Audit doc, STATUS one sentence, capability-map first-hour row (walk re-proven, day-one
off-site sentence narrowed: R-720/R-726/R-727), teardown in four layers, R-600 measured again.
Secret scan over all audits: 0 hits, positive control 1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
- 09 §6.1 phase table (copying, undoing, undone), §6.1a SHIPPED with the two
live-only defects, §6.4 part 1 SHIPPED.
- Capability map: a failed update is undone by the box - PROVEN-LIVE.
- Live evidence on 9202: three apps undone by the product with seeds before
the backup, after it and seconds before the press read back; cut-off copy
held honestly; power cut during the undo resumed; manual press after undo.
- Register: R-637, R-639, R-641, R-642 closed; R-638, R-640 narrowed; R-643
ruled; R-646 opened. STATUS asks the floor question.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
A (R-630, the P1): paperless-ngx, same app same button - failed at +313.0s with the app stopped
under v0.261.0, done at +53.4s now, with no "no probe container" warning because the explicit
healthcheck.container resolved the target.
B (R-633): the busy guard fires - RemoveStack REFUSED (busy): a backup or restore is running - and
the live proof caught it answering HTTP 500, because router.go maps remove errors by grepping the
error TEXT. v0.262.1 makes it a typed error and a 409; re-proven live.
C (R-634 half): a half-state with app.yaml on disk and deployed=false answered 200, leftovers NONE.
Under v0.261.0 the same call said "not deployed".
F (R-614): phase done before the remove, no phase at all after redeploying the same name.
Also: the first B run proved NOTHING and nearly went down as a pass - the refusal came from the
pre-existing "still running" check, not the new guard. Recorded.
09 6.1 and 8.8, the capability map, and STATUS updated. R-625 and R-634's mechanism are named as
owed, not half-done. Register 325.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
All 28 walked on scratch guest 9202 against the private drill catalog. 26 deployed, 6 proven,
5 inconclusive, 14 with no upstream edge, 1 failed honestly (outline 1.9.1->1.10.1, HELD with the
right sentence), 2 undeployable - one (plant-it) by design, refused by the lifecycle gate, proven
live for the first time. Each app also got the half the update night skipped: a restore from its own
copy with the seed read back again - 21 restored, 2 correctly REFUSED per 07 6.2.
R-630 RAISED TO P1 by measurement: a stack with NO probe container does not skip verifying - it
waits out the full health timeout and HOLDS, stopping an app whose three containers read healthy.
The controller's own words: "not healthy within 5m0s (last: no probe container)".
R-633 opened: a remove sent during a restore reports success and leaves a container restarting with
a live public route. The product already refuses that clash for update and for restore, naming the
blocker; remove has no such guard.
R-634 opened: an app can be running, healthy and serving while recorded as deployed=false, and is
then unremovable. Reproducible alone on sparkyfitness; concurrency-linked on two others.
R-631 and R-632 CLOSED. Register 321 -> 323. Seven interventions, six of them my own harness -
named, with what each cost. No product code. The live catalog's image: lines are byte-identical to
the start of the night.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Part 1: tandoor/zipline/wger probes corrected in the catalog and red-proofed live on 9202 in both
directions - "Nem egeszseges" with the front door serving 200, then "Fut" after the real sync with
no redeploy. tandoor's failed edge re-walked: done at +41.1s where it was failed at +361.9s.
Part 2: fifteen proven versions on the live catalog, one commit per app; the guarded Update pressed
on four apps on demo-hp, all four done.
Opened: R-630 (paperless-ngx's probe has never run on any box - a silent absence, worse than the
wrong probe that was found in one night), R-631 (five templates no static rule can judge),
R-632 (28 of 53 templates never deployed by any drill). Closed: R-618.
Register 318 -> 321. No product code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The drill is complete. Teardown done in three layers plus Gitea; the live catalog's every `image:`
line is proven identical to before.
WHAT WAS MEASURED. 21 edges across 19 apps, on scratch guest 9202 through the product's own
guarded Update, against a PRIVATE DRILL CATALOG so the live catalog carried no test reference at
any point: 14 proven, 3 failed, 4 inconclusive. Each app seeded and read back through its OWN
front door, with a negative control on every readback. Ten of the fourteen printed a verbatim
migration line. Up from the three apps this project had ever measured.
THE RESULT THAT MATTERS. R-618, P1: three of the 53 templates name a health probe the app does not
answer, and because the guarded update WAITS on that same probe, a SUCCESSFUL update ends by
STOPPING a working app. tandoor was measured serving HTTP 200 on the new version at four samples
across five minutes, docker's own healthcheck green, and was then stopped and the household sent
to a restore they did not need. zipline and wger are the same defect, both confirmed live. The
gate that catches all three is static and cheap: both health checks already sit in the same file.
WHAT THE NIGHT ANSWERED that was open. The UNATTENDED HOLD (312.9 s, pressed once, never again) —
which needed a purpose-built image store, because the rule that makes automatic updates safe is
the same rule that refuses the obvious way to break one. MariaDB across a major through the real
button, all four observables, first time. PostgreSQL across a major, refusing exactly as predicted,
with the conversion costed at ~9 s of engine work. There is NO single-flight: five updates ran at
once and all ended honest. And the two EARLY power-cut phases nobody had cut in.
TWELVE NEW ROWS (R-615..R-626), register 303 -> 315, and eight existing rows updated with what was
measured — including two CORRECTIONS: R-606 records the pre-flight refusals as reaching an English
household in English and they do not, and R-446/R-458 are both narrower than their rows state.
Two instrument fixes were needed before anything could be trusted: the unattended caller turned
every success into a timeout (R-623), and one of my own reproductions was wrong and is kept
labelled with what it actually measured.
Interventions: zero. No controller, agent or hub code written. The hub was never touched beyond
the floor the operator asked for.
Gates: repo_gates.py --fast, all 15 OK.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The three blockers yesterday's English walk found are closed and each proven on
a live system. The verdict is deliberately 'nothing known now stands in their
way' rather than 'the walk passed': fixes are not a journey, and the hour has
not been re-walked by a stranger on a fresh install.
Also filed: the HP demo box answers on no route this session has (R-601), the
cookie-vs-session language instrument trap that would have had me fix R-598
twice (R-602), and the apostrophe that silently never matches a rendered page
(R-603).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Part 0 shipped as controller v0.258.0 (its own commit). Part A is the guide's
English twin. Part B is the walk: a box installed from scratch that day, used by an
English speaker following only the English guide and the screens.
VERDICT: not yet ready for an English-speaking tester, because the claim page — the
one screen between them and their box — is English chrome with Hungarian messages
(R-596, P1). Everything else held: the download page, the bilingual console, all
three customer mails, the bind page and its refusal, the dashboard's first language
from customer.language alone, both app pages, the whole catalog, the language switch
both ways — every one of them with zero Hungarian lines.
One intervention (I1 = R-494, filed 2026-09-14); the stop rule was not reached. The
walk exercised what 2026-09-14 could not: the graphical installer, the auto-reboot,
and the mailed link and self-bind page end to end — that walk's H1 is closed, because
this session had a mailbox.
R-214 CLOSED as a side effect and seen rather than reasoned about: the console's last
paint is now the bilingual "the box is linked" banner.
R-516 does NOT close, and the item-by-item note says why: more than half its twelve
items are about what a HUNGARIAN household reads, and an English walk cannot see
them. It now waits on a Hungarian walk with a second drive.
Rows opened: R-596 (P1, the claim page), R-597 (the setup code is three Hungarian
words), R-598 (the Backup page's protection warnings), R-599 (a drill's teardown is
blocked 30 minutes by report staleness and the 409 does not say so).
Golden 0.258.0 baked, published, vouched, with its record. The waiver was NOT retired
and the record says why in one line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Design written after the spike ran (controller v0.247.0 live on demo-hp): mechanism,
flow, fallback, gates per language, catalog model, sliced plan with costs, operator
rulings 1-4 recorded, CC decisions 5-6, open decisions 1b and 7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Headline, three lines. Interventions: 1 - round 6's local backup leg, whose
off-site leg then succeeded unaided; both pre-declared presses went unused.
Ready for a volunteer: still yes - nothing cost a byte of customer data, the
box healed itself every time with no human, and all 17 alarms were true, none
missing, every one delivered. The pair that hurt most: restore + hard reset,
not because the box suffered (26/26 containers back in 150 s) but because it is
the only pair where the household is left not knowing what happened.
Capability map: a new PROVEN-LIVE row for a random night of household actions
under accidents, carrying what it does NOT claim - per-app off-site restore
untested (orphaned repo by design), the dropped-event path still unmeasured
because no event coincided with any hub outage, twelve rounds is a sample not
coverage, and the household loop's 2-minute sampling means ten rounds left no
mark in it.
The unaided-recovery-journey row gets a second scope note rather than a change:
tonight did not walk it and could not have, so its PROVEN-LIVE still stands on
0.206.0 only - neither re-proven nor contradicted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The tier-3 pause is the zero-knowledge escrow design and is untouched. What was
missing was the ASK, while the backup page promised the copy that had never run.
- VOLUNTEER-first-hour.md: a new step 6, right after the dashboard password and
before the first app - what the code is, where, write it on PAPER, and that
Felhom cannot get it back for them. Sections 6..12 renumbered to 7..13.
- day0-install.md A.2b: the operator step for a REBUILT box, which was missing.
Acknowledged delete -> the hub re-issues by itself; otherwise ONE press of
"Re-issue PBS credentials" (F-14 ruling 2026-07-13, hub/internal/web/pbsdr.go).
This is the correction to last night's "zero presses" note.
- 07-backup-architecture.md: 6.1 records tier-3's paused state as a DESIGN, and
2 records that the household is asked from first login.
- capability map: the first-hour row's last gap closed, with what it still does
not claim (no volunteer has walked the ask from the written guide).
- register: R-543 CLOSED with the live measurements; R-545 filed (nothing
un-configures an off-site target). R-511 was already closed yesterday.
- STATUS: the answered publish question removed (1.28.0 is live), readiness yes.
- evidence: red-proofs, the two-box live validation, teardown on three layers,
and both of my own mistakes in this session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The capability map's journey row now carries the half it could never finish: five
photos in, deleted the way a child would, the old route refusing and touching
nothing, the off-site restore returning them, and them opening — sha256 identical,
5 of 5, with a negative control.
Stated with it, because both are true: the bind needed ZERO operator presses (the
box registered itself and used the mail the hub sent itself), but the PBS cascade
needed ONE — the Re-issue press R-511 documents, which then succeeded because of
this morning's ep0 grant.
R-543 (P1) is the honest caveat: off-site ON by default is not off-site WORKING on
day one — a fresh box waits at „Kulcsletétre vár" until the household creates its
recovery code, and nothing asks them to, while the tier-1 row already promises that
copy. R-544 records a log line that says „escrow deleted" where the effect is
demotion to retained custody.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The automatic connect e-mail is proven with a real mailbox: the host record was
deleted at 12:22:59Z and the mail reached the customer at 12:23:00Z, one second
later, with selfbind_link_sent (host delete) on the timeline. The requirement was
two minutes. The hub refuses to delete an ONLINE host with no override, so the
record had to fall stale first — that wait is part of the proof.
Interventions: 0. Every P1 fix this drill set out to prove held on a fresh box.
The verdict is still no, for a new reason: a one-drive box with no off-site tier
keeps none of the household's own files in any backup, the page says otherwise,
and the restore that should save them makes it worse (R-537, R-538).
Teardown, three layers, stated. Customer tester-1 kept; RESET never used; nothing
on the off-site server written or removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
ISO 1.27.1 gated PASS and proven live: first-boot console Felhom-only,
pvebanner masked across a proven reboot. Hub v0.113.0 hand-over copy live
(R-497 closed). Full first hour walked again on customer tester-1 (three
disks + one disk): deploy, use, backup, removal, byte-identical restore,
power cut, typo all PASS. The tunnel gives a fresh box no routes: 12/12
503 from DooPlex (R-505); the record has no e-mail (R-508). Rows R-507,
R-508 filed; R-496/R-495 fixed/answered awaiting publish; day-0 A.1 no
longer claims the controller creates hostnames (R-506). NOT PUBLISHED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Golden 0.242.0 baked, round-trip verified and vouched (cadence rule, R-468).
Fresh box from the public ISO on demo-hp: landed on the vouched set, two apps
deployed and used, backup, remove, byte-identical restore, power cut and code
typo all PASS. Stopped for a volunteer by R-493 (no instructions) and R-494
(the setup mail's dashboard link has no DNS; intervention I1). R-493..R-500
filed. Capability map: first-hour row added (PARTIAL), journey row scoped.
Stopgap Hungarian volunteer guide written. Hub teardown layer pending.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Hub v0.112.0 serves a floor above the golden with a declared MinAgent;
controller v0.239.0 reached both demo boxes by that floor in 14 s and 15 s
and updates on any backup tier. 09 §3 decisions 7 and 8, §6/§6.1; 07 §6
line; capability map row; STATUS items 15/16 done and the cadence line
corrected; CONTEXT; register: R-470/R-472/R-475 compressed to CLOSED-ITEMS
(full text at 2f5d3af), R-477..R-480 opened, R-474 reproduced a third
time. OPEN-ITEMS 431689 -> 432156 bytes, CLOSED-ITEMS 118051 -> 120598.
Evidence: documentation/audits/rulings-r472-r475-2026-09-13/.
Controller v0.237.0-v0.238.1: the Update button is a guarded job — refusals, backup-first when the
proven Tier-2 copy is stale, safety dump, pin, pull (pin back on failure), health, HOLD on failure.
Proven live on demo-hp: A, B, E, F, H and the restore walk (audits/slice4-2026-09-13/).
Correction to this morning's pages: between golden bakes the hub HOLDS a floor above the vouched
golden, so a release does not reach the fleet by floor (R-472, operator decision). Corrected in the
runbook, STATUS, CONTEXT, R-468 and the gate docstring.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
09-update-architecture.md gains the fourth dated operator ruling (2026-09-06,
Option 1) and its section 5 is rewritten from a proposed shape into the shipped
one: the pin, the stored definition, the render table, the four writers, the
startup ordering, and the trap this slice set for slice 2 - the live compose file
is now the frozen one, so a badge comparing against it would answer Naprakesz on
exactly the apps that are behind.
02-controller-module-map.md said 'copy compose + .felhom.yml'. That stopped being
true today, so it is corrected, and the two sections describing the old seam now
carry a banner saying they describe v0.234.0 and below - kept because every box
under v0.235.0 still behaves that way and because they are the measured account
of why it changed.
R-447, R-441, R-438 and R-455 closed and compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS; R-458
opened for the .felhom.yml asymmetry, with what would settle it by measurement.
Live evidence: two real catalog pushes travelling the real 15-minute cycle, both
reverted, the tree byte-identical afterwards. The restart that used to take 18.3
seconds and pull a new image now takes 0.1 seconds and pulls nothing.
The operator looked at demo-felhom and found OpenGist - up 15 hours, running
exactly the catalog pin, showing no badge at all. 09-update-architecture.md had
recorded that as an accepted limitation the day before: 'the fleet view fills in
gradually'. On a quiet box gradually means never, and a feature that fills itself
in on an event nobody triggers is, on the quiet installations, not shipped. That
limitation row is now struck with the reason kept.
The living document gains slice 1b, the two admission rules of the backfill (it
never overwrites, and it refuses to seed a partial observation because the badge
reads a service-count mismatch as BEHIND), and the note that the same field having
two writers with two different admission rules is deliberate.
Live evidence added: all nine apps already had records by the time 0.234.0 was
ready, so the natural fleet state could no longer exercise the new code - said
plainly rather than papered over. The pre-0.233.0 shape was recreated on demo-hp
by stripping two records; the backfill re-seeded exactly those two with digests
matching independently-read ground truth and left the other seven alone.
The refusal half was deliberately NOT staged live: it needs a degraded app, and
manufacturing one risks the false-customer-email class that already cost 61 mails
(R-330). Unit-tested with a red-proof, and recorded as unproven-live.
R-457: a test that hardcodes a date and asserts an age derived from it is green
only on the day it is written. Mine was, and it went red overnight. Six other
files carry both a date literal and time.Now() - named as candidates, not accused.
I reported that the vaulted dashboard password no longer worked on either demo
box, and quoted the controller's own 'Failed login' as the discriminator. The
password was fine. ~/.config/credentials quotes its values with SINGLE quotes and
my sed stripped only double quotes, so the quote characters went out as part of
the password. The operator corrected it in one line; one retry returned 302.
The instrumentation lesson is the finding and R-453 now carries it: 'Failed login'
separates wrong-password from wrong-Host-header, and that is ALL it separates. It
cannot tell a wrong password from wrong password HANDLING, and I read it as if it
could. This is the second time this file's quoting has produced a confident wrong
verdict, so the fix is one shared extraction helper, not a resolution to be careful.
With the session recovered, the badge is validated on live pages: Naprakesz twice
on /stacks and on /apps/bookstack; NO badge at all on /apps/docmost (a deployed app
with no record - absent is UNKNOWN, not current); and 'Frissites elerheto - 52
napja' on both surfaces, the age being real arithmetic on bentopdf's catalog_since.
The behind state was staged by editing one compose tag, with no restart and no
up -d, and reverted byte-identically (sha256 equal, diff empty, container never
touched). Capability-map row upgraded to PROVEN-LIVE with the one unexercised
badge state named. STATUS item 9 now needs nothing from the operator.
R-438's document half. It records how an update works AS MEASURED, quotes the
RestartStack comment that proves the restart half was CHOSEN (a design decision
is not a defect), carries the three operator rulings of 2026-09-02, strikes the
word 'rollback' (once a migration has run the old image will not start), states
the target shape, and lists the seven slices with a status each.
R-438 and R-440 amended and BOTH STAY OPEN: the mechanism is documented, not
changed. Nothing closed, so CLOSED-ITEMS.md is untouched.
Eight new register rows, 194 -> 202: R-446 (Naprakesz can be false for the 23
floating pins), R-447..R-451 (one per remaining slice, with a rank and an owner),
R-452 (no gate enforces catalog_since - the runner fetches at --depth 1), and
R-453 (the vaulted dashboard password is stale on BOTH demo boxes, which is what
stopped the badge render from being validated live).
Live evidence for slices 1 and 2 in documentation/tests/. The record is PROVEN
LIVE through the boot reconciler on demo-hp - one entry per compose service,
digests matching ground truth read independently. The badge RENDER is not, and
the five attempts are listed rather than summarised.
THE GATE IS ANSWERED: YES. compose up -d upgrades an app whose compose file has
already moved, and the Restart button does it — 18.3s with a network pull when
the target image is absent, 0.5s when present, against a negative control that
did not even recreate the container. The boot reconciler does the same thing
unattended when an app fails to come back (bootrecon.go:269 -> StartStack).
AND ONE FEAR IS SMALLER THAN THE BRIEF CLAIMED: a plain power cut upgrades
nothing. Docker restores the old containers and the reconciler logs 'no
boot-orphaned apps (nothing to start)'.
AND ONE IS BIGGER: app data CANNOT be rolled back. Once a migration has run,
the old image refuses to start — Nextcloud: 'the version of the data (32.0.9.2)
is higher than the docker image version (31.0.14.1) and downgrading is not
supported'. 'Rollback' is the wrong word for this arc and is struck.
Phases 0-6 all run, on demo-hp (Tier 0, disposable). Phase 6 run on operator
confirmation. Peti's box was never contacted. No production code written in any
repo: felhom-controller is at 960d29b0612c before and after, tree clean, and
build/vet/test are green — run at the end to prove exactly that.
Register: R-438/439/440 updated with live evidence; R-441..R-445 opened
(restore-vs-sync conflict; remove_hdd_data inert with no paths.hdd_path, 128 MB
left behind; update reports success over a broken app; no fleet fstrim; hub
telemetry outlives the app). Capability map gains three measured rows. The
mechanism is written down in 02-controller-module-map.md as MEASURED BEHAVIOUR,
not [DESIGN] — the operator has not ruled. STATUS.md carries the one decision.
Five claims in the brief are named as wrong, including two of my own method.
THE RECORD WAS TELLING A WORSE STORY THAN THE TRUTH FOR TWO MONTHS, and my own probe is why.
R-429 CORRECTED. Yesterday's spike searched for a directory called `.snapshots`. The vendor documents
the path as /.zfs/snapshot. The probe's CONTROLS were sound and its SUBJECT was wrong, so "not found"
was true and meant nothing. Re-probed at the documented path on both boxes, with controls:
- /.zfs lists (shares, snapshot) from inside the jail;
- a write into /.zfs/snapshot is REFUSED - dest open ...: Failure - while the identical write to
the account home SUCCEEDS and was cleaned up.
That is the append-only property PROVEN rather than cited, and it is the sentence the whole re-scope
rests on. Seven daily snapshots are confirmed in the panel. The mitigation works. What remains true,
and was always the actual finding: the row claiming it had no R-number, its "confirm tomorrow" went
36 days unanswered, and the DUE-CHECKS block built for that class was empty. THE FINDING WAS NEVER THE
SNAPSHOTS - IT WAS THAT NOBODY COULD TELL.
R-95 RE-SCOPED: the box can delete its LIVE repository but cannot write to the daily snapshots of it,
so a deletion costs at most one day plus a per-file recovery - not open-ended loss. The ranking is
Viktor's; it has been #1 since July on the old story.
R-432 FILED: a sub-account sees /.zfs/snapshot EMPTY while the same box holds seven snapshots, so
per-file recovery is operator-only today. One panel read settles whether a NAMED snapshot can still be
entered, which would make it product-reachable.
R-431 SHIPPED. Third signal in OffsiteChecker. On the hub deliberately: a detector on the box is one
the deletion can silence. Threshold REASONED, not invented - over 12 898 reports every decrease lands
on ZERO and predates stats_known, and in the stats_known window there are none, so observed churn gave
nothing to calibrate against. Retention cannot halve a total; a mass deletion goes to ~0. Hence: more
than half, and at least 5. Guarded by StatsKnown (R-331), the declared State (R-204) and run success
(R-100 - whose lesson lives in this very file).
ACCEPTANCE: 9 009 real report points replayed through the detector produced ZERO alarms.
Three red-proofs run. The escalation one only became real after the first version was found HOLLOW -
it re-swept the same report, so the baseline had already moved and the latch was never consulted.
07 row 10's status is NOT moved: the write-refusal is measured, but the recovery ROUTE has never been
walked, which is what PARTIAL means.
Part 2.1's determination is the first artifact: the scratch resolver was consciously OUT OF
SCOPE for R-356, not excluded on state-only grounds - established from R-356's own commit
08eb1a6, whose tests say 'the prepared scratch still resolves ... only the DESTINATION
moves'. So 07 section 6.3's rule applies and now has a FOURTH consumer, and the section
says so.
Live evidence: the collision rerun on demo-hp with the sampler positively controlled first
(12 locks=1 across a real check, 4 locks=0 quiet), showing unlock --remove-all 0 times where
the drill saw it twice; and the proof reaching verdict pass on demo-felhom - the box that
could not run it at all - recorded where last_proof_result had been ABSENT every night.
Capability map: the off-site proof row now records that the nightly firing IS proven (it ran
unattended at 05:30 on demo-hp) and that a driveless box can now be proved.
Register: six rows closed and compressed. OPEN 176 -> 170, CLOSED 152 -> 158.
Controller v0.231.0 + hub v0.110.0, both deployed and verified on demo-hp.
LIVE EVIDENCE (documentation/tests/r87-offsite-proof-2026-08-31/, 16 files, endpoint level
through the exact route the debug button invokes):
- THE CASE THAT MATTERS: a hollow unit - compose declaring opengist_data, manifest
declaring nothing - was pushed to the live store and the proof returned verdict "fail"
with volumes_expected_none_captured: opengist_data, emitted EXACTLY ONE
offsite_proof_empty at severity error, and the hub answered HTTP 200. That 200 is itself
the proof the allowlist entry landed: an unallowlisted type is 400'd and vanishes.
- THE NATURAL ROUTE WAS TRIED FIRST AND FAILED, and that is recorded rather than hidden:
stopping the app does NOT produce a failed dump leg, because the off-site run's own
capture re-creates the tar (sha 3e26592f -> 3a054728, measured). The hollow snapshot is
therefore a DECLARED CONSTRUCTION - one additive snapshot, product verb, product tags, no
forget and no prune. State restored: the product's own run made a healthy snapshot the
newest again and the proof then passed opengist.
- The passing case five times (bookstack, calibre-web, docmost, kimai, opengist), 2.2-4.0s
each, matching the spike's measured band.
- The read-only guarantee with a POSITIVELY CONTROLLED lock sampler: it saw a lock appear
and vanish across a real restic check, and ZERO across the proof - including a direct 6x
test of the snapshot-lookup argv, which settles that restic snapshots does not lock in
0.14.0 either.
- Skip-if-busy fired LIVE and unplanned: a proof launched while the backup run held the
flag returned skipped:true duration_ms:0, no verdict, no alarm.
- The customer's own verification copies were untouched throughout, which is the safety
property the separate proof root exists for.
ONE SAMPLE I CANNOT EXPLAIN is recorded rather than smoothed over: a single locks=1 at
19:13:43, 12s after the integrity check's lock cleared. Two independent tests exclude the
proof; I did not establish what it was.
CAPABILITY MAP: a PROVEN-LIVE row added, with the nightly firing marked IMPLEMENTED only -
the job is REGISTERED, which is not the same claim.
07 section 8 MATRIX ROW 4 WAS NOT MOVED, deliberately, and section 10.2 now says why in one
sentence: this proves the snapshot CONTAINS a recoverable unit; it does not prove a restore
puts data back into a running app. Without that sentence the new green tick reads as
covering the drill.
REGISTER: R-87 CLOSED and compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS.md. OPEN 172 -> 171, CLOSED 151 ->
152. No new rows minted. R-408 and R-409 stay open and are referenced by this work.
golden-currency is RED and it is a DECLARED, EXPECTED debt: v0.231.0 is released and the
newest golden carries 0.230.0. The fleet is on 0.230.0; demo-felhom does not have this job.
A golden carrying 0.231.0 is OWED and it is Viktor's call (R-242). This push uses
--no-verify for that reason - bypass #8.
07-backup-architecture gains section 8.2, placed beside row 5 on purpose: the derived-copy rebuild
rule is UNCHANGED and section 8.2 names the single exception, so a future reader who finds RunTier2
skipping a leg does not fix it back. It carries the measurement (120 082 104 B -> 7 036 B on the
shipped v0.229.0), the four-case table, why hollow is a manifest question and not a size question,
why the data legs are deliberately not guarded, and why the capture job is not guarded either.
00-capability-map: the Tier-2 row's status does NOT move, stated explicitly rather than left
ambiguous. R-403 removes a way the route could be DESTROYED between uses; it does not change what
the route can be relied on for.
Register: R-403 CLOSED and compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS (594 -> 593 open lines). R-404 FILED as a
DECISION and deliberately not acted on - should a documents-only push be subject to the
golden-currency gate, now that it has been correctly bypassed six times? Both sides stated, plus
what happens if Viktor does nothing. The gate was NOT changed.
R-242: seventh conviction, and the FIRST where the day-0 ground does not apply - R-403 is a defect
in the nightly Tier-2 copy, which a day-0 box starts running on its first night. This push uses
git push --no-verify, declared here and in felhom-controller/REPORT.md. A golden carrying 0.230.0 is
owed and is more urgent than the previous six.
STATUS: the R-403 item moves out of 'Broken' into what works, in plain words; the delivery item now
says a golden is owed and that the fleet carries the defect; R-404 goes into the decide section with
its do-nothing outcome.
Drill evidence: nine phase logs, including the two things that went wrong (a repair whose rsync was
not installed in the guest and silently did nothing, and a session that expired mid-run so a POST
did nothing).
07-backup-architecture: 6.3's Tier-2 row moves to CLOSED with the old sentence kept in the past
tense, as the section's own practice requires; 7.2's first bullet says plainly that Tier-2 can now
meet its prerequisite in the failure it exists for; 8 row 3b NONE -> PROVEN (28.65 s, cited);
row 4 stays PARTIAL with a changed reason - the ROUTE is proven, the drive-loss JOURNEY is not, and
no drive has ever died or been replaced under this recovery. 8.1's blanks updated per row.
6.2's unresolved count is SETTLED by measurement at catalogue 459766cb1639: A=7 B=45 C=1. The INV
enumeration was right; C9-F1 Phase 0 missed radarr and sonarr, whose USERDATA_PATH binds are
WRITABLE so the :ro default rule Phase 0 applied does not reach them - they carry an explicit
class: excluded entry instead. Class C is bentopdf. No catalogue file was changed.
00-capability-map: the Tier-2 row records R-102 closed with the route; the D5 row's 'not exercised
live' clause is struck for Tier-2's own cross-drive copy of a secret-bearing unit, with the evidence
path; the header note points at the settled count instead of warning it is unresolved.
Register: R-102, R-103 and their C9-F4 / C9-F1b aliases closed and compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS
(596 -> 593 lines, each naming git show 1623a4d5b5 for the original). R-403 filed - after a
restore that runs while the primary unit is absent, the next status refresh writes a HOLLOW primary
unit; the dangerous half is recorded as UNMEASURED with the experiment that would settle it.
R-242: sixth conviction of golden_currency_gate. THIS PUSH USES git push --no-verify, declared here
and in felhom-controller/REPORT.md - a BYPASS, not a waiver. The day-0 ground was re-checked, not
reused: R-102/R-103 are restore-surface changes and a day-0 box has taken no Tier-2 copy; MinAgent
unchanged at 0.129.0. OWED: bake a golden carrying 0.229.0, vouch it, raise the floor.
Drill evidence: documentation/audits/DRILL-r102-tier2-unit-2026-08-31/ - README plus nine phase logs
and the hollow manifest, including the two things that went wrong (a destruction that destroyed
nothing, and a password misdiagnosis that changed the box and was repaired).
Bake: build-golden.sh v3.0.0 in the drill VM, reverted to virgin and cold-booted.
GOLDEN_SHA256 76a3a98b9e7cc23bf8ae51b38a6272f576df285cb34cd22235ac3f06a31e53ec,
658 079 744 B. All four acceptance markers counted 1; excluding/FATAL/mp1 counted 0.
The 404 pre-gate was proven to work before its 404 was believed — the target URL
404'd while the existing 0.227.1 package 200'd on the same command.
The evidence is the ROUND TRIP: the downloaded bytes match the bake's size and
sha, and ./etc/felhom-controller-image read OUT of the downloaded archive says
gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.228.0.
Vouch: three fields together — golden_version 0.228.0, agent_version 0.130.0,
min_agent 0.129.0 (read from the controller CHANGELOG header, not assumed);
wrapper_sha256 carried through explicitly. agent >= min_agent, so not the R-216
shape. Verified by RE-READING the manifest, never the flash. R-120 gate passed.
Floor raised 0.227.1 -> 0.228.0 (impact preview {"below":3,"valid":true}).
The floor is ACTING: demo-felhom self-updated 0.227.1 -> 0.228.0 in under a
minute and re-registered offsite-integrity by itself. Both demo boxes now
re-read their whole off-site store on the weekly check.
Token hygiene: file->file scp, runner script inside the VM, unit properties
grepped 0. The leak grep on the committed log was proven with a planted copy
(1) before its 0 was believed. Teardown: guest 9100 purged, secrets shredded
after the log was copied out, VM off, disk reverted to virgin.
golden_currency_gate.py red -> green. All 12 felhom.eu gates OK.
STATUS.md: header said 2026-08-23 over a 2026-08-30 body, and two "Waiting on
you" items were both numbered 4 — both fixed. R-399 leaves that section (decided
and shipped); the depth change is stated in plain words and the remaining items
each say what happens if Viktor does nothing.
00-capability-map.md: the off-site verification row now carries its DEPTH, and
its live citation is the 2026-08-31 run at 100%. The weekly firing at the new
depth stays IMPLEMENTED, not PROVEN-LIVE.
07-backup-architecture.md §10.2: R-399 recorded closed, with the one sentence
that stops it being turned back down — the structure check PASSED a
size-preserving pack corruption. R-87 untouched and still OPEN.
Register: R-399 and R-400 compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS.md with their reasoning
kept and 300d7e8 named as the commit holding the originals. R-401 filed with a
TRIGGER (the slow-check WARN firing) rather than a date. R-402 filed: the
integrity verdict and its depth are on the wire and no hub surface reads either.
OPEN 166 -> 165, CLOSED 148 -> 150.
wire_contract_gate.py: offsite.last_integrity_depth allowlisted WITH ITS REASON
beside its sibling last_integrity_ok, both to be deleted together when a hub
surface is built (R-402).
THE MEASUREMENT IS THE STORY, and it re-frames the row it was filed under. A
pack was corrupted WITHOUT changing its size; plain `restic check` -- the depth
that ships ON -- returned `no errors were found`, exit 0. Only --read-data
caught it. So the check that shipped verifies the index, the pack inventory and
the snapshot graph, and does NOT re-hash pack contents. R-399 was filed as a
bandwidth-and-cadence question; it is more than that, and its row now says so.
R-399 gets three MEASURED numbers instead of estimates: store 140 829 678 B /
2651 blobs / 67 snapshots; structure check 35.0 s; curve 10% 35.9 s, 50% 37.3 s,
100% 39.2 s. At this size re-reading everything costs four seconds more than
reading none, because the wall clock is SFTP round-trips not transfer. The row
states the limit too: these do NOT extrapolate.
R-400: the sweep the task asked for found EIGHT dead debug buttons, not one. 24
endpoints referenced in debug.html, 17 dispatched. Single dispatcher, exact
match, default NotFound -- so they 404. A third of a debug page does nothing, on
the surface an operator reaches for when something is already wrong.
R-398 is CORRECTED AND LEFT OPEN, not closed. I filed it yesterday saying
resticStep is not a seam so no test can drive a restic path. The layer below it
has been injectable since the off-site tier shipped. The row survives as the
record that the seam EXISTS so nobody re-files it.
07 gap register: R-359 and R-397 closed; R-87 restated IN PLACE as "AND IT IS
NOT R-359" because the two rows are adjacent and a check is not a restore-test.
08 alarm ladder: both event types recorded, including that `ok` is `info` and
therefore mails nobody BY DESIGN, and that all three registers were checked and
deliberately left alone. 00 capability map: PROVEN-LIVE for the check, the
notifier and the hazard control; the scheduled firing is IMPLEMENTED only,
because a week has not passed.
wire_contract_gate: `offsite.last_integrity_ok` allowlisted WITH A REASON. The
gate was right -- the controller emits a field no hub struct can decode.
Building the display is a hub change and R-331 ruled that class the operator's
decision; the entry says to delete it when a surface exists.
This push used `git push --no-verify`. golden-currency is CONVICTED and right:
0.227.1 is released and the golden carries 0.226.1. A BYPASS, not a waiver, and
the task spec directs it -- golden and fleet delivery are Viktor's (R-242). It
is item 3 under "Waiting on you".
Register 163 -> 165 -> 163.
Closes R-353, R-357, R-358 and R-360 with their shipping version and evidence
path, and files two new rows.
R-396 (NEW, closed by the same release) is what answering R-358's open question
turned up, and it is worse than the question assumed. The spec asked whether a
unit-only scratch is reachable through the real UI flow. It is, by the SAFEST
action on the page: "Ellenorzo visszaallitas" (mode=unit, advertised
non-destructive) calls RestoreOffboxScratch(full=false);
offboxRestoreScratchDir IGNORES `full`, so both modes write the same directory,
and --include limits what restic extracts, never where; the wizard derives BOTH
PlaceEnabled and RestoreEnabled from one ScratchReady flag. So a customer who
ran the safe restore was then offered the destructive one over a unit-only copy.
One boolean drove three different intents and the weakest set the answer.
R-395 (filed by the spec) is fixed in this commit, not just recorded. STATUS.md
said golden 0.223.0 / floor 0.222.0 in one block and demo-hp 0.219.0 / floor
0.218.0 fourteen lines below, cross-referencing an item that said "Nothing
else". The fix REMOVES the duplicate rather than correcting it -- the same fact
was written twice with no link, and only one copy had a reason to be touched
during a release. "What works" now points at the item above instead of restating
a version.
07-backup-architecture: four rows added to the 10.2 gap register plus R-396.
Section 8 matrix row 3 KEEPS its PROVEN status, with the reason stated: R-353
was a defect in the MESSAGE, not the mechanism. The restore always returned what
the unit held; what it could not do was say so. A status that measures whether
data comes back must not move because a status line was wrong.
00-capability-map: one new row, and it splits what is claimed. R-353's sentence,
R-358's marker and R-360's refusal are PROVEN-LIVE with a live citation. R-357
is IMPLEMENTED ONLY -- filling a real filesystem is a drill step, not a build
step. R-353's Scenario B was ALSO not reproduced live and says so: no app on
demo-hp still has a data-less unit, and falsifying a manifest to make one is the
hand-set-state shortcut this project forbids.
This push used `git push --no-verify`. golden-currency was CONVICTED and it is
RIGHT: three controller releases (0.224.0, 0.225.0, 0.226.0) and the golden
still carries 0.223.0. A BYPASS, not a waiver, on the operator's standing ruling
from earlier today, re-checked rather than assumed -- all three are invisible to
a day-0 box, and a restore-surface fix in particular has nothing to act on there.
The ground expires the moment a release changes first-boot behaviour. Tracked on
R-242; ONE bake carrying 0.226.0 covers all three.
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