the backup promise is kept: photos deleted and returned byte-identical
gates / gates (push) Successful in 20s

The capability map's journey row now carries the half it could never finish: five
photos in, deleted the way a child would, the old route refusing and touching
nothing, the off-site restore returning them, and them opening — sha256 identical,
5 of 5, with a negative control.

Stated with it, because both are true: the bind needed ZERO operator presses (the
box registered itself and used the mail the hub sent itself), but the PBS cascade
needed ONE — the Re-issue press R-511 documents, which then succeeded because of
this morning's ep0 grant.

R-543 (P1) is the honest caveat: off-site ON by default is not off-site WORKING on
day one — a fresh box waits at „Kulcsletétre vár" until the household creates its
recovery code, and nothing asks them to, while the tier-1 row already promises that
copy. R-544 records a log line that says „escrow deleted" where the effect is
demotion to retained custody.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
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# REPORT — DRILL: prove the P1 fixes on a fresh box (2026-09-16)
## Claims in the prompt that turned out wrong — settled so far (measured, not argued)
## Claims in the prompt that turned out wrong — first, as asked
1. **"A custom PBS role can carry just `Datastore.Modify`" — FALSE, and the prompt itself flagged it
as unverified.** Proxmox Backup Server has **no role-create command** and no custom roles: the CLI
describes `<role>` as "Enum representing roles via their [PRIVILEGES] combination", and
`proxmox-backup-manager` offers no `role` subcommand at all. I then measured the narrowest
BUILT-IN role by applying it and reading the effective permissions back: `DatastorePowerUser`
grants **Datastore.Backup + Datastore.Prune only** — it does not help. `DatastoreAdmin` grants
Audit, Backup, Modify, Prune, Read, Verify, and is therefore the narrowest role that works. It is
applied for the hub's `felhom@pbs` on `/datastore/felhom-offsite` only; the per-customer
`DatastoreBackup` entries are untouched.
1. **"The WG hook now adopts a stuck endpoint token."** It does not, on a real box. The hook refused
exactly as R-511 describes, the operator pressed the explicit Re-issue, hub v0.114.0's adopt path ran,
and the ENDPOINT refused it: `missing Datastore.Modify on /datastore/felhom-offsite` → 502, nothing
written. The fix is sound and **inert** until the ep0 grant is given (**R-534**, P1).
2. **"The claim is one-shot — measure it, do not assume."** Correct to doubt it: it is NOT one-shot.
After a successful claim the same URL becomes the password-reset surface with a "request a new code"
button. And the lock-out is not at five wrong codes, it is at **two** — the third try already says
"Túl sok próbálkozás — próbáld újra 15 perc múlva."
3. **"The fresh box lands on golden 0.243.0."** This one was TRUE, and it is now measured rather than
assumed: the golden archive left on the box has sha256 `e2d1843c…c10a`, byte-identical to this drill's
own bake, and the guest runs controller 0.243.0 with no self-update.
4. **"Restore one DB-backed app from the off-site tier onto 9202."** Not walkable at all on this box —
there is no off-site tier to restore from (consequence of item 1), proven by a read-only listing of the
customer's namespace, empty before and after.
5. **My own wrong reading, recorded:** I first reported "no lock-out" for the claim code. That was false
and I corrected it in the same evidence file — the lock-out is real and the alarm for it fired and was
true.
2. **"The banner unit can learn the claimed state" — NOT REACHABLE, as the prompt suspected.** Two
measurements: the one-shot bind delivery emits `FELHOM_CUSTOMER_ID`, `FELHOM_RETRIEVAL_PASSPHRASE`,
`FELHOM_MODE` and `FELHOM_EXTRA_ARGS` — **no domain** — so the console cannot name the dashboard
URL without inventing it; and the unit hands over to the host install and exits, so the later CLAIM
happens when nothing is watching. What IS reachable, and is what shipped: the pairing code stops
being the last thing on the screen the moment the bind lands. The rest of R-535 is recorded as a
residue rather than implied away.
## What I exercised
3. **The baseline "ISO 1.27.1 published → target 1.28.0" needed care, and the care found a trap.**
`installer-v1.28.0` **already existed as a git tag** — from 2026-08-13 — because the install SCRIPT
and the ISO IMAGE are two separately numbered artifacts (`SCRIPT_VERSION` vs `ISO_VERSION`, and
`build-felhom-iso.sh` says so in a comment). The published ISO really was 1.27.1 (confirmed live:
the bucket serves 1.27.1 and 404s 1.28.0), so the target is right — but a session that read the tag
list as the ISO history would have concluded 1.28.0 was already published.
A fresh box from the published ISO 1.27.1, walked as a volunteer: download by checksum, install, first
console, connect e-mail and self-bind, claim, tunnel from outside, data drive, file manager, four apps,
ten minutes of real use, the backup page and „Mentés most", version labels. Then five faults, then the
morning-after checks and a three-layer teardown.
4. **Still open at the time of writing:** "the off-site wizard's full restore brings back deleted files
for nextcloud" — proven for immich in July and read from the design for nextcloud; Part E walks it.
## What broke — product, and mine
5. **„The off-site wizard's full restore brings back deleted files for nextcloud" — TRUE, now measured.**
It was proven for immich in July and read from the design for nextcloud. Tonight it was walked:
five photos, deleted, returned byte-identical (sha256 5/5, negative control).
**Product.** Five new rows: **R-534** (P1, the off-site tier cannot be provisioned — the endpoint token
lacks a grant), **R-535** (P2, the console keeps showing the pairing banner after bind and claim),
**R-536** (P2, „app installed" is sent when the install is merely accepted), **R-537** (P1, the app-backup
page claims it holds the app's data and it does not), **R-538** (P1, a restore reports success and leaves
the app listing files it cannot open, after making the app's own wastebasket unreachable).
6. **My own wrong reading, recorded because I nearly filed it as a product fault.** I reported the data
drive as „formatted but not mounted, 42 minutes on" from `/api/disks/candidates`. The storage page
said the opposite and was right — the drive was mounted, registered and default. The endpoint reports
raw disks from the agent, not what the controller has registered (now **R-542**).
**Mine, recorded because they cost real time.** A blunt `sed` rewrote Redis's memory cap while I was
restoring caps after the memory test — the second time this exact mistake has happened, repaired
per-service. A hand-run `docker compose up -d` inside the guest recreated Paperless without the
controller-injected environment and crash-looped it; repaired through the controller's own API. I measured
my own CSRF error twice before measuring the claim page. And I guessed the file manager's address twice
before reading it off the dashboard.
## What shipped
**controller v0.244.0** — the backup label is PER TIER and no longer claims files a Tier-1 unit cannot
hold (R-537); a unit restore REFUSES before touching anything when it cannot return the app's drive-side
files, and names the route that can (R-538); `app_deployed` moved from the deploy's acceptance to its
completion, with `app_deploy_started` / `app_deploy_failed` as the honest pair (R-536). Plus the pending
„0 B" tile fix.
**hub v0.116.0** — off-site backup is ON by default for a new customer (shared, 100 GB prefilled), and
the two new deploy event types are registered in both `allowedEventTypes` and `customerMessages`.
**ep0** — one narrow grant: `DatastoreAdmin` for the hub's `felhom@pbs` on `/datastore/felhom-offsite`
only. The narrowest role was MEASURED: `DatastorePowerUser` carries Backup+Prune only, and PBS has no
custom roles. Per-customer `DatastoreBackup` entries untouched.
**ISO 1.28.0** — built, gate-checked, installed and walked. **NOT published** — that is the operator's
call and the one STOP of this task.
**golden 0.244.0** — baked, published, vouched as a three-field change (agent and min_agent unchanged at
0.131.0), fleet floor raised 0.242.0 → 0.244.0 and already delivering (demo-felhom moved itself).
## Red-proofs
Each fix seen failing with its own sentence, then passing: the app-shaped label restored → the Tier-1
assertion fails; the guard disabled → „a restore that cannot return the files must refuse" fails; the
accept-time call put back → „the deploy handler announces an INSTALLED app at accept time" fails; the
success hook removed → „the deploy ended and nothing was told about it" fails; the hub default dropped →
„the new-customer form does not default the off-site copy ON" fails.
## The walk, end to end (evidence: `audits/evidence-backup-promise-2026-09-16/`)
Fresh VM from the BUILT image → Felhom's own first screen, no admin URL → registered itself → **bound
with zero operator presses** (the mail the hub sent itself after the morning's host delete) → claimed →
landed on agent 0.131.0 + controller 0.244.0 → data drive registered → Nextcloud deployed → five photos
in → tier-1 leg → **the PBS cascade stopped at R-511's refusal and needed ONE operator press**, which
then succeeded because of this morning's grant → escrow ceremony (re-auth required; code shown once,
captured out-of-band) → tier-3 „Sikeres" → photos deleted → **the old route REFUSED and touched nothing**
→ off-site restore (verification copy, then reconstitution: „5 fájl és 3 adatkötet és az adatbázis") →
**the photos open, byte-identical** → teardown in three layers → the automatic connect e-mail again, one
second after the host delete.
## Rows
Opened 5 (R-534 … R-538), updated 3 (R-511, R-528, R-531), closed 2 earlier in the day (R-529, R-533,
plus R-510 from the walk). **Counted, not asserted:** the register held 236 open rows before this session's
first commit today and holds **238** now. Three of the five new rows are P1: R-534, R-537, R-538.
## The automatic connect e-mail (R-509) — PASSED
The host record `tester-1-652049` was deleted at **12:22:59Z** (the hub refuses to delete an ONLINE host,
with no override by design, so the record had to fall stale first — it did at 12:22:28Z, 25m46s after the
box's last report). In the same second the hub logged „self-bind link auto-minted for tester-1 on host
delete", and the mailbox received „[Felhom] Kösd össze a Felhom dobozodat" at **12:23:00Z — one second
later**. The customer timeline carries `selfbind_link_sent — Self-bind link e-mailed (host delete)`. The
requirement was two minutes.
## Verdict
**Ready for a volunteer: no.** Every P1 fix this drill set out to prove held on a fresh box — the
supervisor restarts a dead controller, the file manager has its own password, the backup page tells the
truth per tier and skips an absent tier without stopping apps, the tunnel opens from outside, and the
connect e-mail now sends itself. Interventions: **0**. What stops a volunteer is new: their own files are
in no backup on a one-drive box, the page says otherwise, and the restore that should save them makes
things worse.
## Teardown
Three layers, stated. Evidence off the box first (R-320): agent journal, controller log and box state,
token-leak control 0. **Machine:** VM 334 purged with its disks; `qm list` empty; demo-hp's own containers
9201 and 9202 untouched. **Host:** nothing to remove — the drill box WAS the nested VM. **Hub:** the host
record deleted, the customer `tester-1` kept with its e-mail, domain and tunnel; **RESET was never used**.
Nothing on the off-site server was written, removed or pruned — its listing is empty before and after.
Opened: R-539, R-540, R-541, R-542, **R-543** (P1 — off-site on by default is not off-site working on day
one), R-544. Closed: R-511, R-534, R-536, R-537, R-538. Register 236 → 244 open.
## Checks
`python3 scripts/repo_gates.py --fast` — all 14 gates OK. `scripts/unproven.py --summary` — unchanged at
**35 of 55 not walked**. CI for the session's pushes: job **642**, conclusion **success**, matched by
`head_sha`.
`repo_gates.py --fast` green at every push; controller `go build/vet/test` green; controller gates 15/15;
`unproven.py --summary` unchanged at 35 of 55 not walked. Secret-leak check on the evidence: six real
secret values as needles, planted control matched 6/6, committed evidence 0.
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# STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next
**Updated 2026-09-16 (evening) — the photos come back, and they open.**
> **Ready for a volunteer: almost — one thing stands in the way, and it is small.** A brand-new box now
> protects the household's own files: I put five photos in, deleted them the way a child would, and got
> them back byte-for-byte from the off-site copy. The old route that used to lie now refuses politely
> and points at the one that works. What is missing: on a new box the off-site copy is switched on but
> **paused** until the household creates their recovery code, and nothing asks them to do it.
**What changed today.** The backup page stops claiming it holds files it does not hold. A restore that
cannot bring your files back now refuses instead of reporting success — and it no longer wipes the app's
own wastebasket on the way. „Alkalmazás telepítve" now means installed, not merely started. Every new
customer gets the off-site copy by default, 100 GB. The off-site server got the one permission it was
missing, so a rebuilt customer's box can be set up again without hand-work.
**What I proved on a box that installed itself this evening.** It installed from the new image, showed
Felhom's own screen with no Proxmox address, registered itself, and **bound with nothing pressed on your
side** — the connect e-mail it used was the one the system sent itself. It landed on today's golden.
Then: five photos in, the local backup, the recovery-code ceremony, the off-site copy, the deletion, the
refusal, the restore, and five photos that open — identical to the originals.
**Decisions I took.** None under the unattended rule.
**Needs you.**
1. **Say yes or no to publishing the new installer image (1.28.0).** It is built and passed every check,
and it fixes the screen that kept showing the pairing code after the box was connected. Nothing is
published without your word. If you do nothing: new volunteers keep getting the older image, which
works but shows that stale screen.
2. **One small fix before a volunteer: tell the household to create their recovery code.** Until they do,
the off-site copy is paused — so „your files are protected" is a promise with a delay in it. I can
add the prompt and make the sentence state the real state.
3. **The slow-crash-loop counter** (yesterday's ruling) is still owed, and is a job for the nightly.
---
## Previous note
**Updated 2026-09-16 (drill on a fresh box) — the fixes hold; the backup promise does not.**
> **Ready for a volunteer: NO — one reason, and it is new.** On a brand-new box with one drive, the
@@ -786,3 +822,4 @@ off. **`peti-felhom` is a real machine we have not heard from since 15 July** an
The 2026-08-09 batch (R-279 … R-292), still untriaged; the three remaining R-264 readers; R-317 (one
line in the agent); R-327 (decide the naming claim's status); R-359 (nothing reads the off-site store).
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ likewise silent. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r361-2026-08-22/evidence/06-part3-decis
**NARROWED 2026-08-21 by the backup-truth drill — kept as history; both halves have since closed, see the entry immediately above.** Proven that night on `demo-hp` with planted, hash-recorded files: the **declared-userdata** leg of a **drive-declaring** app does come back byte-identical (`calibre-web`, 5/5 including two Hungarian accented filenames). **Two legs of the same story do NOT:** (a) the off-site restore has **no named-volume leg at all**, so an app's volume tar sits in the unit, in the snapshot and in the checking folder and is never replayed (**R-354**); (b) for the **40 of 53** apps that declare no data drive the off-site restore **refuses outright**, saying a running app „nincs telepítve" (**R-356**). Since the 40-class keeps ALL its data in named volumes, the end-to-end story is **unproven for that class and disproven for the volume leg generally**. The escrow/key half of this row is untouched by that and still stands. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-backup-truth-2026-08-21/evidence/` and `REPORT.md` (2026-08-21). |
| **The customer's own UNAIDED recovery journey, end to end** | controller v0.206.0, hub v0.98.0, agent v0.127.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-07, the fifth walk) — an unaided customer journey on a real installation, SCOPED: see what it does not claim** | A throwaway appliance was built from the published ISO on demo-hp, claimed, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, then destroyed — guest purged and both enrolled drives wiped. The rebuild and the customer's route were then walked with **no command line inside the guest**. **Data: PASS.** All three sentinels byte-identical (`beb9175d…`, `7c8cb0ad…`, `e012e76f…`), including a 12 MB binary and `C11-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` — the Hungarian filename survived disk → restic → SFTP → Storage Box → restore → disk intact. Restored in **16 s** out of the pre-wipe snapshot `f3d9cd67`, non-destructively. **Journey: FAIL.** Four interventions, three of them root on the appliance: R-216 (a correct code called wrong), R-218 (the store never opened; the box stopped asking), R-219 (the promised listing structurally could not render), R-220 (the app could not be redeployed — its drives were unenrollable). Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM, and what the v0.201.0/v0.97.1 fixes do and do not change.** Six of the nine findings are fixed and each is red-proofed (R-216, R-218, R-219, R-217, R-222, R-215) — but **fixes are not a journey.** This row goes green only when the walk is repeated end to end and completes with no operator intervention. **Three findings are deliberately still open and each is a live blocker for some flow:** **R-214** (the console never stops showing a stale pairing code), **R-220** (after a rebuild the customer's drives cannot be re-enrolled — the deploy refuses and the wizard's list is empty, so no app can be redeployed onto its own data drive), **R-221** (a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony at all, because the pbsdr convergence marker survives on the host while the seeded `escrow.pbs_storage_id` is rewritten out of `agent.json`). **And R-216's fix does not by itself make a NEW box work:** with the hub guard corrected but the Day-0 manifest still vouching agent 0.120.0, a new box is **HELD, not served** — it stops being lied to, which is better, but the feature does not work for it until agent 0.125.0 is vouched. **⚠ CAMPAIGN-11 PHASES 2 + 4 RAN OVERNIGHT 2026-08-05/06 AND THIS ROW STAYS **FAIL**.** **What they add:** eleven injected faults against the recovery journey, each with a positive control, and a full unattended scheduled cycle. **The backup promise strengthened** — the off-site tier ran itself at 04:15 on a box rebuilt twice and set aside hours earlier (`snapshot_count` 1 → 2), all five daily jobs fired exactly once, and nothing on the must-not list fired. **R-217's and R-215's fixes were proven live under exactly their faults**, the set-aside proved it does not delete (12 535 KB byte-exact at the far end), and a wrong code was refused three times with nothing written and no lockout. **What they do NOT add: any progress on the JOURNEY.** These faults are **not a re-walk** — no customer route was walked end to end — and four new findings say the journey got no better where it matters: **R-224** (a hub outage and a stopped agent are BOTH reported to the customer as a bad recovery code, in 0.056 s and 0.030 s — no unseal attempted; the agent's own `err` distinguishes them and it is discarded at the HTTP boundary, and R-216's gate answers `source=version` so it cannot see reachability — **Phase 1's headline defect relocated from the version channel to the transport**), **R-226** (M1, the only message telling a customer to check their typing, is unreachable on any box that has re-escrowed), **R-225** (an unread store renders `0 pillanatkép · 0 GB` above a card saying it holds backups — 1 snapshot and 12 535 KB were really there), **R-228** (the set-aside history is recorded in `orphaned_renamed_to` and shown by nobody — `OrphanedRenamedTo` has zero references in any template or handler). **§4.1 is now MEASURED rather than deduced** — the floor IS served, from the box's own rendered `GetFloor()` and a cold-started controller's settle-gate line. **§4.2's positive half is still NOT measured** and needs a rebuild. Evidence: `audits/CAMPAIGN-11-recovery-journey-2026-08-05.md`, `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal-phase24.md` **2026-08-06 — THE FIVE PHASE-2 FINDINGS ARE FIXED AND THIS ROW STILL SAYS FAIL.** controller **v0.202.0** + agent **v0.126.0** close R-224, R-226, R-225, R-227, R-228. **What changed:** the unlock path now classifies WHY it failed, from the value and never the text, and the message that mentions typing is reachable from exactly one class — a real refusal — with **unknown defaulting to neutral**. Proven live on the venue with the same wrong code and only the hub's reachability changLine truncated
| **A stranger's FIRST HOUR on a fresh install — download → install → claim → two apps → use → backup → remove → restore, plus a power cut and a mistyped code** | controller **v0.242.0**, agent **v0.130.0**, hub **v0.112.0**, golden **0.242.0**, installer ISO **1.26.1** | **PARTIAL (2026-09-14) — every mechanism PASSED on a fresh box; the UNAIDED journey FAILS before the first app** | `audits/DRILL-fresh-install-0242-2026-09-14.md`, evidence `audits/evidence-drill-fresh-install-0242-2026-09-14/journal.md`. A nested VM on demo-hp installed from the public ISO landed on the vouched set (controller 0.242.0, agent 0.130.0) with no hand upgrade; BookStack and PrivateBin deployed in 68 s / 21 s and were used through their front doors; backup-now moved both dates to the true time; removal with every delete box ticked left no volume, no backup and a 404; a page deleted in BookStack came back **byte-identical with its attachment** 32 s after restore; a hard power cut returned every app on the **same version** with data intact and no alarm; a typo in the code was refused and the right code then accepted, five failures locking for 15 min with an honest Hungarian message. **ONE intervention a volunteer could not make:** the setup-code mail's dashboard link does not resolve for a new customer (no tunnel/DNS is created — **R-494**), so the dashboard was reached by LAN address. **And no instruction exists to begin with (R-493).** **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM:** the self-bind page and the mailed setup code were not exercised (no mailbox in the harness — the operator bind and a box-printed code stood in); DR tier and off-site were off (ep0 fence), so escrow and off-site screens were not walked; no browser, so script-rendered state was not observed. Goes green when a volunteer, from written instructions alone, reaches a working dashboard and a first app with zero interventions. **2026-09-14 (evening) — WALKED AGAIN on ISO 1.27.0/1.27.1 + hub v0.113.0, STILL PARTIAL.** `audits/DOORSTEP-walk-1270-2026-09-14.md`. Held again on a new customer (`tester-1`, real domain + tunnel token): install on three disks and on one, the vouched set, deploy, use, backup-now, removal, byte-identical restore, power cut (same versions), typo + lockout. New and proven: the console is Felhom-only from the FIRST boot on 1.27.1 (VM 332, reboot proven, `pvebanner` masked); the hub tells the operator to hand the passphrase over (live). Still ONE intervention: the tunnel connected but received no routes (R-505), and the record has no e-mail (R-508). The graphical installer was proven only to its password screen (R-507). Goes green on a walk with zero interventions on a published installer. **BIGNIGHT 2026-09-14/15 (ISO 1.27.1):** the first hour re-walked with the real mailbox — self-bind link and mailed setup code both worked; 2 interventions (no auto bind mail R-509; tunnel 502 R-510); then twelve apps, a month of routines and nine faults: `audits/BIGNIGHT-household-month-2026-09-14.md`. **DRILL 2026-09-16 on controller 0.243.0 / agent 0.131.0 / hub 0.115.0 / golden 0.243.0 / ISO 1.27.1 — the WALK half is now PROVEN-LIVE with ZERO interventions, and the BACKUP half is narrowed, not proven.** `audits/DRILL-prove-fixes-0243-2026-09-16.md`. A fresh nested box was installed from the published ISO, landed on this drill's own golden **by checksum** (`e2d1843c…c10a`, no self-update), and was walked as a volunteer: the connect e-mail and self-bind page, the claim, **the tunnel from outside (302→200, R-510 CLOSED)**, the data drive, the file manager with its own generated password (`admin`/`admin` refused 401 before any dashboard action), four apps deployed and used, and „Mentés most” with **26 s** of app downtime. **Interventions: 0** — the two operator presses (self-bind send, PBS re-issue) were pre-declared and counted apart, and the four moments that look like help were my own API-driving errors or my own damage, each named in the drill's interventions table. **The automatic connect e-mail is PROVEN with a real mailbox:** a host delete at 12:22:59Z produced the „Kösd össze a Felhom dobozodat” mail at **12:23:00Z**, with `selfbind_link_sent (host delete)` on the timeline (R-509). **WHAT THIS DOES NOT CLAIM, and it is the backup half of this row's own sentence:** on a one-drive box with no off-site tier — what every fresh install is — the household's files are in **no backup at all** (the whole-guest tiers exclude `mp8` by design; the file leg lives at tier 2/3, both unset), the app-backup page nevertheless reads „DB + Konfig + Adatok” (**R-537**), and a restore reports success while leaving Nextcloud listing five photos that return `Sabre\DAV\Exception\NotFound` — after making the app's own trash, which still held every byte, unreachable (**R-538**). **Also still open from this walk:** the off-site tier cannot be provisioned at all (**R-534**, P1, an ep0 grant), the console keeps its pairing banner after biLine truncated
| **A stranger's FIRST HOUR on a fresh install — download → install → claim → two apps → use → backup → remove → restore, plus a power cut and a mistyped code** | controller **v0.242.0**, agent **v0.130.0**, hub **v0.112.0**, golden **0.242.0**, installer ISO **1.26.1** | **PARTIAL (2026-09-14) — every mechanism PASSED on a fresh box; the UNAIDED journey FAILS before the first app** | `audits/DRILL-fresh-install-0242-2026-09-14.md`, evidence `audits/evidence-drill-fresh-install-0242-2026-09-14/journal.md`. A nested VM on demo-hp installed from the public ISO landed on the vouched set (controller 0.242.0, agent 0.130.0) with no hand upgrade; BookStack and PrivateBin deployed in 68 s / 21 s and were used through their front doors; backup-now moved both dates to the true time; removal with every delete box ticked left no volume, no backup and a 404; a page deleted in BookStack came back **byte-identical with its attachment** 32 s after restore; a hard power cut returned every app on the **same version** with data intact and no alarm; a typo in the code was refused and the right code then accepted, five failures locking for 15 min with an honest Hungarian message. **ONE intervention a volunteer could not make:** the setup-code mail's dashboard link does not resolve for a new customer (no tunnel/DNS is created — **R-494**), so the dashboard was reached by LAN address. **And no instruction exists to begin with (R-493).** **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM:** the self-bind page and the mailed setup code were not exercised (no mailbox in the harness — the operator bind and a box-printed code stood in); DR tier and off-site were off (ep0 fence), so escrow and off-site screens were not walked; no browser, so script-rendered state was not observed. Goes green when a volunteer, from written instructions alone, reaches a working dashboard and a first app with zero interventions. **2026-09-14 (evening) — WALKED AGAIN on ISO 1.27.0/1.27.1 + hub v0.113.0, STILL PARTIAL.** `audits/DOORSTEP-walk-1270-2026-09-14.md`. Held again on a new customer (`tester-1`, real domain + tunnel token): install on three disks and on one, the vouched set, deploy, use, backup-now, removal, byte-identical restore, power cut (same versions), typo + lockout. New and proven: the console is Felhom-only from the FIRST boot on 1.27.1 (VM 332, reboot proven, `pvebanner` masked); the hub tells the operator to hand the passphrase over (live). Still ONE intervention: the tunnel connected but received no routes (R-505), and the record has no e-mail (R-508). The graphical installer was proven only to its password screen (R-507). Goes green on a walk with zero interventions on a published installer. **BIGNIGHT 2026-09-14/15 (ISO 1.27.1):** the first hour re-walked with the real mailbox — self-bind link and mailed setup code both worked; 2 interventions (no auto bind mail R-509; tunnel 502 R-510); then twelve apps, a month of routines and nine faults: `audits/BIGNIGHT-household-month-2026-09-14.md`. **DRILL 2026-09-16 on controller 0.243.0 / agent 0.131.0 / hub 0.115.0 / golden 0.243.0 / ISO 1.27.1 — the WALK half is now PROVEN-LIVE with ZERO interventions, and the BACKUP half is narrowed, not proven.** `audits/DRILL-prove-fixes-0243-2026-09-16.md`. A fresh nested box was installed from the published ISO, landed on this drill's own golden **by checksum** (`e2d1843c…c10a`, no self-update), and was walked as a volunteer: the connect e-mail and self-bind page, the claim, **the tunnel from outside (302→200, R-510 CLOSED)**, the data drive, the file manager with its own generated password (`admin`/`admin` refused 401 before any dashboard action), four apps deployed and used, and „Mentés most” with **26 s** of app downtime. **Interventions: 0** — the two operator presses (self-bind send, PBS re-issue) were pre-declared and counted apart, and the four moments that look like help were my own API-driving errors or my own damage, each named in the drill's interventions table. **The automatic connect e-mail is PROVEN with a real mailbox:** a host delete at 12:22:59Z produced the „Kösd össze a Felhom dobozodat” mail at **12:23:00Z**, with `selfbind_link_sent (host delete)` on the timeline (R-509). **WHAT THIS DOES NOT CLAIM, and it is the backup half of this row's own sentence:** on a one-drive box with no off-site tier — what every fresh install is — the household's files are in **no backup at all** (the whole-guest tiers exclude `mp8` by design; the file leg lives at tier 2/3, both unset), the app-backup page nevertheless reads „DB + Konfig + Adatok” (**R-537**), and a restore reports success while leaving Nextcloud listing five photos that return `Sabre\DAV\Exception\NotFound` — after making the app's own trash, which still held every byte, unreachable (**R-538**). **Also still open from this walk:** the off-site tier cannot be provisioned at all (**R-534**, P1, an ep0 grant), the console keeps its pairing banner after biLine truncated
| **Off-site app-data capture covers the paths an app declares MANDATORY — on BOTH drive layouts** | controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04) — and this row was OPTIMISTIC before it** | On demo-hp, an app on the **system-data fallback** bound `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` while the capture set looked in `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books`: the declared-mandatory directory was in **no** snapshot and the run reported `ok` (R-203). After v0.197.0 the capture log reads `1 mandatory path(s)` and the file is **listed inside the snapshot** — `restic ls -l latest --tag calibre-web` → `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt`. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md` §2 and the v0.197.0 CHANGELOG | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM.** It covers CAPTURE, not RESTORE: **no file has ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (R-201, ready to resume). It also does not claim the enrolled-drive layout was ever wrong — it was not, which is precisely why this survived. And a run that still misses a mandatory directory now reports **`incomplete`** rather than `ok`, so this row's guarantee is one the status can express. **Widened 2026-08-06 (controller v0.205.0, R-234):** the same verdict now also covers an app skipped ENTIRELY — until then a missing declared FOLDER made the run incomplete while an app with no recovery unit at all still reported `ok`, so the smaller gap moved the verdict and the bigger one did not. **This row still claims CAPTURE, not that a newly-selected app is protected by the next run** — for a DEPLOYED app it is (the run's own pre-dump phase writes the unit, measured 2026-08-06), and for an undeployed one it is not and the card now says so || **Recurring offsite (PBS) whole-guest backups actually LAND, and RESTORE** — local daily + offsite weekly as scheduled work | agent v0.97–0.103, controller v0.174/0.175, hub v0.76.0, host-install 1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-26)** | `audits/SPIKE-r82-phase0-2026-07-26.md`; per-repo CHANGELOGs/REPORTs. **Restore round-trip on demo-hp:** `--selftest=restore-test` against `felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T15:42:42Z` → `pass:true`, `verified:"boot+running"`, **`mount_parity:"ok"`** (`mp0=/var/lib/docker 50G`, `mp1=/mnt/sys_drive 20G`, mp8/mp9 throwaway stand-ins for the archived binds), `source_tier:"pbs"`, 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, scratch band clean afterwards and the live guest untouched. | **This row is distinct from the DR-tier row above, which proves ACTIVATION, not ARRIVAL.** That tier was PROVEN-LIVE as `applied` since 2026-07-21 while demo-felhom held ONE snapshot (a healing artifact) and demo-hp held **zero, ever** — "applied and empty", the R-39 shape one level quieter. **What earns PROVEN-LIVE here:** (a) demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace); (b) it **restores into a bootable, mount-complete guest** — `mount_parity` is the non-hollow half, since a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume; (c) **the multi-tier quiesce ran through the real UI endpoint** (`POST /api/guest-backup/trigger`, authed+CSRF) and produced **exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it** — `quiescing 1 stack(s)` 17:01:39 → local done 17:02:56 *"next tier may start (app still quiesced)"* → felhom-pbs snapshotted 17:03:06 → `unquiescing` 17:03:06. **App downtime 1m27s for both tiers**, and the app came back healthy. **Known gaps, recorded not hidden:** the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the PRIMARY tier, so the offsite tier is never AUTOMATICALLY restore-tested (the manual/selftest path is proven, the unattended one is not); the hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE rather than a reported cadence; the installer-default fleet flip awaits a full weekly cycle. → **R-82** |
| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **R-189 (agent v0.122.0, 2026-08-03) closed the reporting half of this row, and it was a REAL gap in the evidence path:** the proof above reached the hub only because no restart intervened — `restore_tests[]` came solely from an in-memory store, so the 15:25:14 PASS was in fact LOST when the agent restarted 2 m 43 s later for a deploy (`0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports). Under per-archive due-ness the box would not have repeated the work for a week. The persisted per-tier proof (with the archive, and now the tier) is merged into the report, so a proof survives a restart — one entry per tier, newest wins, and a record that cannot be described honestly is not emitted. **THE HOST TIER'S HALF OF THIS ROW WAS OPTIMISTIC UNTIL 2026-08-03, and it is worth saying plainly.** Every live restore-test cited here is on the OFFSITE tier. The HOST tier was not merely unproven on demo-felhom — it was **unprovable**, and on demo-hp equally: the agent's token had no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, the storage both boxes configure as `local_backup_target`, so the content API answered `{"data":[]}` through the token while root listed three archives. The scheduler skipped it as *"no settled archive yet"* — which is exactly what a brand-new tier reports — so nothing ever said so (**R-185**). **CLOSED 2026-08-03 — agent v0.123.0 + installer 1.24.0.** The grant is applied on both demo boxes (the token now lists 3 and 4 archives), the installer's reuse arm grants on a pre-existing target, and the agent now **asks whether it may read each tier it depends on** instead of inferring it from an empty list: a critical degraded capability naming the storage and the missing role, which the hub alerted and emailed on **while the box was still blind**. **THE HOST TIER IS NOW PROVEN-LIVE, UNATTENDED, ON BOTH DEMO BOXES (2026-08-0Line truncated
| Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier: host delete < RESET < customer Delete): one operator action → pre-first-install; all operational state destroyed, identity + basic config survive | hub v0.61.0, felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (external teardown, incl. two real firings)** | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — two live firings, both host-delete-first, on two different customers** (`demo-vm-felhom` 15:49:57, `demo-felhom` 16:08:51): every leg `ok` (`claim`, `db_purge`, `descriptor`, `hetzner`, `pbs`), escrow acked separately, each completing in 8–9 s (`hub-state.txt` `customer_resets`). The **Hetzner sub-account destruction is now verified against the live pool box** — and produced the run's sharpest lesson: **a sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object.** Deleting it left its `/home` intact, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext under a key this same RESET had destroyed — which is why the orphan guard fired at 16:58:14 (**a finding by S7's own criterion**) and why RESET now needs a base-dir purge → **R-32**. Prior: hub v0.61.0 REPORT; **ep0 live drill 2026-07-17** (throwaway `drill-reset-01` with a real backup: deprovision `deleted:true` destroyed the namespace + backup group + token, idempotent re-run `deleted:false`, all 3 real tenants + shared user survived); red-proofs (ack-gate, partial-failure resumability) + orchestration/store/offsite/render tests | External teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST, every leg idempotent; refuses while any host row exists; separate escrow-custody ack; clears claim (fresh code next onboarding); keeps the offsite tier CHOICE, drops provisioned fields. **Live-clicked 2026-07-18** (twice, by Viktor) — this supersedes the earlier "not live-clicked / Hetzner delete unit-tested only" note. **R-25b CLOSED (hub v0.69.0, 2026-07-21):** the Danger-zone DELETE is now the guided full-teardown cascade that runs this very sequence as its middle leg — see the row below |
@@ -20,3 +20,64 @@ VMID Status Lock Name
## against all 41 evidence files. Planted positive control matched 6/6, so the grep works; the
## committed evidence matched 0 files. The earlier count of „22" was the WORD „password" in labels
## like „Password set" — a word count, not a leak check.
## 2026-09-16T18:16:43Z TEARDOWN, LAYER 3 — delete the HOST record, keep the customer (never RESET)
pre-state: {"deletable":true,"escrow_present":true,"guests":1,"log_bundles":0,"pbs_secret_present":true,"recovery_present":true,"reports":9,"status":"stale","wg_peer_bound":true}
delete POST at 2026-09-16T18:16:43Z
http=409
host record after: 200 (404 = gone)
customer record after: 200 (200 = KEPT)
hub log right after the delete:
2026/09/16 20:16:30 [INFO] Host staleness: tester-1-33b6a9 ok → stale (host_stale)
2026/09/16 20:16:31 [INFO] Operator email sent for tester-1/host_stale
2026/09/16 20:16:43 [WARN] host delete refused: tester-1-33b6a9 has key escrow (acknowledgement missing)
## 2026-09-16T18:17:45Z delete retried WITH the escrow acknowledgement (retained custody)
delete POST at 2026-09-16T18:17:45Z
http=303
host record after: 404 (404 = gone)
customer record after: 200 (200 = KEPT)
hub log right after:
2026/09/16 20:16:31 [INFO] Operator email sent for tester-1/host_stale
2026/09/16 20:16:43 [WARN] host delete refused: tester-1-33b6a9 has key escrow (acknowledgement missing)
2026/09/16 20:17:30 [INFO] Staleness: tester-1 ok → stale (node_stale)
2026/09/16 20:17:31 [INFO] Operator email sent for tester-1/node_stale
2026/09/16 20:17:46 [INFO] host deleted: tester-1-33b6a9 (escrow deleted: true)
2026/09/16 20:17:46 [INFO] self-bind link emailed to the registered address of tester-1
2026/09/16 20:17:46 [INFO] self-bind link (hash 69b8422e…, valid 7 days) emailed to the registered address of tester-1
2026/09/16 20:17:46 [INFO] self-bind link auto-minted for tester-1 on host delete (the console banner's promised email now exists)
## THE FIRST DELETE WAS REFUSED, and it was right to refuse (18:16:43Z):
## „host delete refused: tester-1-33b6a9 has key escrow (acknowledgement missing)" -> HTTP 409,
## host record still 200, customer still 200 — nothing was dropped.
## This box carries a REAL key escrow because the household performed the ceremony an hour ago, and
## the hub will not discard a customer's sealed package on an unacknowledged delete. The documented
## action is to acknowledge it, which moves the escrow to RETAINED custody rather than destroying it.
## AND THE STALENESS ALARM FIRED TRUTHFULLY: „Host staleness: tester-1-33b6a9 ok → stale (host_stale)"
## at 20:16:30 CEST with an operator mail one second later — the box really was gone by then.
## LAYER 3 DONE (18:17:45Z), with the acknowledgement given:
## POST /hosts/tester-1-33b6a9/delete (confirm_host_id + delete_escrow=1) -> 303
## host record -> 404 (gone) customer record -> 200 (KEPT; RESET was never used)
## hub log, same second:
## „host deleted: tester-1-33b6a9 (escrow deleted: true)"
## „self-bind link emailed to the registered address of tester-1"
## „self-bind link (hash 69b8422e…, valid 7 days) emailed to the registered address of tester-1"
## „self-bind link auto-minted for tester-1 on host delete (the console banner's promised email
## now exists)"
## So R-509's automatic e-mail fired again, on a second box, at the second of the delete.
## A WORDING MISMATCH WORTH CHECKING RATHER THAN REPEATING: the refusal text says the acknowledgement
## moves the escrow „to retained custody", while the log line says „escrow deleted: true". Those are
## two different statements about a household's last key, so the customer record is read below
## instead of trusting either sentence.
## THE AUTOMATIC CONNECT E-MAIL — PROVEN AGAIN, on a second box in the same session:
## host delete at 2026-09-16T18:17:45Z -> mail in the customer's inbox at 18:17:46Z (ONE second),
## „[Felhom] Kösd össze a Felhom dobozodat", to tester1@felhom.eu, body „Elkészült a Felhom dobozod,
## és készen áll az összekötésre… https://hub.felhom.eu/bind/…", link valid 7 days.
## Requirement was two minutes. R-509 now has two independent live proofs today (12:23:00Z and
## 18:17:46Z), on two different boxes.
## THE ESCROW'S FATE, answered from the hub's own text rather than from either log line:
## „host deletion only demotes custody, never destroys it"
## „1. The host(s) will be deleted — recovery-key custody is demoted to RETAINED custody, not
## destroyed." …and the customer delete is named as „the one true purge point".
## So the acknowledgement demoted the custody; it did not destroy the household's sealed package.
## The log line „escrow deleted: true" is the FLAG's name, not the effect — recorded as a row.
## CUSTOMER RECORD AFTER EVERYTHING: present (200), with e-mail, domain, tunnel and DR tier intact,
## and „waiting — no host enrolled yet — the Day-0 install enrolls…" — exactly the state a customer
## is in between boxes. RESET was never used.
+1
View File
@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
| **R-541** | **[P3-LOW] There is no path to move a customer between off-site boxes, or from shared to dedicated.** Read from source 2026-09-16: provisioning is idempotent-reuse keyed on the customer (`shared already provisioned for tester-1 (subaccount 311327)`), and a dedicated deprovision destroys the repository — so "move this customer" has no safe route today. It becomes reachable the moment R-540's second pool box exists, or when a customer outgrows the shared model. **Needs:** a move that copies the repository, re-keys, and only then releases the old sub-account — a new mechanism nobody has measured. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub) — design first** |
| **R-542** | **[P3-LOW] `/api/disks/candidates` offers a REGISTERED, in-use drive under „initialize".** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the fresh box (controller 0.244.0): after `/dev/sdb` was formatted, mounted at `/mnt/felhom-drives/adatlemez` and registered as the default data drive, the endpoint still listed it under `initialize` (and again under `attach` with `already_mounted: null`). **Customer-invisible today:** the Meghajtók page filters correctly — its „Nem regisztrált meghajtók" section lists none, and the drive shows as „Adatlemez · Alapértelmezett · Aktív". So the defect is in the raw endpoint that feeds a FORMATTING flow, not in the page. **It also misleads a session:** I read „not mounted" off this endpoint and briefly filed a false finding against the product (corrected in `audits/evidence-backup-promise-2026-09-16/phaseE-freshbox.txt`). **Fix shape:** exclude paths the controller has registered from `initialize`, and set `already_mounted` from the real mount state rather than null. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller/agent)** |
| **R-543** | **[P1-HIGH] Off-site ON by default is not off-site WORKING: on a fresh box tier 3 sits at „Kulcsletétre vár" until the household does the escrow ceremony, and nothing asks them to — while the tier-1 row now tells them their files are protected by that very copy.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the fresh box (controller 0.244.0, hub 0.116.0, off-site provisioned automatically by the new default): the app-backup page reads „3. mentés — Kulcsletétre vár · A távoli mentés a titkosítási kulcs letétbe helyezéséig szünetel", the remote page reads „Helyreállítási kód szükséges", and `POST /backup/offbox/run` returns 302 while producing no snapshot (the controller log shows only `offsite-credential-retry`, no restic activity). **Why it matters more than before today:** hub v0.116.0 makes off-site the default *because* a one-drive box otherwise keeps the household's files in no tier at all (R-537/R-538), and controller v0.244.0 now prints „Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat (és a második meghajtó) védi" under the tier-1 row. On day one both are true-in-intent and false-in-fact: the copy is paused. **Fix shape (one of):** prompt the escrow ceremony as part of first-run when off-site is enabled and un-escrowed; and/or make the tier-1 sentence state the tier's actual state („…védené — a távoli mentés a helyreállítási kód létrehozásáig szünetel"). The ceremony itself works and is customer-facing („Helyreállítási kód létrehozása"); what is missing is that anyone is told to do it. | **READY — rank P1-HIGH; owner: CC (controller copy + first-run prompt)** |
| **R-544** | **[P3-LOW] The host-delete log line says „escrow deleted: true" while the documented (and actual) effect is DEMOTION to retained custody.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 during the teardown of the fresh box: an unacknowledged delete was correctly refused 409 („has key escrow (acknowledgement missing)") and the refusal text promises the acknowledgement „moves it to retained custody"; the acknowledged delete then logged `host deleted: tester-1-33b6a9 (escrow deleted: true)`. The hub's own customer page states the truth — „host deletion only demotes custody, never destroys it… recovery-key custody is demoted to retained custody, not destroyed", with the customer delete named as „the one true purge point". **Nothing is broken; the log is.** An operator reading that line during an incident would believe a household's last key had just been destroyed, and the R-304 retention exists precisely so it is not. **Fix shape:** log what happened — `escrow custody demoted to retained (host delete)` — and keep the boolean's name out of operator-facing text. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub)** |
| **R-537** | **[P1-HIGH] The app-backup page labels the tier-1 backup „DB + Konfig + Adatok" and prints the app's data-drive size next to it — but the tier-1 unit contains NO drive-side app data at all.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the drill box (fresh install, controller 0.243.0, one drive, tier 2 and tier 3 both „Nincs beállítva"): five photos (3 000 000 B) were uploaded into Nextcloud through its own WebDAV interface, then the customer-visible „Mentés most" was pressed (`POST /api/backup/run` → 200, the unit grew 25 337 B → 978 MB). The resulting unit's `manifest.json` lists `db-dumps` + three **docker volume** dumps and nothing else; listing the 781 MB `nextcloud_nextcloud_html.tar` (29 346 entries, positive control `version.php` = 3 hits) gives **`Fotok` = 0 and `nyaralas` = 0**, and `./data/` is the empty bind-mount point. A `find` over the whole `backups/` tree for `*appdata*` / `*Fotok*` returns nothing. The page nevertheless renders „1. mentés … DB + Konfig + Adatok" and „Nextcloud Adatlemez 65.1 MB" — a size measured on exactly the data it does not copy (`internal/web/handlers.go:1176-1178`, `BackupContents`). **This is a truth defect, not a design defect:** `07-backup-architecture.md` §6.2 places nextcloud's file leg at **Tier 2 and Tier 3 only**, and its „[FACT] What the whole-guest tiers do NOT carry" says `mp8 /mnt/felhom-drives` is out of vzdump scope (confirmed live: „excluding bind mount point mp8 … (not a volume)"). So on a one-drive box with no off-site tier — the state every fresh install starts in — the household's files are in **no backup**, while the page says „Adatok". Same family as R-517/R-518. **Fix shape:** render tier-1 contents from the capture set actually written (`ComputeCaptureSet`), so a unit with no file leg reads „DB + Konfig" and the drive size is not shown beside it; and say on the page that the app's files need tier 2 or tier 3. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-0243-2026-09-16/phase2-f10.txt`. **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.244.0, proven live.** The contents label is computed PER TIER from what that tier captures: Tier 1 says „Adatok" only when the app's data really is in the volumes the unit captured, and a class-A app carries one sentence saying where its files ARE protected. Proven on demo-hp through the page the customer opens: Paperless-ngx reads „1. mentés … DB + Konfig" with „Az alkalmazás fájljait a távoli másolat (és a második meghajtó) védi …", while its „2. mentés" row still reads „DB + Konfig + Adatok". Red-proof: restoring the old app-shaped label fails `TestAppBackupRows_Tier1LabelDoesNotClaimFilesItCannotHold`. **RE-PROVEN 2026-09-16 on a FRESH box** (installed from the built ISO 1.28.0, controller 0.244.0, off-site on by default): the Nextcloud row read „1. mentés … DB + Konfig" with the new sentence, „2. mentés … Nincs 2. (off-drive) másolat", „3. mentés Sikeres restic → …your-storagebox.de"; „DB + Konfig + Adatok" appeared ZERO times while the local unit held no file leg. | **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.244.0 (proven live on demo-hp)** |
| **R-538** | **[P1-HIGH] A tier-1 app restore reports plain success and leaves Nextcloud listing files whose bytes were never in the backup — and it destroys the app's own trash, the customer's last copy.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the drill box, F10 („a child deletes the photo folder"): the five photos were deleted through Nextcloud (DELETE 204, PROPFIND 404), then restored through the page exactly as a customer would (`POST /backup/restore` `stack_name=nextcloud` `snapshot_id=helyi` → 302, finished in **35 s**, „A(z) nextcloud: 3 adatkötet és az adatbázis visszaállítva — az alkalmazás újraindult."). Afterwards the folder is back and **lists all five photos**, and **none of them opens**: `GET nyaralas-1..5` = 404 / 503×4 with `Sabre\DAV\Exception\NotFound`, while the positive controls at the same moment pass (`status.php` 200, WebDAV PUT 201, GET 200). Cause: the replayed MariaDB dump (11:01:45Z) knows the photos, the bytes live on `mp8` and were never captured (R-537). **Worse:** the bytes were still on the drive in Nextcloud's own trash (`appdata/nextcloud/admin/files_trashbin/files/Fotok.d1789556707/nyaralas-1..5.jpg`, all five present) and the restored database no longer references them — the trash listing comes back **empty**, so „restore from trash", the one route that would have worked, is gone. The customer is left with five unopenable photos, a success message, and no warning. **Fix shape:** before replaying a database whose app has an uncaptured file leg, refuse or warn („ennek az alkalmazásnak a fájljai nincsenek ebben a mentésben — a visszaállítás után a fájlok hiányozni fognak"); and never present a DB-only restore of a class-A app as a complete one. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-0243-2026-09-16/phase2-f10.txt`. **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.244.0, proven live.** A unit restore refuses before anything is touched when the unit cannot return the app's drive-side files, and names the route that can. Fired live on demo-hp: `POST /backup/restore` for paperless-ngx → 302 with „Ez a mentés nem tartalmazza az alkalmazás fájljait, ezért nem állítjuk vissza az adatbázist föléjük — a fájlok így a helyükön maradnak. A fájlok a távoli másolatból állíthatók vissza …", and the app read `running` before AND after, so nothing was stopped and no trash was made unreachable. The database-and-settings-only path exists as a separately worded second step. Red-proof: disabling the guard fails `TestUnitRestore_RefusesWhenTheUnitCannotHoldTheFiles`. **RE-PROVEN 2026-09-16 on a FRESH box, and this time the refusal had somewhere to point:** after five photos were deleted, `POST /backup/restore` was refused with „…a fájlok így a helyükön maradnak. A fájlok a távoli másolatból állíthatók vissza: … „Teljes visszaállítás (fájlok + adatbázis)"", the app read `running` before AND after, and the wastebasket was untouched. The off-site route then returned all five photos — 200 with the exact uploaded sizes and sha256 IDENTICAL to the originals, 5/5, with a negative control. Evidence: `audits/evidence-backup-promise-2026-09-16/phaseE-photos.txt`. | **CLOSED 2026-09-16 — controller v0.244.0 (proven live on demo-hp)** |
| **R-525** | **[P3-LOW] FileBrowser has its own login; putting it behind the dashboard session (traefik forwardAuth or Quantum proxy auth) is a new mechanism nobody has measured.** Filed 2026-09-15 by the P1-fixes task (B.5). R-513 closed the default-password hole with a generated password; a household still has two logins. **What it needs:** a spike on a scratch guest — forwardAuth to the controller session, and what FileBrowser Quantum does with a trusted header. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (spike)** |