VOUCHED with the operator's approval, verified from the stored hub_settings
rather than the flash: golden_version 0.205.0 -> 0.206.0, sha
c85230b42f53baa9c1ee9986ac312c751d6cbc29fbe070d87bb2214429a9108e.
agent_version and min_agent both stayed 0.127.0. wrapper_sha256 was carried
through explicitly, because the handler CLEARS it when omitted.
THE GATE WAS CONVICTED BEFORE THE BAKE AND IS OK AFTER IT - red to green on
the same command, which is its proof that it measures something real. It went
green on the BAKE, not the vouch; that limitation is stated in its docstring
and stays open on R-242.
THE STALE FLAG WAS WRONG AND IS CLEARED, with the operator's approval. One
row, identity-matched on host_id and guarded on stale_at IS NOT NULL;
changes() returned 1. Verified end to end, not just in the database: the hub
serves the hash again, the box recorded it at 11:10:19Z, and it is
byte-identical to the key that box is using - so shape (c) compares, matches
and correctly stays silent. The false warning is gone, PROVEN WITH A POSITIVE
CONTROL rather than an absent line: 0 escrow-confirm lines since the restart
while 5 scheduler lines in the same window prove the box was logging.
R-246 records the clearance and keeps the column ruling open: stale_at has NO
production writer, changes what a customer is told, and can be seen by nobody
who would look for it. Either give it an evidential setter or retire it.
STATUS.md finished at 87 lines (from 258). Waiting-on-you is now genuinely
empty: the base image is approved and live, and R-245 was re-filed as a
decision taken with quota as its reopening condition.
Session report: REPORT-clear-the-ground-2026-08-08.md - the six spike
questions each answered with method and measurement, Q4 said plainly (only a
database read), Q6 said loudly (a fresh box CANNOT reach this state, so the
next walk cannot meet it), and three observations noticed but not acted on.
Read-only census, no truncation. app_log_issues holds 1309 rows; 71 reference
a torn-down venue (finalwalk, c11, rewalk, part4). Of those 44 are ORPHANS,
naming only torn-down customers and safely deletable, and 27 are SHARED with a
live customer and must be de-referenced, never deleted. 1238 untouched.
The 27 are exactly why the leg was never written, and why a DELETE ... WHERE
customer LIKE would destroy a live customer's issue history.
NOT fixed here, and the reason is stated on the row rather than left implied:
the fix is hub code, this session's scope forbade a hub version bump, and a
hand-run SQL mutation over 71 rows - 27 needing surgical de-referencing - with
no tested code path and no red-proof is the shape that goes wrong on a live
database. The next session now starts from data instead of a guess.
STATUS.md REBUILT FROM THE REGISTER, not trimmed. Its own header says one
screen; it had reached 258 lines, having been 83 four days ago.
The three named defects, all fixed:
1. the "waiting on you" list asked the operator to decide the RECOVERY
SCREEN, built and shipped 2026-08-05, and to approve an orphaned-backup
deletion the register records as DONE the same day;
2. a stray line reading only "- **Nothing.**" sat mid-list;
3. the DooPlex infrastructure work was mixed in with the product's.
Infrastructure is now under ITS OWN HEADING rather than dropped, and the
reason is stated on the page: these are real asks that need the operator, but
they concern the machine this is built on, not what a customer receives.
Dropping them would lose real work; mixing them is why the page stopped being
readable.
The 100-line "what shipped recently" log is gone. That is what the per-repo
CHANGELOGs and the register are for, and restating it here is what made the
page grow back.
R-245 RE-FILED as a decision taken, not a question pending. It sat as
WAITING-ON-OPERATOR for a day with nothing actually pending - it was settled
on 2026-08-07. It keeps the whole reasoning and now carries the condition that
would REOPEN it, which the reasoning already named: QUOTA, old set-aside
history blocking new backups. A condition, not a calendar.
AUDIT OF EVERY WAITING-ON-OPERATOR ROW, parsing the state column exactly
rather than grepping for the phrase (which over-matches rows that merely
mention it): exactly ONE row carried it - R-245 - and it was a settled
decision. So zero rows were genuinely waiting, and the drift was caught while
it was still a single row.
R-246/R-247/R-248 file the read-only stale-blob spike's findings. R-242
updated: it recurred within a day, and shape (b) is now built - with the vouch
half explicitly still open on that row rather than being papered over.
R-241 closed against controller v0.206.0 + hub v0.98.0, following the spike's
ruling rather than the obvious reading. The row records what the fix does AND
the two real bugs the tests caught rather than review - a missing t.Enabled
(caught by an EXISTING test) and a missing falling-edge sync that
reintroduced the very defect the epoch exists to fix.
R-243 UPDATED, not closed: the STATE it describes can no longer be entered
(the mint guard), and what replaces it is VISIBLE rather than silent - the box
declares awaiting_recovery_key and the customer is offered the screen. But the
ALARM GAP is untouched, for the same three reasons, so a box whose customer
never acts still stops backing up with no operator signal. The remaining work
is an operator-side signal for a box held past some age, deliberately not
bundled into R-241's fix.
R-245 NEW - WAITING-ON-OPERATOR, recorded and NOT built: should an undecided
customer be auto-abandoned after 30 days? The operator's proposal is recorded
WITH the reasoning against it, so the decision can be revisited properly: a
reinstall implies a person, so nobody is absent; a customer who cannot find
their code gets in touch, which is why the operator LEVERS were the thing
worth building; the cost is the customer's own storage allowance; and the real
harm is QUOTA, which is a condition, not a calendar. If it is ever built,
build it to trigger on the harm with a dated warning, never on a date alone.
The capability map's recovery-journey row STAYS FAIL. These are fixes, not a
walk - nothing here walked a customer end to end, and the row goes green only
when one completes with no operator intervention AND a byte-identical
sentinel. R-214, R-202 and R-240 are still open.
STATUS compressed rather than extended, per its own one-screen rule, and the
"rebuilding throws away the off-site history" line corrected: the cause is
fixed, so leaving it as a live defect would be false.
hub CHANGELOG v0.98.0 for the superseded-package purge.
Highest register ID moves R-244 -> R-245.
All five layers gone, each verified with a positive control that must
survive and does:
VM 324 + 4 disks -> absent (VM 300 drill-r50 remains)
hub: 13 tables at 0, incl. BOTH escrow tables (demo-felhom/demo-hp/peti remain)
Storage Box u629488-sub4 -> gone (sub1/2/3 remain)
ep0 PBS ns finalwalk -> gone (demo-felhom, demo-hp remain)
WireGuard 10.77.0.5 -> gone from the LIVE wg show on ep0, not just
the hub DB (.2/.3/.4/.250 remain)
14.06 GiB reclaimed against 15 G measured before deletion.
R shredded with a planted-copy control: plant -> search finds both ->
shred -> the same search finds 0. The zero was not believed until the
instrument was proven.
R-244 (NEW): a FULL census after the cascade logged COMPLETE full teardown
found 61 rows still matching finalwalk. Four sources are deliberate
provenance; the fifth, app_log_issues (29 rows), is NOT covered by the
residue purge - and it is systematic: c11 40, rewalk 20, part4 24 still
present from the 2026-08-06 teardown, whose ledger recorded zero
occurrences. That claim used a narrower query than a census and does not
hold; the correction is recorded in both the prior ledger and the register
rather than the measurement quietly redone.
No secret material is involved. The table is a fleet-wide aggregate: 12 of
the 29 rows are finalwalk-only orphans, 17 are shared with LIVE customers
and must be de-referenced, not deleted - very likely why the leg was never
written. Not fixed; a cascade change needs its own red-proof.
Lesson, and it is the reusable part: a per-table absence query is not a
census.
R-239: the operator approved the vouch this session. golden_version
0.203.0 -> 0.205.0 (+ derived sha); agent_version and min_agent both stayed
0.127.0, because the new golden's MinAgent is also 0.127.0 - so in the event
it was a ONE-field change, not three. wrapper_sha256 was carried through
explicitly: the handler reads it from the form and CLEARS it when omitted.
Verified from the stored hub_settings (WAL-aware copy), not from the flash.
The R-120 gate passed exactly - the newest controller the fleet reports is
0.205.0, so a 0.204.0 golden would have been refused.
R-241: the capability map's recovery-journey row and STATUS carry the spike's
ruling - a MINTING defect, not a screen-predicate defect. The row stays FAIL:
delivery is not a journey, and R-241 is diagnosed, not fixed.
R-242 and R-243 surfaced in STATUS in plain language.
Read-only spike on the standing venue (demo-hp VM 324 finalwalk-appliance),
read before anything else touched the fleet. No product code written.
THE RULING. The recovery screen was telling the truth. There genuinely was
nothing recoverable under the key the box held, because the box minted that
key itself over the top of a sealed package it already knew the hub held.
Fixing the predicate would paper over a box quietly making its own history
unopenable.
Three measurements carry it:
1. WriteOffboxSecrets (offbox.go:411) mints on ONE input - does the file
exist. Its two neighbours in the same file both consult
GetHubEscrowIdentityPresent(). Same fact on three paths, used on two.
2. The flag was the PRECONDITION of the chain that reached the minting:
the retry job only logs when the declaration is live, and the venue
logged it at 02:48:03Z - 30 minutes and six ticks before the mint.
3. The box KNEW and discarded it: at 03:28:03Z, 35 minutes before the
customer looked, escrow_confirm.go:154 computed the exact
discriminator and logged the mismatch. Never persisted, never surfaced.
And the hub explicitly disclaims doing this - offsiteheal's package doc:
'credential automatic, key customer-present ... must not quietly widen'.
Also answered: Q2 (shape (b) is structurally unreachable - the escrow gate
sits upstream of the only orphan producer, with a positive control that the
scheduler was alive); Q7 (the 'create a new code' button does NOT destroy
the data - R-198's retention holds - but it converts a self-service recovery
into one needing an unbuilt read path, and it re-enables the screen while
invalidating the code that screen accepts).
New rows:
R-242 - a release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not delivered
until a golden carries it, and nothing enforces that. Recorded
with three proposed shapes; deliberately NOT built.
R-243 - a box in this state silently stops backing up and NO alarm fires:
three individually-correct exclusions leave one state unobserved.
Highest register ID moves R-241 -> R-243.
THE DATA: PASS. All three sentinels byte-identical out of snapshot f5c53b03,
including the 12 MB binary and the accented Hungarian filename whose NAME BYTES
are identical too. Disk -> restic -> SFTP -> Storage Box -> rebuilt machine ->
disk, intact.
THE JOURNEY: FAIL, and further from the line than the previous walk. The claim
worked first try (302 in 0.164s). Then: / lands on the launcher with no recovery
pointer, /recovery 302s away, and the remote page offers to CREATE a new recovery
code — which would orphan the history the customer's code protects. There is no
field anywhere to enter the code they hold. The operator's documented remedy also
refuses, correctly and fail-closed. Recovery needed three guest command lines.
R-241 — and the cause is a success this same walk proved six hours earlier.
OffsiteRecoveryOffer() shows the screen only when (a) there is NO repository
password (pristine rebuild) or (b) one exists but the history will not open under
it. Overnight the credential self-heal collected the staged credential and applied
the tier, writing a FRESH key at 03:18Z — so (a) is false; and (b) is unreachable
because orphan detection needs a run, and runs are blocked by escrow_state=pending.
The gap is self-locking. Measured keys: on-disk 9b4a9a9d... vs recovered-from-R
30ef574f... This is R-218's shape one level up: succeeding at the self-heal stopped
the box OFFERING the recovery it still needed.
Registers: R-201 moved to its outcome; R-241 filed; capability map's recovery row
stays FAIL with both halves and the cause named; STATUS rewritten for the operator.
Highest ID R-238 -> R-241.
The venue is left with the recovered key in place and the self-heal key moved
aside, never deleted. Teardown still owed.
Phase A complete on a NEW venue (demo-hp VM 324, customer finalwalk). Installed
from the published ISO — verified byte-identical to iso.felhom.eu — claimed, app
deployed, three sentinels placed, escrow ceremony 6/6 with restic_pw_sealed=true,
R held in one 0600 file on DooPlex, off-site backup taken and the three sentinels
PROVEN IN THE SNAPSHOT BY NAME (snapshot 1da4f80d, 12.0 MB).
THE HEADLINE: a fresh install lands on agent 0.127.0 (vouched, no hand upgrade —
that half works) and controller 0.203.0, while the newest is 0.205.0. The vouched
golden still bakes 0.203.0, so tonight's box has neither R-237 nor R-234. Filed as
R-239: a delivery gap, not a regression. Every closure claimed for those two is
true of the code and false of the fleet until a golden is baked and vouched.
The five checks, on that box:
T1 ok + the old bare-count warning (no next step)
T2 FAILS — both runs say "elindult", the second as a success flash
T3 FAILS — toggle off hides an existing snapshot; wizard 302s away
T4 ok, and the wording is still "Sikeres" beside "nothing is selected" -> R-240
T5 PASSES — driven as a browser does, prepare -> full_prep -> confirm -> commit
completed; R-238 confirmed a harness artifact, not a product defect
HARNESS FAULT, caught by the §4 gate: the first off-site run reported ok with a
26.6 KB repo — impossible for a 12 MB sentinel. I had placed the files under
.../adatok/felhom-data/userdata/... while this box's namespace root is
/mnt/felhom-drives/adatok directly. The product was correct throughout; proving by
listing rather than by a green status is what caught it before any destruction.
Nothing destroyed. The venue stands.
R-234 was filed as "toggling an app on leaves it without a bundle, so the first run
skips it". Measured on demo-hp: that state does not survive a run — the off-site
run's own pre-dump phase calls captureAllRecoveryUnits for every DEPLOYED stack,
through admitApp, before the push, and a unit moved aside was RECREATED.
The actual cause was the single-flight: the manual run was dropped because an
earlier one was still going, runOffboxBackup returned nil, the handler had already
answered "A tavoli mentes elindult", and the card then showed the PREVIOUS run's
green verdict. Fixed in controller v0.205.0 and proven live on demo-hp: a second
request while one is in flight now says "Mar fut egy tavoli mentes — ez a keres nem
inditott ujat. A most lathato eredmeny meg a korabbi futase", as a flash_error.
Independently, and a real gap on its own: a run that skipped an app the customer
selected is now `incomplete`, not `ok`. Selected+deployed with no unit counts;
selected-but-undeployed is named with what to do but does NOT count, because a box
left amber by an app somebody removed is a status nobody reads.
R-218's state field read REOPENED while the same row's body already recorded the
fix shipped in v0.203.0 and proven live. Corrected to CLOSED, keeping the
over-claim history — it is why the row is worded as it is.
Capability map: the off-site capture row's `incomplete` sentence widened to cover a
whole-app skip, and it still does not claim a newly-selected app is protected by
the next run — for a deployed app it is, for an undeployed one the card says so.
Still open, deliberately: R-213, R-202, R-214, R-235.
Part 0 — c11 and rewalk destroyed, three layers each plus the off-site side and
the WireGuard peer, via the hub's own cascade (external teardown FIRST, DB purge
LAST). 37.3 GB reclaimed on c11-scratch, matching the 20G+17G measured. Positive
control after each: part4 must still be found, and was. ep0 namespaces now exactly
demo-felhom, demo-hp, part4.
The cascade refuses to delete a live host and there is no decommission endpoint,
so both boxes were stopped and aged past the hub's 30m stale_threshold first.
Register corrections — the durable record was wrong about two shipped fixes:
R-218 REOPENED -> CLOSED. Shipped controller v0.203.0, proven live on a
genuinely rebuilt box: the hub re-staged at 13:24:57Z and the box
collected it on a tick, no guest command line, no operator action.
R-220 "OPEN — NOT FIXED" -> CLOSED. Shipped agent v0.127.0, proven live after a
real guest purge with both raw mounts still on the surviving host:
/disks/candidates returned both drives (before: two empty lists) and both
re-attached through the customer endpoint.
R-236 WITHDRAWN — I FILED THIS WRONGLY. The hub log shows offsiteheal re-staged
the stored secret at 13:24:57Z after its documented two-report debounce, with no
provider credential minted. My Re-issue at 13:26:39Z came 102s LATER, was
redundant, and minted an unnecessary provider credential (subaccount 284735) —
the very double-issue the offsite-delivery guard warns about once a minute in the
log. "Nincs teendod" is true; I did not wait ~16 minutes. Operational lesson, not
a product defect.
R-238 reclassified as a harness artifact (mode=full without confirm=1 is step 1 of
a deliberate two-step and starts no job by design); its real residue — the total
silence of that step — is fixed in controller v0.204.0.
R-237 CLOSED by controller v0.204.0.
Destroyed guest 9201 (guarded on hostname — demo-hp also has a 9201), wiped both
drives leaving the raw /mnt/<name> mounts in place, reinstalled from the
published installer v1.25.0.
PASS — the upgrade path:
agent 0.127.0 -> 0.127.0 across the rebuild. The previous re-walk DOWNGRADED
0.126.0 -> 0.125.0 (R-216 part 4). Controller 0.203.0 from the baked golden,
Day-0 provision SUCCESS in ~2m50s, nothing applied by hand.
R-220 FIXED, proven on a genuinely rebuilt box: with both devices mounted raw
AND managed, /disks/candidates offered both drives (before the fix: two empty
lists), and both re-attached through the customer endpoint.
R-218's consume half proven live end to end: credential re-staged at 13:26:32Z,
collected on a tick, tier configured — no guest command line. Previously this
exact situation was dead end 1 and needed a guest shell.
FAIL — the data half, NOT reached. Three new findings, in the order they bite:
R-236 nothing re-stages the off-site one-time password after a rebuild, so the
"Nincs teendod" promise stalls until an operator re-issues. The retry job
is NOT at fault — it retries correctly and logs why.
R-237 the restore surface is keyed on installed + remote-marked apps, so after
a rebuild the customer is shown no backups at all — a circular dead end.
R-238 "Teljes visszaallitas elokeszitese" returns 302 and does NOTHING: no job,
no state change, no error, no line in the controller's own debug ring.
mode=unit on the same form works. This is why the sentinel byte-identity
criterion was not met — nothing came back, rather than coming back wrong.
No guest command line was used at any point in either half — the property the
previous walk could not claim.
Venue: demo-hp VM 323 part4-appliance / guest 9201 / hub customer part4.
Bind 13:53:40 -> agent 0.127.0 ONLINE 13:55:34, no "floor held", controller
0.203.0 from the baked golden. The previous re-walk's reinstall DOWNGRADED the
agent (R-216 part 4); this one did not, because the vouch moved all three fields
(golden_version + agent_version + min_agent) together.
R-218 on a real installation: offsite-credential-retry registered (every 5m0s)
and ticking, 0 "credential retry" lines, and the tier configured unaided 14s
after the settle gate — the previous walk's dead end 1 is gone. Stated precisely
in the journal: this venue proves the SILENT half only; the collecting half was
proven separately with a positive control.
R-225 visible in both states on a live box: "még ismeretlen" before any
snapshot, "12.0 MB / 50 GB" after. Unknown is not zero.
Fixture complete with NO guest command line — the claim used the emailed code
through the real /claim form (the hub keeps only a hash), and the sentinels were
written over SMB with the share mounted so the accented filename never crossed a
shell (verified as hex on both sides, no U+FFFD).
Two new findings, both "presence is not success":
R-234 an offsite run reports success while omitting an app just toggled on —
found ONLY because the pre-destruction verification restore was run
instead of trusting the green tick.
R-235 the console still shows the pairing banner 25 min after the bind, while
promising it refreshes itself.
Half 2 (destroy -> reinstall -> recover -> compare) is owed and NOT started; the
venue is standing and its teardown is owed.
Bake evidence: documentation/tests/golden-0.203.0-2026-08-06/ (bake.log + README).
sha256 3039c6ffa7a5a8b2d959daddb2895c58b44de70f8d4f4a7e12ad4b1c0d61dc88, verified
by an independent round-trip download and by reading /etc/felhom-controller-image
out of the published archive itself. NOT vouched — the hub still serves 0.201.0.
R-233: RUNBOOK-manual-build.md §4.1 named three pass markers, two of which the
script cannot print (`overlay2 OK` does not exist; `mp1` stopped existing in
build-golden.sh v3.0.0 under R-165), and a 404 pre-gate URL with the wrong
filename, which would 404 for the wrong reason and pass even when the version
already existed. A grep for an impossible string reads 0 forever and 0 is
indistinguishable from failure. Markers re-captured from the real log; token
handling moved off the command line into an in-VM runner script; a positive
control is now required on the token-leak grep; the vouch step rewritten as the
three-field change it is (golden_version + agent_version + min_agent).
Five sets, 14/14 successful runs in 14 days, and a file restored byte-identical from the data repo
-- the first time a restore has ever been demonstrated here.
What the failure matrix exposes: notify_failure is a no-op (NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE=true, webhook
commented out) so a failed backup tells nobody; NOTHING leaves the box (Longhorn's target is
DooPlex itself over NFS, the only outbound-looking cron pulls inbound for another project); the
backup tree is a single writable path with no append-only; two sets are same-disk (.claude-memory
and the postgres dumps, whose source sits inside the backup tree); Longhorn retains 1 generation;
secrets/restic-repo has never held a snapshot because backup-secrets.sh never calls restic; and
/opt/backup/docs/BACKUP-RESTORE.md does not exist though the unit advertises it.
NOT a finding: the restic passphrase. On-box copy is on a different disk from the backups and the
operator holds an offline copy out of band, so disk loss is recoverable. The residual is only that
it is operator-held rather than system-held escrow.
A stale lock in the data repo is MINE, from the previous task's verification. Fenced from clearing
it; recorded with its impact and the one command that fixes it.
target-selection.md said demo-hp has no off-site tier. Measured first: pvesm list felhom-pbs on the
box returns two snapshots in demo-hp's OWN namespace (2026-07-28, 2026-08-04) against ep0's
felhom-offsite. The claim was TRUE WHEN WRITTEN and went stale when F10 resolved 2026-07-23. The
measurement is kept in an HTML comment beside the corrected sentence. This file decides which
machine may be destroyed, so the sentence was load-bearing, not cosmetic.
R-229(b) CLOSED (agent 175 -> 99 eff). R-230(b) CLOSED (symlink, proven from fresh sessions).
R-230(a) part-actioned -- three false statements fixed, WARN loop added, bulk ruling still owed.
S-37: a claim in an instruction file is checked, not trusted.
R-229 legs (a) and (c) CLOSED. R-230 opened for what this deliberately left -- the ruling owed on
auto-written staleness, the symlink decision, the spec-as-failing-test pilot. R-231 opened for
/opt/backup/scripts/ being unversioned host state, found while adding the memory store to the
backup set: the same class this task was closing, inside the fix for it.
S-36: the auto-memory store is backed up, never committed; no memory file is ever deleted;
a rule file created mid-session is NOT live in that session.
Second session in this repo, so REPORT-<topic>.md per CLAUDE.md; shared REPORT.md untouched.
New shared scripts/instructions_gate.py, registered in controller_gates.py and
agent_gates.py, never copied into a sibling repo (the reuse_refs_check.py
precedent). 20 fixture tests, all asserting the effect: exit code AND that the
message names the file and the reason.
It is a consistency gate, not a budget gate, and the failure message says so. A
/context reading measured the instruction files at 15k tokens against 869k free in
a 1M window -- space is not the constraint, and a future reader must not re-derive
the wrong reason. The 200-line ceiling is adherence guidance; a file nobody can
hold in their head is where contradictions hide, and five were found here.
Checks run against effective text (HTML comments stripped, because they are
stripped before injection): the line ceiling; every .claude/rules/*.md declares
paths: or an explicit unconditional: true; no component version literal; no
TEMPORARY block carrying a past date; and the workspace-root CLAUDE.md is
byte-identical to its versioned copy -- the live file sits outside any git repo,
so that copy is its only version-controlled record.
Two traps recorded so they are not reintroduced: a bare \d+\.\d+\.\d+ matches the
first three octets of every IPv4 (the gate excludes dotted quads, or it fails on
192.168.0.180 in the agent's own file); and unconditional: true is NOT a Claude
Code feature but this project's own marker.
Workspace-root CLAUDE.md 208 -> 182 lines (142 effective), copy kept identical.
The nine-instance invariant table moved into the felhom-testing skill, which
triggers when writing or reviewing a test; all three directive bullets stayed in
the core. felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md got surgical corrections only and is knowingly still
over the ceiling at 227 effective lines -- closing it needs the restructure R-229
defers, said plainly rather than quietly absorbed.
CONTEXT.md gains standing ruling S-35. OPEN-ITEMS.md gains R-229.
Docs only -- no Go, no version bump, nothing built or deployed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JJc8sAGRWmavP3rMtdpkr2
Five closed in controller v0.202.0 + agent v0.126.0, each with its live or
red-proof evidence in the row. Five explicitly still open and named as such
rather than left to inference: R-214, R-220, R-221, R-213, R-202 — and R-220 is
flagged as currently worked around BY HAND on the campaign venue, which is the
only reason an app could be deployed there.
The capability map's recovery row STAYS FAIL and says why: fixes are not a
re-walk, nothing walked a customer end to end, and the customer-facing messages
were NOT re-driven live because /recovery correctly retires itself once the old
data is set aside — restoring that state is the reconfiguration the task forbade.
The campaign document is ANNOTATED, not rewritten: it records what was true when
it ran, and that is its value.
workspace-CLAUDE.md gains comment-vs-code entry 9 — the escrow header said the
errors were 'DISTINCT on purpose' and named THREE situations while a fourth was
folded into one of them, and a green test named the defect and did not prevent
it because it asserted a STRING one layer below the merge.
ROADMAP needed no collapse — it carries no rows for these IDs.
The move-aside is correct and verified byte-for-byte; what follows it is not.
settings.json records orphaned_renamed_to and OrphanedRenamedTo has zero
references in any template or handler — 12.5 MB of deliberately retained
customer data at a path the box knows and never shows. Fifth instance of the
project's seam-built-but-never-wired pattern.
Campaign document gains the F7/F9/F10/F11 write-ups: F7 split (set-aside PASS,
afterwards FAIL), F9 partial (R-215's gate proven live on a narrower shape),
F10 NOT INJECTED (harness — three self-healing attempts), F11 PASS.
No product code changed.
R-224 every non-code failure on the unlock path is reported as a statement
about the customer's code. F3 (hub REJECTed) and F4 (agent stopped) both
returned M4 for a CORRECT current code, in 0.056 s and 0.030 s — neither
compatible with a real unseal (~1.0 s of scrypt). The agent's err field
distinguishes fetch-failure from unseal-failure and both become one HTTP
400; the controller has no reach-failure branch. The vocabulary exists
and is wired to agentClient() construction, not to the RPC. R-216's gate
answers source=version and cannot see reachability.
R-225 the store reports 0 snapshots / 0 GB when it cannot read it, above a
card saying it holds backups. Measured over SFTP: snapshot f3d9cd67 and
12 535 KB are really there. snapshot_count/repo_size_bytes are ABSENT
from settings.json after a rebuild — unknown renders as zero.
R-226 M1, the only message that tells a customer to check their typing, is
unreachable on any box that has re-escrowed (M4's branch precedes it).
R-227 a restart mid-unlock returns a raw English "Bad Gateway" (I3).
Recorded against existing rows: R-216 §4.1 now MEASURED twice (and a correction
— SetFloor's DEBUG line can never reach the debug ring, so a restart alone
would not have produced it); R-218's live half still NOT measured, deliberately,
because the venue has a target; R-217 and R-215's fixes HELD under their faults.
R-199's back-pointer was already present in the capability map — the brief's
assumption that it was owed is stale.
No product code changed.
The first vouch of agent 0.125.0 was REFUSED by R-120's gate: the artifacts form saves as
a unit, and golden 0.192.0 was older than the newest controller the fleet reports. The
golden had been stale since before controller 0.193.0, so the Day-0 manifest had been
effectively unvouchable for days and nobody had cause to notice. Correcting STATUS.md and
OPEN-ITEMS, which said "one dropdown".
Golden 0.201.0 baked in the drill VM, round-trip verified from Gitea
(e730d7cab343eb35...f007654, 658165766 B), teardown clean, 0 token hits in the saved log.
Manifest now agent=0.125.0 golden=0.201.0 min_agent=0.125.0, read back after the save.
The held floor: the HOLD is established positively (hub log + the box's own "floor still
unknown"). Its RELEASE is not — no HELD line and no dashboard reason are both absences,
the served path logs nothing by design, and the box-side positive needs a restart the
venue cannot take before Phase 2. Recorded as deduction plus a pinned test, not a live
positive.
Registers and evidence for the campaign and its fix pass.
OPEN-ITEMS: R-214..R-223. Six SHIPPED (R-215/216/217/218/219/222); three deliberately
still open and each blocks a real flow (R-214 console banner, R-220 drives unenrollable
after a rebuild, R-221 a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony); R-223 minted and
WAITING-ON-OPERATOR (vouch agent 0.125.0). R-213 and R-202 untouched.
Capability map: a new row for the customer's UNAIDED journey, recorded FAILED and staying
failed until a re-walk passes — fixes are not a journey. The existing rebuild row is
corrected where it said R-198's retention was unit-proven only: it was proven in production
on the first supersession since the fix, identity_blob retained at 572 B byte-length exact.
CLAUDE.md comment-vs-code table: eighth entry — ResolveManagedFloor, the first where the
false invariant was a GUARD rather than a comment alone.
STATUS: the headline is now "the backup promise is proved, the recovery journey is not",
and the one thing waiting on the operator.
- OPEN-ITEMS: R-193 CLOSED with both 2026-08-05 rulings (unlocking and restoring
are separate; 'I do not want the old data' moves the store aside after a double
confirmation), and the shape-(b) reasoning — WriteOffboxSecrets auto-generates a
repository password on re-apply, so the literal 'fresh data area' trigger would
have opened a window that closes by itself.
- R-213 MINTED (R-212 was and still is the highest, re-checked for the second
writer): putting files back in place, with the live-versus-backup comparison
named as its requirement. Not started, deliberately.
- capability map: the 'needs someone who knows to look' qualifier is GONE; what
remains is stated narrowly — no correct-code run through the page, the put-back
is out of scope, and the journey has not been re-walked end to end.
- 07-backup-architecture 7.0: a fifth row, and where the screen deliberately stops.
- CONTEXT: standing ruling S-34.
- STATUS: the headline change and the two things still owed as proof.
No hub change and no hub bump.
The register said 'two set-aside stores, ~1.2 GB'. Measured before touching
anything: THREE set-aside stores totalling ~1.45 GB, and the thing that was
exactly 1.2 GB was demo-felhom's LIVE felhom-repo. Matching on the size would
have deleted a working repository. The operator was shown the corrected list
and confirmed 'delete all three'.
Deleted: demo-felhom orphaned-20260717 (1.4 G) + orphaned-20260718 (3.0 M);
demo-hp orphaned-20260804 (43 M). Both LIVE repos untouched, confirmed by full
listings before and after on each account.
Proof nothing live was caught: a real off-site run on demo-hp immediately
afterwards returned status ok, orphaned false, no error, 6 snapshots.
Method note recorded for the next session: the storage box has a RESTRICTED
shell. 'test -d X && rm -rf -- X' returns 'Command not found' and does nothing
(it failed CLOSED, verified by an unchanged listing); 'rm -r <path>' as one
simple command is the working form.
- OPEN-ITEMS: R-204 all four CLOSED with both 2026-08-05 rulings recorded (the
declared-state trigger and its four-meanings-of-absence reasoning; the recovery
preview's dashboard-password exposure accepted as metadata, not content).
R-193's credential half CLOSED, screen + deletion still open. R-192 CLOSED by
REPLACEMENT. R-202 untouched.
- R-212 MINTED (R-211 was the highest, grepped): the orphaned-ciphertext deletion
HALTED at its STOP because the measured paths do not match the register — three
set-aside stores totalling ~1.45 GB, and the thing that is exactly 1.2 GB is
demo-felhom's LIVE repo. Nothing was deleted.
- capability map: all four interventions closed; the row KEEPS a qualifier for a
new reason — no step needs an operator, but there is no customer-facing recovery
screen, and the journey has not been re-walked end to end.
- 07-backup-architecture 7.0: the four-step table updated; the declaration-vs-
inference reasoning and the credential-automatic/key-customer-present split.
- CONTEXT: standing ruling S-33.
- STATUS: the headline change and the deletion STOP.
- REPORT-r204-item4.md rather than REPORT.md: a parallel session is active in this
shared clone.
Operator ruled "proceed" after reading the pre-analysis; the storageReserved
condition CC made the move conditional on was applied with it. The pre-analysis
is retained verbatim as §11-bis so the ruling can be audited against what it
was given.
MOVED WITH ZERO LOSS, verified BEFORE the original was touched on four
independent observables: 550,891 = 550,891 filesystem entries; 448 = 448
trusted.overlay xattrs (load-bearing — overlayfs stacking rides them, which is
why rsync -X is not optional); 37,243 = 37,243 hardlinks; byte-identical
meta.db sha256. Verified again after: identical image/tag/volume ID SETS,
cache 2.782 GB / 38 records, ceiling still 30 GiB, pg 4 DBs / 31 tables /
175,135,767 B, redis DBSIZE 2437. End-to-end proof was a real build on the
relocated store, rc=0 — not an inventory count.
k3s was never at risk, and that was established BEFORE stopping anything: it
runs a separate containerd, so Gitea, the registry, the hub, PBS, Longhorn and
~160 pods stayed up. Only the two jarr-* dev containers were affected.
TRAP FOUND WHILE PROVING THE GUARD, and it is the reusable part:
RequiresMountsFor on a path with NO mount unit is a SILENT NO-OP — containerd
started normally against an absent-but-unmounted path. A typo'd guard buys
nothing and says nothing: the built-but-never-wired shape again. The guard was
therefore verified positively at the unit level (Requires= AND
After=mnt-ssd_2.mount on both units), and refusal proven with a genuinely
absent DEVICE via a temporary synthetic .mount unit — /mnt/ssd_2 hosts 12 live
Longhorn replicas and must never be unmounted, and editing fstab on a
production host risks emergency mode at boot. Result:
"Job containerd.service/start failed with result 'dependency'", is-active
inactive. It refused rather than creating an empty store on the root disk.
storageReserved on SSD2 0 -> 80 GB; still Schedulable=True at 76.34%.
NOT PROVEN, AND NOT GLOSSED (R-209a): the operator ruled DO NOT REBOOT, so the
move has not survived a reboot — which is this task's own standard for
validated. The MECHANISM is proven; the CONSEQUENCE (that a real boot mounts
/mnt/ssd_2 before containerd starts, in this host's actual ordering) is not,
and mount-ordering reasoning is exactly the class this project has been burned
by. So: the pre-move tree stays MOVED ASIDE, not deleted (34.3 GB, which is why
/ sits at 54% and not lower), and felhom-store-postboot-check.service — oneshot,
enabled, dry-run PASS at install — validates it automatically at the next boot,
asserting positively that /var/lib/containerd does NOT exist. Read
/var/log/felhom-store-postboot-check.log after the next boot; on PASS the
rollback copy can go and ~34 GB returns.
Gates: repo_gates.py --fast — all OK, rc=0 (run separately from this commit).
Spike output only; no production Go code. The one shipped change rides in
homelab-manifests 6808a4b (R-205, the monitoring rule).
VERDICT: mechanism confirmed, with one correction and one refutation.
- CONFIRMED: builder.gc IS honoured under the containerd worker and DOES evict.
Proven by naming a 440 MB `go mod download` record present at build N and
absent by N+2 — not by absence of an error.
- CORRECTED: honoured ONLY in the `policy` array form. The flat form is
SILENTLY ignored — daemon starts, logs nothing, keeps its defaults.
`dockerd --validate` returned "configuration OK" for a bogus key AND for a
config that then crashed the daemon. The oracle is `docker buildx inspect`.
- REFUTED: Docker's `data-root` would NOT move the cache — it moves 0.62 GB.
The 181.4 GB belongs to the system containerd (`root` in
/etc/containerd/config.toml).
P3 (operator-approved) executed: prune claimed 156.9 GB, the filesystem
returned 150.35 GB (the 6.5 GB gap is layers shared with images), SYNCHRONOUSLY
— / went 86% -> 53% used, and Longhorn's default disk went
Schedulable=False (DiskPressure) -> Schedulable=True (18.85% -> 50.32%).
P7 root-caused the largest item and it is NOT the cap: all 208 `go mod download`
records had Usage count 1. Isolated by controlled builds — same VERSION build-arg
-> CACHED, new VERSION -> executed, byte-identical tree. `ARG VERSION`/`ARG
GIT_COMMIT` sit ABOVE the module-download step, and a RUN's cache key includes
the stage environment. Both Dockerfiles have it. One line each to fix -> R-208.
P6 NOT EXECUTED — stops at the operator, as specified. Pre-analysis: the move is
safe as measured (+38.8 pp above the 25% floor) but SSD2 is the only Longhorn
disk with storageReserved=0 and is overcommitted 6.9x; at full inflation the move
lands 12 pp BELOW the floor. The prune removed the move's urgency, so CC
recommends against it unless ~80 GB is reserved on SSD2 -> R-209.
Register: R-205 (CLOSED, shipped), R-206 (Ansible: cap + prune + narrowed Docker
ban), R-207 (DRY_RUN guard), R-208 (ARG ordering), R-209/R-210 (operator),
R-211 (Prometheus has no config-reloader — rules changes have never applied
until something restarted the pod; found while verifying R-205).
Gates: repo_gates.py --fast — all OK, rc=0 (run separately from this commit).
- OPEN-ITEMS: R-196 CLOSED; R-204 items 1-3 CLOSED with item 4 named and
its dependency stated. Header restates that R-202, the 1.2 GB ciphertext
deletion and R-198's still-unit-proven retention all REMAIN OPEN.
- capability map: the recovery row keeps its 'with a person present'
qualifier, names which crutch remains, and cites the three now gone.
- 07-backup-architecture: new 7.0 - what a customer can and cannot do
ALONE, the four steps in a table with status. This is the section a
future reader will use to answer that question.
- CONTEXT: standing ruling S-32, superseding S-31 steps 2-5.
- STATUS: rewritten to one screen per its own header; removes a corrupted
half-overwritten section left from the drill session.
- ROADMAP: R-196 and R-204 collapsed.
R-198 — host_escrow_superseded shipped with `blob` (the K-escrow / PBS datastore key) and
identity_blob was added to host_escrow LATER, never here. The offsite restic REPOSITORY
password lives in identity_blob. So demoteCurrentEscrowTx -- whose own comment calls it "THE
ONE escrow row-copy routine" -- retained the whole-guest key and silently dropped the off-site
data key, which is the secret the retention was built to preserve. And because the copy happens
as the new blob overwrites the old, the destroying act was the ESCROW CEREMONY: the exact thing
a rebuilt box tells its customer to run, on a card promising in Hungarian that the old backups
stay recoverable. Both demo boxes crossed that line on 2026-08-04.
- identity_blob added to the table (CREATE + additive ALTER) and carried in the shared copy
routine, so BOTH callers are fixed at once: re-escrow and host-delete demotion.
- ListSupersededEscrow reads it back; store.HostEscrow gains IdentityBlob.
- CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity is the census of who the fix protects.
- Nothing is backfillable: pre-v0.93.0 retained rows have no blob and their sources are gone.
- Tests assert the CONSEQUENCE (a retained row can still yield a repo password), which is why
the pre-existing retention test stayed green for two months asserting the mechanism.
R-197 — SaveHostEscrow returns the hash it replaced; the escrow PUT raises
offsite_repo_key_changed (warning, operator-only, edge-triggered) when both hashes are known and
differ. No hash value travels. Severity chosen for the world v0.93.0 creates: with the identity
blob retained, a changed key is "this history now depends on an older recovery code", not a loss.
R-192 (half) — the stuck alert now reports the two shapes it actually covers, burned and
regressed, each stating its own measurement; the regressed text withdraws the Re-issue
recommendation. Every self-heal refusal leaves a notification_log row with its reason. The
guard's logic is unchanged; its 500-oldest-reports scoping stays OPEN and the window is named in
the alert text so the limitation travels with the number. offsite_delivery_stuck and
offsite_credential_restaged are added to operatorOnlyEvents -- neither was registered and neither
has a customerMessages entry, which is not a block.
R-196 — five comments (not the three the spec expected) claimed ReissueCredentials rotates the
restic repo password. It resets the PROVIDER password and cannot touch the repo password, which
is generated on the box. All five corrected; the staleness mark documented as precautionary. The
BEHAVIOUR stays open.
Not in this release: R-199, R-200, R-201 remain open -- the chain that hands the key back is
still unassembled. Part 5 hit its gate; the orphan card is untouched (R-202).
Read-only recon of the escrow -> recovery chain, from a dead node to an open
repository. No production code, no build, no version bump.
Headline: the hub's superseded-escrow retention does NOT retain the offsite
repository password. host_escrow_superseded has no identity_blob column and
demoteCurrentEscrowTx copies only the K-escrow blob, so what survives a
supersession is the PBS datastore key, not the restic repo password. The next
escrow ceremony -- which the system tells a rebuilt box's customer to run --
destroys the last copy. Both demo boxes crossed that line on 2026-08-04.
Also established:
- the hub's blob-serving endpoints (re-enroll / restore-directive) have zero
callers anywhere: agent, hub UI, scripts, runbooks (R-199)
- POST /backup/offbox/inject-password is routed and handled but no template
contains the form (R-200)
- nothing in the recovery path has ever been exercised; the one live
round-trip proof (2026-06-10) predates the ResticRepoPassword field (R-201)
- a fail-closed mint refusal IS implementable: the report ACK already carries
escrow{identity_blob_present, restic_pw_sha256} and the controller discards
it whenever no offbox target exists
Corrections: yesterday's spike annotated (candidate (b) overturned in part --
unattended recovery is impossible, customer-present is not); capability-map
retention claim struck through and replaced with what the code does.
Deliverable: documentation/audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md
Register: new R-198..R-201; R-193 and R-192 updated; STATUS.md refreshed.
Part 4 (ships): `david` — a prospective customer with hosts=0, host_deletions=0,
reports=0 — e-mailed an expected_dbdump_missed ERROR at 03:00 UTC three mornings
running. The existing down-skip could never cover it: it reads the staleness
checker's state, which is seeded from a query over the `reports` table, so a
customer that never reported has no state at all and GetState() returns "" rather
than "down". store.HasEverBoundHost (hosts row OR host_deletions tombstone) is
consulted once per customer at the top of the deadline loop. The discriminator is
"was a host EVER bound", never "has a report arrived" — a box installed and never
heard from is a real fault and keeps alarming. Fail-OPEN on a read error. Red-proof
observed: removing the guard fails with `got [expected_dbdump_missed]`, verbatim the
event david sent.
Parts 0-3 (spike, NO production code for R-193/R-192):
audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md establishes that the one-shot
provider password is the RECOVERABLE secret and the restic repository password is the
irreplaceable one — and that a guest rebuild mints a fresh one, orphaning the previous
off-site history. Measured without touching a box, by comparing
host_escrow.restic_pw_sha256 against host_escrow_superseded: BOTH demo boxes changed
(demo-hp 15 snapshots / 40.9 MB, demo-felhom 36 snapshots / 1.14 GB). demo-felhom's
"lucky" 76-second recovery restored delivery and not the repository, silently, for 13h.
ReissueCredentials does NOT rotate the restic password (R-39's record and two hub
comments are wrong -> R-196); candidate (b) is not implementable against a
zero-knowledge escrow; candidate (a) already exists as F3 and is wired to the wrong
event. Ends in ranked options and an unanswered question for the operator.
R-195 SHIPPED; R-196 + R-197 filed; R-192 + R-193 updated, neither closed.
The 20-minute latch expired at 10:20:29 and the hub logged degraded -> ok
(agent_capability_recovered) at 10:30:40. Final state on both boxes: agent
0.124.1, two ACL rows on /storage/felhom-backup.
CI run 28 failed and run 29 passed on the same sha. The tag was created locally at
07:38:36Z; run 28 started 07:38:31Z (commit push) and run 29 at 07:38:41Z (tag
push). The old race was 'tag before package'; the new one is 'package before its
tag is pushed' — the window the converse probe exists to detect, and it did.
Not confirmed from the run log (the endpoint 404s), so recorded as the
timing-consistent explanation rather than a proven one. The gate passes locally
with all 7 versions installable and none untagged. Both obvious closures are the
'make the gate blind for a window' shape this row refused, so the options are to
accept a seconds-wide window or to make releases quiet to CI another way.
R-191: the gate was run first and it mattered — ep0's prune jobs have run daily
since 2026-07-27 (18 tasks, all OK). THREE of my own queries said the opposite and
all three were broken instruments (worker-type vs worker_type, prune vs prunejob,
proxmox-backup vs proxmox-backup-proxy); acting on any would have disabled the only
pruning attempt while reporting that nothing prunes.
R-190: the row now reflects the MITIGATION, not the cause, and says so. Includes
that v0.124.0's transition record failed in production while every unit test
passed, and Part 3's single pass — the token-rotation class is real and documented
in our own installer but does not fit this box (same token still authenticates, the
other three grants survived, no installer run evidenced); ruled out on this box, not
fleet-wide.
R-194: PVE caches permissions (~40s and ~16min measured), so a single permission
read is a lagging indicator and may explain when R-190's refusal surfaced.
07-backup-architecture: the offsite retention row was RIGHT and the configuration
disagreed with it — noted, since a doc that states a contract does not enforce it.
Re-issue through the designed endpoint: fresh password staged 07:11:51, settle-gate
GO, consumed 15s later at 07:12:06, offsite configured at 07:12:09 against the SAME
sub-account (275124) and repo path. Both boxes now escrowed.
CORRECTION to this session's own reading: the escrow did NOT recover by itself.
escrow_state went pending -> escrowed 15s after the apply and I inferred automation;
the operator had run the ceremony. It needed a human on both boxes — demo-hp at
07:16:02, demo-felhom at 07:20:28 (its escrow had been pending since its own rebuild
the day before). A 15-second state change is not evidence of automation, which is the
same class as reading an absent log line as success.
Snapshot continuity is NOT established: both boxes report snapshot_count 0, but the
run-history keys are ABSENT rather than zeroed — a controller that has never run an
offbox backup, not an empty repo. The 04:15 run decides it.
Operator confirms no hub-side offsite config change, so the regression was not an
action. Evidence: demo-hp's controller went 0.187.0 -> 0.192.0 at 06:12:18 with a
new config hash and the agent re-keyed its leaf three minutes earlier — a guest
rebuild. The last pre-rebuild report shows the tier fully healthy: escrowed, last
success 02:16:39Z, 15 snapshots, 40.9 MB. No offsite object in the 108 reports
since.
Mechanism: the restic credential is delivered once. demo-hp consumed its secret on
2026-07-23; the rebuilt controller has no copy and no way to request another.
demo-felhom survived the SAME rebuild only because its secret was still unconsumed
— it consumed it four seconds after its config hash changed and was reporting
offsite again 76 seconds later. That difference was luck, not design.
Also sharpens R-192: the self-heal's guard refuses when any report since the
consume carried an offbox target, but that query reads the OLDEST 500 reports —
all of which predate the rebuild. Healthy history before a rebuild is not evidence
the credential still works, which is why the automation that exists for this case
declined to act.
demo-hp has been emailing daily since 2026-08-03 06:12 UTC that '500 reports
since carry no offbox target — the credential is likely burned'. Measured against
the hub's own data: all 500 of those reports DO carry one. The credential was
consumed 2026-07-23 and applied successfully; the controller reported an offsite
object continuously until 2026-08-03 05:59:21, then it vanished at 06:12:19 and
has been absent for 108 reports. A regressed apply, not a burn.
Two defects. maybeEmitStuck builds its message from ReportsSinceConsume while
hardcoding 'carry no offbox target' and never consults OffsiteReportsSinceConsume,
so the recommended action targets a failure that did not occur. And maybeHeal
refuses SILENTLY on exactly that field ('regressed-apply shape -> operator's
call', a bare return), so there is a daily email with the wrong story, no heal,
and nothing saying why the heal declined.
The underlying condition is real: that box currently has no off-site copy of its
customer app data, since 08:12 CEST on 2026-08-03. What removed it is not
established.
Four SCHEDULED runs, none triggered by hand: demo-felhom host 83.8s / offsite
540.4s; demo-hp host 109.3s / offsite 300.1s. Each restored into a scratch guest,
booted, verified and destroyed itself; zero 990000 guests or volumes afterwards
and both local-lvm figures returned to their pre-run values.
Both boxes had BOTH tiers due at once, so R-86's ordering was observed live for
the first time: never-proven sorted first, each box took its HOST tier, deferred
the offsite one, and picked it up on the next evaluation six hours later. The
host-tier proofs reached the hub through R-189's merge — demo-felhom's report
carries two tiers, and the local one can only have come from disk.
The capability map's optimistic half is cashed, with its scope stated: these two
boxes, not the fleet.
Surfaced and filed rather than fixed:
- R-190: a storage ACL that demonstrably worked at 04:44 was gone by 09:24, with
a reinstall, any logged pveum activity and any cluster-log entry ruled out.
- R-191: every weekly offsite backup uploads successfully and then fails the job
on a prune the box is deliberately not allowed to do (R-89 moved it
server-side; both boxes still arm keep_last=2).
Two corrections to yesterday's record: the R-185 drift DID surface as 403s on the
write path (six, with the hub raising whole_guest_backup_failed at the first), and
my earlier "no restore_test_* events" was produced by grepping a 404 page.
CORRECTION 1 — the runbook annotation and the R-185 row both said the drift did
not surface as a 403 because writes go through a root path. That is WRONG.
demo-felhom's local-api backup jobs 403'd six times between 09:24 and 17:34 CEST
on exactly that storage and privilege, and the hub raised whole_guest_backup_failed
at the first with edge-triggering suppressing the rest. The impact was not only an
unreadable tier: the agent's own whole-guest backups to it were failing.
CORRECTION 2 — on this box the grant was LOST, not never issued. A vzdump by the
agent's token to that storage completed OK at 04:44:50 the same morning; the first
403 is 09:24:56. Ruled out by measurement: a host reinstall (uptime 12 days), any
pveum/ACL/user.cfg activity in syslog 04:00-10:00, any ACL entry in the cluster
log. Correlated but not established: guest 9201 was reprovisioned nine minutes
before the first failure.
R-190 files the unexplained disappearance, and notes that the new store-grant
probe detects the STATE but says nothing about the TRANSITION.
- OPEN-ITEMS: R-185 closed with the measurement, the corrected root cause (the
installer's Scenario-F reuse arm, not PVE_STORAGES), and the live sequence.
Records that demo-hp carried the same drift and was fixed too.
- capability map: the whole-guest row's HOST-tier half was OPTIMISTIC and now
says so — that tier was not merely unproven, it was unprovable on both demo
boxes, and every live proof cited was on the offsite tier.
- vzdump-target-move runbook: its item 5 predicted this; annotated (not
rewritten) with what actually happened — the create arm did grant, the reuse
arm did not, and it surfaced as a silent unreadable tier rather than the 403
the item expected, because vzdump writes through a root path.
- CONTEXT: S-21 (an empty listing cannot distinguish forbidden from newborn; the
measured trap that an ungranted path answers with INHERITED privileges) and
S-22 (the Scenario-F arm must finish the job).
- STATUS: rewritten for the operator, back to one screen.
- OPEN-ITEMS: all three rows closed with their measurements. R-189 records the
migration consequence seen live (a pre-R-189 record has no tier and is not
reportable, so upgrading does not retroactively make an old proof visible).
R-188 records both directions demonstrated and the fixture cleaned up. R-186
carries the before/after sha values including the CGO_ENABLED discrepancy.
The priority list states explicitly that R-185 is the one left open from that
group and that this session did not touch it.
- capability map: the restore-proof row now says the evidence path itself had a
gap — the proof reached the hub only because no restart intervened — and what
closed it.
- CONTEXT: S-19 (a proof is durable and reportable, a failure is neither, and
why) and S-20 (the release ordering, what each step protects, and how a binary
is verified).
- STATUS: rewritten for the operator, back to one screen.
The agent reports restore_tests[] from an IN-MEMORY store ('lost on restart; the
cadence re-populates'), and the hub report interval is 900s. A restart inside
that window drops the result. That used to self-heal within 24h because the next
cadence re-tested the tier; under per-archive due-ness the agent will NOT re-test
a proven archive, so the hub can stay ignorant until the next archive generation
— a week on the offsite tier.
Observed today: the 15:25:14 PASS on felhom-pbs (a real 14.5 GB offsite restore)
reached no host-report at all, because the agent was restarted 2m43s later for
the v0.121.1 deploy.
The persisted proof already exists — RestoreTestState.Snapshot() even carries the
comment 'for the host-report gauge' and has NO production caller: a seam built and
never wired, and an invariant asserted in a comment with no test, in one method.
on: [push] fires the gates workflow on the TAG push too, and release-agent.sh
pushes the tag before publishing (deliberately). CI can therefore run the
published-versions gate inside the window where the tag exists and the package
does not, and correctly reports 'every released agent version must be
INSTALLABLE' for a release that completes seconds later.
Measured across two releases in one session: v0.121.0 -> runs 12/13 (success,
failure) on the same sha; v0.121.1 -> runs 17/18 (failure, success) on the same
sha; and one pair both green — a race, not a rule.
It matters because R-168 made CI email on failure so a red gate cannot be missed.
A signal that cries wolf on every second correct release is how that mail becomes
something you archive unread.
admin