Part 0 — floor raised to 0.260.0, MinAgent 0.131.0 declared. 3 boxes below, all
down or blocked; both demo boxes SERVED.
Part 1 (R-610) — the DANGEROUS power cut, measured three times with three apps and
two cut mechanisms. All ended honest: resumed, completed, and pinned/installed/live
compose/docker inspect all agreed. vikunja's 2.6.0 migration had ALREADY run 0.64 s
after the cut decision and the seeded data read back intact — so the branch that is
one step from old-binary-on-migrated-database is now evidence, not argument.
Instrument limit stated: `starting` lasts under a second; all three landed in
`verifying`, which RecoverUpdates handles in the same branch.
Part 3 (R-611) — the night the previous session skipped without saying so. An app
updated with nobody pressing anything; a terminally-refused app was pressed exactly
once and never again over three passes. The unattended HOLD was NOT produced: the
within-a-major rule correctly refused the broken edge before it was attempted, so
Q4 still rests on the attended hold from slice 4. Said plainly rather than implied.
Rows: closed R-608/609/610/611; opened R-612 (P1 wishlist unusable on a fresh
install, and its error is a lie), R-613 (uptime-kuma healthy on its setup wizard),
R-614 (stale update phase survives a redeploy). R-520's pointer corrected.
Catalog: two drill pairs, both reverted; every image line byte-identical to
ff9717d3. The alpine:3.20 negative control a security review flagged is cleared.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Part C shipped the same day the pilot was read: fifty apps in three pushes, 1 031 of
1 032 strings. The English Apps list shows ZERO Hungarian app descriptions across all
53 apps — the only Hungarian left on it is the "Naprakész" badge (R-589) and the
language picker naming itself, which is correct.
The Hungarian Apps list is identical to the pre-slice capture once the per-session
CSRF token AND Docker's own "Up N hours" container string are normalised. Both
normalisations are stated in the evidence rather than applied quietly — the second
one moved because two hours of wall clock passed between captures, not because any
copy changed.
Fleet floor raised to 0.257.0 with the declared MinAgent 0.131.0, above the vouched
golden so the declaration carries it. demo-felhom went 0.255.0 -> 0.257.0 by itself
in under 12 seconds and THEN rendered the English tagline: the floor delivered the
feature, not a version string.
Rows: R-593 (papra describes a session-signing key as "the app's subdomain" — the one
string left untranslated) and R-594 (the catalog gate can convict a retrieval promise
but has no way to REGISTER a true one, which the shared vocabulary's design calls
for). R-560 closed. 281 -> 287 rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
10-localisation.md §7 goes from [DESIGN, proposed] to [FACT], with the numbers it was
specced against corrected — and one correction chose an instrument rather than a
footnote. The catalog has 1 032 copy strings, not 835. 832 carry a Hungarian letter,
which was right. But the ASCII-ONLY Hungarian is ~120 strings, not three: „Aldomain"
appears 53 times and „A szerver domain neve" 53 times, and the three the plan named
(„Igen"/„Nem"/„Nincs") do not occur in this catalog at all. An accent-only gate passes
every one of them inside an English block — R-565's blind spot arriving again in a
different repo.
New §10.6 records what was proven live rather than reasoned about: the English pages
show English; the seven Hungarian pages are byte-identical before and after the push
apart from the per-session CSRF token; and a 0.255.0 box with the block synced onto it
renders identically and logs no warning, in a 93-line window that contains the sync's
own lines, so the absence is evidence and not a dead log.
Rows R-589 (the update badge is Hungarian on an English page), R-590 (the data-folder
card's backup promise, likewise, and it is a promise about the customer's files),
R-591 (Stack.Copy() deep-copies five Meta fields and not the new I18n map — safe
today, which is precisely why it is a row), R-592 (three defects inside the new
catalog gate, closed the same session, each found by its own decoy). R-560 updated:
Parts A and B done, Part C waiting on the operator's read of the pilot.
STATUS asks for that read, and for the floor to 0.257.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The image is BUILT but NOT PUBLISHED, and that is deliberate: publishing to
iso.felhom.eu is public and irreversible, and the runbook needs a proof install
on BOTH menu entries plus a reboot against the uploaded bytes. That is
supervised, so I stopped there. felhom-installer-1.29.0-pve9.2-1.iso, sha256
c67ceaa3…fb02, with every mechanically checkable criterion passing (G1, G2, G5,
G6, G7, G9, G16 — including both payload files byte-identical to repo HEAD).
The download pages still name 1.28.0, the image that IS published. Pointing
them at a file that is not there would hand every reader a 404. A new site gate
refuses the two pages naming different installer files or checksums, so
whoever publishes 1.29.0 cannot update one and forget the other.
Measured rather than read: the pairing banner is 24 rows on a 25-row console.
One row of margin — so the height is now pinned, because two more lines push
the HUNGARIAN code at row 5 off the top, and a banner whose code has scrolled
away is furniture.
R-587: two root-password files from July sit in the directory the public ISO is
published from. Both 404 on the bucket (against a 200 control), so nothing
leaked — but the only thing keeping them off is an --include pattern they miss
by an accident of naming. A pattern that protects by coincidence is not a
control.
R-588: release records live in two different places, which made me wrongly
conclude 1.28.0's gate had never been run. It had.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The hub has written every customer e-mail in Hungarian whatever the box was set
to. The box has published its language since controller v0.247.0; nothing read
it. Now it does.
Nothing an operator reads changes. The Hungarian mails are byte-identical, and
that is a diff rather than a reading: 56 goldens per language captured from
v0.117.0 BEFORE any string moved, and all 56 Hungarian ones pass unchanged after
every sentence was routed through the new bundle.
- internal/i18n: flat bundle, 79 keys, hu authoritative + hu fallback, ceiling 0.
- customerMessages/severityLabels are DERIVED from the bundle, so a sentence is
written in one place and all 40+ tests that read those maps still work.
- Language order: last reported -> created-with -> hu. reports.language defaults
to EMPTY, never hu: "never told us" is not "chose Hungarian".
- message_customer on POST /api/v1/event, additive and optional forever, for the
sentences the box composes and the hub cannot translate.
- The bind page is per-language, and its `expired` state stays Hungarian: it is
the state an unknown token lands in, so rendering a real English customer's
token in English would make the LANGUAGE answer what the TEXT refuses to.
Two defects found inside the release:
- R-581: the newest report was picked by received_at, which has SECOND
granularity, so same-second reports tied and the winner was arbitrary. Ordered
by the autoincrement id now. GetCustomers() still has the shape - row open.
- R-582: the English copy-guard stems, ported word for word from Hungarian,
convicted 141 honest sentences. The English claim is a phrase with a modal.
R-555 closed: the language allowlist entry is out of wire_contract_gate.py.
hub_copy_gate.py follows the sentences into the bundle - without that it would
have scanned four files that no longer hold any customer text and reported
success. Three new decoys incl. an innocent control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The capability map's journey row now carries the half it could never finish: five
photos in, deleted the way a child would, the old route refusing and touching
nothing, the off-site restore returning them, and them opening — sha256 identical,
5 of 5, with a negative control.
Stated with it, because both are true: the bind needed ZERO operator presses (the
box registered itself and used the mail the hub sent itself), but the PBS cascade
needed ONE — the Re-issue press R-511 documents, which then succeeded because of
this morning's ep0 grant.
R-543 (P1) is the honest caveat: off-site ON by default is not off-site WORKING on
day one — a fresh box waits at „Kulcsletétre vár" until the household creates its
recovery code, and nothing asks them to, while the tier-1 row already promises that
copy. R-544 records a log line that says „escrow deleted" where the effect is
demotion to retained custody.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The automatic connect e-mail is proven with a real mailbox: the host record was
deleted at 12:22:59Z and the mail reached the customer at 12:23:00Z, one second
later, with selfbind_link_sent (host delete) on the timeline. The requirement was
two minutes. The hub refuses to delete an ONLINE host with no override, so the
record had to fall stale first — that wait is part of the proof.
Interventions: 0. Every P1 fix this drill set out to prove held on a fresh box.
The verdict is still no, for a new reason: a one-drive box with no off-site tier
keeps none of the household's own files in any backup, the page says otherwise,
and the restore that should save them makes it worse (R-537, R-538).
Teardown, three layers, stated. Customer tester-1 kept; RESET never used; nothing
on the off-site server written or removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Hub v0.112.0 serves a floor above the golden with a declared MinAgent;
controller v0.239.0 reached both demo boxes by that floor in 14 s and 15 s
and updates on any backup tier. 09 §3 decisions 7 and 8, §6/§6.1; 07 §6
line; capability map row; STATUS items 15/16 done and the cadence line
corrected; CONTEXT; register: R-470/R-472/R-475 compressed to CLOSED-ITEMS
(full text at 2f5d3af), R-477..R-480 opened, R-474 reproduced a third
time. OPEN-ITEMS 431689 -> 432156 bytes, CLOSED-ITEMS 118051 -> 120598.
Evidence: documentation/audits/rulings-r472-r475-2026-09-13/.
Controller v0.237.0-v0.238.1: the Update button is a guarded job — refusals, backup-first when the
proven Tier-2 copy is stale, safety dump, pin, pull (pin back on failure), health, HOLD on failure.
Proven live on demo-hp: A, B, E, F, H and the restore walk (audits/slice4-2026-09-13/).
Correction to this morning's pages: between golden bakes the hub HOLDS a floor above the vouched
golden, so a release does not reach the fleet by floor (R-472, operator decision). Corrected in the
runbook, STATUS, CONTEXT, R-468 and the gate docstring.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Operator rulings 2026-09-13, both shipped the same day:
- MariaDB finishes its own conversion (catalog eec1228/bd32830/3525e35). Harness E3/E3b `proven`
with engine_state_after "already upgraded to 12.3.3-MariaDB [exit=1]", the skip line gone, C3
still `failed`; landed on demo-hp through the real 15-min cycle, nothing recreated, one deliberate
restart logged "MariaDB upgrade not required" with the app serving. Evidence:
documentation/audits/r459-close-2026-09-13/. The engine-major rule + gate keep every engine
inside its major until Slice 4 (R-448) — removal tracked as R-469.
- Goldens on a cadence, not per release. golden_currency_gate.py reads a dated waiver
(documentation/tests/golden-waiver.yml, <= 14 days, row-bound): valid + BEHIND -> loud advisory,
exit 0; expired -> red again naming the date; UNRECORDED (R-385) never covered; malformed -> 2,
never 0. Tests cases 5-15 incl. the R-421 decoy; red-proof old-vs-new on the real behind tree.
R-242's vouch half stays open. Cadence in RUNBOOK-manual-build.md §4.2 + the checklist.
- Golden 0.236.0 baked, round-tripped, vouched, floor raised 0.232.0 -> 0.236.0
(documentation/tests/golden-0.236.0-2026-09-13/) — the last per-release bake; the waiver was
issued AFTER it landed. No --no-verify anywhere in this session.
Rows: R-459 CLOSED, R-467 CLOSED, R-242 narrowed; R-468/R-469/R-470/R-471 opened. 09 §3 gains
decisions 5 and 6; STATUS items 11 and 12 closed; CONTEXT records the cadence ruling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Outcome A, qualified. Not B and not C.
It does not degrade: 5 of 5 restarts of 12.3 on an 11.6 datadir, readback passed
every time, mariadb_upgrade_info unchanged, the entrypoint line never escalated
past [Note]. It also never heals - the engine answers 'Major version upgrade
detected from 11.6.2-MariaDB to 12.3.3-MariaDB. Check required!' on every start
and will forever.
The trade R-459 was expected to produce is not real. Converting properly SUCCEEDS
across the multi-major jump, takes 7 seconds, backs up the system database
unasked - and putting 11.6 back afterwards STILL starts and serves the data. So
the operator is being handed a cheap correction, not a choice between a correct
engine and a reversible one.
The exit-code polarity was measured rather than read: 0 means the upgrade IS
needed, 1 means it is not. Assuming either the flag name or the polarity would
have inverted the headline. And run without credentials the same command returns
a confident-looking FATAL ERROR that is an auth failure.
R-464: after converting and going back, the entrypoint prints 'MariaDB upgrade
not required' on a state the same engine calls an unsupported downgrade. The
obvious cheap instrument for R-459 would have been to grep for that line, and it
would have reported fine for the broken case.
R-463: the PostgreSQL analogue, deliberately NOT measured here. 11 templates, 8
on postgres:16-alpine, register grep for pg_upgrade returns zero. The two engines
fail in OPPOSITE directions - MariaDB skips quietly, Postgres refuses to start -
so that one cannot hide; it presents as eight apps down at once.
No template changed. Teardown all three layers, hub checked rather than asserted,
local-lvm 30.53 percent before and after.
R-449. Until today one app upgrade out of 53 had ever been measured, by hand, and
the whole update arc was designed against that single data point.
C3 first: the negative control, whose TO image exits immediately, came back
failed. That is what makes the greens mean anything, and it cost 556s because a
negative is only honest if it waits out the full settle window.
Seven edges, three apps. All five real catalog upgrades kept the customer's data.
The finding that changes an assumption the arc was carrying: whether an upgrade
can be UNDONE is a property of the individual APP, not of upgrades. Docmost
refuses - 'corrupted migrations: previously executed migration
20260213T085259-notifications is missing' - and privatebin does not. That
reproduces the Nextcloud result on a second app by a DIFFERENT mechanism, so the
struck word 'rollback' now rests on two measurements instead of one.
The finding nobody was looking for, R-459: our own bookstack template moves
MariaDB across a major and sets no MARIADB_* env at all, so the engine logs that
the datadir upgrade it requires is being skipped, and serves anyway. The cause is
assigned rather than guessed - the app half alone produces no upgrade line, both
edges that move the engine produce it - which is exactly what decomposing E3 into
E3a and E3b was for. It also explains why E3's abort looked like it worked: the
datadir was never converted. Whether that ever breaks is NOT established, and the
row says so.
Also opened: R-460 (bookstack's file half cannot be seeded headlessly), R-461
(target-selection.md names a venue that does not exist and fences a VM that is
gone), R-462 (the widening, costed with this run's real numbers - and the cost is
dominated by fixtures, which do not amortise).
Teardown all three layers, hub checked rather than asserted. local-lvm read 30.50
percent before and after. The capability map was deliberately NOT edited: this
measured apps, not the product.
09-update-architecture.md gains the fourth dated operator ruling (2026-09-06,
Option 1) and its section 5 is rewritten from a proposed shape into the shipped
one: the pin, the stored definition, the render table, the four writers, the
startup ordering, and the trap this slice set for slice 2 - the live compose file
is now the frozen one, so a badge comparing against it would answer Naprakesz on
exactly the apps that are behind.
02-controller-module-map.md said 'copy compose + .felhom.yml'. That stopped being
true today, so it is corrected, and the two sections describing the old seam now
carry a banner saying they describe v0.234.0 and below - kept because every box
under v0.235.0 still behaves that way and because they are the measured account
of why it changed.
R-447, R-441, R-438 and R-455 closed and compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS; R-458
opened for the .felhom.yml asymmetry, with what would settle it by measurement.
Live evidence: two real catalog pushes travelling the real 15-minute cycle, both
reverted, the tree byte-identical afterwards. The restart that used to take 18.3
seconds and pull a new image now takes 0.1 seconds and pulls nothing.
The operator looked at demo-felhom and found OpenGist - up 15 hours, running
exactly the catalog pin, showing no badge at all. 09-update-architecture.md had
recorded that as an accepted limitation the day before: 'the fleet view fills in
gradually'. On a quiet box gradually means never, and a feature that fills itself
in on an event nobody triggers is, on the quiet installations, not shipped. That
limitation row is now struck with the reason kept.
The living document gains slice 1b, the two admission rules of the backfill (it
never overwrites, and it refuses to seed a partial observation because the badge
reads a service-count mismatch as BEHIND), and the note that the same field having
two writers with two different admission rules is deliberate.
Live evidence added: all nine apps already had records by the time 0.234.0 was
ready, so the natural fleet state could no longer exercise the new code - said
plainly rather than papered over. The pre-0.233.0 shape was recreated on demo-hp
by stripping two records; the backfill re-seeded exactly those two with digests
matching independently-read ground truth and left the other seven alone.
The refusal half was deliberately NOT staged live: it needs a degraded app, and
manufacturing one risks the false-customer-email class that already cost 61 mails
(R-330). Unit-tested with a red-proof, and recorded as unproven-live.
R-457: a test that hardcodes a date and asserts an age derived from it is green
only on the day it is written. Mine was, and it went red overnight. Six other
files carry both a date literal and time.Now() - named as candidates, not accused.
The row carried 'KNOWN, not MEASURED' because the throttle was still in force. It
cleared 40 minutes later and the check was run: docker pull from Hub answered
'Image is up to date' for both bases - Hub's own manifest resolved to the images
already local, the ones v0.233.0 was built from - and the manifest bodies are
identical between registries.
This matters for the row's own decision: the mirror being a sound source is what
makes 'sanction the mirror in build.sh' a real option next to 'get a Docker Hub
login', rather than a hope.
I reported that the vaulted dashboard password no longer worked on either demo
box, and quoted the controller's own 'Failed login' as the discriminator. The
password was fine. ~/.config/credentials quotes its values with SINGLE quotes and
my sed stripped only double quotes, so the quote characters went out as part of
the password. The operator corrected it in one line; one retry returned 302.
The instrumentation lesson is the finding and R-453 now carries it: 'Failed login'
separates wrong-password from wrong-Host-header, and that is ALL it separates. It
cannot tell a wrong password from wrong password HANDLING, and I read it as if it
could. This is the second time this file's quoting has produced a confident wrong
verdict, so the fix is one shared extraction helper, not a resolution to be careful.
With the session recovered, the badge is validated on live pages: Naprakesz twice
on /stacks and on /apps/bookstack; NO badge at all on /apps/docmost (a deployed app
with no record - absent is UNKNOWN, not current); and 'Frissites elerheto - 52
napja' on both surfaces, the age being real arithmetic on bentopdf's catalog_since.
The behind state was staged by editing one compose tag, with no restart and no
up -d, and reverted byte-identically (sha256 equal, diff empty, container never
touched). Capability-map row upgraded to PROVEN-LIVE with the one unexercised
badge state named. STATUS item 9 now needs nothing from the operator.
R-454 five gofmt-unclean internal/web test files at the BASELINE, with no gate
that would ever notice; R-455 DooPlex has no Docker Hub login and the
unauthenticated ceiling now blocks a BUILD, not just the catalog's resolvability
gate; R-456 a partly-dead stack is not a boot orphan and that rule exists in no
document, so this session re-derived it by watching a repair not happen.
All three were observations in felhom-controller/REPORT.md, which is overwritten
every session. The controller's observations gate refused the push until each one
either named a row or declared itself not a finding - which is exactly its job.
R-438's document half. It records how an update works AS MEASURED, quotes the
RestartStack comment that proves the restart half was CHOSEN (a design decision
is not a defect), carries the three operator rulings of 2026-09-02, strikes the
word 'rollback' (once a migration has run the old image will not start), states
the target shape, and lists the seven slices with a status each.
R-438 and R-440 amended and BOTH STAY OPEN: the mechanism is documented, not
changed. Nothing closed, so CLOSED-ITEMS.md is untouched.
Eight new register rows, 194 -> 202: R-446 (Naprakesz can be false for the 23
floating pins), R-447..R-451 (one per remaining slice, with a rank and an owner),
R-452 (no gate enforces catalog_since - the runner fetches at --depth 1), and
R-453 (the vaulted dashboard password is stale on BOTH demo boxes, which is what
stopped the badge render from being validated live).
Live evidence for slices 1 and 2 in documentation/tests/. The record is PROVEN
LIVE through the boot reconciler on demo-hp - one entry per compose service,
digests matching ground truth read independently. The badge RENDER is not, and
the five attempts are listed rather than summarised.
THE GATE IS ANSWERED: YES. compose up -d upgrades an app whose compose file has
already moved, and the Restart button does it — 18.3s with a network pull when
the target image is absent, 0.5s when present, against a negative control that
did not even recreate the container. The boot reconciler does the same thing
unattended when an app fails to come back (bootrecon.go:269 -> StartStack).
AND ONE FEAR IS SMALLER THAN THE BRIEF CLAIMED: a plain power cut upgrades
nothing. Docker restores the old containers and the reconciler logs 'no
boot-orphaned apps (nothing to start)'.
AND ONE IS BIGGER: app data CANNOT be rolled back. Once a migration has run,
the old image refuses to start — Nextcloud: 'the version of the data (32.0.9.2)
is higher than the docker image version (31.0.14.1) and downgrading is not
supported'. 'Rollback' is the wrong word for this arc and is struck.
Phases 0-6 all run, on demo-hp (Tier 0, disposable). Phase 6 run on operator
confirmation. Peti's box was never contacted. No production code written in any
repo: felhom-controller is at 960d29b0612c before and after, tree clean, and
build/vet/test are green — run at the end to prove exactly that.
Register: R-438/439/440 updated with live evidence; R-441..R-445 opened
(restore-vs-sync conflict; remove_hdd_data inert with no paths.hdd_path, 128 MB
left behind; update reports success over a broken app; no fleet fstrim; hub
telemetry outlives the app). Capability map gains three measured rows. The
mechanism is written down in 02-controller-module-map.md as MEASURED BEHAVIOUR,
not [DESIGN] — the operator has not ruled. STATUS.md carries the one decision.
Five claims in the brief are named as wrong, including two of my own method.
Both earlier commit messages carried a wrong line count - 621->688 and 688->700 - because I
mixed wc -l with a Python line split and then carried the error forward. Corrected in the
report rather than by rewriting history, and named there.
CI verified by run id against head_sha: 500, 501, 502 all success.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM
REPORT.md carries the deployed sentence quoted from the RUNNING binary (kubectl cp + byte
grep, both controls), the stopping line as it reads in all three places, the enumerated
deferred set, the two provider questions, the register census, and the ArgoCD verification.
R-437 filed: the register compression sweep is OWED and was deliberately not run here.
Measured first — 12 of 181 rows / ~25 KB of 316 KB (about 7%) carry a closed leading
verdict — so it buys little and touches everything, and it is the exact operation that
misfiled seven rows in August (R-378; the seventh, R-87, sat wrong for nine days, R-405).
The row carries the scope so it can be picked up cold.
The live alarm trigger was NOT run and the report says so in its own section rather than
substituting quietly: this alarm only fires on a real fall in a real customer's snapshot
count, so firing it means either deleting real backups or POSTing a falsified report
claiming demo-hp lost its own. That would write a fabricated point into a customer's report
history, move its latch and baseline, and mail the operator a second alarm about a real box
hours after the first one already confused him. Covered instead by the deployed-bytes proof
plus three red-proofed tests driving saveReport -> Check -> notify. What remains unproven is
named: that the dispatcher delivers THIS wording to a mailbox.
Register 688 -> 700 lines; 182 rows; open-state 170.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM
The drill was to delete demo-hp's off-site history and get it back out of a Storage
Box snapshot, filling row 10's blank RTO. Phase 1 found there is nothing to get it
back from: no snapshot is reachable from a sub-account BY ANY NAME.
Measured, read-only, no delete verb issued against any live store:
- 777,600 exact names in the vendor form YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS, nine full days at
second granularity, plus 126 alternative shapes -> ZERO hits.
- The control is what makes that mean anything: the identical 600-name batch shape
with one real path appended returned it, 6 of 6.
- Structural cause: /home (u629488-sub3) is st_dev 0,82; /.zfs/snapshot is st_dev
0,276; /home/.zfs does not exist. A snapshot under /.zfs/snapshot belongs to a
different dataset than the one holding felhom-repo.
- Three tools agree with controls in the same run: SFTP, the port-23 shell,
rsync --list-only.
So yesterday's re-scope splits: clause (a) "the box cannot write into the snapshot
area" STANDS and is re-confirmed; clause (b) "the rest is recoverable file by file"
is NOT SUPPORTED. STOPPED before Phase 2 on the operator's ruling — with no recovery
leg the deletion would have destroyed real history to buy only an alarm test that
could not fire at the specified size. Store verified untouched at 69 snapshots.
R-432 ANSWERED (negatively; its panel-read next step withdrawn as unnecessary).
R-433 no snapshot reachable by any name — decides R-95's remedy and its rank.
R-434 the drop alarm's text promises a file-by-file recovery that cannot be performed.
R-435 the drop detector is blind to a single-app deletion (>50% of 69 needed, ~9 given).
R-436 LEAD: the provider offers `rclone serve restic --stdio` and restic 0.14.0 speaks
`rclone:` (measured, controlled) — real prevention may need no new machine, IF
the vendor pins --append-only. Ask before building.
07 §8 row 10: text corrected, status NOT moved, RTO still blank.
No code, no version bump, no image, no golden. REPORT.md's only copy of the R-331
report preserved as REPORT-r331-backup-card.md before overwrite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM
Hub 0.109.0 + controller 0.225.0 deployed and verified from the live objects,
not from a rollout message (an ArgoCD "rolled out" can name the old image):
argocd sync=Synced rev==HEAD, deploy and pod both on felhom-hub:0.109.0, both
boxes on felhom-controller:0.225.0 (healthy).
Fetched from the live hub at the exact URL the operator's browser requests:
demo-hp 67 snapshots / 134.3 MB / last success 15h ago / 50 GB quota
demo-felhom 10 snapshots / 132.5 KB / last success 15h ago / 50 GB quota
Both read "Snapshots 0 / Repo Size 0 MB / Integrity Unknown" before this change.
Integrity row grep count is 0 on both pages.
Cross-checked against the SOURCE rather than against the card itself: the boxes'
own settings.json hold snapshot_count 67 / 10 and repo_size_bytes 140829678 /
135635, and 135635/1024 = 132.5 KB, matching the rendered value.
Stated rather than implied: the "never measured" branch was NOT verified live.
Both boxes report stats_known:true, so exercising it would have meant falsifying
a box's state. It is covered at render level by TestBackupCard_ThreeWayRuling and
TestBackupCard_OldControllerDegradesToUnknownNotEmpty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM
Two gates blocked the R-331 hub push. One is FIXED, one is BYPASSED, and the
difference is stated rather than blurred.
FIXED -- due-checks (R-341, 5 days overdue). The +7d measurement was TAKEN on
ep0 rather than deferred again. Precondition passed: proxy still MainPID 551655,
ps -o lstart= still 2026-08-18 09:51:04, NRestarts=0, so this is the same proxy
generation as t0 (anchor is ps, not ActiveEnterTimestamp, which reads 03:54:54Z
here -- R-346's trap).
Result: fd = 17. Not 17 more -- seventeen TOTAL, exactly the documented
baseline, against 405 at the first check. Socket histogram: one LISTEN, ESTAB 0,
CLOSE-WAIT 0.
The verdict is UNANSWERABLE, not "the upgrade fixed it". R-341 asks whether the
PBS 4.2.5-1 upgrade changed the fd slope; inside this interval we removed the
leak OURSELVES (R-344, agent 0.130.0, now live on both boxes). A slope of ~0
measures our fix, not the upgrade, and reading it the other way would credit a
changelog that was read in advance and found to contain no such mechanism. The
perturbation pre-registered for this window was Phase C at ~3%; the actual
perturbation was the removal of the entire phenomenon. Row closed as moot.
What it DOES establish is worth more than the original question: twelve days
after the R-344 fix, same proxy generation, no restart to hide behind, ep0 sits
at baseline with zero established connections. R-336's ~323-day runway concern
retires with it.
BYPASSED -- golden-currency. Controller v0.224.0 and v0.225.0 are released and
the newest golden bake carries 0.223.0, so a machine installed right now gets
neither. The gate is RIGHT. This push therefore uses `git push --no-verify`,
declared here, in hub/CHANGELOG.md, in REPORT.md and on R-242.
A BYPASS, not a waiver: the gate offers a waiver only for a release that
DELIBERATELY needs no golden, and these need one. The operator was asked and
ruled bypass-now-bake-later, on the ground that neither fix bites a day-0 box --
R-330 is a nightly false alarm about apps a new box has not installed yet, R-331
is a hub display over backups a new box has not taken yet -- and both arrive by
self-update. That ground is recorded because it is what to re-check: it does NOT
extend to a release changing first-boot behaviour.
OWED: bake a golden carrying 0.225.0 and vouch it (RUNBOOK-manual-build.md 4.1,
three-field change, MinAgent 0.129.0). Fourth bypass of this gate, and the gap
is now two releases wide rather than one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM
The customer page's Backup card read `Snapshots 0 / Repo Size 0 MB / Integrity
Unknown` for EVERY customer, indefinitely. Measured on demo-hp 2026-08-30 while
that night's controller log said `[offbox] backup OK: 8 app(s) backed up, 67
snapshot(s), 2m14s` and the box held snapshot_count:67, repo_size_bytes:
140829678, stats_known:true.
A card reading "no backups" over a working backup is worse than no card -- the
R-88 direction of failure (degrade to NO BACKUP rather than to UNKNOWN) on the
one screen that answers "is this customer protected?".
The data was never missing. The card rendered the report's `backup` object,
whose snapshot/size/integrity fields have had no producer since slice 8C. The
live numbers are in the `offsite` object, which THIS PACKAGE already reads for
the Offsite page and which monitor.OffsiteChecker already alarms from. Proof the
bytes were arriving: the Offsite page rendered demo-hp's usage as 0.1 GB from
that very object while the Backup card said 0 MB. So this is a render fix over
an existing feed, not a new pipeline.
Not a one-line swap, because snapshot_count:0 means two opposite things --
"holds nothing" and "never measured". R-225 measured that confusion one layer
down. backup_card.go resolves a three-way ruling in Go (a {{if}} chain over
map[string]interface{} float64s cannot keep the absent/zero distinction the card
is entirely about):
no offsite object -> "No off-site data reported", and says explicitly that
this is NOT the same as "no backups"
disabled + state -> names the blocker (needs_credential)
stats_known:false -> em-dash + "never been measured". NEVER 0
stats_known:true -> the real numbers, INCLUDING a real 0
A pre-v0.225.0 controller sends no stats_known -> false -> "unknown". That
direction is pinned: upgrading the hub ahead of the fleet must not report every
un-upgraded customer as having zero backups.
The Integrity row is DELETED, not re-sourced: nothing produces it, the
controller runs no integrity check, and NotifyIntegrityOK/Failed are called from
nowhere.
RED-PROOF: restore the pre-fix card markup -> all four tests fail, reporting 67
and 134.3 MB absent from the rendered page and the Integrity row present. The
tests drive handleCustomerUnified and grep the HTML on purpose: the defect was
the template's choice of source object, so a test one layer below it would have
been green against the shipped bug.
Green gate clean: 18 packages, rc 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM
The four existing skills cover the product; nothing covered how work is
reported. Two rules this project has paid for — check the artifact rather
than the report, and do not state a claim more firmly than the evidence
allows — lived only in the operator's head and in chat, where Claude Code
never read them.
- felhom-evidence five confidence tiers, artifact-over-report
- felhom-diagnosis no hypothesis until a command has been seen red
- felhom-plain-language ASD-STE100, two options, the re-pitch
- felhom-handoff the note goes to a FILE, not the conversation
- felhom-doc-authoring the pointer decides whether material is reached
scripts/check_skills.py asserts what decides whether a skill is EVER
reached: frontmatter parses, name == directory, description and body
non-empty, under 150 lines, installed copy still samefile()s into the
repo. install_skills.py globs and never reads the file, so a missing
description installs perfectly and then silently never loads.
It convicted on its first run: felhom-build-deploy is 179 lines. NOT
trimmed here (pre-existing skills are out of scope, and trimming a
deploy skill without exercising its commands is how a wrong command
reaches a live host) — a named single-entry GRANDFATHERED exception,
WARNed every run, R-394. A new skill over the limit is convicted.
Red-proof run and seen failing: description removed from
felhom-evidence -> exit 1, "frontmatter field 'description' is missing
or empty". Restored, tree clean.
skills/SOURCES.md records both MIT upstreams, that these are adaptations
not copies, and the six pieces deliberately EXCLUDED with reasons.
Register: R-392 (no architecture doc covers the two-AI workflow),
R-393 (decision-log skill deferred, with the reason), R-394.
The alarm ladder gains §6.2 - which events are per-app, per-run, per-tier or
coarse, and why the default is coarse. CONTEXT records two rulings: the grain is
allow-listed rather than inferred from the payload, with crossdrive_failed as
the proof that a payload rule would have been wrong; and a finding recorded only
in REPORT.md has a lifetime of one session.
R-389 closed and compressed, keeping its rules and naming the commit whose
git show returns the full text. R-390 and R-391 left open.
REPORT.md is gate 11's first real subject and passes: six observations, two
FILED, four NOT-A-FINDING with their reasons. Three of those declarations are
things a tidier report would have omitted - the gate's own spec would have
passed the item it was built to catch, the burst has no ceiling, and ArgoCD
said "successfully rolled out" while still running the old image.
STATUS carries forward the one thing outstanding: the controller floor still
reads 0.222.0 while the golden reads 0.223.0.
The cooldown key was customerID:eventType plus the tier and run suffixes, and
none of them names an app, so every app going down inside the same hour
collapsed onto one key and only the first was mailed. Measured on demo-hp:
bookstack sent 09:27:51, privatebin suppressed 09:31:51 under
key=demo-hp:app_start_failed.
cooldownStackSuffix is the third sibling of cooldownTierSuffix and
cooldownRunSuffix, and separate for the reason the second one's docstring
already gives: the existing two keep byte-identical semantics for every type
that uses them.
It is ALLOW-LISTED to app_start_failed and takes the event type as well as the
details, unlike its siblings, and that asymmetry is the safety property. The
backup family's cooldown is coarse ON PURPOSE (R-97a, R-182) so one full disk
sends one digest rather than one mail per app - and crossdrive_failed is
severity error, reaches the operator leg, and carries stack_name through a
DIFFERENT struct, so a payload-shape rule would have split it silently. The
hour itself does not change.
Gate 11 refuses a push whose REPORT.md carries an observation with neither
`FILED: R-NNN` nor `NOT-A-FINDING: <reason>`. It deliberately does NOT accept a
passing mention of some other R-number: the lost item cited R-182 as an analogy,
so "cites a register row" would have passed the very item the gate exists to
catch. That discrepancy with the spec is recorded in the gate's docstring.
Registered here and in the controller and agent runners. NOT in the catalog
runner - it has no shared-gate mechanism and appends --all to every gate;
filed as R-391 rather than left as a sentence, which is this session's lesson.
PROMPT-TEMPLATE.md §15.9 corrected: "documented, NOT acted on" was the wording
that invited the gap, and it now names the markers and points at the gate.
R-390 filed for the golden-bake runbook's missing `pveam update`.
Hub tests 709 -> 716.
The alarm ladder gains the severity contract (the hub's vocabulary is exact, it
coerces silently, and three things now hold it) and the intent test with its
three-way ruling on unknown. Both marked [DESIGN] with the live measurements.
Part 5 is RECORDED AND NOT IMPLEMENTED: the operator's notification philosophy,
verbatim, marked plainly as direction rather than current behaviour, with the
12 -> 15 toggle growth as the argument. Filed as R-388, a product decision.
R-329 and R-386 compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS with their rules kept and the
full-text commit named. R-387 filed closed - including WHY the dispatcher branch
was kept rather than deleted, which is evidence (three monitor checkers call
ProcessEvent directly) and not caution.
The drill record names three things that had to be re-run: an inert red-proof
mutation, Scenario G refused twice behind an HTTP 200, and the live Scenario A
NOT proving the customer gate because demo-hp has no prefs row at all.
Register: OPEN 328325 -> 328132 B, CLOSED 71441 -> 74642 B.
The gate failed only on `released > baked`, so it could catch a forgotten bake
and nothing else. A golden AHEAD of the record passed silently - and that is
how controller 0.221.1 was built, baked AND vouched while the newest CHANGELOG
heading still read v0.221.0, with every gate green. Reproduced on the real
history: newest released 0.221.0 / newest golden baked 0.221.1 -> exit 0.
The gate now asks whether the version being shipped is WRITTEN DOWN: the baked
version must have its own `## vX.Y.Z` heading anywhere in the CHANGELOG.
Membership rather than `baked > released` deliberately - a comparison against
the newest heading alone goes green the moment any later entry is written,
leaving the unrecorded version permanently unrecorded. INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2)
preserved; every refusal names a reason and a route.
Red-proofed both directions: old gate/old record exit 0, new gate/old record
exit 1, new gate/fixed record exit 0, absent clone exit 2, post-bake exit 0.
08-alarm-ladder.md is new, and its absence was itself the finding: no document
owned "when does a broken app raise an alarm?". The rules lived as comments in
four packages, each locally correct, with the ordering between them legible only
by reading one function top to bottom - which is how R-384 survived review.
R-383 and R-384 closed into CLOSED-ITEMS with their rules kept. R-385 filed
closed. R-386 filed OPEN: a single-container app stopped out of band raises no
alarm, and a comment claims the opposite - measured live, 9 scans, 0 events,
against a positive control from the same box 17 minutes earlier. Not fixed here.
Golden 0.222.0 baked and published; vouching is the operator's act.
07-backup-architecture.md gains a dated [FACT] on R-361 - a comment asserting an
invariant the code did not have, for four months - and a [DESIGN] on the db_dumps
decision INCLUDING the trap it created: a stable list lets the already-current
early return fire, so per-capture housekeeping must sit above it.
00-capability-map.md records the NEGATIVE from Part 3 so it is not re-derived: a
held app does NOT raise the dead-app alarm. It aggregates to unhealthy, which
IsDownState excludes. Measured on the shipped build with the scans demonstrably
running over it. No suppression was built and no row opened.
R-383: the double-failure message names an undo copy that is not there - R-361's
own class, one surface over, observed on both 0.220.2 and 0.221.1.
R-384: an app whose database has died reads unhealthy and raises no alarm.
R-361 closed and compressed. OPEN-ITEMS 325236 -> 327266 bytes.
Golden 0.221.1 baked, published and round-trip verified. The golden-currency gate
blocked this push and that block is not circular, so it was satisfied rather than
bypassed - no --no-verify anywhere in this session.
07-backup-architecture.md 6.3 gains a dated [DESIGN] paragraph on replay ->
rollback -> hold, including why no engine flag closes it: --single-transaction
makes Postgres atomic, MariaDB DDL is not transactional, so the rollback is the
fix and the flag is a belt.
Drill record for the live walk, including the TWO defects the walk found in the
fix itself (a rollback into a re-created container; an operator route that
cleared the file while the running controller kept refusing) and the ONE
red-proof that PASSED, which is reported rather than omitted.
R-379..R-382 compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS.md. OPEN-ITEMS 330683 -> 325236 bytes.
STATUS.md restates the outcome and names the next operator step.
A drill, not an implementation. No code, no version bump, no CHANGELOG entry.
Ten of the forty driveless apps carry a database; I re-measured that count and
got 10. For those ten the restore is a five-leg operation that never ran at all
until this week, because R-356 refused before any of it started.
Walked end to end on demo-hp for both engines - docmost (Postgres 16) and
bookstack (MariaDB 12.3) - each deployed for the drill, planted through the
app's own interface, destroyed for real, restored through the endpoint the UI
posts to.
Q1 does it complete: YES. All five legs ran and succeeded, 32s / 25s. Accented
names byte-identical both directions.
Q2 which leg won: the SQL DUMP. Three-way discriminator returned the altered
dump's value. This confirms R-164's F17 ordering on the OFF-SITE path; R-164
only ever cited the local one. Scratch-only mutation; store proved unmutated.
Q3 does a failure tell the truth: partly, and two defects.
Filed R-379 (HIGH, the undo copy is valid, named, and unappliable by any product
action - proven by applying it by hand on both engines), R-380 (HIGH, a failed
MariaDB replay leaves a partial database behind an app reporting healthy, where
Postgres crash-loops visibly), R-381 (MEDIUM, the failure message pastes engine
stderr including customer table rows into the Hungarian surface), R-382 (LOW,
the summary log omits the volume count it already has).
H1, H2 and H4 did NOT fire and that is recorded. H3 fired in a shape nobody
predicted: not a quiet success, but a loud error over a silent inconsistency.
R-361 reproduced independently on a second app. restic check: no errors, 29
snapshots. A flaw in the drill's own planting - a double-escaped accented title -
was caught by reading stored bytes as hex, recorded, and re-measured in Phase 1b.
Register 325236 -> 330683 bytes. Nothing dropped. Teardown: two apps retained
with reason, no pvesm before-snapshot taken (said plainly), no hub-side record
created.
07-backup-architecture.md: three places said no offsite action unpacks the
named-volume tars. R-107 closed in controller v0.218.0; all three corrected with
a dated [FACT], the old sentence kept in the past tense. R-102 is NOT closed and
the correction says so explicitly.
New [DESIGN] paragraph in 6.3: the restore destination is resolved by the same
rule as the capture destination, and the wrong-disk refusal applies to apps that
have a drive to get wrong. Carries the 13/40 measurement.
STATUS.md was internally contradictory - nothing waiting, and one decision
waiting, for something the same page recorded as shipped. 218 -> 102 lines; the
deciding section now says what happens if nothing is done.
R-356 compressed into CLOSED-ITEMS.md; OPEN-ITEMS 327109 -> 325236 bytes.
Drill record and 16 evidence files for the live walk on demo-hp.
Records and process only. No machine contacted.
ONE REGISTER (operator ruling). 17 roadmap rows moved into OPEN-ITEMS.md keeping their
identifiers, evidence and original filing dates - the oldest R-10, filed 2026-07-15, 38 days.
15 ideas stay in ROADMAP.md, which is their home; the gate exempts them by their own state
word. 59 already-closed rows stay as history. Sorting rule recorded in the roadmap header:
does the item assert something about the shipped product a reader could check and find false?
scripts/one_register_gate.py, wired as the 11th gate. Control run: baseline passes, a planted
open roadmap-only row is convicted by name, removing it passes with the file byte-identical,
and a planted `idea` row is correctly exempt. Its four residual holes are in its docstring.
The gate earned its keep immediately: it caught R-103, a READY finding my hand-sort mis-read as
done because my regex matched the whole row where the body contains "shipped" - the gate matches
the state cell. It also caught R-203 and R-163, recorded closed in the register and still open in
the roadmap; the roadmap copies are marked SUPERSEDED with the register's verdict.
HOUSEKEEPING. OPEN-ITEMS 672,376 -> 327,109 bytes (-51%); ROADMAP 239,306 -> 78,110 (-67%).
Closed work compressed to 17% into CLOSED-ITEMS.md and ROADMAP-HISTORY.md; every entry names the
commit whose git show returns the full original text. Rule-sentences are kept verbatim under
"Reasoning kept" rather than judged entry by entry - 25 carry one.
CONTEXT.md deliberately NOT compressed and the disagreement is argued in the report: 86% of it is
standing rulings still in force, this prompt's own 3.4 says the log is never edited, and it has no
per-ruling delimiter. Filed as R-377 - the problem is navigational, not volumetric.
The hot/bulk placement decision was NEVER recorded as a decision anywhere - established, not
assumed. Now marked [DESIGN] with a pointer honest about having no original date, given a
decision-log entry that records what was rejected, and the [DESIGN]/[FACT] legend carried from 1
of 8 architecture documents to 8 of 8. Existing statements deliberately left unmarked (R-376).
PROMPT-TEMPLATE gains N.7: compress what you closed, rehome live reasoning before it goes, state
the register's size before and after.
Ceiling R-375 -> R-378.
Documentation and survey only. No code, no machine contacted.
THE CORRECTION. The 40 catalogue templates without a configurable path are not missing a
choice: 01-topology-and-trust.md:150-152 classes each volume hot (DB/config/cache -> fast
storage, ENFORCED) or bulk (media/files), and the 40 are all-hot apps. The deploy page has
been saying so to the customer all along (deploy.html:624-625). SPEC-app-data-placement and
R-352 are corrected in place with the framing MARKED, not deleted; every measurement stands.
R-356 was re-checked and survives, strengthened - an absent HDD_PATH is the normal state, so
reading it as "not installed" misreads a correct configuration.
The disk claim, precisely: since R-165 there is ONE guest data volume with two binds, not two
volumes (build-golden.sh:29-40, 99). A physical-disk failure losing data and first-tier copy
together is REAL and is what the other tiers exist for. A full data volume stopping the OS is
NOT real and was the overstated one.
THE SWEEP. 113 survey-class documents examined, 14 statements of "not filed", 2 already filed.
Its positive control convicted the sweep itself twice before it convicted the corpus - markdown
bold broke the strongest pattern, and the reporter re-searched a truncated line - both false
zeros of the exact class being hunted, and together worth 2 of the 14.
THE HEADLINE. The gap the 2026-08-21 drill rediscovered WAS filed - as R-107, ROADMAP.md:122,
M/READY, 2026-07-28 - and is absent from OPEN-ITEMS.md, which calls itself the single source of
truth. OPEN-ITEMS and that rule both landed 2026-07-27; R-107 went to ROADMAP alone the day
after. 72 ids live only in ROADMAP, 29 not done, some of them findings. Filed as R-369 (HIGH).
Five more still-open gaps filed with their ages: R-371 (17d), R-372 (38d, the oldest), R-373
(20d), R-374 (14d), R-375 (4d). R-368 corrects Part 4: the storage default IS applied at deploy
time via deploy.html:612 - the earlier "the deploy route never reads it" came from grepping Go
and never the templates. R-370 records the process failure and is closed by the template change.
PROMPT-TEMPLATE gains the two rules it lacked: name the architecture document for the area and
say what it says (with a file->area map and the test "is this something we chose?"), and an
enumerated gap becomes a register row in the same session - a ROADMAP row alone does not count.
Ceiling R-367 -> R-375.
NOT WALKED moved 32 -> 35 of 55, which the repo checklist asks be stated. Also records the
hardcoded-sha defect found in render_stands.py and the positive control run on check_stands.py.
Both of the drill's HIGH findings are fixed in controller v0.218.0 and confirmed on demo-hp with
a negative control first — the same planted, hash-recorded fixture run through the same steps on
both builds.
R-355: paperless-ngx's PostgreSQL was dumped into a directory for a stack that does not exist, so
it never entered the recovery unit, the off-site copy or the restore; and because the same wrong
name reached writeSafetyDump, a destructive restore took no undo copy and the fail-closed refusal
was never reached. Fixed by reading the compose project label. Sweep proven able to convict
before its count was trusted: one affected app of 53.
R-354: the off-site restore had no named-volume leg. Now it replays them from the scratch unit,
before the database and inside the stopped window, and VolumesReplayed reaches the sentence.
The half-false comment beside the skip is corrected and the half that still holds is named.
Golden 0.218.0 baked and published, sha 8e427869d13eafb71562b77d1535eef6c7f32b4db24f659b988ec6d7db8f478b,
verified by round trip on the downloaded bytes. NOT vouched and the floor NOT raised — both are
the operator's decision, and raising the floor is what puts this on demo-felhom, which is still
on 0.217.0 and still has both defects.
R-367 filed: the dumps already written under the wrong name are stranded. Nothing deletes them
(an existing guard), they are adoptable by hand, and doing it automatically would be a migration.
Ceiling R-366 -> R-367.
The box's own 02:30 / 03:30 / 04:15 cycle ran unattended and agrees with the manual one
on every measure. The one that matters: R-355 is not an artefact of manual triggering —
the scheduled run again wrote paperless-ngx's PostgreSQL dump into a directory for a
stack that does not exist, and again left the app's own unit recording db_dumps: null.
Part 4.2's terminal deletion has now been observed. At 05:10 the sweep removed exactly
the recorded set-aside store and left the live repository untouched; at 05:13 the hub
dropped the sealed package that protected it and said so (event 3025). Both halves went
together, three minutes apart, and the controller cleared its own state. demo-felhom's
two preserved fixtures were verified untouched throughout.
R-366 (HIGH) filed, found incidentally: the 21 August reinstall orphaned demo-hp's PBS
whole-guest archives as well as its restic repo, so a rebuilt box loses BOTH off-premises
tiers at once. The restore-test caught it and named the key mismatch precisely; it is
merely called "a failed restore test" rather than "your older backups are unreadable".
demo-hp is left HEALTHY, not broken. Ceiling R-353 -> R-366.
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