R-543 closed: the household is asked for the recovery code (controller v0.245.0)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 21s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 21s
The tier-3 pause is the zero-knowledge escrow design and is untouched. What was missing was the ASK, while the backup page promised the copy that had never run. - VOLUNTEER-first-hour.md: a new step 6, right after the dashboard password and before the first app - what the code is, where, write it on PAPER, and that Felhom cannot get it back for them. Sections 6..12 renumbered to 7..13. - day0-install.md A.2b: the operator step for a REBUILT box, which was missing. Acknowledged delete -> the hub re-issues by itself; otherwise ONE press of "Re-issue PBS credentials" (F-14 ruling 2026-07-13, hub/internal/web/pbsdr.go). This is the correction to last night's "zero presses" note. - 07-backup-architecture.md: 6.1 records tier-3's paused state as a DESIGN, and 2 records that the household is asked from first login. - capability map: the first-hour row's last gap closed, with what it still does not claim (no volunteer has walked the ask from the written guide). - register: R-543 CLOSED with the live measurements; R-545 filed (nothing un-configures an off-site target). R-511 was already closed yesterday. - STATUS: the answered publish question removed (1.28.0 is live), readiness yes. - evidence: red-proofs, the two-box live validation, teardown on three layers, and both of my own mistakes in this session. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
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@@ -14,6 +14,43 @@
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> language, one screen, no identifiers in the prose. Same subjects, different readers; merging them
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> would make one of the two audiences stop reading. `STATUS.md` is also a **view of `OPEN-ITEMS.md`**
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> and holds nothing of its own; this file does hold its own content, namely the standing rulings below.
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## Decisions 2026-09-16 (evening) — the recovery code: the household is asked, the page says „szünetel"
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**No new ruling. One correction to the record, from the operator (2026-09-16):** the note saying a
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rebuilt box needs zero presses for its off-site setup was WRONG. The press exists by the F-14 ruling
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of 2026-07-13 — the hub re-issues by itself **only** when the previous box was deleted through the
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acknowledged flow; otherwise `handleHostEnroll` reuses the existing record and mints nothing, and the
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operator presses „Re-issue PBS credentials" once (`hub/internal/web/pbsdr.go`). That ruling stands and
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is now written into `runbooks/day0-install.md` §A.2b, where it was missing.
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**R-543 CLOSED — controller v0.245.0.** The tier-3 pause is the zero-knowledge escrow design and was
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not touched. Two copy changes only:
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- **`internal/web/escrow_banner.go`** — the R-241 reminder bar, SECOND INSTANCE. `escrowPaused()`
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reads the same two facts `tier3State` reads (`backupMgr.OffboxConfigured()` and
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`settings.GetOffboxTarget().EscrowState != "escrowed"`), so the bar and the app rows cannot
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disagree. **It hangs off `executeTemplate` (server.go), the single render choke point** — not the
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three `addRecoveryBanner` call sites, because a per-handler helper reaches only the pages someone
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remembered (the seam-built-but-never-wired class). Login and claim render through
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`s.tmpl.ExecuteTemplate` directly and never pass through it; `hasAdminSession()` (mirroring
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`RequireAuth`, legacy-open included) keeps it off the public `/s/<token>` share page. Dismissal:
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session cookie `felhom_escrow_banner`, no MaxAge/Expires, route `/backup/escrow/banner/dismiss`.
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- **`driveFilesNoteFor` (`internal/web/backup_page_state.go`)** — the tier-1 file sentence takes
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`tier3State`'s OWN vocabulary instead of the app's shape, and returns (note, linkHref, linkText) so
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the template renders a real anchor. Assigned at the END of the app-row loop, where `Tier3State` and
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`Tier2Configured` are both already resolved.
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**Trap re-learned, twice in one session, and worth the line:** inside a guest the controller's data
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directory is `/var/lib/docker/volumes/felhom-controller-data/_data/data`; `/opt/docker/felhom-controller/data`
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is the CONTAINER's view of the same files. A teardown script using the container path from a guest
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shell printed „offbox dir now: ABSENT" — true of a path that never existed, false of the thing being
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claimed — and left the target fully configured. Also: the controller answers on the container address
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`172.17.0.2:8080` with the mandatory `Host` header; it is NOT on the guest's `127.0.0.1`, and neither
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guest is reachable from DooPlex at all.
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**New row:** R-545 (P3) — nothing un-configures an off-site target; `/backup/offbox/reset` refuses
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unless the repo is ORPHANED and means „start a new remote backup", not „forget this destination".
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## Decisions 2026-09-16 (afternoon) — the backup promise: files protected from day one
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**Ruling: the off-site copy is ON for every customer from day one** — shared (a sub-account on the
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@@ -1,36 +1,39 @@
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# STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next
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**Updated 2026-09-16 (evening) — the photos come back, and they open.**
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**Updated 2026-09-16 (late evening) — the box now asks for the recovery code, and the page stops promising a copy that has not run.**
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> **Ready for a volunteer: almost — one thing stands in the way, and it is small.** A brand-new box now
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> protects the household's own files: I put five photos in, deleted them the way a child would, and got
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> them back byte-for-byte from the off-site copy. The old route that used to lie now refuses politely
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> and points at the one that works. What is missing: on a new box the off-site copy is switched on but
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> **paused** until the household creates their recovery code, and nothing asks them to do it.
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> **Ready for a volunteer: yes.** The one thing standing in the way this morning is fixed. On a new
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> box the off-site copy is switched on but paused until the household writes down their recovery
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> code — that pause is deliberate and correct, because that code is the only key and we cannot open
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> their copies without it. What was wrong is that nothing asked them. Now every page says so until
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> they do it, and the backup page says „would protect" instead of „protects" while it waits.
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**What changed today.** The backup page stops claiming it holds files it does not hold. A restore that
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cannot bring your files back now refuses instead of reporting success — and it no longer wipes the app's
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own wastebasket on the way. „Alkalmazás telepítve" now means installed, not merely started. Every new
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customer gets the off-site copy by default, 100 GB. The off-site server got the one permission it was
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missing, so a rebuilt customer's box can be set up again without hand-work.
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**What changed today (this note).** A reminder bar on every page of the dashboard: „the off-site
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backup is paused until you create your recovery code", with the button that does it. The sentence
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under each app's local backup now tells the truth about the state it is in — protected, waiting, or
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no copy at all — instead of promising the same thing in all three. The first-hour guide asks for the
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code right after the dashboard password and before the first app, and says plainly that we cannot
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get it back for them. The operator step for rebuilding an existing customer's box is written down
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where it was missing: normally nothing to press, but one press when the old box was not deleted
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through the acknowledged flow.
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**What I proved on a box that installed itself this evening.** It installed from the new image, showed
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Felhom's own screen with no Proxmox address, registered itself, and **bound with nothing pressed on your
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side** — the connect e-mail it used was the one the system sent itself. It landed on today's golden.
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Then: five photos in, the local backup, the recovery-code ceremony, the off-site copy, the deletion, the
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refusal, the restore, and five photos that open — identical to the originals.
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**What I proved on real boxes.** On a box whose recovery code exists: no bar anywhere, and the page
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says the files are protected. On a box waiting for the code: the bar on every page, an off-site run
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refused with „waiting for the key to be placed in escrow" and no copy written, and an app's row
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reading „would be protected … paused until you create the recovery code". Both boxes were running
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today's build. The throwaway app and the test setup were removed afterwards and checked gone.
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**Decisions I took.** None under the unattended rule.
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**Needs you.**
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1. **Say yes or no to publishing the new installer image (1.28.0).** It is built and passed every check,
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and it fixes the screen that kept showing the pairing code after the box was connected. Nothing is
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published without your word. If you do nothing: new volunteers keep getting the older image, which
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works but shows that stale screen.
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2. **One small fix before a volunteer: tell the household to create their recovery code.** Until they do,
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the off-site copy is paused — so „your files are protected" is a promise with a delay in it. I can
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add the prompt and make the sentence state the real state.
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3. **The slow-crash-loop counter** (yesterday's ruling) is still owed, and is a job for the nightly.
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1. **Nothing blocking.** The installer image you approved is published and live on the download page,
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and the recovery-code gap is closed. A volunteer can start.
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2. **The slow-crash-loop counter** (the ruling of 2026-09-15) is still owed, and is a job for the
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nightly. If you do nothing: a box that keeps crashing slowly is still reported as healthy for
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longer than it should be.
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3. **One small thing worth knowing, not doing:** there is no button that forgets an off-site
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destination once set — only one that disables it. Written down as a low-priority job. If you do
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nothing: a household that types the wrong address keeps the old one on the box, switched off.
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---
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@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ likewise silent. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r361-2026-08-22/evidence/06-part3-decis
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**NARROWED 2026-08-21 by the backup-truth drill — kept as history; both halves have since closed, see the entry immediately above.** Proven that night on `demo-hp` with planted, hash-recorded files: the **declared-userdata** leg of a **drive-declaring** app does come back byte-identical (`calibre-web`, 5/5 including two Hungarian accented filenames). **Two legs of the same story do NOT:** (a) the off-site restore has **no named-volume leg at all**, so an app's volume tar sits in the unit, in the snapshot and in the checking folder and is never replayed (**R-354**); (b) for the **40 of 53** apps that declare no data drive the off-site restore **refuses outright**, saying a running app „nincs telepítve" (**R-356**). Since the 40-class keeps ALL its data in named volumes, the end-to-end story is **unproven for that class and disproven for the volume leg generally**. The escrow/key half of this row is untouched by that and still stands. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-backup-truth-2026-08-21/evidence/` and `REPORT.md` (2026-08-21). |
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| **The customer's own UNAIDED recovery journey, end to end** | controller v0.206.0, hub v0.98.0, agent v0.127.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-07, the fifth walk) — an unaided customer journey on a real installation, SCOPED: see what it does not claim** | A throwaway appliance was built from the published ISO on demo-hp, claimed, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, then destroyed — guest purged and both enrolled drives wiped. The rebuild and the customer's route were then walked with **no command line inside the guest**. **Data: PASS.** All three sentinels byte-identical (`beb9175d…`, `7c8cb0ad…`, `e012e76f…`), including a 12 MB binary and `C11-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` — the Hungarian filename survived disk → restic → SFTP → Storage Box → restore → disk intact. Restored in **16 s** out of the pre-wipe snapshot `f3d9cd67`, non-destructively. **Journey: FAIL.** Four interventions, three of them root on the appliance: R-216 (a correct code called wrong), R-218 (the store never opened; the box stopped asking), R-219 (the promised listing structurally could not render), R-220 (the app could not be redeployed — its drives were unenrollable). Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM, and what the v0.201.0/v0.97.1 fixes do and do not change.** Six of the nine findings are fixed and each is red-proofed (R-216, R-218, R-219, R-217, R-222, R-215) — but **fixes are not a journey.** This row goes green only when the walk is repeated end to end and completes with no operator intervention. **Three findings are deliberately still open and each is a live blocker for some flow:** **R-214** (the console never stops showing a stale pairing code), **R-220** (after a rebuild the customer's drives cannot be re-enrolled — the deploy refuses and the wizard's list is empty, so no app can be redeployed onto its own data drive), **R-221** (a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony at all, because the pbsdr convergence marker survives on the host while the seeded `escrow.pbs_storage_id` is rewritten out of `agent.json`). **And R-216's fix does not by itself make a NEW box work:** with the hub guard corrected but the Day-0 manifest still vouching agent 0.120.0, a new box is **HELD, not served** — it stops being lied to, which is better, but the feature does not work for it until agent 0.125.0 is vouched. **⚠ CAMPAIGN-11 PHASES 2 + 4 RAN OVERNIGHT 2026-08-05/06 AND THIS ROW STAYS **FAIL**.** **What they add:** eleven injected faults against the recovery journey, each with a positive control, and a full unattended scheduled cycle. **The backup promise strengthened** — the off-site tier ran itself at 04:15 on a box rebuilt twice and set aside hours earlier (`snapshot_count` 1 → 2), all five daily jobs fired exactly once, and nothing on the must-not list fired. **R-217's and R-215's fixes were proven live under exactly their faults**, the set-aside proved it does not delete (12 535 KB byte-exact at the far end), and a wrong code was refused three times with nothing written and no lockout. **What they do NOT add: any progress on the JOURNEY.** These faults are **not a re-walk** — no customer route was walked end to end — and four new findings say the journey got no better where it matters: **R-224** (a hub outage and a stopped agent are BOTH reported to the customer as a bad recovery code, in 0.056 s and 0.030 s — no unseal attempted; the agent's own `err` distinguishes them and it is discarded at the HTTP boundary, and R-216's gate answers `source=version` so it cannot see reachability — **Phase 1's headline defect relocated from the version channel to the transport**), **R-226** (M1, the only message telling a customer to check their typing, is unreachable on any box that has re-escrowed), **R-225** (an unread store renders `0 pillanatkép · 0 GB` above a card saying it holds backups — 1 snapshot and 12 535 KB were really there), **R-228** (the set-aside history is recorded in `orphaned_renamed_to` and shown by nobody — `OrphanedRenamedTo` has zero references in any template or handler). **§4.1 is now MEASURED rather than deduced** — the floor IS served, from the box's own rendered `GetFloor()` and a cold-started controller's settle-gate line. **§4.2's positive half is still NOT measured** and needs a rebuild. Evidence: `audits/CAMPAIGN-11-recovery-journey-2026-08-05.md`, `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal-phase24.md` **2026-08-06 — THE FIVE PHASE-2 FINDINGS ARE FIXED AND THIS ROW STILL SAYS FAIL.** controller **v0.202.0** + agent **v0.126.0** close R-224, R-226, R-225, R-227, R-228. **What changed:** the unlock path now classifies WHY it failed, from the value and never the text, and the message that mentions typing is reachable from exactly one class — a real refusal — with **unknown defaulting to neutral**. Proven live on the venue with the same wrong code and only the hub's reachability changLine truncated
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| **A stranger's FIRST HOUR on a fresh install — download → install → claim → two apps → use → backup → remove → restore, plus a power cut and a mistyped code** | controller **v0.242.0**, agent **v0.130.0**, hub **v0.112.0**, golden **0.242.0**, installer ISO **1.26.1** | **PARTIAL (2026-09-14) — every mechanism PASSED on a fresh box; the UNAIDED journey FAILS before the first app** | `audits/DRILL-fresh-install-0242-2026-09-14.md`, evidence `audits/evidence-drill-fresh-install-0242-2026-09-14/journal.md`. A nested VM on demo-hp installed from the public ISO landed on the vouched set (controller 0.242.0, agent 0.130.0) with no hand upgrade; BookStack and PrivateBin deployed in 68 s / 21 s and were used through their front doors; backup-now moved both dates to the true time; removal with every delete box ticked left no volume, no backup and a 404; a page deleted in BookStack came back **byte-identical with its attachment** 32 s after restore; a hard power cut returned every app on the **same version** with data intact and no alarm; a typo in the code was refused and the right code then accepted, five failures locking for 15 min with an honest Hungarian message. **ONE intervention a volunteer could not make:** the setup-code mail's dashboard link does not resolve for a new customer (no tunnel/DNS is created — **R-494**), so the dashboard was reached by LAN address. **And no instruction exists to begin with (R-493).** **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM:** the self-bind page and the mailed setup code were not exercised (no mailbox in the harness — the operator bind and a box-printed code stood in); DR tier and off-site were off (ep0 fence), so escrow and off-site screens were not walked; no browser, so script-rendered state was not observed. Goes green when a volunteer, from written instructions alone, reaches a working dashboard and a first app with zero interventions. **2026-09-14 (evening) — WALKED AGAIN on ISO 1.27.0/1.27.1 + hub v0.113.0, STILL PARTIAL.** `audits/DOORSTEP-walk-1270-2026-09-14.md`. Held again on a new customer (`tester-1`, real domain + tunnel token): install on three disks and on one, the vouched set, deploy, use, backup-now, removal, byte-identical restore, power cut (same versions), typo + lockout. New and proven: the console is Felhom-only from the FIRST boot on 1.27.1 (VM 332, reboot proven, `pvebanner` masked); the hub tells the operator to hand the passphrase over (live). Still ONE intervention: the tunnel connected but received no routes (R-505), and the record has no e-mail (R-508). The graphical installer was proven only to its password screen (R-507). Goes green on a walk with zero interventions on a published installer. **BIGNIGHT 2026-09-14/15 (ISO 1.27.1):** the first hour re-walked with the real mailbox — self-bind link and mailed setup code both worked; 2 interventions (no auto bind mail R-509; tunnel 502 R-510); then twelve apps, a month of routines and nine faults: `audits/BIGNIGHT-household-month-2026-09-14.md`. **DRILL 2026-09-16 on controller 0.243.0 / agent 0.131.0 / hub 0.115.0 / golden 0.243.0 / ISO 1.27.1 — the WALK half is now PROVEN-LIVE with ZERO interventions, and the BACKUP half is narrowed, not proven.** `audits/DRILL-prove-fixes-0243-2026-09-16.md`. A fresh nested box was installed from the published ISO, landed on this drill's own golden **by checksum** (`e2d1843c…c10a`, no self-update), and was walked as a volunteer: the connect e-mail and self-bind page, the claim, **the tunnel from outside (302→200, R-510 CLOSED)**, the data drive, the file manager with its own generated password (`admin`/`admin` refused 401 before any dashboard action), four apps deployed and used, and „Mentés most” with **26 s** of app downtime. **Interventions: 0** — the two operator presses (self-bind send, PBS re-issue) were pre-declared and counted apart, and the four moments that look like help were my own API-driving errors or my own damage, each named in the drill's interventions table. **The automatic connect e-mail is PROVEN with a real mailbox:** a host delete at 12:22:59Z produced the „Kösd össze a Felhom dobozodat” mail at **12:23:00Z**, with `selfbind_link_sent (host delete)` on the timeline (R-509). **WHAT THIS DOES NOT CLAIM, and it is the backup half of this row's own sentence:** on a one-drive box with no off-site tier — what every fresh install is — the household's files are in **no backup at all** (the whole-guest tiers exclude `mp8` by design; the file leg lives at tier 2/3, both unset), the app-backup page nevertheless reads „DB + Konfig + Adatok” (**R-537**), and a restore reports success while leaving Nextcloud listing five photos that return `Sabre\DAV\Exception\NotFound` — after making the app's own trash, which still held every byte, unreachable (**R-538**). **Also still open from this walk:** the off-site tier cannot be provisioned at all (**R-534**, P1, an ep0 grant), the console keeps its pairing banner after biLine truncated
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| **A stranger's FIRST HOUR on a fresh install — download → install → claim → two apps → use → backup → remove → restore, plus a power cut and a mistyped code** | controller **v0.242.0**, agent **v0.130.0**, hub **v0.112.0**, golden **0.242.0**, installer ISO **1.26.1** | **PARTIAL (2026-09-14) — every mechanism PASSED on a fresh box; the UNAIDED journey FAILS before the first app** | `audits/DRILL-fresh-install-0242-2026-09-14.md`, evidence `audits/evidence-drill-fresh-install-0242-2026-09-14/journal.md`. A nested VM on demo-hp installed from the public ISO landed on the vouched set (controller 0.242.0, agent 0.130.0) with no hand upgrade; BookStack and PrivateBin deployed in 68 s / 21 s and were used through their front doors; backup-now moved both dates to the true time; removal with every delete box ticked left no volume, no backup and a 404; a page deleted in BookStack came back **byte-identical with its attachment** 32 s after restore; a hard power cut returned every app on the **same version** with data intact and no alarm; a typo in the code was refused and the right code then accepted, five failures locking for 15 min with an honest Hungarian message. **ONE intervention a volunteer could not make:** the setup-code mail's dashboard link does not resolve for a new customer (no tunnel/DNS is created — **R-494**), so the dashboard was reached by LAN address. **And no instruction exists to begin with (R-493).** **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM:** the self-bind page and the mailed setup code were not exercised (no mailbox in the harness — the operator bind and a box-printed code stood in); DR tier and off-site were off (ep0 fence), so escrow and off-site screens were not walked; no browser, so script-rendered state was not observed. Goes green when a volunteer, from written instructions alone, reaches a working dashboard and a first app with zero interventions. **2026-09-14 (evening) — WALKED AGAIN on ISO 1.27.0/1.27.1 + hub v0.113.0, STILL PARTIAL.** `audits/DOORSTEP-walk-1270-2026-09-14.md`. Held again on a new customer (`tester-1`, real domain + tunnel token): install on three disks and on one, the vouched set, deploy, use, backup-now, removal, byte-identical restore, power cut (same versions), typo + lockout. New and proven: the console is Felhom-only from the FIRST boot on 1.27.1 (VM 332, reboot proven, `pvebanner` masked); the hub tells the operator to hand the passphrase over (live). Still ONE intervention: the tunnel connected but received no routes (R-505), and the record has no e-mail (R-508). The graphical installer was proven only to its password screen (R-507). Goes green on a walk with zero interventions on a published installer. **BIGNIGHT 2026-09-14/15 (ISO 1.27.1):** the first hour re-walked with the real mailbox — self-bind link and mailed setup code both worked; 2 interventions (no auto bind mail R-509; tunnel 502 R-510); then twelve apps, a month of routines and nine faults: `audits/BIGNIGHT-household-month-2026-09-14.md`. **DRILL 2026-09-16 on controller 0.243.0 / agent 0.131.0 / hub 0.115.0 / golden 0.243.0 / ISO 1.27.1 — the WALK half is now PROVEN-LIVE with ZERO interventions, and the BACKUP half is narrowed, not proven.** `audits/DRILL-prove-fixes-0243-2026-09-16.md`. A fresh nested box was installed from the published ISO, landed on this drill's own golden **by checksum** (`e2d1843c…c10a`, no self-update), and was walked as a volunteer: the connect e-mail and self-bind page, the claim, **the tunnel from outside (302→200, R-510 CLOSED)**, the data drive, the file manager with its own generated password (`admin`/`admin` refused 401 before any dashboard action), four apps deployed and used, and „Mentés most” with **26 s** of app downtime. **Interventions: 0** — the two operator presses (self-bind send, PBS re-issue) were pre-declared and counted apart, and the four moments that look like help were my own API-driving errors or my own damage, each named in the drill's interventions table. **The automatic connect e-mail is PROVEN with a real mailbox:** a host delete at 12:22:59Z produced the „Kösd össze a Felhom dobozodat” mail at **12:23:00Z**, with `selfbind_link_sent (host delete)` on the timeline (R-509). **WHAT THIS DOES NOT CLAIM, and it is the backup half of this row's own sentence:** on a one-drive box with no off-site tier — what every fresh install is — the household's files are in **no backup at all** (the whole-guest tiers exclude `mp8` by design; the file leg lives at tier 2/3, both unset), the app-backup page nevertheless reads „DB + Konfig + Adatok” (**R-537**), and a restore reports success while leaving Nextcloud listing five photos that return `Sabre\DAV\Exception\NotFound` — after making the app's own trash, which still held every byte, unreachable (**R-538**). **Also still open from this walk:** the off-site tier cannot be provisioned at all (**R-534**, P1, an ep0 grant), the console keeps its pairing banner after biLine truncated
|
||||
| **Off-site app-data capture covers the paths an app declares MANDATORY — on BOTH drive layouts** | controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04) — and this row was OPTIMISTIC before it** | On demo-hp, an app on the **system-data fallback** bound `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` while the capture set looked in `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books`: the declared-mandatory directory was in **no** snapshot and the run reported `ok` (R-203). After v0.197.0 the capture log reads `1 mandatory path(s)` and the file is **listed inside the snapshot** — `restic ls -l latest --tag calibre-web` → `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt`. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md` §2 and the v0.197.0 CHANGELOG | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM.** It covers CAPTURE, not RESTORE: **no file has ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (R-201, ready to resume). It also does not claim the enrolled-drive layout was ever wrong — it was not, which is precisely why this survived. And a run that still misses a mandatory directory now reports **`incomplete`** rather than `ok`, so this row's guarantee is one the status can express. **Widened 2026-08-06 (controller v0.205.0, R-234):** the same verdict now also covers an app skipped ENTIRELY — until then a missing declared FOLDER made the run incomplete while an app with no recovery unit at all still reported `ok`, so the smaller gap moved the verdict and the bigger one did not. **This row still claims CAPTURE, not that a newly-selected app is protected by the next run** — for a DEPLOYED app it is (the run's own pre-dump phase writes the unit, measured 2026-08-06), and for an undeployed one it is not and the card now says so || **Recurring offsite (PBS) whole-guest backups actually LAND, and RESTORE** — local daily + offsite weekly as scheduled work | agent v0.97–0.103, controller v0.174/0.175, hub v0.76.0, host-install 1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-26)** | `audits/SPIKE-r82-phase0-2026-07-26.md`; per-repo CHANGELOGs/REPORTs. **Restore round-trip on demo-hp:** `--selftest=restore-test` against `felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T15:42:42Z` → `pass:true`, `verified:"boot+running"`, **`mount_parity:"ok"`** (`mp0=/var/lib/docker 50G`, `mp1=/mnt/sys_drive 20G`, mp8/mp9 throwaway stand-ins for the archived binds), `source_tier:"pbs"`, 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, scratch band clean afterwards and the live guest untouched. | **This row is distinct from the DR-tier row above, which proves ACTIVATION, not ARRIVAL.** That tier was PROVEN-LIVE as `applied` since 2026-07-21 while demo-felhom held ONE snapshot (a healing artifact) and demo-hp held **zero, ever** — "applied and empty", the R-39 shape one level quieter. **What earns PROVEN-LIVE here:** (a) demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace); (b) it **restores into a bootable, mount-complete guest** — `mount_parity` is the non-hollow half, since a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume; (c) **the multi-tier quiesce ran through the real UI endpoint** (`POST /api/guest-backup/trigger`, authed+CSRF) and produced **exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it** — `quiescing 1 stack(s)` 17:01:39 → local done 17:02:56 *"next tier may start (app still quiesced)"* → felhom-pbs snapshotted 17:03:06 → `unquiescing` 17:03:06. **App downtime 1m27s for both tiers**, and the app came back healthy. **Known gaps, recorded not hidden:** the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the PRIMARY tier, so the offsite tier is never AUTOMATICALLY restore-tested (the manual/selftest path is proven, the unattended one is not); the hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE rather than a reported cadence; the installer-default fleet flip awaits a full weekly cycle. → **R-82** |
|
||||
| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **R-189 (agent v0.122.0, 2026-08-03) closed the reporting half of this row, and it was a REAL gap in the evidence path:** the proof above reached the hub only because no restart intervened — `restore_tests[]` came solely from an in-memory store, so the 15:25:14 PASS was in fact LOST when the agent restarted 2 m 43 s later for a deploy (`0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports). Under per-archive due-ness the box would not have repeated the work for a week. The persisted per-tier proof (with the archive, and now the tier) is merged into the report, so a proof survives a restart — one entry per tier, newest wins, and a record that cannot be described honestly is not emitted. **THE HOST TIER'S HALF OF THIS ROW WAS OPTIMISTIC UNTIL 2026-08-03, and it is worth saying plainly.** Every live restore-test cited here is on the OFFSITE tier. The HOST tier was not merely unproven on demo-felhom — it was **unprovable**, and on demo-hp equally: the agent's token had no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, the storage both boxes configure as `local_backup_target`, so the content API answered `{"data":[]}` through the token while root listed three archives. The scheduler skipped it as *"no settled archive yet"* — which is exactly what a brand-new tier reports — so nothing ever said so (**R-185**). **CLOSED 2026-08-03 — agent v0.123.0 + installer 1.24.0.** The grant is applied on both demo boxes (the token now lists 3 and 4 archives), the installer's reuse arm grants on a pre-existing target, and the agent now **asks whether it may read each tier it depends on** instead of inferring it from an empty list: a critical degraded capability naming the storage and the missing role, which the hub alerted and emailed on **while the box was still blind**. **THE HOST TIER IS NOW PROVEN-LIVE, UNATTENDED, ON BOTH DEMO BOXES (2026-08-0Line truncated
|
||||
| Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier: host delete < RESET < customer Delete): one operator action → pre-first-install; all operational state destroyed, identity + basic config survive | hub v0.61.0, felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (external teardown, incl. two real firings)** | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — two live firings, both host-delete-first, on two different customers** (`demo-vm-felhom` 15:49:57, `demo-felhom` 16:08:51): every leg `ok` (`claim`, `db_purge`, `descriptor`, `hetzner`, `pbs`), escrow acked separately, each completing in 8–9 s (`hub-state.txt` `customer_resets`). The **Hetzner sub-account destruction is now verified against the live pool box** — and produced the run's sharpest lesson: **a sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object.** Deleting it left its `/home` intact, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext under a key this same RESET had destroyed — which is why the orphan guard fired at 16:58:14 (**a finding by S7's own criterion**) and why RESET now needs a base-dir purge → **R-32**. Prior: hub v0.61.0 REPORT; **ep0 live drill 2026-07-17** (throwaway `drill-reset-01` with a real backup: deprovision `deleted:true` destroyed the namespace + backup group + token, idempotent re-run `deleted:false`, all 3 real tenants + shared user survived); red-proofs (ack-gate, partial-failure resumability) + orchestration/store/offsite/render tests | External teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST, every leg idempotent; refuses while any host row exists; separate escrow-custody ack; clears claim (fresh code next onboarding); keeps the offsite tier CHOICE, drops provisioned fields. **Live-clicked 2026-07-18** (twice, by Viktor) — this supersedes the earlier "not live-clicked / Hetzner delete unit-tested only" note. **R-25b CLOSED (hub v0.69.0, 2026-07-21):** the Danger-zone DELETE is now the guided full-teardown cascade that runs this very sequence as its middle leg — see the row below |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -77,6 +77,13 @@ So the honest statement of the property is:
|
||||
> **The hub cannot open the escrow. The operator can reach a live box. Neither fact substitutes for
|
||||
> the other, and R is what keeps the first true.**
|
||||
|
||||
**[DESIGN] Because R is the only key, the household is ASKED for it from the first login** (controller
|
||||
v0.245.0, R-543). Off-site backup is enabled by default but does not RUN until the ceremony is done,
|
||||
so the ask is not a nicety — it is the step that turns the default-on tier into an actual copy. The
|
||||
volunteer guide asks for it immediately after the dashboard password and before the first app
|
||||
(`runbooks/VOLUNTEER-first-hour.md` §6), and the product repeats the ask on every page until it is
|
||||
done (§6.1).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. The two lanes (D1)
|
||||
@@ -299,6 +306,17 @@ never touches off-site snapshots (R-474). A removed app whose unit was kept is l
|
||||
| **Plane-2** whole-guest, local | `local:` → `/var/lib/vz/dump` on the host | rootfs + `mp0 /var/lib/docker` + `mp1 /mnt/sys_drive` | **24 h** (`backup_cadence_seconds: 0`) | `local_backup_retention: 3` | **no** |
|
||||
| **Plane-2** whole-guest, offsite | `felhom-pbs:` → ep0 datastore `felhom-offsite`, per-customer namespace, over WireGuard | same contents | **7 days** (`604800`) | server-side prune on ep0, `keep-last 2` at `03:30` — **and the box asks for none** (R-191) | **yes** (per-customer key) |
|
||||
|
||||
> **[FACT] Tier-3 has a fifth state the table above does not show: PAUSED (R-543, controller
|
||||
> v0.245.0).** Off-site is ON by default from hub v0.116.0, and a run does not start until the
|
||||
> household has performed the escrow ceremony — `tier3State` calls this `escrow_pending` and the page
|
||||
> says „Kulcsletétre vár". **This is the design, not a defect:** the escrow is zero-knowledge (§2),
|
||||
> the household's recovery code is the only key, and a run started without one would write a copy
|
||||
> nobody could ever open. What was wrong until v0.245.0 is that **nothing asked the household for the
|
||||
> code**, so a fresh box could sit paused indefinitely while its Tier-1 row promised that the off-site
|
||||
> copy protected the app's files. Since v0.245.0 every dashboard page carries the reminder (the R-241
|
||||
> bar, second instance) and the Tier-1 sentence renders by state — „védené … szünetel" while paused.
|
||||
> Measured on a fresh box 2026-09-16: zero snapshots, and the page said the files were protected.
|
||||
|
||||
> **R-191 (2026-08-04) — this row was RIGHT and the configuration disagreed with it, weekly, for as long as R-89 has been in force.** The contract has not changed: offsite retention is ep0's, the box's token is write-only, and the box cannot delete its own history. What had not followed was the installer's `keep_last: 2` on the offsite tier, so every weekly run uploaded its snapshot successfully and then failed the whole JOB on a prune the token is refused — `whole_guest_backup_failed` in the operator's inbox about a backup that had already succeeded. Fixed in installer **1.25.0** (`keep_last: 0`) and on both live boxes; a gate now asserts it. **Verified before changing it:** ep0's two prune jobs have run every day since 2026-07-27, 18 tasks, all OK. A doc that states the contract does not enforce it — the gate does.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
|
||||
## R-543 live validation — controller v0.245.0, 2026-09-16, demo-hp
|
||||
## Method: endpoint-level. Every request below is the exact request the browser makes (same handler,
|
||||
## same session cookie, same CSRF); only rendering is skipped. claude-in-chrome is not available here.
|
||||
## Reachability note: neither guest answers on its LXC address from DooPlex, and the controller does
|
||||
## not listen on the guest's 127.0.0.1 — it answers on the container address 172.17.0.2:8080 with the
|
||||
## mandatory Host header. All requests therefore run INSIDE the guest via `pct exec`.
|
||||
## Secrets: the dashboard password was read with scripts/read_credential.py (value never printed,
|
||||
## file->file, 0600) and passed to curl as --data-urlencode password@<file>.
|
||||
|
||||
### THE SEAM, STATED
|
||||
The two halves of this proof are on two boxes, not one box before and after a ceremony:
|
||||
* PAUSED half — guest 9202 (scratch), off-site configured and escrow NOT complete.
|
||||
* ESCROWED half — guest 9201 (demo), off-site configured, escrowed, running.
|
||||
Running a real escrow ceremony on a fresh target would provision off-site storage, and this task's
|
||||
fences put ep0 out of bounds. So the escrowed side is OBSERVED on a box that is already escrowed
|
||||
rather than produced here. What is NOT weakened by the seam: both boxes run the same binary
|
||||
(0.245.0), and the paused box's state was produced through the product's own configuration endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
## ── 1. ESCROWED + ACTIVE — guest 9201 (0.245.0) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
login OK
|
||||
GET /dashboard -> 200 bytes=60816 escrow-bar-hits=0
|
||||
GET /launcher -> 200 bytes=44462 escrow-bar-hits=0
|
||||
GET /backups/apps -> 200 bytes=106304 escrow-bar-hits=0
|
||||
tier-1 file sentence, as rendered (2 class-A apps):
|
||||
"Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat (és a második meghajtó) védi — ez a helyi mentés a
|
||||
beállításokat és az adatbázist tartalmazza."
|
||||
word counts on /backups/apps: Kulcslet=0 szünetel=0 védi=2 védené=0
|
||||
=> a box whose recovery code exists is NOT nagged, and the promise it prints is a true one.
|
||||
|
||||
## ── 2. PAUSED — guest 9202 (0.245.0) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
The state was produced through the product's own endpoint, POST /backup/offbox/config, with a
|
||||
throwaway ed25519 key and a pinned known_hosts line. 9202 has no agent local API, so the escrow
|
||||
STAGE could not run — the handler said so and saved the target anyway:
|
||||
|
||||
POST /backup/offbox/config -> 302
|
||||
flash: "A távoli mentési cél elmentve. — a kulcs letéti előkészítése nem sikerült
|
||||
(az ügynök nem elérhető); próbáld újra."
|
||||
|
||||
Persisted state afterwards (read from the guest's own settings.json):
|
||||
enabled=True host=192.168.0.162 repo_path=/mnt/nvme-1tb/r543-paused-proof
|
||||
escrow_state=pending last_run=None last_status=None snapshot_count=None
|
||||
data/offbox/: known_hosts 95 B (0644) | repo_password 64 B (0600) | ssh_key 411 B (0600)
|
||||
=> OffboxConfigured() is genuinely true (valid target + both secret files), and the escrow is NOT
|
||||
complete. This is the state a fresh box lands in on day one.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2a. The bar is on EVERY page, not on the three someone remembered
|
||||
GET /dashboard -> 200 escrow-bar-hits=1
|
||||
GET /launcher -> 200 escrow-bar-hits=1
|
||||
GET /backups/apps -> 200 escrow-bar-hits=1
|
||||
GET /settings -> 200 escrow-bar-hits=1
|
||||
GET /apps -> 404 escrow-bar-hits=0 (no such route; a 404 carries no bar)
|
||||
|
||||
Quoted from /dashboard:
|
||||
"A távoli mentés szünetel, amíg nem hozod létre a helyreállítási kódot."
|
||||
<a href="/backup/escrow"> (the route out, on the bar itself)
|
||||
|
||||
### 2b. A manual off-site run, while paused — refused, FOR THE RIGHT REASON
|
||||
POST /backup/offbox/run -> 302
|
||||
flash: "A távoli mentés a kulcs letétbe helyezésére vár."
|
||||
after the attempt: last_run=None last_status=None snapshot_count=None
|
||||
=> No snapshot, and the refusal came from the fork-4 escrow gate (offbox_handlers.go:224
|
||||
OffboxRunnable), NOT from an unreachable target — the target was never contacted. This matters:
|
||||
a run that failed to connect would have proven nothing about the pause.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2c. „Most nem" is for the visit only
|
||||
POST /backup/escrow/banner/dismiss -> 302
|
||||
Set-Cookie: felhom_escrow_banner=1; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax
|
||||
^ no Max-Age and no Expires => a browser SESSION cookie, exactly as R-241 does it
|
||||
same visit, cookie sent -> escrow-bar-hits=0
|
||||
next visit, no cookie -> escrow-bar-hits=1
|
||||
=> the off-site tier is still paused tomorrow, so the question is still asked tomorrow.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2d. The tier-1 FILE sentence, live, with the tier paused
|
||||
The first pass of this phase could not show it: 9202 had no class-A app, so the sentence had nothing
|
||||
to render („védi"=0 AND „védené"=0 — the „szünetel"=1 on that page was the BAR in the layout, not the
|
||||
sentence). Recorded because it was briefly written down as a limit and it was not one. A throwaway
|
||||
class-A app was then deployed on the box's own drive and the off-site copy turned on for it:
|
||||
|
||||
POST /api/stacks/calibre-web/deploy -> 202 {"ok":true,"message":"Telepítés elindítva ..."}
|
||||
(HDD_PATH=/mnt/felhom-drives/scratch_hdd — the guest's own registered data drive, 938 G)
|
||||
POST /backup/offbox/toggle app=calibre-web enabled=true -> 302
|
||||
|
||||
Rendered on /backups/apps, with the tier configured and PAUSED:
|
||||
|
||||
"Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat védené — a távoli mentés a helyreállítási kód
|
||||
létrehozásáig szünetel."
|
||||
...followed by the route: "Helyreállítási kód létrehozása →"
|
||||
|
||||
word counts on /backups/apps: Kulcslet=1 szünetel=3 védi=0 védené=1
|
||||
Kulcslet=1 is the tier-3 row's own state („Kulcsletétre vár").
|
||||
szünetel=3 is the bar + the sentence + the tier row.
|
||||
védi=0 is the point: the page no longer claims a protection that has never run.
|
||||
|
||||
=> Both wordings are now observed LIVE on real boxes running 0.245.0: „védi" on the escrowed box
|
||||
(9201, §1) and „védené … szünetel" on the paused box (9202, here).
|
||||
|
||||
## ── 3. TEARDOWN, three layers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
Recorded after the evidence above was already written to DooPlex (R-320: evidence leaves the machine
|
||||
at the END OF THE PHASE, before any revert — not at the end of the session).
|
||||
|
||||
MACHINE (guest 9202, scratch):
|
||||
* the throwaway class-A app removed WITH its data and its backups:
|
||||
POST /api/stacks/calibre-web/stop -> 200
|
||||
POST /api/stacks/calibre-web/remove -> 200 {"removed":"calibre-web",
|
||||
"volumes_removed":["calibre-web_calibre_web_config"],"hdd_paths_removed":[],
|
||||
"hdd_note":"Az alkalmazás nem tárolt saját adatot…"}
|
||||
verified after: containers named calibre = 0, drive folders = 0
|
||||
* the off-site target this proof created is GONE:
|
||||
before: offbox present=True, data/offbox/ held ssh_key, repo_password, known_hosts
|
||||
after : offbox present=False, data/offbox/ ABSENT, all three files `shred -u`'d
|
||||
MY OWN MISTAKE, recorded: the first teardown pass used the CONTAINER's view of the data path
|
||||
(/opt/docker/felhom-controller/data) from a shell running in the GUEST, where that path does
|
||||
not exist. It printed „offbox dir now: ABSENT" — which was TRUE of a path that never existed
|
||||
and FALSE of the thing being claimed. The target was still fully configured. The same wrong
|
||||
path had already produced three FileNotFoundError tracebacks earlier in this phase; I read
|
||||
those as noise instead of as the instrument telling me it was pointed at nothing. The re-run
|
||||
stops the controller first, edits the real file, shreds the secrets, restarts, and RE-READS
|
||||
the state to confirm — a teardown asserted is not a teardown observed.
|
||||
* controller restarted and healthy: felhom-controller:0.245.0 Up (healthy)
|
||||
* temp files: none left (`ls /tmp/.r543*` empty in the guest)
|
||||
* NOT touched: filebrowser, traefik, the box's registered data drive, its password, its claim state.
|
||||
|
||||
HOST (demo-hp): /tmp/.r543pw and /tmp/.r543key shredded; .r543kh, the scripts and one stray
|
||||
/tmp/.r543out removed. Verified: 0 files matching /tmp/.r543* remain.
|
||||
|
||||
HUB: provisioned nothing. Guest 9202 has hub reporting OFF and no tunnel, so no customer, no host
|
||||
record, no escrow row and no event was created by any of this. Nothing to tear down.
|
||||
|
||||
NOT torn down, deliberately: guest 9201 now runs controller 0.245.0. That is the release being
|
||||
shipped, not a drill artifact, and its own off-site tier was never touched (still escrowed, active).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
## R-543 red-proofs — controller v0.245.0, 2026-09-16, DooPlex
|
||||
## Each fix was BROKEN first and the test was watched convicting it. A test never seen failing has
|
||||
## not been shown to test anything.
|
||||
|
||||
### RED-PROOF 1 — the reminder bar
|
||||
Break: delete `s.addEscrowBanner(data, r)` from executeTemplate (internal/web/server.go).
|
||||
That is the whole wiring: the bar hangs off the single render choke point, so removing one line
|
||||
returns the product to the measured 2026-09-16 state (a paused off-site tier, and silence).
|
||||
|
||||
--- FAIL: TestR543_A_PausedBoxAsksOnEveryPage (0.20s)
|
||||
r543_escrow_banner_test.go:72: R-543: /dashboard does not tell the household the off-site copy is PAUSED. The tier is on, nothing is running, and the page is silent about it
|
||||
r543_escrow_banner_test.go:76: R-543: /dashboard states the pause but names no route to end it — a reminder without its door is the shape that left a fresh box waiting indefinitely
|
||||
r543_escrow_banner_test.go:72: R-543: /launcher does not tell the household the off-site copy is PAUSED. The tier is on, nothing is running, and the page is silent about it
|
||||
r543_escrow_banner_test.go:76: R-543: /launcher states the pause but names no route to end it — a reminder without its door is the shape that left a fresh box waiting indefinitely
|
||||
FAIL gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/web 0.208s
|
||||
|
||||
Note BOTH pages fail. That is the point of the hook placement: a per-handler helper would have
|
||||
covered the three pages someone remembered, which is the seam-built-but-never-wired shape.
|
||||
|
||||
### RED-PROOF 2 — the tier-1 sentence
|
||||
Break: return the v0.244.0 wording from driveFilesNoteFor before the state switch, i.e. compute the
|
||||
sentence from the app's shape alone, exactly as v0.244.0 shipped it.
|
||||
|
||||
--- FAIL: TestR543_Tier1Sentence_PausedStateDoesNotPromise (0.00s)
|
||||
r543_tier1_sentence_test.go:38: R-543: the sentence claims the files ARE protected while the copy is paused for the recovery code. This is the exact promise a fresh box read for its whole first day: "Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat (és a második meghajtó) védi — ez a helyi mentés a beállításokat és az adatbázist tartalmazza."
|
||||
r543_tier1_sentence_test.go:42: R-543: the paused sentence must say the copy WOULD protect them and that it is waiting; got "Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat (és a második meghajtó) védi — ez a helyi mentés a beállításokat és az adatbázist tartalmazza."
|
||||
r543_tier1_sentence_test.go:46: R-543: the paused sentence names no route out (link="" text="")
|
||||
FAIL gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/web 0.007s
|
||||
|
||||
### RESTORED
|
||||
go test ./internal/web/ -run 'R543'
|
||||
ok gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/web 0.895s
|
||||
|
||||
### The filter was proven to match (the `-run` trap: a pattern matching nothing prints `ok`, exit 0)
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_A_PausedBoxAsksOnEveryPage --- PASS (0.29s)
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_B_EscrowedBoxIsNotNagged --- PASS (0.19s)
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_C_UnconfiguredBoxIsNotNagged --- PASS (0.20s)
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_D_DismissIsForThisVisitOnly --- PASS (0.28s)
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_Tier1Sentence_ActiveStateKeepsThePromise --- PASS
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_Tier1Sentence_PausedStateDoesNotPromise --- PASS
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_Tier1Sentence_NoCopyAtAllSaysSo --- PASS
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_Tier1Sentence_SecondDriveCounts --- PASS
|
||||
=== RUN TestR543_Tier1Sentence_NoFileLegsNoSentence --- PASS
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixture validity (an instrument that can lose its precondition measures nothing)
|
||||
escrowServer asserts backupMgr.OffboxConfigured() itself before any assertion runs: the target is
|
||||
enabled and valid AND the ssh_key + repo_password files exist on disk. A fixture that silently fell
|
||||
back to "not configured" would make every one of these tests pass for the wrong reason.
|
||||
@@ -725,8 +725,9 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
|
||||
| **R-540** | **[P3-LOW] The hub knows exactly ONE off-site pool box, so there is no rule for what happens when it fills.** Read from source 2026-09-16 while making off-site the default: `HETZNER_POOL_BOX_ID` is a single value, and every shared customer becomes a sub-account on that box. With off-site now ON for every new customer (hub v0.116.0) the box fills faster, and the fill warning (80%/90% of the box, `monitor/offsite.go`) tells the operator it is filling but nothing says which box a new customer should land on. **Needs a selection rule** (least-full, or explicit per-customer), not a bigger box. No customer is at risk today: the pool box read 0.3% full (2.7 GB of 1 TB), Σ shared quota 150 GB, oversub 0.15x. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub)** |
|
||||
| **R-541** | **[P3-LOW] There is no path to move a customer between off-site boxes, or from shared to dedicated.** Read from source 2026-09-16: provisioning is idempotent-reuse keyed on the customer (`shared already provisioned for tester-1 (subaccount 311327)`), and a dedicated deprovision destroys the repository — so "move this customer" has no safe route today. It becomes reachable the moment R-540's second pool box exists, or when a customer outgrows the shared model. **Needs:** a move that copies the repository, re-keys, and only then releases the old sub-account — a new mechanism nobody has measured. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub) — design first** |
|
||||
| **R-542** | **[P3-LOW] `/api/disks/candidates` offers a REGISTERED, in-use drive under „initialize".** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the fresh box (controller 0.244.0): after `/dev/sdb` was formatted, mounted at `/mnt/felhom-drives/adatlemez` and registered as the default data drive, the endpoint still listed it under `initialize` (and again under `attach` with `already_mounted: null`). **Customer-invisible today:** the Meghajtók page filters correctly — its „Nem regisztrált meghajtók" section lists none, and the drive shows as „Adatlemez · Alapértelmezett · Aktív". So the defect is in the raw endpoint that feeds a FORMATTING flow, not in the page. **It also misleads a session:** I read „not mounted" off this endpoint and briefly filed a false finding against the product (corrected in `audits/evidence-backup-promise-2026-09-16/phaseE-freshbox.txt`). **Fix shape:** exclude paths the controller has registered from `initialize`, and set `already_mounted` from the real mount state rather than null. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller/agent)** |
|
||||
| **R-543** | **[P1-HIGH] Off-site ON by default is not off-site WORKING: on a fresh box tier 3 sits at „Kulcsletétre vár" until the household does the escrow ceremony, and nothing asks them to — while the tier-1 row now tells them their files are protected by that very copy.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the fresh box (controller 0.244.0, hub 0.116.0, off-site provisioned automatically by the new default): the app-backup page reads „3. mentés — Kulcsletétre vár · A távoli mentés a titkosítási kulcs letétbe helyezéséig szünetel", the remote page reads „Helyreállítási kód szükséges", and `POST /backup/offbox/run` returns 302 while producing no snapshot (the controller log shows only `offsite-credential-retry`, no restic activity). **Why it matters more than before today:** hub v0.116.0 makes off-site the default *because* a one-drive box otherwise keeps the household's files in no tier at all (R-537/R-538), and controller v0.244.0 now prints „Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat (és a második meghajtó) védi" under the tier-1 row. On day one both are true-in-intent and false-in-fact: the copy is paused. **Fix shape (one of):** prompt the escrow ceremony as part of first-run when off-site is enabled and un-escrowed; and/or make the tier-1 sentence state the tier's actual state („…védené — a távoli mentés a helyreállítási kód létrehozásáig szünetel"). The ceremony itself works and is customer-facing („Helyreállítási kód létrehozása"); what is missing is that anyone is told to do it. | **READY — rank P1-HIGH; owner: CC (controller copy + first-run prompt)** |
|
||||
| **R-543** | **[P1-HIGH] Off-site ON by default is not off-site WORKING: on a fresh box tier 3 sits at „Kulcsletétre vár" until the household does the escrow ceremony, and nothing asks them to — while the tier-1 row now tells them their files are protected by that very copy.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the fresh box (controller 0.244.0, hub 0.116.0, off-site provisioned automatically by the new default): the app-backup page reads „3. mentés — Kulcsletétre vár · A távoli mentés a titkosítási kulcs letétbe helyezéséig szünetel", the remote page reads „Helyreállítási kód szükséges", and `POST /backup/offbox/run` returns 302 while producing no snapshot (the controller log shows only `offsite-credential-retry`, no restic activity). **Why it matters more than before today:** hub v0.116.0 makes off-site the default *because* a one-drive box otherwise keeps the household's files in no tier at all (R-537/R-538), and controller v0.244.0 now prints „Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat (és a második meghajtó) védi" under the tier-1 row. On day one both are true-in-intent and false-in-fact: the copy is paused. **Fix shape (one of):** prompt the escrow ceremony as part of first-run when off-site is enabled and un-escrowed; and/or make the tier-1 sentence state the tier's actual state („…védené — a távoli mentés a helyreállítási kód létrehozásáig szünetel"). The ceremony itself works and is customer-facing („Helyreállítási kód létrehozása"); what is missing is that anyone is told to do it. **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.245.0, both halves proven live.** The pause is untouched: it is the zero-knowledge escrow design, and this row was never about the mechanism. (a) **The household is asked:** while the off-site tier is configured and its escrow is not complete, every authenticated page carries „A távoli mentés szünetel, amíg nem hozod létre a helyreállítási kódot." linking `/backup/escrow`. It is the R-241 bar, second instance — same session-cookie dismissal, back at the next visit, gone for good when escrowed; **no second banner system**. It hangs off `executeTemplate`, the single render choke point, so it cannot reach only the pages someone remembered. (b) **The tier-1 sentence renders by state:** `driveFilesNoteFor` takes `tier3State`'s own vocabulary — `active` → „védi", `escrow_pending` → „védené … a helyreállítási kód létrehozásáig szünetel" + the route, no off-site and no second drive → „nincs másolat" + both ways out. **Measured live on 0.245.0:** on a paused box (9202, off-site configured through the product's own endpoint, `escrow_state=pending`) the bar renders on /dashboard, /launcher, /backups/apps and /settings; a manual `POST /backup/offbox/run` is refused by the fork-4 gate („A távoli mentés a kulcs letétbe helyezésére vár.") with `last_run=None, snapshot_count=None`; and a throwaway class-A app's row reads „…védené … szünetel" with „védi"=0. On an escrowed box (9201) the bar is absent on all three pages and the row reads „védi". Both red-proofed (the bar test fails on BOTH pages with the one hook line removed; the sentence test quotes the exact v0.244.0 promise when the state is ignored). The first-hour guide now asks for the code right after the dashboard password and before the first app. Evidence: `audits/evidence-recovery-code-2026-09-16/`. | **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — shipped in controller v0.245.0 and proven live** |
|
||||
| **R-544** | **[P3-LOW] The host-delete log line says „escrow deleted: true" while the documented (and actual) effect is DEMOTION to retained custody.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 during the teardown of the fresh box: an unacknowledged delete was correctly refused 409 („has key escrow (acknowledgement missing)") and the refusal text promises the acknowledgement „moves it to retained custody"; the acknowledged delete then logged `host deleted: tester-1-33b6a9 (escrow deleted: true)`. The hub's own customer page states the truth — „host deletion only demotes custody, never destroys it… recovery-key custody is demoted to retained custody, not destroyed", with the customer delete named as „the one true purge point". **Nothing is broken; the log is.** An operator reading that line during an incident would believe a household's last key had just been destroyed, and the R-304 retention exists precisely so it is not. **Fix shape:** log what happened — `escrow custody demoted to retained (host delete)` — and keep the boolean's name out of operator-facing text. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub)** |
|
||||
| **R-545** | **[P3-LOW] There is no product action that un-configures an off-site target — only one that re-starts an ORPHANED repository.** FOUND 2026-09-16 while exercising R-543's paused state on the scratch guest: `POST /backup/offbox/config` configures a target and can disable it (`enabled` unchecked), but nothing removes it. `POST /backup/offbox/reset` refuses unless `OffboxOrphaned()` is true („Az offsite tároló nincs elárvult állapotban."), and it means „start a new remote backup, set the old history aside" — not „forget this destination". So a household that sets up the wrong NAS, or a box being handed to someone else, keeps the host, user, path, ssh key and minted repo password on disk with no route to clear them; a disabled target still holds its secrets in `data/offbox/`. **Why P3 and not higher:** a disabled target runs nothing and the secrets are 0600 on the box's own disk, so nothing leaks and no copy is lost. **Fix shape:** a „Távoli cél törlése" action beside the config form that clears the target and shreds `data/offbox/`, REFUSING while the hub holds a sealed package for this box (the R-241 rule — dropping the key would orphan the history that package protects). Teardown for this session's proof had to clear it out-of-band for exactly this reason, which is the measurement. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** |
|
||||
| **R-537** | **[P1-HIGH] The app-backup page labels the tier-1 backup „DB + Konfig + Adatok" and prints the app's data-drive size next to it — but the tier-1 unit contains NO drive-side app data at all.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the drill box (fresh install, controller 0.243.0, one drive, tier 2 and tier 3 both „Nincs beállítva"): five photos (3 000 000 B) were uploaded into Nextcloud through its own WebDAV interface, then the customer-visible „Mentés most" was pressed (`POST /api/backup/run` → 200, the unit grew 25 337 B → 978 MB). The resulting unit's `manifest.json` lists `db-dumps` + three **docker volume** dumps and nothing else; listing the 781 MB `nextcloud_nextcloud_html.tar` (29 346 entries, positive control `version.php` = 3 hits) gives **`Fotok` = 0 and `nyaralas` = 0**, and `./data/` is the empty bind-mount point. A `find` over the whole `backups/` tree for `*appdata*` / `*Fotok*` returns nothing. The page nevertheless renders „1. mentés … DB + Konfig + Adatok" and „Nextcloud Adatlemez 65.1 MB" — a size measured on exactly the data it does not copy (`internal/web/handlers.go:1176-1178`, `BackupContents`). **This is a truth defect, not a design defect:** `07-backup-architecture.md` §6.2 places nextcloud's file leg at **Tier 2 and Tier 3 only**, and its „[FACT] What the whole-guest tiers do NOT carry" says `mp8 /mnt/felhom-drives` is out of vzdump scope (confirmed live: „excluding bind mount point mp8 … (not a volume)"). So on a one-drive box with no off-site tier — the state every fresh install starts in — the household's files are in **no backup**, while the page says „Adatok". Same family as R-517/R-518. **Fix shape:** render tier-1 contents from the capture set actually written (`ComputeCaptureSet`), so a unit with no file leg reads „DB + Konfig" and the drive size is not shown beside it; and say on the page that the app's files need tier 2 or tier 3. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-0243-2026-09-16/phase2-f10.txt`. **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.244.0, proven live.** The contents label is computed PER TIER from what that tier captures: Tier 1 says „Adatok" only when the app's data really is in the volumes the unit captured, and a class-A app carries one sentence saying where its files ARE protected. Proven on demo-hp through the page the customer opens: Paperless-ngx reads „1. mentés … DB + Konfig" with „Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat (és a második meghajtó) védi …", while its „2. mentés" row still reads „DB + Konfig + Adatok". Red-proof: restoring the old app-shaped label fails `TestAppBackupRows_Tier1LabelDoesNotClaimFilesItCannotHold`. **RE-PROVEN 2026-09-16 on a FRESH box** (installed from the built ISO 1.28.0, controller 0.244.0, off-site on by default): the Nextcloud row read „1. mentés … DB + Konfig" with the new sentence, „2. mentés … Nincs 2. (off-drive) másolat", „3. mentés Sikeres restic → …your-storagebox.de"; „DB + Konfig + Adatok" appeared ZERO times while the local unit held no file leg. | **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.244.0 (proven live on demo-hp)** |
|
||||
| **R-538** | **[P1-HIGH] A tier-1 app restore reports plain success and leaves Nextcloud listing files whose bytes were never in the backup — and it destroys the app's own trash, the customer's last copy.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the drill box, F10 („a child deletes the photo folder"): the five photos were deleted through Nextcloud (DELETE 204, PROPFIND 404), then restored through the page exactly as a customer would (`POST /backup/restore` `stack_name=nextcloud` `snapshot_id=helyi` → 302, finished in **35 s**, „A(z) nextcloud: 3 adatkötet és az adatbázis visszaállítva — az alkalmazás újraindult."). Afterwards the folder is back and **lists all five photos**, and **none of them opens**: `GET nyaralas-1..5` = 404 / 503×4 with `Sabre\DAV\Exception\NotFound`, while the positive controls at the same moment pass (`status.php` 200, WebDAV PUT 201, GET 200). Cause: the replayed MariaDB dump (11:01:45Z) knows the photos, the bytes live on `mp8` and were never captured (R-537). **Worse:** the bytes were still on the drive in Nextcloud's own trash (`appdata/nextcloud/admin/files_trashbin/files/Fotok.d1789556707/nyaralas-1..5.jpg`, all five present) and the restored database no longer references them — the trash listing comes back **empty**, so „restore from trash", the one route that would have worked, is gone. The customer is left with five unopenable photos, a success message, and no warning. **Fix shape:** before replaying a database whose app has an uncaptured file leg, refuse or warn („ennek az alkalmazásnak a fájljai nincsenek ebben a mentésben — a visszaállítás után a fájlok hiányozni fognak"); and never present a DB-only restore of a class-A app as a complete one. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-0243-2026-09-16/phase2-f10.txt`. **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.244.0, proven live.** A unit restore refuses before anything is touched when the unit cannot return the app's drive-side files, and names the route that can. Fired live on demo-hp: `POST /backup/restore` for paperless-ngx → 302 with „Ez a mentés nem tartalmazza az alkalmazás fájljait, ezért nem állítjuk vissza az adatbázist föléjük — a fájlok így a helyükön maradnak. A fájlok a távoli másolatból állíthatók vissza …", and the app read `running` before AND after, so nothing was stopped and no trash was made unreachable. The database-and-settings-only path exists as a separately worded second step. Red-proof: disabling the guard fails `TestUnitRestore_RefusesWhenTheUnitCannotHoldTheFiles`. **RE-PROVEN 2026-09-16 on a FRESH box, and this time the refusal had somewhere to point:** after five photos were deleted, `POST /backup/restore` was refused with „…a fájlok így a helyükön maradnak. A fájlok a távoli másolatból állíthatók vissza: … „Teljes visszaállítás (fájlok + adatbázis)"", the app read `running` before AND after, and the wastebasket was untouched. The off-site route then returned all five photos — 200 with the exact uploaded sizes and sha256 IDENTICAL to the originals, 5/5, with a negative control. Evidence: `audits/evidence-backup-promise-2026-09-16/phaseE-photos.txt`. | **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.244.0 (proven live on demo-hp)** |
|
||||
| **R-525** | **[P3-LOW] FileBrowser has its own login; putting it behind the dashboard session (traefik forwardAuth or Quantum proxy auth) is a new mechanism nobody has measured.** Filed 2026-09-15 by the P1-fixes task (B.5). R-513 closed the default-password hole with a generated password; a household still has two logins. **What it needs:** a spike on a scratch guest — forwardAuth to the controller session, and what FileBrowser Quantum does with a trusted header. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (spike)** |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -102,7 +102,26 @@ nem kell újra összekötni.)*
|
||||
**legalább 12 karakteres** jelszót. Ez lesz a vezérlőpult jelszava.
|
||||
4. Ha nem jött meg a kód: **„Új kód kérése"** — mindig ugyanarra az e-mail címre érkezik.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Az első két alkalmazás telepítése (~2 perc)
|
||||
## 6. A helyreállítási kód (~2 perc) — ezt ne hagyd ki
|
||||
|
||||
A doboz a fájljaidról **titkosított** másolatot küld a Felhom távoli tárhelyére. A titkosítás
|
||||
kulcsát **csak te** kapod meg: ez a **helyreállítási kód**. Amíg nem hozod létre, **a távoli
|
||||
mentés nem indul el** — a vezérlőpult minden oldalán látszó sáv ezt írja:
|
||||
„A távoli mentés szünetel, amíg nem hozod létre a helyreállítási kódot."
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Biztonsági mentés → Távoli mentés**, vagy egyszerűen kattints a sávon a
|
||||
**„Helyreállítási kód létrehozása"** hivatkozásra.
|
||||
2. Add meg a vezérlőpult jelszavát, és indítsd el. Kb. fél perc.
|
||||
3. A kód **egyetlen egyszer** jelenik meg a képernyőn. **Írd fel papírra**, és tedd el oda, ahová a
|
||||
fontos iratokat teszed. Fénykép a telefonról nem elég, ha a telefon is elveszik.
|
||||
|
||||
> ⚠ **A Felhom nem tudja visszaszerezni ezt a kódot.** Nem azért, mert nem akarja: a másolataidat
|
||||
> úgy titkosítják, hogy mi magunk se tudjuk megnyitni őket. Ha a kód elvész, a távoli másolatok
|
||||
> megmaradnak, de **senki — mi sem — nem tudja többé megnyitni őket**.
|
||||
|
||||
Ha ezzel megvagy, a sáv eltűnik, és a távoli mentés magától elindul.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Az első két alkalmazás telepítése (~2 perc)
|
||||
|
||||
1. A vezérlőpulton: **Alkalmazások**. Keresd meg például a **BookStack**-et (családi wiki) és a
|
||||
**PrivateBin**-t (titkosított jegyzet), és nyomd meg a **Telepítés** gombot.
|
||||
@@ -110,7 +129,7 @@ nem kell újra összekötni.)*
|
||||
Az „Automatikusan generált értékek" részt nem kell felírnod.
|
||||
3. **Telepítés indítása.** A BookStack kb. 1 perc, a PrivateBin kb. 20 másodperc.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Első belépés az alkalmazásokba
|
||||
## 8. Első belépés az alkalmazásokba
|
||||
|
||||
- **BookStack:** az alkalmazás oldalán az „Első lépések" rész a címet `wiki.DOMAIN` alakban írja —
|
||||
a DOMAIN helyére a saját domained kerül (ismert hiba). Belépés: `admin@admin.com` / `password`.
|
||||
@@ -118,7 +137,7 @@ nem kell újra összekötni.)*
|
||||
- **PrivateBin:** nincs belépés. Írj be szöveget, **Küldés**, és a kapott linket oszd meg — a kulcs a
|
||||
linkben van, a szerver nem látja a tartalmat.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Mentések
|
||||
## 9. Mentések
|
||||
|
||||
- **Biztonsági mentés → Áttekintés:** két sárga figyelmeztetést látsz („Csak egy másolat készül",
|
||||
„ugyanazon a lemezen van") — **ezek igazak**: amíg nincs második meghajtó vagy távoli mentés, egy
|
||||
@@ -128,23 +147,23 @@ nem kell újra összekötni.)*
|
||||
teljes rendszermentésben (PBS)" — ez nem minden dobozra igaz (ismert hiba). Az Áttekintés oldal a
|
||||
pontos.*
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Visszaállítás
|
||||
## 10. Visszaállítás
|
||||
|
||||
**Biztonsági mentés → Visszaállítás:** válaszd az alkalmazást és a mentést, pipáld be a „Megértettem"
|
||||
négyzetet, **Visszaállítás indítása**. Az alkalmazás kb. fél percre leáll, majd az utolsó mentés
|
||||
állapotával indul újra.
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Alkalmazás eltávolítása
|
||||
## 11. Alkalmazás eltávolítása
|
||||
|
||||
**Alkalmazások:** előbb **Leállítás**, utána megjelenik az **Eltávolítás**. A párbeszédablak felsorolja,
|
||||
mi törlődik mindenképp, és bepipálhatod a mentések törlését is.
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Áramszünet
|
||||
## 12. Áramszünet
|
||||
|
||||
Ha elmegy az áram, a doboz magától visszaindul, kb. 2 perc múlva minden alkalmazás ugyanazon a
|
||||
verzión fut, amelyen előtte. A vezérlőpultba újra be kell jelentkezned.
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Ha elgépelted a kódot
|
||||
## 13. Ha elgépelted a kódot
|
||||
|
||||
A beállító oldal „Hibás vagy lejárt kód" üzenettel visszadobja — írd be újra. **Öt** hibás próbálkozás
|
||||
után 15 percre zárol („Túl sok próbálkozás — próbáld újra 15 perc múlva."). Új kódot a
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -95,6 +95,26 @@ On save the hub generates two credentials:
|
||||
self-bind mail tells the customer they received it from the Felhom operator.) Treat it like a password.
|
||||
- **Customer API key** — internal (baked into the generated controller.yaml); never handled manually.
|
||||
|
||||
### A.2b REBUILDING a box that already exists — the one press (F-14 ruling, 2026-07-13)
|
||||
|
||||
**A rebuilt box does NOT always get its off-site credentials by itself, and this step was missing
|
||||
from this runbook.** Which of the two happens is decided by how the PREVIOUS box left:
|
||||
|
||||
| How the previous box was removed | What the hub does | Operator action |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Deleted through the **acknowledged** delete flow (the escrow acknowledgement was given) | the hub re-issues the off-site credentials **by itself** when the new box enrolls — the box consumes the single-use secret and the tier comes up | **none** |
|
||||
| The host record was left in place, or the delete was not acknowledged | the hub **reuses** the existing record and mints nothing — the box asks, is refused, and the off-site tier never starts | **one press:** Hub UI → the customer → **„Re-issue PBS credentials"** |
|
||||
|
||||
The refusal is correct and deliberate: re-issuing over a live record would orphan the history the
|
||||
customer's recovery code protects. The mint-once-and-reuse decision lives in `hub/internal/web/pbsdr.go`;
|
||||
there are **two** Re-issue buttons on that page — the off-site one and the PBS-DR one — and they are
|
||||
not interchangeable.
|
||||
|
||||
> This is the correction to the note that said a rebuilt box needs zero presses. It needs zero
|
||||
> presses only on the acknowledged path. Measured on a fresh box 2026-09-16: the box reproduced the
|
||||
> refusal by itself, the re-issue then ADOPTED the record (generation 2) and the box consumed the
|
||||
> single-use secret.
|
||||
|
||||
### A.3 Verify the Day-0 artifact manifest
|
||||
|
||||
Hub UI → **Configuration → Day-0 artifacts**. The manifest must vouch an **agent version** and a
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user