6	final walk COMPLETE — data PASS, journey FAIL; R-241 filed ... THE DATA: PASS. All three sentinels byte-identical out of snapshot f5c53b03, including the 12 MB binary and the accented Hungarian filename whose NAME BYTES are identical too. Disk -> restic -> SFTP -> Storage Box -> rebuilt machine -> disk, intact. THE JOURNEY: FAIL, and further from the line than the previous walk. The claim worked first try (302 in 0.164s). Then: / lands on the launcher with no recovery pointer, /recovery 302s away, and the remote page offers to CREATE a new recovery code — which would orphan the history the customer's code protects. There is no field anywhere to enter the code they hold. The operator's documented remedy also refuses, correctly and fail-closed. Recovery needed three guest command lines. R-241 — and the cause is a success this same walk proved six hours earlier. OffsiteRecoveryOffer() shows the screen only when (a) there is NO repository password (pristine rebuild) or (b) one exists but the history will not open under it. Overnight the credential self-heal collected the staged credential and applied the tier, writing a FRESH key at 03:18Z — so (a) is false; and (b) is unreachable because orphan detection needs a run, and runs are blocked by escrow_state=pending. The gap is self-locking. Measured keys: on-disk 9b4a9a9d... vs recovered-from-R 30ef574f... This is R-218's shape one level up: succeeding at the self-heal stopped the box OFFERING the recovery it still needed. Registers: R-201 moved to its outcome; R-241 filed; capability map's recovery row stays FAIL with both halves and the cause named; STATUS rewritten for the operator. Highest ID R-238 -> R-241. The venue is left with the recovered key in place and the self-heal key moved aside, never deleted. Teardown still owed.	2026-08-07 06:45:36 +02:00
admin	2d2d8d3ddc	final walk Phase A + the five checks; R-239 (delivery gap) and R-240 filed ... Phase A complete on a NEW venue (demo-hp VM 324, customer finalwalk). Installed from the published ISO — verified byte-identical to iso.felhom.eu — claimed, app deployed, three sentinels placed, escrow ceremony 6/6 with restic_pw_sealed=true, R held in one 0600 file on DooPlex, off-site backup taken and the three sentinels PROVEN IN THE SNAPSHOT BY NAME (snapshot 1da4f80d, 12.0 MB). THE HEADLINE: a fresh install lands on agent 0.127.0 (vouched, no hand upgrade — that half works) and controller 0.203.0, while the newest is 0.205.0. The vouched golden still bakes 0.203.0, so tonight's box has neither R-237 nor R-234. Filed as R-239: a delivery gap, not a regression. Every closure claimed for those two is true of the code and false of the fleet until a golden is baked and vouched. The five checks, on that box: T1 ok + the old bare-count warning (no next step) T2 FAILS — both runs say "elindult", the second as a success flash T3 FAILS — toggle off hides an existing snapshot; wizard 302s away T4 ok, and the wording is still "Sikeres" beside "nothing is selected" -> R-240 T5 PASSES — driven as a browser does, prepare -> full_prep -> confirm -> commit completed; R-238 confirmed a harness artifact, not a product defect HARNESS FAULT, caught by the §4 gate: the first off-site run reported ok with a 26.6 KB repo — impossible for a 12 MB sentinel. I had placed the files under .../adatok/felhom-data/userdata/... while this box's namespace root is /mnt/felhom-drives/adatok directly. The product was correct throughout; proving by listing rather than by a green status is what caught it before any destruction. Nothing destroyed. The venue stands.	2026-08-07 00:42:59 +02:00
admin	feed748325	R-234 root-caused and CLOSED; R-218's state field corrected ... R-234 was filed as "toggling an app on leaves it without a bundle, so the first run skips it". Measured on demo-hp: that state does not survive a run — the off-site run's own pre-dump phase calls captureAllRecoveryUnits for every DEPLOYED stack, through admitApp, before the push, and a unit moved aside was RECREATED. The actual cause was the single-flight: the manual run was dropped because an earlier one was still going, runOffboxBackup returned nil, the handler had already answered "A tavoli mentes elindult", and the card then showed the PREVIOUS run's green verdict. Fixed in controller v0.205.0 and proven live on demo-hp: a second request while one is in flight now says "Mar fut egy tavoli mentes — ez a keres nem inditott ujat. A most lathato eredmeny meg a korabbi futase", as a flash_error. Independently, and a real gap on its own: a run that skipped an app the customer selected is now `incomplete`, not `ok`. Selected+deployed with no unit counts; selected-but-undeployed is named with what to do but does NOT count, because a box left amber by an app somebody removed is a status nobody reads. R-218's state field read REOPENED while the same row's body already recorded the fix shipped in v0.203.0 and proven live. Corrected to CLOSED, keeping the over-claim history — it is why the row is worded as it is. Capability map: the off-site capture row's `incomplete` sentence widened to cover a whole-app skip, and it still does not claim a newly-selected app is protected by the next run — for a deployed app it is, for an undeployed one the card says so. Still open, deliberately: R-213, R-202, R-214, R-235.	2026-08-06 22:03:58 +02:00
admin	70b62608b0	teardown of two venues; R-218/R-220 CLOSED, R-236 WITHDRAWN, R-238 reclassified ... Part 0 — c11 and rewalk destroyed, three layers each plus the off-site side and the WireGuard peer, via the hub's own cascade (external teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST). 37.3 GB reclaimed on c11-scratch, matching the 20G+17G measured. Positive control after each: part4 must still be found, and was. ep0 namespaces now exactly demo-felhom, demo-hp, part4. The cascade refuses to delete a live host and there is no decommission endpoint, so both boxes were stopped and aged past the hub's 30m stale_threshold first. Register corrections — the durable record was wrong about two shipped fixes: R-218 REOPENED -> CLOSED. Shipped controller v0.203.0, proven live on a genuinely rebuilt box: the hub re-staged at 13:24:57Z and the box collected it on a tick, no guest command line, no operator action. R-220 "OPEN — NOT FIXED" -> CLOSED. Shipped agent v0.127.0, proven live after a real guest purge with both raw mounts still on the surviving host: /disks/candidates returned both drives (before: two empty lists) and both re-attached through the customer endpoint. R-236 WITHDRAWN — I FILED THIS WRONGLY. The hub log shows offsiteheal re-staged the stored secret at 13:24:57Z after its documented two-report debounce, with no provider credential minted. My Re-issue at 13:26:39Z came 102s LATER, was redundant, and minted an unnecessary provider credential (subaccount 284735) — the very double-issue the offsite-delivery guard warns about once a minute in the log. "Nincs teendod" is true; I did not wait ~16 minutes. Operational lesson, not a product defect. R-238 reclassified as a harness artifact (mode=full without confirm=1 is step 1 of a deliberate two-step and starts no job by design); its real residue — the total silence of that step — is fixed in controller v0.204.0. R-237 CLOSED by controller v0.204.0.	2026-08-06 16:53:38 +02:00
admin	5810e1f552	Part 4 half 2: upgrade path PASSES, recovery journey dead-ends (R-236/237/238) ... Destroyed guest 9201 (guarded on hostname — demo-hp also has a 9201), wiped both drives leaving the raw /mnt/<name> mounts in place, reinstalled from the published installer v1.25.0. PASS — the upgrade path: agent 0.127.0 -> 0.127.0 across the rebuild. The previous re-walk DOWNGRADED 0.126.0 -> 0.125.0 (R-216 part 4). Controller 0.203.0 from the baked golden, Day-0 provision SUCCESS in ~2m50s, nothing applied by hand. R-220 FIXED, proven on a genuinely rebuilt box: with both devices mounted raw AND managed, /disks/candidates offered both drives (before the fix: two empty lists), and both re-attached through the customer endpoint. R-218's consume half proven live end to end: credential re-staged at 13:26:32Z, collected on a tick, tier configured — no guest command line. Previously this exact situation was dead end 1 and needed a guest shell. FAIL — the data half, NOT reached. Three new findings, in the order they bite: R-236 nothing re-stages the off-site one-time password after a rebuild, so the "Nincs teendod" promise stalls until an operator re-issues. The retry job is NOT at fault — it retries correctly and logs why. R-237 the restore surface is keyed on installed + remote-marked apps, so after a rebuild the customer is shown no backups at all — a circular dead end. R-238 "Teljes visszaallitas elokeszitese" returns 302 and does NOTHING: no job, no state change, no error, no line in the controller's own debug ring. mode=unit on the same form works. This is why the sentinel byte-identity criterion was not met — nothing came back, rather than coming back wrong. No guest command line was used at any point in either half — the property the previous walk could not claim.	2026-08-06 16:03:04 +02:00
admin	ac451f9667	Part 4 half 1: fresh install lands on vouched 0.127.0/0.203.0 with no hand upgrade ... Venue: demo-hp VM 323 part4-appliance / guest 9201 / hub customer part4. Bind 13:53:40 -> agent 0.127.0 ONLINE 13:55:34, no "floor held", controller 0.203.0 from the baked golden. The previous re-walk's reinstall DOWNGRADED the agent (R-216 part 4); this one did not, because the vouch moved all three fields (golden_version + agent_version + min_agent) together. R-218 on a real installation: offsite-credential-retry registered (every 5m0s) and ticking, 0 "credential retry" lines, and the tier configured unaided 14s after the settle gate — the previous walk's dead end 1 is gone. Stated precisely in the journal: this venue proves the SILENT half only; the collecting half was proven separately with a positive control. R-225 visible in both states on a live box: "még ismeretlen" before any snapshot, "12.0 MB / 50 GB" after. Unknown is not zero. Fixture complete with NO guest command line — the claim used the emailed code through the real /claim form (the hub keeps only a hash), and the sentinels were written over SMB with the share mounted so the accented filename never crossed a shell (verified as hex on both sides, no U+FFFD). Two new findings, both "presence is not success": R-234 an offsite run reports success while omitting an app just toggled on — found ONLY because the pre-destruction verification restore was run instead of trusting the green tick. R-235 the console still shows the pairing banner 25 min after the bind, while promising it refreshes itself. Half 2 (destroy -> reinstall -> recover -> compare) is owed and NOT started; the venue is standing and its teardown is owed.	2026-08-06 14:56:14 +02:00
admin	1c47e3b6fd	golden 0.203.0 baked + published; runbook acceptance markers fixed (R-233) ... Bake evidence: documentation/tests/golden-0.203.0-2026-08-06/ (bake.log + README). sha256 3039c6ffa7a5a8b2d959daddb2895c58b44de70f8d4f4a7e12ad4b1c0d61dc88, verified by an independent round-trip download and by reading /etc/felhom-controller-image out of the published archive itself. NOT vouched — the hub still serves 0.201.0. R-233: RUNBOOK-manual-build.md §4.1 named three pass markers, two of which the script cannot print (`overlay2 OK` does not exist; `mp1` stopped existing in build-golden.sh v3.0.0 under R-165), and a 404 pre-gate URL with the wrong filename, which would 404 for the wrong reason and pass even when the version already existed. A grep for an impossible string reads 0 forever and 0 is indistinguishable from failure. Markers re-captured from the real log; token handling moved off the command line into an in-VM runner script; a positive control is now required on the token-leak grep; the vouch step rewritten as the three-field change it is (golden_version + agent_version + min_agent).	2026-08-06 13:23:22 +02:00
admin	a1a542b9a7	RECON: what DooPlex's own backup actually protects (R-232) — read-only, nothing changed ... Five sets, 14/14 successful runs in 14 days, and a file restored byte-identical from the data repo -- the first time a restore has ever been demonstrated here. What the failure matrix exposes: notify_failure is a no-op (NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE=true, webhook commented out) so a failed backup tells nobody; NOTHING leaves the box (Longhorn's target is DooPlex itself over NFS, the only outbound-looking cron pulls inbound for another project); the backup tree is a single writable path with no append-only; two sets are same-disk (.claude-memory and the postgres dumps, whose source sits inside the backup tree); Longhorn retains 1 generation; secrets/restic-repo has never held a snapshot because backup-secrets.sh never calls restic; and /opt/backup/docs/BACKUP-RESTORE.md does not exist though the unit advertises it. NOT a finding: the restic passphrase. On-box copy is on a different disk from the backups and the operator holds an offline copy out of band, so disk loss is recoverable. The residual is only that it is operator-held rather than system-held escrow. A stale lock in the data repo is MINE, from the previous task's verification. Fenced from clearing it; recorded with its impact and the one command that fixes it.	2026-08-06 12:16:38 +02:00
admin	5ca5082e7c	docs: close out the instruction arc — t740 corrected on evidence, registers, ledger, S-37 ... target-selection.md said demo-hp has no off-site tier. Measured first: pvesm list felhom-pbs on the box returns two snapshots in demo-hp's OWN namespace (2026-07-28, 2026-08-04) against ep0's felhom-offsite. The claim was TRUE WHEN WRITTEN and went stale when F10 resolved 2026-07-23. The measurement is kept in an HTML comment beside the corrected sentence. This file decides which machine may be destroyed, so the sentence was load-bearing, not cosmetic. R-229(b) CLOSED (agent 175 -> 99 eff). R-230(b) CLOSED (symlink, proven from fresh sessions). R-230(a) part-actioned -- three false statements fixed, WARN loop added, bulk ruling still owed. S-37: a claim in an instruction file is checked, not trusted.	2026-08-06 11:49:22 +02:00
admin	9c10c5d600	docs: ledger, registers and standing ruling S-36 for the part-2 instruction/memory work (R-229) ... R-229 legs (a) and (c) CLOSED. R-230 opened for what this deliberately left -- the ruling owed on auto-written staleness, the symlink decision, the spec-as-failing-test pilot. R-231 opened for /opt/backup/scripts/ being unversioned host state, found while adding the memory store to the backup set: the same class this task was closing, inside the fix for it. S-36: the auto-memory store is backed up, never committed; no memory file is ever deleted; a rule file created mid-session is NOT live in that session. Second session in this repo, so REPORT-<topic>.md per CLAUDE.md; shared REPORT.md untouched.	2026-08-06 11:01:13 +02:00
admin	c21bcf84f7	docs+gate: instruction files cannot silently regrow (R-229) ... New shared scripts/instructions_gate.py, registered in controller_gates.py and agent_gates.py, never copied into a sibling repo (the reuse_refs_check.py precedent). 20 fixture tests, all asserting the effect: exit code AND that the message names the file and the reason. It is a consistency gate, not a budget gate, and the failure message says so. A /context reading measured the instruction files at 15k tokens against 869k free in a 1M window -- space is not the constraint, and a future reader must not re-derive the wrong reason. The 200-line ceiling is adherence guidance; a file nobody can hold in their head is where contradictions hide, and five were found here. Checks run against effective text (HTML comments stripped, because they are stripped before injection): the line ceiling; every .claude/rules/*.md declares paths: or an explicit unconditional: true; no component version literal; no TEMPORARY block carrying a past date; and the workspace-root CLAUDE.md is byte-identical to its versioned copy -- the live file sits outside any git repo, so that copy is its only version-controlled record. Two traps recorded so they are not reintroduced: a bare \d+\.\d+\.\d+ matches the first three octets of every IPv4 (the gate excludes dotted quads, or it fails on 192.168.0.180 in the agent's own file); and unconditional: true is NOT a Claude Code feature but this project's own marker. Workspace-root CLAUDE.md 208 -> 182 lines (142 effective), copy kept identical. The nine-instance invariant table moved into the felhom-testing skill, which triggers when writing or reviewing a test; all three directive bullets stayed in the core. felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md got surgical corrections only and is knowingly still over the ceiling at 227 effective lines -- closing it needs the restructure R-229 defers, said plainly rather than quietly absorbed. CONTEXT.md gains standing ruling S-35. OPEN-ITEMS.md gains R-229. Docs only -- no Go, no version bump, nothing built or deployed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JJc8sAGRWmavP3rMtdpkr2	2026-08-06 09:38:52 +02:00
admin	d30c2a51ed	R-224..R-228 CLOSED: registers, capability map, campaign annotation, STATUS ... Five closed in controller v0.202.0 + agent v0.126.0, each with its live or red-proof evidence in the row. Five explicitly still open and named as such rather than left to inference: R-214, R-220, R-221, R-213, R-202 — and R-220 is flagged as currently worked around BY HAND on the campaign venue, which is the only reason an app could be deployed there. The capability map's recovery row STAYS FAIL and says why: fixes are not a re-walk, nothing walked a customer end to end, and the customer-facing messages were NOT re-driven live because /recovery correctly retires itself once the old data is set aside — restoring that state is the reconfiguration the task forbade. The campaign document is ANNOTATED, not rewritten: it records what was true when it ran, and that is its value. workspace-CLAUDE.md gains comment-vs-code entry 9 — the escrow header said the errors were 'DISTINCT on purpose' and named THREE situations while a fourth was folded into one of them, and a green test named the defect and did not prevent it because it asserted a STRING one layer below the merge. ROADMAP needed no collapse — it carries no rows for these IDs.	2026-08-06 08:34:04 +02:00
admin	ce6fafa14f	CAMPAIGN-11: R-228 (set-aside history invisible) + campaign doc F7/F9/F10/F11 sections ... The move-aside is correct and verified byte-for-byte; what follows it is not. settings.json records orphaned_renamed_to and OrphanedRenamedTo has zero references in any template or handler — 12.5 MB of deliberately retained customer data at a path the box knows and never shows. Fifth instance of the project's seam-built-but-never-wired pattern. Campaign document gains the F7/F9/F10/F11 write-ups: F7 split (set-aside PASS, afterwards FAIL), F9 partial (R-215's gate proven live on a narrower shape), F10 NOT INJECTED (harness — three self-healing attempts), F11 PASS. No product code changed.	2026-08-05 23:59:09 +02:00
admin	259f48aedc	OPEN-ITEMS: CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 2 findings R-224..R-227, and what Phase 2 recorded against existing rows ... R-224 every non-code failure on the unlock path is reported as a statement about the customer's code. F3 (hub REJECTed) and F4 (agent stopped) both returned M4 for a CORRECT current code, in 0.056 s and 0.030 s — neither compatible with a real unseal (~1.0 s of scrypt). The agent's err field distinguishes fetch-failure from unseal-failure and both become one HTTP 400; the controller has no reach-failure branch. The vocabulary exists and is wired to agentClient() construction, not to the RPC. R-216's gate answers source=version and cannot see reachability. R-225 the store reports 0 snapshots / 0 GB when it cannot read it, above a card saying it holds backups. Measured over SFTP: snapshot f3d9cd67 and 12 535 KB are really there. snapshot_count/repo_size_bytes are ABSENT from settings.json after a rebuild — unknown renders as zero. R-226 M1, the only message that tells a customer to check their typing, is unreachable on any box that has re-escrowed (M4's branch precedes it). R-227 a restart mid-unlock returns a raw English "Bad Gateway" (I3). Recorded against existing rows: R-216 §4.1 now MEASURED twice (and a correction — SetFloor's DEBUG line can never reach the debug ring, so a restart alone would not have produced it); R-218's live half still NOT measured, deliberately, because the venue has a target; R-217 and R-215's fixes HELD under their faults. R-199's back-pointer was already present in the capability map — the brief's assumption that it was owed is stale. No product code changed.	2026-08-05 23:28:54 +02:00
admin	3a539ea530	docs: R-223 CLOSED by a golden rebake — and it was never a dropdown ... The first vouch of agent 0.125.0 was REFUSED by R-120's gate: the artifacts form saves as a unit, and golden 0.192.0 was older than the newest controller the fleet reports. The golden had been stale since before controller 0.193.0, so the Day-0 manifest had been effectively unvouchable for days and nobody had cause to notice. Correcting STATUS.md and OPEN-ITEMS, which said "one dropdown". Golden 0.201.0 baked in the drill VM, round-trip verified from Gitea (e730d7cab343eb35...f007654, 658165766 B), teardown clean, 0 token hits in the saved log. Manifest now agent=0.125.0 golden=0.201.0 min_agent=0.125.0, read back after the save. The held floor: the HOLD is established positively (hub log + the box's own "floor still unknown"). Its RELEASE is not — no HELD line and no dashboard reason are both absences, the served path logs nothing by design, and the box-side positive needs a restart the venue cannot take before Phase 2. Recorded as deduction plus a pinned test, not a live positive.	2026-08-05 22:29:30 +02:00
admin	1a0f7db92f	docs: CAMPAIGN-11 — the journey FAILED, R-198's retention PROVEN, six findings fixed ... Registers and evidence for the campaign and its fix pass. OPEN-ITEMS: R-214..R-223. Six SHIPPED (R-215/216/217/218/219/222); three deliberately still open and each blocks a real flow (R-214 console banner, R-220 drives unenrollable after a rebuild, R-221 a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony); R-223 minted and WAITING-ON-OPERATOR (vouch agent 0.125.0). R-213 and R-202 untouched. Capability map: a new row for the customer's UNAIDED journey, recorded FAILED and staying failed until a re-walk passes — fixes are not a journey. The existing rebuild row is corrected where it said R-198's retention was unit-proven only: it was proven in production on the first supersession since the fix, identity_blob retained at 572 B byte-length exact. CLAUDE.md comment-vs-code table: eighth entry — ResolveManagedFloor, the first where the false invariant was a GUARD rather than a comment alone. STATUS: the headline is now "the backup promise is proved, the recovery journey is not", and the one thing waiting on the operator.	2026-08-05 18:04:13 +02:00
admin	f45b1f6761	docs: R-193 CLOSED (the recovery screen); R-213 minted for the put-back ... - OPEN-ITEMS: R-193 CLOSED with both 2026-08-05 rulings (unlocking and restoring are separate; 'I do not want the old data' moves the store aside after a double confirmation), and the shape-(b) reasoning — WriteOffboxSecrets auto-generates a repository password on re-apply, so the literal 'fresh data area' trigger would have opened a window that closes by itself. - R-213 MINTED (R-212 was and still is the highest, re-checked for the second writer): putting files back in place, with the live-versus-backup comparison named as its requirement. Not started, deliberately. - capability map: the 'needs someone who knows to look' qualifier is GONE; what remains is stated narrowly — no correct-code run through the page, the put-back is out of scope, and the journey has not been re-walked end to end. - 07-backup-architecture 7.0: a fifth row, and where the screen deliberately stops. - CONTEXT: standing ruling S-34. - STATUS: the headline change and the two things still owed as proof. No hub change and no hub bump.	2026-08-05 12:56:55 +02:00
admin	63e0ac01f2	R-212 CLOSED: the three orphaned stores deleted after a corrected list (~1.45 GB) ... The register said 'two set-aside stores, ~1.2 GB'. Measured before touching anything: THREE set-aside stores totalling ~1.45 GB, and the thing that was exactly 1.2 GB was demo-felhom's LIVE felhom-repo. Matching on the size would have deleted a working repository. The operator was shown the corrected list and confirmed 'delete all three'. Deleted: demo-felhom orphaned-20260717 (1.4 G) + orphaned-20260718 (3.0 M); demo-hp orphaned-20260804 (43 M). Both LIVE repos untouched, confirmed by full listings before and after on each account. Proof nothing live was caught: a real off-site run on demo-hp immediately afterwards returned status ok, orphaned false, no error, 6 snapshots. Method note recorded for the next session: the storage box has a RESTRICTED shell. 'test -d X && rm -rf -- X' returns 'Command not found' and does nothing (it failed CLOSED, verified by an unchanged listing); 'rm -r <path>' as one simple command is the working form.	2026-08-05 11:15:24 +02:00
admin	4faebe2926	docs: R-204 ALL FOUR items closed; R-193 credential half; R-192 by replacement; R-212 filed ... - OPEN-ITEMS: R-204 all four CLOSED with both 2026-08-05 rulings recorded (the declared-state trigger and its four-meanings-of-absence reasoning; the recovery preview's dashboard-password exposure accepted as metadata, not content). R-193's credential half CLOSED, screen + deletion still open. R-192 CLOSED by REPLACEMENT. R-202 untouched. - R-212 MINTED (R-211 was the highest, grepped): the orphaned-ciphertext deletion HALTED at its STOP because the measured paths do not match the register — three set-aside stores totalling ~1.45 GB, and the thing that is exactly 1.2 GB is demo-felhom's LIVE repo. Nothing was deleted. - capability map: all four interventions closed; the row KEEPS a qualifier for a new reason — no step needs an operator, but there is no customer-facing recovery screen, and the journey has not been re-walked end to end. - 07-backup-architecture 7.0: the four-step table updated; the declaration-vs- inference reasoning and the credential-automatic/key-customer-present split. - CONTEXT: standing ruling S-33. - STATUS: the headline change and the deletion STOP. - REPORT-r204-item4.md rather than REPORT.md: a parallel session is active in this shared clone.	2026-08-05 11:06:41 +02:00
admin	c917251eeb	docs: P6 EXECUTED — containerd store moved to SSD2; reboot deferred (R-209, R-209a) ... Operator ruled "proceed" after reading the pre-analysis; the storageReserved condition CC made the move conditional on was applied with it. The pre-analysis is retained verbatim as §11-bis so the ruling can be audited against what it was given. MOVED WITH ZERO LOSS, verified BEFORE the original was touched on four independent observables: 550,891 = 550,891 filesystem entries; 448 = 448 trusted.overlay xattrs (load-bearing — overlayfs stacking rides them, which is why rsync -X is not optional); 37,243 = 37,243 hardlinks; byte-identical meta.db sha256. Verified again after: identical image/tag/volume ID SETS, cache 2.782 GB / 38 records, ceiling still 30 GiB, pg 4 DBs / 31 tables / 175,135,767 B, redis DBSIZE 2437. End-to-end proof was a real build on the relocated store, rc=0 — not an inventory count. k3s was never at risk, and that was established BEFORE stopping anything: it runs a separate containerd, so Gitea, the registry, the hub, PBS, Longhorn and ~160 pods stayed up. Only the two jarr-* dev containers were affected. TRAP FOUND WHILE PROVING THE GUARD, and it is the reusable part: RequiresMountsFor on a path with NO mount unit is a SILENT NO-OP — containerd started normally against an absent-but-unmounted path. A typo'd guard buys nothing and says nothing: the built-but-never-wired shape again. The guard was therefore verified positively at the unit level (Requires= AND After=mnt-ssd_2.mount on both units), and refusal proven with a genuinely absent DEVICE via a temporary synthetic .mount unit — /mnt/ssd_2 hosts 12 live Longhorn replicas and must never be unmounted, and editing fstab on a production host risks emergency mode at boot. Result: "Job containerd.service/start failed with result 'dependency'", is-active inactive. It refused rather than creating an empty store on the root disk. storageReserved on SSD2 0 -> 80 GB; still Schedulable=True at 76.34%. NOT PROVEN, AND NOT GLOSSED (R-209a): the operator ruled DO NOT REBOOT, so the move has not survived a reboot — which is this task's own standard for validated. The MECHANISM is proven; the CONSEQUENCE (that a real boot mounts /mnt/ssd_2 before containerd starts, in this host's actual ordering) is not, and mount-ordering reasoning is exactly the class this project has been burned by. So: the pre-move tree stays MOVED ASIDE, not deleted (34.3 GB, which is why / sits at 54% and not lower), and felhom-store-postboot-check.service — oneshot, enabled, dry-run PASS at install — validates it automatically at the next boot, asserting positively that /var/lib/containerd does NOT exist. Read /var/log/felhom-store-postboot-check.log after the next boot; on PASS the rollback copy can go and ~34 GB returns. Gates: repo_gates.py --fast — all OK, rc=0 (run separately from this commit).	2026-08-05 10:27:40 +02:00
admin	ee9d9bf203	docs: SPIKE — DooPlex build-cache containment; R-205..R-211 (2026-08-05) ... Spike output only; no production Go code. The one shipped change rides in homelab-manifests 6808a4b (R-205, the monitoring rule). VERDICT: mechanism confirmed, with one correction and one refutation. - CONFIRMED: builder.gc IS honoured under the containerd worker and DOES evict. Proven by naming a 440 MB `go mod download` record present at build N and absent by N+2 — not by absence of an error. - CORRECTED: honoured ONLY in the `policy` array form. The flat form is SILENTLY ignored — daemon starts, logs nothing, keeps its defaults. `dockerd --validate` returned "configuration OK" for a bogus key AND for a config that then crashed the daemon. The oracle is `docker buildx inspect`. - REFUTED: Docker's `data-root` would NOT move the cache — it moves 0.62 GB. The 181.4 GB belongs to the system containerd (`root` in /etc/containerd/config.toml). P3 (operator-approved) executed: prune claimed 156.9 GB, the filesystem returned 150.35 GB (the 6.5 GB gap is layers shared with images), SYNCHRONOUSLY — / went 86% -> 53% used, and Longhorn's default disk went Schedulable=False (DiskPressure) -> Schedulable=True (18.85% -> 50.32%). P7 root-caused the largest item and it is NOT the cap: all 208 `go mod download` records had Usage count 1. Isolated by controlled builds — same VERSION build-arg -> CACHED, new VERSION -> executed, byte-identical tree. `ARG VERSION`/`ARG GIT_COMMIT` sit ABOVE the module-download step, and a RUN's cache key includes the stage environment. Both Dockerfiles have it. One line each to fix -> R-208. P6 NOT EXECUTED — stops at the operator, as specified. Pre-analysis: the move is safe as measured (+38.8 pp above the 25% floor) but SSD2 is the only Longhorn disk with storageReserved=0 and is overcommitted 6.9x; at full inflation the move lands 12 pp BELOW the floor. The prune removed the move's urgency, so CC recommends against it unless ~80 GB is reserved on SSD2 -> R-209. Register: R-205 (CLOSED, shipped), R-206 (Ansible: cap + prune + narrowed Docker ban), R-207 (DRY_RUN guard), R-208 (ARG ordering), R-209/R-210 (operator), R-211 (Prometheus has no config-reloader — rules changes have never applied until something restarted the pod; found while verifying R-205). Gates: repo_gates.py --fast — all OK, rc=0 (run separately from this commit).	2026-08-05 10:02:46 +02:00
admin	0dbd954fec	docs: R-196 closed, R-204 items 1-3 closed, item 4 open (R-193) ... - OPEN-ITEMS: R-196 CLOSED; R-204 items 1-3 CLOSED with item 4 named and its dependency stated. Header restates that R-202, the 1.2 GB ciphertext deletion and R-198's still-unit-proven retention all REMAIN OPEN. - capability map: the recovery row keeps its 'with a person present' qualifier, names which crutch remains, and cites the three now gone. - 07-backup-architecture: new 7.0 - what a customer can and cannot do ALONE, the four steps in a table with status. This is the section a future reader will use to answer that question. - CONTEXT: standing ruling S-32, superseding S-31 steps 2-5. - STATUS: rewritten to one screen per its own header; removes a corrupted half-overwritten section left from the drill session. - ROADMAP: R-196 and R-204 collapsed.	2026-08-05 07:37:35 +02:00
admin	2a7ac03c47	R-201 PASSED: a customer's file survived a machine rebuild and came back byte-identical	2026-08-04 23:18:47 +02:00
admin	b228fd102d	R-201 night run: the off-site key IS recoverable after a real rebuild (proven); the verdict is blocked by R-204	2026-08-04 22:33:01 +02:00
admin	73fb595e38	R-203 shipped: the app and its backup agree, and 'ok' means it — R-201 unblocked	2026-08-04 18:52:14 +02:00
admin	a0c4b607a6	drill R-201: prepared and HALTED before the wipe — a mandatory data directory was missing from the off-site snapshot while the run said ok (R-203)	2026-08-04 15:00:06 +02:00
admin	846253baa8	docs: the offsite key is proven recoverable (R-199 closed, R-200 half, R-201 scoped)	2026-08-04 13:55:25 +02:00
admin	91cabdde1b	hub v0.93.0: the retention keeps the key it was built to keep (R-198) + three honesty fixes (R-197, R-192, R-196) ... R-198 — host_escrow_superseded shipped with `blob` (the K-escrow / PBS datastore key) and identity_blob was added to host_escrow LATER, never here. The offsite restic REPOSITORY password lives in identity_blob. So demoteCurrentEscrowTx -- whose own comment calls it "THE ONE escrow row-copy routine" -- retained the whole-guest key and silently dropped the off-site data key, which is the secret the retention was built to preserve. And because the copy happens as the new blob overwrites the old, the destroying act was the ESCROW CEREMONY: the exact thing a rebuilt box tells its customer to run, on a card promising in Hungarian that the old backups stay recoverable. Both demo boxes crossed that line on 2026-08-04. - identity_blob added to the table (CREATE + additive ALTER) and carried in the shared copy routine, so BOTH callers are fixed at once: re-escrow and host-delete demotion. - ListSupersededEscrow reads it back; store.HostEscrow gains IdentityBlob. - CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity is the census of who the fix protects. - Nothing is backfillable: pre-v0.93.0 retained rows have no blob and their sources are gone. - Tests assert the CONSEQUENCE (a retained row can still yield a repo password), which is why the pre-existing retention test stayed green for two months asserting the mechanism. R-197 — SaveHostEscrow returns the hash it replaced; the escrow PUT raises offsite_repo_key_changed (warning, operator-only, edge-triggered) when both hashes are known and differ. No hash value travels. Severity chosen for the world v0.93.0 creates: with the identity blob retained, a changed key is "this history now depends on an older recovery code", not a loss. R-192 (half) — the stuck alert now reports the two shapes it actually covers, burned and regressed, each stating its own measurement; the regressed text withdraws the Re-issue recommendation. Every self-heal refusal leaves a notification_log row with its reason. The guard's logic is unchanged; its 500-oldest-reports scoping stays OPEN and the window is named in the alert text so the limitation travels with the number. offsite_delivery_stuck and offsite_credential_restaged are added to operatorOnlyEvents -- neither was registered and neither has a customerMessages entry, which is not a block. R-196 — five comments (not the three the spec expected) claimed ReissueCredentials rotates the restic repo password. It resets the PROVIDER password and cannot touch the repo password, which is generated on the box. All five corrected; the staleness mark documented as precautionary. The BEHAVIOUR stays open. Not in this release: R-199, R-200, R-201 remain open -- the chain that hands the key back is still unassembled. Part 5 hit its gate; the orphan card is untouched (R-202).	2026-08-04 12:56:58 +02:00
admin	3f2b7bc023	RECON: trace the offsite DR chain link by link — it does not join up (R-198..R-201) ... Read-only recon of the escrow -> recovery chain, from a dead node to an open repository. No production code, no build, no version bump. Headline: the hub's superseded-escrow retention does NOT retain the offsite repository password. host_escrow_superseded has no identity_blob column and demoteCurrentEscrowTx copies only the K-escrow blob, so what survives a supersession is the PBS datastore key, not the restic repo password. The next escrow ceremony -- which the system tells a rebuilt box's customer to run -- destroys the last copy. Both demo boxes crossed that line on 2026-08-04. Also established: - the hub's blob-serving endpoints (re-enroll / restore-directive) have zero callers anywhere: agent, hub UI, scripts, runbooks (R-199) - POST /backup/offbox/inject-password is routed and handled but no template contains the form (R-200) - nothing in the recovery path has ever been exercised; the one live round-trip proof (2026-06-10) predates the ResticRepoPassword field (R-201) - a fail-closed mint refusal IS implementable: the report ACK already carries escrow{identity_blob_present, restic_pw_sha256} and the controller discards it whenever no offbox target exists Corrections: yesterday's spike annotated (candidate (b) overturned in part -- unattended recovery is impossible, customer-present is not); capability-map retention claim struck through and replaced with what the code does. Deliverable: documentation/audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md Register: new R-198..R-201; R-193 and R-192 updated; STATUS.md refreshed.	2026-08-04 12:16:04 +02:00
admin	b7c5cfc061	docs: R-193 spike report, operator STATUS, and the ROADMAP R-1 scope correction (F3 covers HOST re-enroll, not a guest rebuild)	2026-08-04 11:12:08 +02:00
admin	7fff45d688	R-195: a customer with no machine ever bound does not alarm (hub v0.92.0) + R-193/R-192 spike ... Part 4 (ships): `david` — a prospective customer with hosts=0, host_deletions=0, reports=0 — e-mailed an expected_dbdump_missed ERROR at 03:00 UTC three mornings running. The existing down-skip could never cover it: it reads the staleness checker's state, which is seeded from a query over the `reports` table, so a customer that never reported has no state at all and GetState() returns "" rather than "down". store.HasEverBoundHost (hosts row OR host_deletions tombstone) is consulted once per customer at the top of the deadline loop. The discriminator is "was a host EVER bound", never "has a report arrived" — a box installed and never heard from is a real fault and keeps alarming. Fail-OPEN on a read error. Red-proof observed: removing the guard fails with `got [expected_dbdump_missed]`, verbatim the event david sent. Parts 0-3 (spike, NO production code for R-193/R-192): audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md establishes that the one-shot provider password is the RECOVERABLE secret and the restic repository password is the irreplaceable one — and that a guest rebuild mints a fresh one, orphaning the previous off-site history. Measured without touching a box, by comparing host_escrow.restic_pw_sha256 against host_escrow_superseded: BOTH demo boxes changed (demo-hp 15 snapshots / 40.9 MB, demo-felhom 36 snapshots / 1.14 GB). demo-felhom's "lucky" 76-second recovery restored delivery and not the repository, silently, for 13h. ReissueCredentials does NOT rotate the restic password (R-39's record and two hub comments are wrong -> R-196); candidate (b) is not implementable against a zero-knowledge escrow; candidate (a) already exists as F3 and is wired to the wrong event. Ends in ranked options and an unanswered question for the operator. R-195 SHIPPED; R-196 + R-197 filed; R-192 + R-193 updated, neither closed.	2026-08-04 11:04:39 +02:00
admin	f456835bbc	REPORT/R-190: the alert pair closed — one loss, one email, one recovery ... The 20-minute latch expired at 10:20:29 and the hub logged degraded -> ok (agent_capability_recovered) at 10:30:40. Final state on both boxes: agent 0.124.1, two ACL rows on /storage/felhom-backup.	2026-08-04 10:31:46 +02:00
admin	e06920d930	R-188: the reorder moved the race rather than removing it (observed on the v0.124.0 release) ... CI run 28 failed and run 29 passed on the same sha. The tag was created locally at 07:38:36Z; run 28 started 07:38:31Z (commit push) and run 29 at 07:38:41Z (tag push). The old race was 'tag before package'; the new one is 'package before its tag is pushed' — the window the converse probe exists to detect, and it did. Not confirmed from the run log (the endpoint 404s), so recorded as the timing-consistent explanation rather than a proven one. The gate passes locally with all 7 versions installable and none untagged. Both obvious closures are the 'make the gate blind for a window' shape this row refused, so the options are to accept a seconds-wide window or to make releases quiet to CI another way.	2026-08-04 10:08:10 +02:00
admin	a684a81796	docs: R-191 closed, R-190 mitigation shipped (mechanism open), R-194 filed ... R-191: the gate was run first and it mattered — ep0's prune jobs have run daily since 2026-07-27 (18 tasks, all OK). THREE of my own queries said the opposite and all three were broken instruments (worker-type vs worker_type, prune vs prunejob, proxmox-backup vs proxmox-backup-proxy); acting on any would have disabled the only pruning attempt while reporting that nothing prunes. R-190: the row now reflects the MITIGATION, not the cause, and says so. Includes that v0.124.0's transition record failed in production while every unit test passed, and Part 3's single pass — the token-rotation class is real and documented in our own installer but does not fit this box (same token still authenticates, the other three grants survived, no installer run evidenced); ruled out on this box, not fleet-wide. R-194: PVE caches permissions (~40s and ~16min measured), so a single permission read is a lagging indicator and may explain when R-190's refusal surfaced. 07-backup-architecture: the offsite retention row was RIGHT and the configuration disagreed with it — noted, since a doc that states a contract does not enforce it.	2026-08-04 10:04:25 +02:00
admin	33f0ab2f33	R-193: demo-hp offsite restored on the box; escrow correction recorded ... Re-issue through the designed endpoint: fresh password staged 07:11:51, settle-gate GO, consumed 15s later at 07:12:06, offsite configured at 07:12:09 against the SAME sub-account (275124) and repo path. Both boxes now escrowed. CORRECTION to this session's own reading: the escrow did NOT recover by itself. escrow_state went pending -> escrowed 15s after the apply and I inferred automation; the operator had run the ceremony. It needed a human on both boxes — demo-hp at 07:16:02, demo-felhom at 07:20:28 (its escrow had been pending since its own rebuild the day before). A 15-second state change is not evidence of automation, which is the same class as reading an absent log line as success. Snapshot continuity is NOT established: both boxes report snapshot_count 0, but the run-history keys are ABSENT rather than zeroed — a controller that has never run an offbox backup, not an empty repo. The 04:15 run decides it.	2026-08-04 09:23:08 +02:00
admin	2584dfb938	R-193: a guest rebuild silently drops the offsite tier; R-192 cause established ... Operator confirms no hub-side offsite config change, so the regression was not an action. Evidence: demo-hp's controller went 0.187.0 -> 0.192.0 at 06:12:18 with a new config hash and the agent re-keyed its leaf three minutes earlier — a guest rebuild. The last pre-rebuild report shows the tier fully healthy: escrowed, last success 02:16:39Z, 15 snapshots, 40.9 MB. No offsite object in the 108 reports since. Mechanism: the restic credential is delivered once. demo-hp consumed its secret on 2026-07-23; the rebuilt controller has no copy and no way to request another. demo-felhom survived the SAME rebuild only because its secret was still unconsumed — it consumed it four seconds after its config hash changed and was reporting offsite again 76 seconds later. That difference was luck, not design. Also sharpens R-192: the self-heal's guard refuses when any report since the consume carried an offbox target, but that query reads the OLDEST 500 reports — all of which predate the rebuild. Healthy history before a rebuild is not evidence the credential still works, which is why the automation that exists for this case declined to act.	2026-08-04 09:05:53 +02:00