DRILL R-356b: the off-site restore for a driveless app that HAS a database
gates / gates (push) Successful in 16s

A drill, not an implementation. No code, no version bump, no CHANGELOG entry.

Ten of the forty driveless apps carry a database; I re-measured that count and
got 10. For those ten the restore is a five-leg operation that never ran at all
until this week, because R-356 refused before any of it started.

Walked end to end on demo-hp for both engines - docmost (Postgres 16) and
bookstack (MariaDB 12.3) - each deployed for the drill, planted through the
app's own interface, destroyed for real, restored through the endpoint the UI
posts to.

Q1 does it complete: YES. All five legs ran and succeeded, 32s / 25s. Accented
names byte-identical both directions.

Q2 which leg won: the SQL DUMP. Three-way discriminator returned the altered
dump's value. This confirms R-164's F17 ordering on the OFF-SITE path; R-164
only ever cited the local one. Scratch-only mutation; store proved unmutated.

Q3 does a failure tell the truth: partly, and two defects.

Filed R-379 (HIGH, the undo copy is valid, named, and unappliable by any product
action - proven by applying it by hand on both engines), R-380 (HIGH, a failed
MariaDB replay leaves a partial database behind an app reporting healthy, where
Postgres crash-loops visibly), R-381 (MEDIUM, the failure message pastes engine
stderr including customer table rows into the Hungarian surface), R-382 (LOW,
the summary log omits the volume count it already has).

H1, H2 and H4 did NOT fire and that is recorded. H3 fired in a shape nobody
predicted: not a quiet success, but a loud error over a silent inconsistency.

R-361 reproduced independently on a second app. restic check: no errors, 29
snapshots. A flaw in the drill's own planting - a double-escaped accented title -
was caught by reading stored bytes as hex, recorded, and re-measured in Phase 1b.

Register 325236 -> 330683 bytes. Nothing dropped. Teardown: two apps retained
with reason, no pvesm before-snapshot taken (said plainly), no hub-side record
created.
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# REPORT — R-356 doc corrections, register housekeeping, and one gate fix (2026-08-22)
# REPORT — DRILL R-356b: the off-site restore for a driveless app that HAS a database (2026-08-22)
Companion to `felhom-controller` v0.219.0 (R-356). This repo carried the architecture correction, the
drill record, the register move and one genuine gate defect found on the way.
**A drill, not an implementation.** No production code was written, no version bumped, no CHANGELOG
entry made. The deliverables are a findings document, four register rows and a capability-map update.
## 1. `documentation/architecture/07-backup-architecture.md` — R-107 was closed and the doc said otherwise
Full record: `documentation/audits/DRILL-r356b-driveless-db-restore-2026-08-22/`
Three places, each corrected with a dated **[FACT]** citing `offbox_reconstitute.go` `volReplay` and
controller v0.218.0:
## What was measured
- §6.3, the Tier-3 row — was *"no offsite action unpacks the named-volume tars it captures"*.
- §8, matrix row 4 — was *"the volume tars in either copy are unreachable"*.
- The R-107 index row.
Ten of the forty driveless apps carry a database. **I re-measured that count myself and got 10** — the
same ten the runbook names. For those ten, restoring is a five-leg operation that, until this week,
never ran at all: R-356 refused before any of it started.
**The old sentence's history is kept, not deleted:** each correction says what was true, until when,
and what closed it. A correction that erases what was believed leaves the next reader no way to tell
a fixed gap from one that was never noticed.
Both engines were walked end to end on `demo-hp`: `docmost` (Postgres 16) and `bookstack`
(MariaDB 12.3), each deployed for this drill, planted through the app's **own** interface, destroyed
for real, and restored through the exact endpoint the UI's button posts to.
**R-102 — the Tier-2 half — is NOT closed, and the correction says so explicitly** so it cannot be
read as covering both. The Tier-2 row stands exactly as written.
## The three answers
## 2. §6.3 — the R-356 reasoning recorded as reasoning, not as a closed row
**Q1 — does it complete? YES.** All five legs ran in order and all succeeded — 32 s for Postgres,
25 s for MariaDB. Data back, apps healthy, accented names byte-identical in both directions.
A new **[DESIGN]** paragraph: the restore destination is resolved by the same rule as the capture
destination (drive if the app has one, system data path otherwise); the refusal that protects a drive
app from being restored onto the wrong disk applies to apps that **have a drive to get wrong**. It
carries the 13/40 measurement and points at `felhom-controller/CONTEXT.md`.
**Q2 — which leg returned the data? The SQL dump.** A three-way discriminator (volume tar
`ORIGINAL-VALUE-A`, altered dump `ALTERED-VALUE-B`, live `LIVE-VALUE-C3`) returned **`ALTERED-VALUE-B`**.
The ordering the code comment asserts holds in practice. This **confirms R-164's F17 claim on a second
path** — R-164 cites `restore_unit.go`, the local restore; this measures `offbox_reconstitute.go`.
The mutation was applied to the prepared scratch only, and the store was proved unmutated afterwards
by re-preparing a fresh scratch (sha256 back to `c5414f24…`).
## 3. `STATUS.md` — the contradiction is gone, and the page is one screen
**Q3 — does a failure tell the truth? Partly.** The customer does see a failure and the undo copy is
named. But two things are wrong, and they are the drill's findings.
It said nothing was waiting while also saying one decision was waiting — to publish agent 0.130.0 —
which the same page recorded as already published (R-347, closed). **218 → 102 lines.**
## Findings filed — R-379 … R-382
"Waiting on you" now lists **four** real items, and — per the exemption — **each says what happens if
the operator does nothing**. The two new ones are this release's hand-off: vouch a golden carrying
controller 0.219.0, then raise the floor last, in a separate save.
- **R-379 (HIGH)** — the undo copy is valid, is named, and **nothing in the product can apply it**.
Proven by applying it by hand on both engines and getting the exact prior state back.
`pre-restore-` files are deliberately skipped at three code sites; the filename appears only inside
an error string.
- **R-380 (HIGH)** — a failed **MariaDB** replay leaves a partially-applied database behind an app
reporting `health=healthy, running=true, restarts=0`. `bookstack`'s schema-version ledger was wiped
to 0 rows while its user data stayed intact and the dashboard said fine. Postgres, by contrast,
fails visibly (crash-loop). H3 fired — but not in its predicted shape: the prediction was a *quiet
success*; what happens is a loud error and a silent inconsistency.
- **R-381 (MEDIUM)** — the failure message pastes raw engine stderr into the Hungarian customer
surface: 407 bytes for Postgres, **615 for MariaDB, whose middle is an `INSERT INTO migrations
VALUES (…)` listing — actual table rows shown to the customer.**
- **R-382 (LOW)** — the reconstitution's summary log omits the volume count it already has. The
customer-facing flash names the volumes; the operator log does not.
## 4. `documentation/audits/DRILL-r356-hot-only-restore-2026-08-22/`
**Register: 325 236 bytes before, 330 683 after.** Ceiling was R-378; next free id is now R-383.
The live walk on `demo-hp`: both classes, both messages verbatim with their byte counts, both accented
filenames as explicit hex, and 16 evidence files. **Copied off at the end of each phase.** Nothing was
reverted during this drill, so no intermediate teardown could have taken it.
## Also recorded
## 5. Register housekeeping (N.7)
- **R-361 reproduced independently** on a second app: after the first reconstitution docmost's
`db-dumps/` held only `pre-restore-*` files. Not re-filed — noted as corroboration.
- **`restic check` passed** at the end: `no errors were found`, 29 snapshots.
- **The `-db` suffix attribution is correct** for `bookstack-db` — the R-355 shape does not reproduce.
- **Observed, not filed:** a newly deployed app is absent from the off-site set until switched on by
hand. Plausibly deliberate; the consequence is stated so the default can be judged.
- **A flaw in the drill's own method, recorded rather than hidden:** the first accented title was
double-escaped by a shell chain and stored as literal ASCII. Caught by reading the stored bytes back
as hex, and re-measured properly in Phase 1b.
R-356 compressed out of `OPEN-ITEMS.md` into `CLOSED-ITEMS.md`, keeping its title, shipping version,
evidence path and every sentence stating a rule, plus the pointer
`git show e18668f9e19f:documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` for the full original text.
## Capability map
| file | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| `OPEN-ITEMS.md` | 327 109 bytes | **325 236 bytes** |
| `CLOSED-ITEMS.md` | 61 580 bytes | **63 507 bytes** |
The 2026-08-21 narrowing of *"A customer's file survives a machine rebuild and comes back"* is now
history: both defects it named (R-354, R-356) are closed and proven. The row records what is now
walked — including this drill — and states plainly what is still **not** claimed: the success path is
proven, the recovery-from-a-bad-restore path is not.
## 6. A real gate defect, found by CI going red
## Teardown, three layers
CI run **387** (job 386) failed `instructions_gate` on commit `08eb1a6` while run 73 on its parent had
passed. The cause was not the push: `ef6ac6f` (this repo, the same day) compressed closed rows out of
`OPEN-ITEMS.md` into `CLOSED-ITEMS.md`, and `register_state()` read only `OPEN-ITEMS.md` and
`ROADMAP.md`. **Every citation of a compressed item became "a reference to nothing"**, failing the
next push in a sibling repo for a rule file nobody had touched — and it would have fired again on this
task's own R-356 compression.
1. `docmost` and `bookstack` were deployed by this drill and are **RETAINED** with their planted data —
it is the evidence, and they are the only deployed members of this app class on the box. Both left
healthy and sane.
2. No `pvesm` "before" snapshot was taken — **said plainly rather than reconstructed.** Measured
directly: ~233 MB of volumes inside guest 9201 (16 % of 69 GB used).
3. **No hub-side record was created.** No customer, no appliance. Nothing to dispose of.
`CLOSED-ITEMS.md` is now the third source. It answers *does this ID exist* and answers *closed* for
the rows it owns; `OPEN-ITEMS.md` remains the sole authority on **openness**, so a row it claims as
open is not overridden. **Both controls still convict:** an ID present nowhere fails, and a citation
claiming a closed item is still open fails — each watched failing, then watched clearing.
## Gate state
`python3 scripts/repo_gates.py --fast` — all green **except `golden-currency`**, which is correct and
is operator item 1: controller 0.219.0 is released and no golden carries it.
All phases were run. Nothing was dropped.
@@ -55,7 +55,9 @@
| **The offsite repository password can be RECOVERED from the sealed escrow with the customer's recovery code** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.195.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04)** | On demo-felhom, through the real endpoints end to end: the box fetched its own sealed blob from the hub with its own per-host credential (hub log: *escrow blob SERVED … 572 opaque bytes, self_scope=true*), the agent unsealed it with the customer's recovery code, and the extracted repository password's sha256 was **byte-identical** to the one on disk — `c60c8bc737a6…`, which is ALSO the hash the hub had independently stored, so three sources agree. Five minutes earlier the same path with a WRONG code failed closed at age's KDF with nothing written, which proves links 6 and 7 ran independently of the success. R was searched for afterwards and found in 0 log lines and 0 files, with a positive control confirming the search would have found it. Evidence: per-repo CHANGELOGs; `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3 links 6–8 | **WHAT THIS ROW DOES NOT CLAIM, stated because the previous over-claim here was struck out four hours earlier.** It covers the KEY, not the DATA. **R-199 BACK-POINTER (omitted when this row was written): the recovery chain's link inventory and the per-link status live in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3; links 1–8 are walked, 9–11 are not.** **Re-confirmed 2026-08-04 evening by an attempt to prove the DATA half:** the R-201 drill was prepared on demo-hp and **halted before the wipe** — the sentinel file was not in the off-site snapshot (R-203), so the wipe would have destroyed it and proven nothing. **No file has still ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (`audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md`). The install half of the chain (controller v0.196.0 `--recover-offsite-install`, R-200) is likewise unit-proven only — it has never run against a live recovery. A recovered password has never been **installed** (the diagnostic compares and refuses to write, by design), no existing repository has ever been **reopened** under one, and **no file has ever been restored** from an off-site history via a recovered key. Links 9–11 of the chain are open (R-200's remaining half, R-201). The proof also used a box whose local key still exists — the rebuilt-box case, where there is nothing to compare against, is exactly what the drill covers and it has not run || DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21) | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 | Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected.) **⚠ The candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE is WITHDRAWN — the 2026-07-18 rehearsal produced a live counter-example (R-39).** On the reborn N100 the descriptor auto-provisioned and the agent reported `converged state=applied` (16:45:53), yet **the storage is dead**: `pvesm status` → `felhom-pbs: error fetching datastores - 401 Unauthorized` / `inactive`, and a direct probe with the stored credential returns **401 on every endpoint including `/version`** while the WG transport is healthy (handshake 9 s, 27.9 ms RTT) — i.e. authentication failure, not ACL scope. Root cause in the evidence: **the hub minted a SECOND token secret at 16:47:52, two minutes after the agent had applied the first, and `consumed_at` is still NULL**; the converged state machine will not re-apply, and the agent's 15-minute verify loop **cannot even read the credential to notice** (`open /etc/pve/priv/storage/felhom-pbs.pw: permission denied` — non-root agent reading a file it writes through a root wrapper). A tier that reports `applied` while silently unable to authenticate is exactly the shape that must not carry a PROVEN-LIVE badge. See `tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` F2 and `pbs-dr-state.txt`. **agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17:** the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick `pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, `pvesm status felhom-offsite`=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot `pveum` grant **2026-07-21 — the R-39 fleet fix SHIPPED (hub v0.68.0 + agent v0.91.2), closing the self-heal chain end to end.** The three defects that let a box be `applied` and dead simultaneously are each addressed: the hub stamps a monotonic `secret_generation` into the descriptor so a credential re-key finally MOVES the content hash the agent Line truncated
| **A customer's file survives a machine rebuild and comes back — the whole off-site story, end to end** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04 night drill)** | demo-hp's controller data volume was destroyed and the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced `8a9e33aa4da6…` — **byte-identical** to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to the hub's independent record — and installed cleanly on the bare box. `identity_blob` was unchanged across the wipe (572 B, `updated_at` still 11:11:37). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §2 | **WHAT IT DOES AND DOES NOT CLAIM.** PROVEN: after a real rebuild the key recovers byte-identical, the EXISTING repository opens (3 snapshots, 42 026 B — the pre-wipe size; not a fresh history), and the customer restore flow returns the file byte-identical. **ALL FOUR MANUAL INTERVENTIONS ARE CLOSED, AND THE CUSTOMER IS NOW OFFERED THE RECOVERY (2026-08-05). ONE QUALIFIER REMAINS AND IT IS NOT THE OLD ONE — state it precisely.** The 2026-08-04 drill needed four interventions between "the key is recoverable" and "the file is back", none of them in any design document (R-204). **Items 1–3 closed in controller v0.198.0 + hub v0.95.0** (the reset code works first time; a Re-issue no longer marks a healthy escrow stale; a unit restore states it returned the app's definition and database and NOT the customer's files). **Item 4 closed in controller v0.199.0 + hub v0.96.0** (a rebuilt box DECLARES `offsite.state=needs_credential` and `internal/offsiteheal` re-arms the stored credential before minting). **AND THE "needs someone who knows to look" HALF IS NOW GONE TOO (controller v0.200.0, R-193):** a full-page recovery screen takes over the landing pages while the hub holds a sealed package this box cannot open, explains that nobody can replace a lost recovery code, takes the code, opens the repository and lists what is in it — proven live on demo-felhom, which is genuinely in that state (`/launcher` → 302 `/recovery`; a wrong code refused with nothing written, three times, no lockout; the code found in no file, no container log and no debug ring, with a planted-copy positive control that first exposed a mis-aimed sweep). **WHAT THE QUALIFIER IS NOW, and it is narrower:** (1) **the final unlock has never been driven with a CORRECT code through the page** — no recovery code was kept for demo-felhom's orphaned history and demo-hp's is operator-held out of band, so the live run exercised the whole chain (handler → agent → hub fetch → age KDF) and stopped at the unseal; the install and listing rest on tests. (2) **putting files back in place is deliberately NOT part of this** — restore stays per-app, and the step after the listing is R-213. (3) **the journey has still not been re-walked end to end since these fixes** — the closures are proven individually, not as one uninterrupted run. That re-walk is one more drill and it is what is owed. Scope: `demo-hp`, a controller-data-volume rebuild — **NOT** a total host loss, and **NOT** a guest reprovision. **⚠ THE RE-WALK RAN ON 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11) AND IT FAILED. THIS ROW STAYS AS IT IS — it records a key recovering and a file returning, which remains true — but the JOURNEY row below is the honest verdict and this row must not be read as covering it.** The campaign built a throwaway appliance from the published ISO, destroyed it, and walked the customer's route: **the data half PASSED** (three sentinels byte-identical, including a 12 MB binary and a non-ASCII Hungarian filename, out of the pre-wipe snapshot in 16 s) and **the journey half FAILED** — four operator interventions, three needing root on the appliance, and the first of them was the machine telling the customer their perfectly correct recovery code was wrong (R-216). **R-198's retention is NO LONGER unit-proven — it was PROVEN IN PRODUCTION on 2026-08-05** (CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 3): the first supersession since the fix retained `identity_blob` at **572 B, byte-length exact**, carrying the OLD key `626e424670248db3` while the current row moved to the newly minted `e11a6c542b73477a`; `offsite_repo_key_changed` and `escrow_superseded` both fired at the instant of supersession, and the next off-site run REFUSED as `orphaned` rather than starting a fresh history. Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` **NARROWED 2026-08-21 by the backup-truth drill — the claim holds for the leg it was proven on and NOT for the others.** Proven that night on `demo-hp` with planted, hash-recorded files: the **declared-userdata** leg of a **drive-declaring** app does come back byte-identical (`calibre-web`, 5/5 including two Hungarian accented filenames). **Two legs of the same story do NOT:** (a) the off-site restore has **no named-volume leg at all**, so an app's volume tar sits in the unit, in the snapshot and in the checking folder and is never replayed (**R-354**); (bLine truncated
| **A customer's file survives a machine rebuild and comes back — the whole off-site story, end to end** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04 night drill)** | demo-hp's controller data volume was destroyed and the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced `8a9e33aa4da6…` — **byte-identical** to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to the hub's independent record — and installed cleanly on the bare box. `identity_blob` was unchanged across the wipe (572 B, `updated_at` still 11:11:37). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §2 | **WHAT IT DOES AND DOES NOT CLAIM.** PROVEN: after a real rebuild the key recovers byte-identical, the EXISTING repository opens (3 snapshots, 42 026 B — the pre-wipe size; not a fresh history), and the customer restore flow returns the file byte-identical. **ALL FOUR MANUAL INTERVENTIONS ARE CLOSED, AND THE CUSTOMER IS NOW OFFERED THE RECOVERY (2026-08-05). ONE QUALIFIER REMAINS AND IT IS NOT THE OLD ONE — state it precisely.** The 2026-08-04 drill needed four interventions between "the key is recoverable" and "the file is back", none of them in any design document (R-204). **Items 1–3 closed in controller v0.198.0 + hub v0.95.0** (the reset code works first time; a Re-issue no longer marks a healthy escrow stale; a unit restore states it returned the app's definition and database and NOT the customer's files). **Item 4 closed in controller v0.199.0 + hub v0.96.0** (a rebuilt box DECLARES `offsite.state=needs_credential` and `internal/offsiteheal` re-arms the stored credential before minting). **AND THE "needs someone who knows to look" HALF IS NOW GONE TOO (controller v0.200.0, R-193):** a full-page recovery screen takes over the landing pages while the hub holds a sealed package this box cannot open, explains that nobody can replace a lost recovery code, takes the code, opens the repository and lists what is in it — proven live on demo-felhom, which is genuinely in that state (`/launcher` → 302 `/recovery`; a wrong code refused with nothing written, three times, no lockout; the code found in no file, no container log and no debug ring, with a planted-copy positive control that first exposed a mis-aimed sweep). **WHAT THE QUALIFIER IS NOW, and it is narrower:** (1) **the final unlock has never been driven with a CORRECT code through the page** — no recovery code was kept for demo-felhom's orphaned history and demo-hp's is operator-held out of band, so the live run exercised the whole chain (handler → agent → hub fetch → age KDF) and stopped at the unseal; the install and listing rest on tests. (2) **putting files back in place is deliberately NOT part of this** — restore stays per-app, and the step after the listing is R-213. (3) **the journey has still not been re-walked end to end since these fixes** — the closures are proven individually, not as one uninterrupted run. That re-walk is one more drill and it is what is owed. Scope: `demo-hp`, a controller-data-volume rebuild — **NOT** a total host loss, and **NOT** a guest reprovision. **⚠ THE RE-WALK RAN ON 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11) AND IT FAILED. THIS ROW STAYS AS IT IS — it records a key recovering and a file returning, which remains true — but the JOURNEY row below is the honest verdict and this row must not be read as covering it.** The campaign built a throwaway appliance from the published ISO, destroyed it, and walked the customer's route: **the data half PASSED** (three sentinels byte-identical, including a 12 MB binary and a non-ASCII Hungarian filename, out of the pre-wipe snapshot in 16 s) and **the journey half FAILED** — four operator interventions, three needing root on the appliance, and the first of them was the machine telling the customer their perfectly correct recovery code was wrong (R-216). **R-198's retention is NO LONGER unit-proven — it was PROVEN IN PRODUCTION on 2026-08-05** (CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 3): the first supersession since the fix retained `identity_blob` at **572 B, byte-length exact**, carrying the OLD key `626e424670248db3` while the current row moved to the newly minted `e11a6c542b73477a`; `offsite_repo_key_changed` and `escrow_superseded` both fired at the instant of supersession, and the next off-site run REFUSED as `orphaned` rather than starting a fresh history. Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` **RE-WIDENED 2026-08-22, and the narrowing below is now HISTORY — read both, in order.** Both defects named in the 2026-08-21 narrowing are closed and proven live: **R-354** (controller v0.218.0, `volReplay`) and **R-356** (controller v0.219.0). The **40-class end-to-end story is now WALKED**, including the hardest ten of it: `audits/DRILL-r356-hot-only-restore-2026-08-22/` proved a driveless app with NO database (`privatebin`: planted, off-sited, deleted, restored, **15/15 files byte-identical**, two Hungarian accented names), and `audits/DRILL-r356b-drivLine truncated
**NARROWED 2026-08-21 by the backup-truth drill — kept as history; both halves have since closed, see the entry immediately above.** Proven that night on `demo-hp` with planted, hash-recorded files: the **declared-userdata** leg of a **drive-declaring** app does come back byte-identical (`calibre-web`, 5/5 including two Hungarian accented filenames). **Two legs of the same story do NOT:** (a) the off-site restore has **no named-volume leg at all**, so an app's volume tar sits in the unit, in the snapshot and in the checking folder and is never replayed (**R-354**); (b) for the **40 of 53** apps that declare no data drive the off-site restore **refuses outright**, saying a running app „nincs telepítve" (**R-356**). Since the 40-class keeps ALL its data in named volumes, the end-to-end story is **unproven for that class and disproven for the volume leg generally**. The escrow/key half of this row is untouched by that and still stands. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-backup-truth-2026-08-21/evidence/` and `REPORT.md` (2026-08-21). |
| **The customer's own UNAIDED recovery journey, end to end** | controller v0.206.0, hub v0.98.0, agent v0.127.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-07, the fifth walk) — an unaided customer journey on a real installation, SCOPED: see what it does not claim** | A throwaway appliance was built from the published ISO on demo-hp, claimed, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, then destroyed — guest purged and both enrolled drives wiped. The rebuild and the customer's route were then walked with **no command line inside the guest**. **Data: PASS.** All three sentinels byte-identical (`beb9175d…`, `7c8cb0ad…`, `e012e76f…`), including a 12 MB binary and `C11-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` — the Hungarian filename survived disk → restic → SFTP → Storage Box → restore → disk intact. Restored in **16 s** out of the pre-wipe snapshot `f3d9cd67`, non-destructively. **Journey: FAIL.** Four interventions, three of them root on the appliance: R-216 (a correct code called wrong), R-218 (the store never opened; the box stopped asking), R-219 (the promised listing structurally could not render), R-220 (the app could not be redeployed — its drives were unenrollable). Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM, and what the v0.201.0/v0.97.1 fixes do and do not change.** Six of the nine findings are fixed and each is red-proofed (R-216, R-218, R-219, R-217, R-222, R-215) — but **fixes are not a journey.** This row goes green only when the walk is repeated end to end and completes with no operator intervention. **Three findings are deliberately still open and each is a live blocker for some flow:** **R-214** (the console never stops showing a stale pairing code), **R-220** (after a rebuild the customer's drives cannot be re-enrolled — the deploy refuses and the wizard's list is empty, so no app can be redeployed onto its own data drive), **R-221** (a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony at all, because the pbsdr convergence marker survives on the host while the seeded `escrow.pbs_storage_id` is rewritten out of `agent.json`). **And R-216's fix does not by itself make a NEW box work:** with the hub guard corrected but the Day-0 manifest still vouching agent 0.120.0, a new box is **HELD, not served** — it stops being lied to, which is better, but the feature does not work for it until agent 0.125.0 is vouched. **⚠ CAMPAIGN-11 PHASES 2 + 4 RAN OVERNIGHT 2026-08-05/06 AND THIS ROW STAYS **FAIL**.** **What they add:** eleven injected faults against the recovery journey, each with a positive control, and a full unattended scheduled cycle. **The backup promise strengthened** — the off-site tier ran itself at 04:15 on a box rebuilt twice and set aside hours earlier (`snapshot_count` 1 → 2), all five daily jobs fired exactly once, and nothing on the must-not list fired. **R-217's and R-215's fixes were proven live under exactly their faults**, the set-aside proved it does not delete (12 535 KB byte-exact at the far end), and a wrong code was refused three times with nothing written and no lockout. **What they do NOT add: any progress on the JOURNEY.** These faults are **not a re-walk** — no customer route was walked end to end — and four new findings say the journey got no better where it matters: **R-224** (a hub outage and a stopped agent are BOTH reported to the customer as a bad recovery code, in 0.056 s and 0.030 s — no unseal attempted; the agent's own `err` distinguishes them and it is discarded at the HTTP boundary, and R-216's gate answers `source=version` so it cannot see reachability — **Phase 1's headline defect relocated from the version channel to the transport**), **R-226** (M1, the only message telling a customer to check their typing, is unreachable on any box that has re-escrowed), **R-225** (an unread store renders `0 pillanatkép · 0 GB` above a card saying it holds backups — 1 snapshot and 12 535 KB were really there), **R-228** (the set-aside history is recorded in `orphaned_renamed_to` and shown by nobody — `OrphanedRenamedTo` has zero references in any template or handler). **§4.1 is now MEASURED rather than deduced** — the floor IS served, from the box's own rendered `GetFloor()` and a cold-started controller's settle-gate line. **§4.2's positive half is still NOT measured** and needs a rebuild. Evidence: `audits/CAMPAIGN-11-recovery-journey-2026-08-05.md`, `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal-phase24.md` **2026-08-06 — THE FIVE PHASE-2 FINDINGS ARE FIXED AND THIS ROW STILL SAYS FAIL.** controller **v0.202.0** + agent **v0.126.0** close R-224, R-226, R-225, R-227, R-228. **What changed:** the unlock path now classifies WHY it failed, from the value and never the text, and the message that mentions typing is reachable from exactly one class — a real refusal — with **unknown defaulting to neutral**. Proven live on the venue with the same wrong code and only the hub's reachability changLine truncated
| **Off-site app-data capture covers the paths an app declares MANDATORY — on BOTH drive layouts** | controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04) — and this row was OPTIMISTIC before it** | On demo-hp, an app on the **system-data fallback** bound `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` while the capture set looked in `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books`: the declared-mandatory directory was in **no** snapshot and the run reported `ok` (R-203). After v0.197.0 the capture log reads `1 mandatory path(s)` and the file is **listed inside the snapshot** — `restic ls -l latest --tag calibre-web` → `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt`. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md` §2 and the v0.197.0 CHANGELOG | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM.** It covers CAPTURE, not RESTORE: **no file has ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (R-201, ready to resume). It also does not claim the enrolled-drive layout was ever wrong — it was not, which is precisely why this survived. And a run that still misses a mandatory directory now reports **`incomplete`** rather than `ok`, so this row's guarantee is one the status can express. **Widened 2026-08-06 (controller v0.205.0, R-234):** the same verdict now also covers an app skipped ENTIRELY — until then a missing declared FOLDER made the run incomplete while an app with no recovery unit at all still reported `ok`, so the smaller gap moved the verdict and the bigger one did not. **This row still claims CAPTURE, not that a newly-selected app is protected by the next run** — for a DEPLOYED app it is (the run's own pre-dump phase writes the unit, measured 2026-08-06), and for an undeployed one it is not and the card now says so || **Recurring offsite (PBS) whole-guest backups actually LAND, and RESTORE** — local daily + offsite weekly as scheduled work | agent v0.97–0.103, controller v0.174/0.175, hub v0.76.0, host-install 1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-26)** | `audits/SPIKE-r82-phase0-2026-07-26.md`; per-repo CHANGELOGs/REPORTs. **Restore round-trip on demo-hp:** `--selftest=restore-test` against `felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T15:42:42Z` → `pass:true`, `verified:"boot+running"`, **`mount_parity:"ok"`** (`mp0=/var/lib/docker 50G`, `mp1=/mnt/sys_drive 20G`, mp8/mp9 throwaway stand-ins for the archived binds), `source_tier:"pbs"`, 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, scratch band clean afterwards and the live guest untouched. | **This row is distinct from the DR-tier row above, which proves ACTIVATION, not ARRIVAL.** That tier was PROVEN-LIVE as `applied` since 2026-07-21 while demo-felhom held ONE snapshot (a healing artifact) and demo-hp held **zero, ever** — "applied and empty", the R-39 shape one level quieter. **What earns PROVEN-LIVE here:** (a) demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace); (b) it **restores into a bootable, mount-complete guest** — `mount_parity` is the non-hollow half, since a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume; (c) **the multi-tier quiesce ran through the real UI endpoint** (`POST /api/guest-backup/trigger`, authed+CSRF) and produced **exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it** — `quiescing 1 stack(s)` 17:01:39 → local done 17:02:56 *"next tier may start (app still quiesced)"* → felhom-pbs snapshotted 17:03:06 → `unquiescing` 17:03:06. **App downtime 1m27s for both tiers**, and the app came back healthy. **Known gaps, recorded not hidden:** the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the PRIMARY tier, so the offsite tier is never AUTOMATICALLY restore-tested (the manual/selftest path is proven, the unattended one is not); the hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE rather than a reported cadence; the installer-default fleet flip awaits a full weekly cycle. → **R-82** |
| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **R-189 (agent v0.122.0, 2026-08-03) closed the reporting half of this row, and it was a REAL gap in the evidence path:** the proof above reached the hub only because no restart intervened — `restore_tests[]` came solely from an in-memory store, so the 15:25:14 PASS was in fact LOST when the agent restarted 2 m 43 s later for a deploy (`0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports). Under per-archive due-ness the box would not have repeated the work for a week. The persisted per-tier proof (with the archive, and now the tier) is merged into the report, so a proof survives a restart — one entry per tier, newest wins, and a record that cannot be described honestly is not emitted. **THE HOST TIER'S HALF OF THIS ROW WAS OPTIMISTIC UNTIL 2026-08-03, and it is worth saying plainly.** Every live restore-test cited here is on the OFFSITE tier. The HOST tier was not merely unproven on demo-felhom — it was **unprovable**, and on demo-hp equally: the agent's token had no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, the storage both boxes configure as `local_backup_target`, so the content API answered `{"data":[]}` through the token while root listed three archives. The scheduler skipped it as *"no settled archive yet"* — which is exactly what a brand-new tier reports — so nothing ever said so (**R-185**). **CLOSED 2026-08-03 — agent v0.123.0 + installer 1.24.0.** The grant is applied on both demo boxes (the token now lists 3 and 4 archives), the installer's reuse arm grants on a pre-existing target, and the agent now **asks whether it may read each tier it depends on** instead of inferring it from an empty list: a critical degraded capability naming the storage and the missing role, which the hub alerted and emailed on **while the box was still blind**. **THE HOST TIER IS NOW PROVEN-LIVE, UNATTENDED, ON BOTH DEMO BOXES (2026-08-0Line truncated
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
# DRILL — R-356b: the off-site restore for a driveless app that HAS a database (2026-08-22)
**This was a drill, not an implementation. No production code was written, no version bumped, no
CHANGELOG entry made.** The output is this document and four register rows.
**Subject:** `demo-hp` (Tier 0, disposable), guest 9201, controller **v0.219.0**, floor **0.219.0**.
**Method:** endpoint-level. `claude-in-chrome` is not available on DooPlex, so every product action was
the exact HTTP endpoint the UI's own form posts to — `/api/stacks/<app>/deploy`,
`/backup/offbox/{toggle,run,restore,reconstitute}` — driven with the session cookie and the session
CSRF token scraped from the page. App content was planted through each app's **own** interface
(docmost's JSON API; BookStack's login form + `POST /books`).
## 1. Baselines, confirmed at drill start
| repo | HEAD | note |
|---|---|---|
| felhom-controller | `0f3cf0dbb2c0` | v0.219.0 |
| felhom-agent | `40d857b52711` | v0.130.0 |
| felhom.eu | `8c9f1b798b12` | ahead of the runbook's hash — this session's own golden-bake commit |
| app-catalog | `459766cb1639` | |
Read from the **hub** (`/configuration`, Basic auth, ClusterIP): `golden_version` **0.219.0**,
`agent_version` **0.130.0**, `min_agent` **0.129.0**, global controller floor **0.219.0**. All four as
expected — the operator's three-field vouch and the floor raise both landed.
**The 10-app count, measured in this session and not taken from the runbook: 10.**
Method: `needs_hdd: false` in `.felhom.yml` **and** a `postgres|mariadb|mysql` image in the compose.
Same ten names as the runbook: bookstack, calcom, claper, docmost, kimai, outline, rallly,
sparkyfitness, tandoor, zipline. Evidence `01`.
**Architecture document read:** `documentation/architecture/07-backup-architecture.md` §6.1, §6.2 and
§6.3 **as corrected on 2026-08-22** — including the corrected Tier-3 row, the note that R-102 is *not*
closed, and the `[DESIGN]` paragraph on destination resolution.
Register ceiling before this drill: **R-378**.
## 2. The three questions
### Q1 — Does it complete at all? **YES.**
A driveless app with a database restores end to end, comes back healthy, and returns the planted data.
Measured on `docmost` (Postgres 16). All five legs that had **never run in this combination** executed
in order and every one succeeded, in **32 seconds**:
| leg | evidence |
|---|---|
| undo copy of the live DB, taken while up | `pre-restore-20260822T135827Z-docmost-postgres.sql`, 135 624 B |
| database-service identification | `[docmost-postgres]` |
| stop → place files → **replay volumes** | "Restored **3** Docker volume(s)" — incl. the 52 MB Postgres data directory |
| start **only** the DB service | `docker compose up -d docmost-postgres`, 0.4 s |
| replay the SQL dump on top | "Imported DB dump docmost-postgres.sql", 2 s |
3 pages planted through docmost's own API → destroyed (`count(*) FROM pages` = **0**, no soft-deleted
rows either) → **3 pages back**, same ids. The discriminator went `ORIGINAL-VALUE-A` →
`DESTROYED-VALUE-C` → **`ORIGINAL-VALUE-A`**.
Repeated on `bookstack` (MariaDB 12.3): all five legs, **25 seconds**, 2 volumes replayed including a
**161 MB** MariaDB data directory, the planted book back with its accented name byte-identical.
**Accented round-trip, byte-for-byte:**
`c3817276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912074c3bc6bc3b67266c3ba72c3b367c3a970203220e28094205233353662`
("Árvíztűrő tükörfúrógép 2 — R356b", docmost) and
`C3817276C3AD7A74C5B172C591206BC3B66E79766573706F6C6320E28094205233353662`
("Árvíztűrő könyvespolc — R356b", bookstack). Both identical before and after. Non-ASCII never crossed
a shell chain: strings were embedded in python files inside the guest, or passed with
`--data-urlencode "name@file"`.
> **A flaw in this drill's own method, recorded rather than hidden.** The FIRST accented title was
> planted through a shell argument chain that double-escaped it, so it was stored as the literal ASCII
> text `Árv…` rather than as accented bytes. It was caught by reading the stored value back **as
> hex** — the same discipline that makes the rest of these numbers worth anything. The pages
> round-tripped exactly either way, so Q1's answer stands, but the accented coverage did not, and was
> re-measured in Phase 1b. The faulty page is deliberately left in place as the record.
### Q2 — Which leg returned the data? **The SQL dump.**
A three-way discriminator was built so the answer could not be ambiguous:
| holder | value |
|---|---|
| live database before the restore | `LIVE-VALUE-C3` — if it survived, neither leg wrote |
| the volume tar (52 MB Postgres data dir) | `ORIGINAL-VALUE-A` |
| the SQL dump, **altered in the scratch only** | `ALTERED-VALUE-B` |
**Result: `ALTERED-VALUE-B`.** The dump won. The ordering the code comment asserts —
*"volumes FIRST, database after, so a logical .sql dump still wins over whatever copy of the same
database a volume tar happens to contain"* (`offbox_reconstitute.go`, the R-354 block) — **holds in
practice on the off-site path.** It was an intention; it is now an observation.
Mutation asserted: dump sha256 `c5414f24…` → `834c32b1…`, zero occurrences of the original left, one of
the altered. Evidence `13`.
**The fence held.** Only the prepared scratch was mutated. Proved afterwards by re-preparing a fresh
scratch from the same snapshot: sha256 back to `c5414f24…`, reading `ORIGINAL-VALUE-A`. Evidence `14`.
> **This confirms an existing claim on a new path rather than establishing a new one.** **R-164**
> already records *"the dump is authoritative and replayed after the tar so it WINS (F17)"* — but cites
> `internal/backup/restore_unit.go:262-266`, the **local** restore. Q2 extends that to
> `offbox_reconstitute.go`, the **off-site** path, which had never been exercised for this app class.
### Q3 — Does a failure in the database leg tell the truth? **Partly. Two defects.**
Measured by truncating the dump in the scratch mid-statement, on both engines.
| | Postgres (docmost) | MariaDB (bookstack) |
|---|---|---|
| customer sees a failure | **yes** — `alert alert-error`, "sikertelen" | **yes** |
| message names the undo copy | **yes**, by filename | **yes** |
| app afterwards | **crash-loops** — visibly broken | **`health=healthy, running=true, restarts=0`** |
| database afterwards | **emptied** — 43 tables, 0 rows in pages/users/spaces | **partially applied** — book and users intact, `migrations` **wiped to 0 rows** |
| undo copy valid? | **yes** — proven by applying it | **yes** — proven by applying it |
| product can apply the undo copy | **NO** | **NO** |
## 3. Hypotheses — what fired and what did not
- **H1 (schema collision).** **DID NOT FIRE.** The dump replayed cleanly onto a freshly-replaced
Postgres data directory in 2 s under `ON_ERROR_STOP=1`. This is the notable negative: the two legs do
not collide in practice for this app class.
- **H2 (replayed data directory will not start).** **DID NOT FIRE.** Both engines started healthy on a
data directory that had just been replaced wholesale from a tar.
- **H3 (MariaDB and Postgres do not fail the same way).** **FIRED — but not in the predicted shape.**
The prediction was a quiet partial success with no error. What actually happens is a **visible
error** *and* a **silently inconsistent database behind a healthy-looking app**. See R-380.
- **H4 (credentials).** **DID NOT FIRE.** `ImportDump` discovered `dbUser=docmost/dbName=docmost` from
the **live** container and they matched the restored directory, exactly as predicted — secrets are
not regenerated on reconstitution.
## 4. Findings filed
| id | severity | what |
|---|---|---|
| **R-379** | HIGH | The undo copy is valid, is named to the customer, and **no product action can apply it** |
| **R-380** | HIGH | A failed **MariaDB** replay leaves a partially-applied database behind a **healthy** app |
| **R-381** | MEDIUM | The failure message pastes raw engine stderr — **including customer database rows** — into the Hungarian customer surface |
| **R-382** | LOW | The reconstitution's summary log line omits the volume count it already has |
**An independent reproduction of an existing row.** After the first reconstitution, docmost's
`db-dumps/` held **only** `pre-restore-*` files — the app's own `docmost-postgres.sql` was gone. That is
**R-361** reproducing on a second app, unprompted. Not re-filed; noted here as corroboration.
## 5. Observations — noticed, recorded, NOT acted on
- **A newly deployed app is not in the off-site set.** `docmost` and `bookstack` were both absent from
`app_backup` entirely until switched on by hand. This is plausibly deliberate (the switch is the
customer's), and it is **not filed as a defect** — but the consequence is that an app can be deployed,
run, and never leave the box, while the nightly run reports "backup OK". Stated so the next reader can
decide whether the default is right.
- **`restic check` was run by hand and passed** — `no errors were found`, 29 snapshots. Nothing in the
product runs it (**R-359**, already filed). Reproducing the invocation took three attempts because the
key file is `ssh_key`, not `id_offbox` as the arg-builder's variable naming suggests.
- **The `-db` container-suffix attribution is correct here.** `bookstack-db`'s dump landed in
`bookstack`'s own unit as `bookstack-mariadb.sql` — the R-355 failure shape does **not** reproduce,
because v0.218.0's compose-project attribution handles it.
## 6. Phases run
| phase | status |
|---|---|
| 1 — Postgres, does it complete | **run** |
| 1b — accented round-trip, re-measured after a method flaw | **run** |
| 2 — which leg won | **run** |
| 3 — failure path, Postgres | **run** |
| 4 — MariaDB: Phase 1 and Phase 3 equivalents | **run** |
Nothing was dropped.
## 7. Evidence
`evidence/`, files `00`–`31`, copied off `demo-hp` at the end of each phase. Nothing was reverted or
torn down mid-run, so no intermediate teardown could have taken any of it.
## 8. Teardown — three layers
1. **Apps.** `docmost` and `bookstack` were **deployed by this drill** and are **RETAINED**, with their
planted data. Reason: the planted data *is* the evidence for every claim above, and they are the only
deployed members of the 10-app class on the box, so the next drill in this area starts from a real
subject instead of rebuilding one. Both are healthy and sane at the end (docmost restored via its
undo copy; bookstack's `migrations` table restored 0 → 102 rows the same way).
2. **Storage.** No `pvesm` "before" snapshot was taken — **stated plainly rather than reconstructed.**
Measured directly instead: the two apps' volumes total ~233 MB
(docmost 67 MB + 228 KB + 4 KB, bookstack 166 MB + 224 KB) inside guest 9201, which sits at
16 % of 69 GB. Host `local-lvm` 34.81 %, `local` 14.27 %.
3. **Hub-side record.** **None was created.** This drill created no customer and no appliance record;
it deployed two apps inside an existing guest of an existing customer. Nothing to dispose of.
## 9. Store integrity at the end
`restic check` against the live repository: **`no errors were found`**, 29 snapshots, exclusive lock
taken and released. Evidence `30`.
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
Baselines re-verified at drill start, 2026-08-22.
repo HEAD clean in-sync-with-origin/main
felhom-controller 0f3cf0dbb2c0 yes yes (v0.219.0)
felhom-agent 40d857b52711 yes yes (v0.130.0)
felhom.eu 8c9f1b798b12 yes yes (ahead of the runbook's f2edf7e54595:
this session's own golden-bake commit)
app-catalog-felhom.eu 459766cb1639 yes yes
Read from the HUB (operator UI, Basic auth, ClusterIP 10.43.52.34:8080/configuration):
golden_version 0.219.0 <- vouched
agent_version 0.130.0
min_agent 0.129.0
global controller floor 0.219.0 <- raised
Register ceiling before this drill: R-378 (highest id across OPEN-ITEMS.md + CLOSED-ITEMS.md).
Next free id: R-379.
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
bookstack | image: mariadb:12.3
calcom | image: postgres:16-alpine
claper | image: postgres:16-alpine
docmost | image: postgres:16-alpine
kimai | image: mariadb:11.6
outline | image: postgres:16-alpine
rallly | image: postgres:16-alpine
sparkyfitness | image: postgres:15-alpine
tandoor | image: postgres:16-alpine
zipline | image: postgres:16-alpine
Method: for each templates/<app>/, an app qualifies when BOTH
(a) .felhom.yml declares needs_hdd: false
(b) docker-compose.yml has an image: line matching postgres|mariadb|mysql
Catalog @ 459766cb1639.
COUNT MEASURED THIS SESSION: 10 -- agrees with the runbook's table.
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
== 1. plant the control row
INSERT 0 1
== 2. FIND it
found: R356B-FINDABILITY-CONTROL
== 3. remove it
DELETE 1
== 4. fail to find it
absent, as required
== the planted state that must survive:
1|ORIGINAL-VALUE-A
== pages visible through the app's own API:
page: "\\u00c1rv\\u00edzt\\u0171r\\u0151 t\\u00fck\\u00f6rf\\u00far\\u00f3g\\u00e9p \\u2014 R356b drill"
page: "R356B-PAGE-2-sentinel"
page: "R356B-PAGE-1-sentinel"
count: 3
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
PLANTED STATE — docmost on demo-hp, 2026-08-22, before the off-site run.
Through the app's OWN API (POST /api/pages/create, format=markdown), 3 pages:
id=01a029ad-81fe-792b-87c2-b940ffc80c0c slugId=F4G3YyHtFj title="R356B-PAGE-1-sentinel"
body: FELHOM-R356B-SENTINEL-ALPHA-2026-08-22 plain ascii body
id=01a029ad-8298-712b-bf80-e41d1186a746 slugId=87aKZR4rlm title="R356B-PAGE-2-sentinel"
body: FELHOM-R356B-SENTINEL-BETA-2026-08-22 second body
id=01a029ad-8314-76e9-bef0-2108aed8b7a6 slugId=fJOFUooa0N title=<accented, see below>
body: FELHOM-R356B-SENTINEL-GAMMA-2026-08-22 akcentusos oldal torzse
ACCENTED TITLE, as explicit UTF-8 hex bytes:
c3817276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912074c3bc6bc3b67266c3ba72c3b367c3a97020e28094205233353662206472696c6c
= "Árvíztűrő tükörfúrógép — R356b drill"
Non-ASCII never crossed a shell chain: the planting script was base64-encoded on DooPlex and
decoded inside the guest.
DIRECTLY IN THE DATABASE — the Q2 discriminator:
table felhom_r356b_discriminator
row id=1, marker='ORIGINAL-VALUE-A'
FINDABILITY CONTROL (evidence 02): a control row was planted, FOUND, removed, and then NOT found.
Every absence claim later in this drill rests on that control.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"last_duration":"2m38s","last_error":"","last_run":"2026-08-22T13:37:41Z","orphaned":false,"progress":{"active":false,"current_app":"","percent":0,"bytes_done":0,"total_bytes":0,"done_human":"","total_human":"","files_done":0,"total_files":0,"current_file":"","elapsed_sec":0,"phase":""},"repo_size_human":"54.1 MB","snapshots":28,"status":"ok"}
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
2332 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/compose/.felhom.yml
445 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/compose/app.yaml
3105 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/compose/docker-compose.yml
139770 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/db-dumps/docmost-postgres.sql
1376 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/manifest.json
52344320 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/volume-dumps/docmost_docmost_postgres_data.tar
56320 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/volume-dumps/docmost_docmost_redis_data.tar
1536 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/volume-dumps/docmost_docmost_storage.tar
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
== BEFORE — pages in the database:
01a029ad-81fe-792b-87c2-b940ffc80c0c | R356B-PAGE-1-sentinel
01a029ad-8298-712b-bf80-e41d1186a746 | R356B-PAGE-2-sentinel
01a029ad-8314-76e9-bef0-2108aed8b7a6 | \u00c1rv\u00edzt\u0171r\u0151 t\u00fck\u00f6rf\u00far\u00f3g\u00e9p \u2014 R356b drill
== deleting all three pages through the app's own API (force delete, not trash):
01a029ad-81fe-792b-87c2-b940ffc80c0c -> {"success":true,"status":200}
01a029ad-8298-712b-bf80-e41d1186a746 -> {"success":true,"status":200}
01a029ad-8314-76e9-bef0-2108aed8b7a6 -> {"success":true,"status":200}
== move the discriminator to a POST-SNAPSHOT value, so a revert is visible:
UPDATE 1
== AFTER — pages in the database (must be empty):
(none — genuinely gone)
== AFTER — any row at all in pages, incl. soft-deleted (a trash that still holds them is not a deletion):
0
== AFTER — discriminator:
1|DESTROYED-VALUE-C
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
HTTP/2 302
location: /backups/restore/app?name=docmost&flash=A+teljes+visszaall%C3%ADtas+elindult+%E2%80%94+az+allapot+itt+friss%C3%BCl.
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container paperless-webserver (image=ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:2.20.15, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:140: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: found postgres container: paperless-postgres (id=5be5e049dab2)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:805: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: paperless-postgres → stack "paperless-ngx" from the compose project label (the container name would have given "paperless")
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:160: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: paperless-postgres → stack=paperless-ngx, dbUser=paperless, dbName=paperless
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container paperless-redis (image=redis:7-alpine, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container opengist (image=ghcr.io/thomiceli/opengist:1.13, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container kimai (image=kimai/kimai2:apache-2.57.0, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:140: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: found mariadb container: kimai-db (id=53e87f2a117d)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:160: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: kimai-db → stack=kimai, dbUser=root, dbName=kimai
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container calibre-web (image=crocodilestick/calibre-web-automated:v4.0.6, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container felhom-controller (image=gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.219.0, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container filebrowser (image=gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container cloudflared (image=cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.6.0, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:133: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: skipping container traefik (image=traefik:v3.6.7, not a database)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:167: [DEBUG] DiscoverDatabases: found 4 database(s), skipped 12 non-DB container(s)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:170: [INFO] [backup] Discovered 4 databases
2026/08/22 13:58:30 restore_db.go:77: [INFO] [backup] Restore docmost: replaying DB dump into docmost-postgres (postgres)
2026/08/22 13:58:30 dbdump.go:700: [DEBUG] [backup] ImportDump: importing /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/db-dumps/docmost-postgres.sql into docmost-postgres (postgres)
2026/08/22 13:58:32 dbdump.go:710: [INFO] [backup] Imported DB dump docmost-postgres.sql into docmost-postgres (postgres)
2026/08/22 13:58:32 restore_db.go:87: [INFO] [backup] Restore docmost: replayed 1 DB dump(s)
2026/08/22 13:58:32 manager.go:986: [DEBUG] [stacks] StartStack docmost: current state=starting deployed=true
2026/08/22 13:58:32 manager.go:989: [INFO] [stacks] Starting stack: docmost
2026/08/22 13:58:32 manager.go:996: [DEBUG] [stacks] StartStack docmost: prepared 10 env vars for compose
2026/08/22 13:58:32 manager.go:1261: [DEBUG] Env vars for compose: [PATH, HOSTNAME, FELHOM_BOOTSTRAP_PATH, HOME, DOMAIN, APP_SECRET, DB_PASSWORD, DOMAIN, SUBDOMAIN, IMPORT_PATH] (10 app + 0 system)
2026/08/22 13:58:32 manager.go:1270: [DEBUG] Running: docker compose up -d (in /opt/docker/stacks/docmost)
2026/08/22 13:58:43 manager.go:1004: [INFO] [stacks] Stack docmost started successfully (took 11.1s)
2026/08/22 13:58:46 manager.go:1261: [DEBUG] Env vars for compose: [PATH, HOSTNAME, FELHOM_BOOTSTRAP_PATH, HOME, DOMAIN, APP_SECRET, DB_PASSWORD, DOMAIN, SUBDOMAIN, IMPORT_PATH] (10 app + 0 system)
2026/08/22 13:58:46 manager.go:1270: [DEBUG] Running: docker compose ps -a --format table {{.Name}} {{.Image}} {{.State}} {{.Status}} (in /opt/docker/stacks/docmost)
2026/08/22 13:58:46 restore.go:204: [DEBUG] [backup] Post-restore health check: docmost not yet running, waiting...
2026/08/22 13:58:46 manager.go:1350: [INFO] [stacks] Stack docmost post-start status:
2026/08/22 13:58:46 manager.go:1353: [INFO] [stacks] docmost docmost/docmost:0.95.0 running Up 3 seconds (health: starting)
2026/08/22 13:58:46 manager.go:1353: [INFO] [stacks] docmost-postgres postgres:16-alpine running Up 16 seconds (healthy)
2026/08/22 13:58:46 manager.go:1353: [INFO] [stacks] docmost-redis redis:7-alpine running Up 14 seconds (healthy)
2026/08/22 13:58:46 auth.go:134: [DEBUG] [web] auth: valid session for GET /backup/offbox/status
2026/08/22 13:58:46 server.go:393: [DEBUG] [web] ServeHTTP: GET /backup/offbox/status from 172.18.0.4:52436
2026/08/22 13:58:51 restore.go:204: [DEBUG] [backup] Post-restore health check: docmost not yet running, waiting...
2026/08/22 13:58:56 restore.go:199: [DEBUG] [backup] Post-restore health check: docmost is running
2026/08/22 13:58:56 offbox_reconstitute.go:452: [INFO] [offbox] reconstituted docmost from snapshot 239dd86c: 0 file(s) placed, 1 DB dump(s) replayed, safety dump=pre-restore-20260822T135827Z-docmost-postgres.sql, skewed=false
2026/08/22 13:58:56 offbox_handlers.go:455: [INFO] [web] off-box reconstitute docmost completed (async): files=0 dbs=1 snapshot=239dd86c
2026/08/22 13:59:02 healthprobe.go:153: [DEBUG] Health probe docmost: HTTP GET :3000/ → 200 (6ms)
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
== pages in the database after the restore:
01a029ad-81fe-792b-87c2-b940ffc80c0c | R356B-PAGE-1-sentinel
01a029ad-8298-712b-bf80-e41d1186a746 | R356B-PAGE-2-sentinel
01a029ad-8314-76e9-bef0-2108aed8b7a6 | \u00c1rv\u00edzt\u0171r\u0151 t\u00fck\u00f6rf\u00far\u00f3g\u00e9p \u2014 R356b drill
== page count:
3
== THE DISCRIMINATOR (Q2):
1|ORIGINAL-VALUE-A
== through the app's OWN interface — log in fresh and list:
HTTP/2 400
count: 0
== body of the accented page, read back through the app:
title hex:
content : null
login: HTTP/2 200
== pages listed through the app's OWN interface:
title(hex)=5c753030633172765c75303065647a745c7530313731725c753031353120745c75303066636b5c753030663672665c7530306661725c7530306633675c753030653970205c7532303134205233353662206472696c6c id=01a029ad-8314-76e9-bef0-2108aed8b7a6
title(hex)=52333536422d504147452d322d73656e74696e656c id=01a029ad-8298-712b-bf80-e41d1186a746
title(hex)=52333536422d504147452d312d73656e74696e656c id=01a029ad-81fe-792b-87c2-b940ffc80c0c
count: 3
== the accented page, body read back through the app:
title hex : 5c753030633172765c75303065647a745c7530313731725c753031353120745c75303066636b5c753030663672665c7530306661725c7530306633675c753030653970205c7532303134205233353662206472696c6c
title : "\\u00c1rv\\u00edzt\\u0171r\\u0151 t\\u00fck\\u00f6rf\\u00far\\u00f3g\\u00e9p \\u2014 R356b drill"
body has GAMMA sentinel: True
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
PHASE 1 RESULT — docmost (driveless, Postgres 16), demo-hp, controller v0.219.0
THE FIVE LEGS, in order, from the controller log (evidence 08). Every one ran; every one succeeded.
13:58:24 POST /backup/offbox/reconstitute (the endpoint the UI's button posts to)
13:58:27 leg 1 safety dump written -> pre-restore-20260822T135827Z-docmost-postgres.sql (135 624 B)
13:58:2x leg 2 DB service identified -> [docmost-postgres]
13:58:28 leg 3a stack stopped
13:58:28 leg 3b volumes replayed -> docmost_docmost_postgres_data
13:58:29 docmost_docmost_redis_data
13:58:30 docmost_docmost_storage = "Restored 3 Docker volume(s)"
13:58:30 leg 4 DB service ONLY started -> docker compose up -d docmost-postgres (0.4s)
13:58:30 leg 5 ImportDump docmost-postgres.sql -> docmost-postgres (postgres)
13:58:32 "Imported DB dump ... " / "replayed 1 DB dump(s)" (2 s)
13:58:32 full StartStack
13:58:56 reconstituted docmost from snapshot 239dd86c:
0 file(s) placed, 1 DB dump(s) replayed,
safety dump=pre-restore-20260822T135827Z-docmost-postgres.sql, skewed=false
Total 32 s. All three containers healthy afterwards.
WHAT CAME BACK
pages before destruction : 3
pages after destruction : 0 (count(*) FROM pages = 0 — not even soft-deleted rows)
pages after restore : 3 same ids, same titles
discriminator before : ORIGINAL-VALUE-A
discriminator moved to : DESTROYED-VALUE-C (deliberately, so a revert would be visible)
discriminator after : ORIGINAL-VALUE-A -> the snapshot's value was restored
Read back through the APP'S OWN interface after the restore: login HTTP 200, /api/pages/recent
returned all 3 pages, and the body of the third still contained its GAMMA sentinel.
HYPOTHESES — what fired and what did not
H1 (schema collision, dump replays over a restored data directory) — DID NOT FIRE.
The import completed in 2 s with no error under ON_ERROR_STOP=1. This is the notable result:
the two legs do not collide in practice for this app.
H2 (replayed data directory will not start) — DID NOT FIRE. docmost-postgres came up healthy
on a data directory that had just been replaced wholesale from a tar.
H4 (credentials) — DID NOT FIRE. ImportDump discovered dbUser=docmost/dbName=docmost from the
LIVE container and they matched the restored directory, as predicted: secrets are not
regenerated on reconstitution.
H3 (MariaDB vs Postgres error handling) — not applicable to this phase; Phase 4.
A FLAW IN THIS DRILL'S OWN PLANTING, recorded rather than hidden
The first accented title was planted through a shell argument chain that double-escaped it, so
it was stored as the LITERAL ASCII text Árvízt... rather than as accented bytes.
Caught by reading the stored value back as hex. The pages round-tripped exactly, so Phase 1's
Q1 answer stands — but the ACCENTED-BYTES coverage did not, and was re-measured in Phase 1b
with the title embedded in a python source file inside the guest, never passed as a shell
argument. Wire bytes and stored bytes were compared and are identical.
PHASE 1b — the accented round-trip, re-measured properly
planted (wire bytes) : c3817276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912074c3bc6bc3b67266c3ba72c3b367c3a970203220e28094205233353662
stored at plant time : identical
destroyed : all 4 pages permanently; count(*) FROM pages = 0
restored (snapshot a49de51d, 14:05:33): 4 pages back
accented title after : c3817276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912074c3bc6bc3b67266c3ba72c3b367c3a970203220e28094205233353662
MATCH : TRUE ("Árvíztűrő tükörfúrógép 2 — R356b")
discriminator : DESTROYED-VALUE-C2 -> ORIGINAL-VALUE-A
The first three pages also came back; page 01a029ad-8314-... still carries the double-escaped
ASCII title, which is what this drill's own faulty plant stored. It is left in place as the
record of that flaw rather than quietly re-planted.
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
== BEFORE: page count and the accented title as hex
4
accented title hex: c3817276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912074c3bc6bc3b67266c3ba72c3b367c3a970203220e28094205233353662
== destroy ALL pages through the app (permanent, not trash):
01a029ad-81fe-792b-87c2-b940ffc80c0c -> {"success":true,"status":200}
01a029ad-8298-712b-bf80-e41d1186a746 -> {"success":true,"status":200}
01a029ad-8314-76e9-bef0-2108aed8b7a6 -> {"success":true,"status":200}
01a029c6-47b8-7252-8ea2-4c2036f9e1d0 -> {"success":true,"status":200}
UPDATE 1
== AFTER destruction — page count (must be 0) and discriminator:
0
1|DESTROYED-VALUE-C2
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
== page count after restore (was 0 before):
4
== all titles, as UTF-8 hex:
01a029ad-81fe-792b-87c2-b940ffc80c0c hex=52333536422d504147452d312d73656e74696e656c
01a029ad-8298-712b-bf80-e41d1186a746 hex=52333536422d504147452d322d73656e74696e656c
01a029ad-8314-76e9-bef0-2108aed8b7a6 hex=5c753030633172765c75303065647a745c7530313731725c753031353120745c75303066636b5c753030663672665c7530306661725c7530306633675c753030653970205c7532303134205233353662206472696c6c
01a029c6-47b8-7252-8ea2-4c2036f9e1d0 hex=c3817276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912074c3bc6bc3b67266c3ba72c3b367c3a970203220e28094205233353662
== THE ACCENTED PAGE — expected hex:
c3817276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912074c3bc6bc3b67266c3ba72c3b367c3a970203220e28094205233353662
actual hex: c3817276c3ad7a74c5b172c5912074c3bc6bc3b67266c3ba72c3b367c3a970203220e28094205233353662
MATCH: True
== discriminator (was DESTROYED-VALUE-C2 before the restore):
1|ORIGINAL-VALUE-A
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
BEFORE sha256: c5414f24426a4a0050becadeb564990465bf48772a7cb029daaebd22ef788441
BEFORE line 1536: 1 ORIGINAL-VALUE-A 2026-08-22 15:34:22.455005+02
AFTER line 1536: 1 ALTERED-VALUE-B 2026-08-22 15:34:22.455005+02
AFTER sha256: 834c32b19b9ec053b2909f031751cbbcf8d14941b5af2fdf1f3779b113b82d36
occurrences of ORIGINAL-VALUE-A left in the scratch dump: 0
occurrences of ALTERED-VALUE-B: 1
--- the volume tar still holds the ORIGINAL (it is the other candidate):
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 53301760 Aug 22 14:01 /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/offsite-restore/docmost/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/db-dumps/../volume-dumps/docmost_docmost_postgres_data.tar
THE THREE-WAY DISCRIMINATOR, set up before the reconstitution:
live database now holds : LIVE-VALUE-C3 <- if this survives, NEITHER leg wrote
volume tar holds : ORIGINAL-VALUE-A <- if this wins, the volume tar supplied the state
altered SQL dump holds : ALTERED-VALUE-B <- if this wins, the dump supplied it (as the comment intends)
FENCE: the mutation was applied to the PREPARED SCRATCH ONLY. The off-site store and the live
recovery unit were not touched. Proved after the run by re-preparing a fresh scratch from the same
snapshot and confirming it still reads ORIGINAL-VALUE-A.
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
fresh scratch sha256: c5414f24426a4a0050becadeb564990465bf48772a7cb029daaebd22ef788441
line 1536 : 1 ORIGINAL-VALUE-A 2026-08-22 15:34:22.455005+02
ORIGINAL-VALUE-A present: 1
ALTERED-VALUE-B present: 0
0
--- the LIVE recovery unit db-dumps dir (never touched by a restore):
total 420
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 22 14:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4096 Aug 22 14:05 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 135624 Aug 22 13:58 pre-restore-20260822T135827Z-docmost-postgres.sql
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 135847 Aug 22 14:05 pre-restore-20260822T140501Z-docmost-postgres.sql
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 141361 Aug 22 14:07 pre-restore-20260822T140713Z-docmost-postgres.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
live discriminator before Phase 3: ALTERED-VALUE-B
live page count before Phase 3 : 4
--- CORRUPTION METHOD: truncate the dump mid-COPY-block (a realistic partial/corrupt dump)
size before: 141364
size after : 62000
last line now: COPY public.felhom_r356b_discriminator
sha256 after: 30e84d2c0d0bcf3e7043459a0d135e96cdb65947f4138f181837b1ee35d2e087
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
2026/08/22 14:09:40 offbox_handlers.go:451: [ERROR] [web] off-box reconstitute docmost (async): az adatbázis visszaállítása sikertelen: importing postgres dump for docmost: postgres import into docmost-postgres failed: ERROR: syntax error at end of input
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
=== CUSTOMER-FACING MESSAGE, VERBATIM ===
A teljes visszaállítás sikertelen: az adatbázis visszaállítása sikertelen: importing postgres dump for docmost: postgres import into docmost-postgres failed: ERROR: syntax error at end of input
LINE 1: COPY public.felhom_r356b_discriminator
^ — exit status 3 — a korábbi állapot mentése megvan: pre-restore-20260822T140924Z-docmost-postgres.sql
=== UTF-8 hex ===
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
=== byte length: 407
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
== tables left in the public schema (a healthy docmost has ~30):
43
== does pages still exist?
pages
== rows in pages (was 4 before the failed restore):
0
== rows in users (the workspace owner):
0
== rows in spaces :
0
== discriminator rows (was 1):
0
== the undo copy that the message named:
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 141363 Aug 22 14:09 /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/docmost/db-dumps/pre-restore-20260822T140924Z-docmost-postgres.sql
== is that undo copy a VALID dump? (header + row count for pages)
43
--
-- PostgreSQL database dump
--
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
== does the undo copy CONTAIN the lost data?
rows in its pages COPY block: 4
rows in its users COPY block: 1
contains the accented title : 1
== APPLY it by hand — proving the undo copy WORKS (nothing in the product will do this):
(1 row)
== state after applying the undo by hand:
pages: 4
users: 1
discriminator: ALTERED-VALUE-B
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
PHASE 3 RESULT — the failure path (docmost, Postgres)
CORRUPTION METHOD: the prepared scratch's db-dumps/docmost-postgres.sql was TRUNCATED from
141 364 B to 62 000 B, landing mid-statement at "COPY public.felhom_r356b_discriminator ".
sha256 30e84d2c0d0bcf3e7043459a0d135e96cdb65947f4138f181837b1ee35d2e087.
Scratch only. Store and live unit untouched.
DOES THE CUSTOMER SEE A FAILURE? YES.
Rendered in an `alert alert-error` block under the heading "Eredmény", beginning
"A teljes visszaállítás sikertelen:". Not a warning beside a success.
DOES THE MESSAGE NAME THE UNDO COPY? YES.
"... — a korábbi állapot mentése megvan: pre-restore-20260822T140924Z-docmost-postgres.sql"
IS THE APP RUNNING AFTERWARDS? NO — it crash-loops.
`docmost | Restarting (1)`; docmost-postgres and docmost-redis stay healthy. Login through
traefik returns 404 because there is no healthy backend.
This is recorded as HONEST rather than as a defect: the app is visibly broken, not falsely
green. An earlier reading in this session said "reports healthy" — that was wrong, taken from
a "health: starting" line during the restart, and is corrected here.
WHAT STATE IS THE DATA IN? EMPTY, and that is inherent to the mechanism.
The truncated dump ran its DROP/CREATE sequence and died partway through the data:
tables in public schema : 43 (schema intact)
pages : 0 (was 4)
users : 0 (was 1 — the workspace owner)
spaces : 0
felhom_r356b_discriminator: 0 (was 1)
IS THE UNDO COPY VALID AND SUFFICIENT? YES — proven by using it.
141 363 B, proper pg_dump header, 43 COPY blocks.
Its pages block holds 4 rows, its users block 1 row, and it contains the accented title.
Applied BY HAND (docker cp + psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1): pages 4, users 1,
discriminator ALTERED-VALUE-B — exactly the pre-restore state.
THE GAP — and it is the finding of this phase:
NOTHING IN THE PRODUCT CAN APPLY THAT UNDO COPY.
- The filename appears ONLY inside the error text. There is no button, no list entry, no route.
- `preRestoreDumpPrefix` ("pre-restore-") is explicitly SKIPPED at three places so these files
are never offered as a restore source:
internal/backup/restore_unit.go:125
internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:489
internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:539
- So a customer whose off-site dump is corrupt is left with a crash-looping app, an emptied
database, and a filename they cannot act on. The data is recoverable — by us, by hand.
SECOND FINDING — the message leaks raw engine internals at a Hungarian customer.
407 bytes, of which the middle ~250 are untranslated English psql output including a caret
diagram and "exit status 3":
"importing postgres dump for docmost: postgres import into docmost-postgres failed:
ERROR: syntax error at end of input
LINE 1: COPY public.felhom_r356b_discriminator
^ — exit status 3"
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
PHASE 4 PLANTED STATE — bookstack (driveless, MariaDB 12.3, container bookstack-db)
Deployed by this drill (it was not on the box). Off-site switch turned ON and verified.
Through the app's OWN web interface (login form -> POST /books, session cookie + Laravel _token):
entities: id=1 type=book
name (UTF-8 hex): C3817276C3AD7A74C5B172C591206BC3B66E79766573706F6C6320E28094205233353662
= "Árvíztűrő könyvespolc — R356b"
description : FELHOM-R356B-BOOKSTACK-SENTINEL-2026-08-22
The name was written from a python file inside the guest and passed to curl with
--data-urlencode "name@/tmp/bs.name", so it never crossed a shell argument.
NOTE: this BookStack version has no `books` table — the 2025_09_15 migration
`drop_old_entity_tables` unified books/chapters/pages into `entities`. 42 tables total.
Directly in the database — the discriminator:
felhom_r356b_disc: id=1, marker='ORIGINAL-VALUE-A'
FINDABILITY CONTROL: a control row was planted (id=99), FOUND, removed, and then NOT found.
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
== BEFORE:
1 book C3817276C3AD7A74C5B172C591206BC3B66E79766573706F6C6320E28094205233353662
1 ORIGINAL-VALUE-A
== DESTROY (delete the book through the app is a soft-delete; this removes it outright):
== AFTER destruction — entities count (must be 0) and discriminator:
0
1 DESTROYED-VALUE-C
== also check the deletions/recycle-bin table is not holding it:
0
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
2075 ./mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/bookstack/compose/.felhom.yml
426 ./mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/bookstack/compose/app.yaml
2330 ./mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/bookstack/compose/docker-compose.yml
58775 ./mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/bookstack/db-dumps/bookstack-mariadb.sql
1325 ./mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/bookstack/manifest.json
136704 ./mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/bookstack/volume-dumps/bookstack_bookstack_config.tar
160945152 ./mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/bookstack/volume-dumps/bookstack_bookstack_db_data.tar
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
== entities after restore (was 0):
1 book C3817276C3AD7A74C5B172C591206BC3B66E79766573706F6C6320E28094205233353662
== expected accented hex:
C3817276C3AD7A74C5B172C591206BC3B66E79766573706F6C6320E28094205233353662
== discriminator (was DESTROYED-VALUE-C):
1 ORIGINAL-VALUE-A
== containers:
bookstack | Up 41 seconds (healthy)
bookstack-db | Up 47 seconds (healthy)
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
size before : 30000
sha before : e4575b65d84ef24a605c56883f54384c3cd0d91e75862bad9ae69ec7bff52da4
size after : 30000
sha after : e4575b65d84ef24a605c56883f54384c3cd0d91e75862bad9ae69ec7bff52da4
tail (truncation point):
51_update_entity_relation_columns',1),
(96,'2025_09_15_134813_drop_old_entity_tables',1),
(97,'2025_
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
2026/08/22 14:24:30 offbox_handlers.go:451: [ERROR] [web] off-box reconstitute bookstack (async): az adatbázis visszaállítása sikertelen: importing mariadb dump for bookstack: mariadb import into bookstack-db failed: --------------
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
=== CUSTOMER-FACING MESSAGE, VERBATIM ===
A teljes visszaállítás sikertelen: az adatbázis visszaállítása sikertelen: importing mariadb dump for bookstack: mariadb import into bookstack-db failed: --------------
INSERT INTO `migrations` VALUES
(1,&#39;2014_10_12_000000_create_users_table&#39;,1),
(2,&#39;2014_10_12_100000_create_password_resets_table&#39;,1),
(3,&#39;2015_07_12_114933_create_books_table&#39;,1),
(4,&#39;2015_07_12_190027_create_pages_table&#39;,1),
(5,&#39;2015_07_13_172121_create_images_table&#39;,1),
(6,&#39;2015_07_ — exit status 1 — a korábbi állapot mentése megvan: pre-restore-20260822T142418Z-bookstack-mariadb.sql
=== UTF-8 hex ===
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
=== byte length: 615
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
== tables left:
42
== entities (was 1):
1
== users:
2
== discriminator table still there?
1
== migrations rows (the table the dump died inside):
0
== containers:
bookstack | Up 2 minutes (healthy)
bookstack-db | Up 3 minutes (healthy)
== undo copy on disk:
total 128
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 22 14:24 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4096 Aug 22 14:25 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 58595 Aug 22 14:22 pre-restore-20260822T142223Z-bookstack-mariadb.sql
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 58775 Aug 22 14:24 pre-restore-20260822T142418Z-bookstack-mariadb.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
== applying the undo copy by hand (nothing in the product will do this):
== state after:
entities : 1
users : 2
migrations: 102
book name : C3817276C3AD7A74C5B172C591206BC3B66E79766573706F6C6320E28094205233353662
disc : ORIGINAL-VALUE-A
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
repo: sftp:u629488-sub3@u629488-sub3.your-storagebox.de:/home/felhom-repo (port 23)
using temporary cache in /tmp/restic-check-cache-2896564091
create exclusive lock for repository
load indexes
check all packs
check snapshots, trees and blobs
[0:01] 100.00% 29 / 29 snapshots
no errors were found
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
Name Type Status Total (KiB) Used (KiB) Available (KiB) %
felhom-pbs pbs active 0 0 0 0.00%
local dir active 40453376 5772488 32593772 14.27%
local-lvm lvmthin active 56487936 19663450 36824485 34.81%
--- guest 9201 disk:
Filesystem Size Used Avail Use% Mounted on
/dev/mapper/pve-vm--9201--disk--1 69G 10G 56G 16% /var/lib/felhom
/dev/mapper/pve-vm--9201--disk--1 69G 10G 56G 16% /mnt/sys_drive
+4
View File
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ the fault was real. Full observables: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/jour
| ID | What | State |
|---|---|---|
| **R-379** | **The pre-restore undo copy is taken, is valid, is named to the customer — and NOTHING IN THE PRODUCT CAN APPLY IT.** When an off-site DB replay fails, `reimportDBDumpsFrom` returns and the refusal names the safety dump by filename (`offbox_reconstitute.go:436-441`). That filename appears ONLY inside the error string: there is no button, no list entry, no route. `preRestoreDumpPrefix` ("pre-restore-") is deliberately SKIPPED at three sites so these files are never offered as a restore source — `internal/backup/restore_unit.go:125`, `internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:489`, `internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:539`. **PROVEN LIVE 2026-08-22 on `demo-hp`, both engines.** Postgres (`docmost`): after a truncated dump the live database held 43 tables and **0 rows** in `pages`, `users` and `spaces`, and the app crash-looped. The undo copy (141 363 B, 43 COPY blocks, 4 page rows, 1 user row, the accented title present) was applied BY HAND and restored the exact prior state. MariaDB (`bookstack`): same, `migrations` 0 -> 102 rows. **So the data is recoverable — by us, by hand, over a support conversation. The customer has a filename.** | **OPEN — HIGH** | — | Offer the undo copy as a restore source on the app's restore page when one exists, or state in the message that recovery needs support and how to ask. The skip at the three sites is correct for *normal* listing — the gap is that there is no deliberate second surface. **Do NOT widen the three skips**: they exist so a safety dump is never mistaken for the app's own backup (that confusion is R-361's neighbourhood). | CC |
| **R-380** | **A failed MariaDB replay leaves a PARTIALLY APPLIED database behind an app that reports HEALTHY — Postgres fails visibly, MariaDB does not.** `ImportDump` gives the Postgres branch `-v ON_ERROR_STOP=1`; the MariaDB branch is a plain `mariadb -u root -p<pw> <db>` with no equivalent (`internal/appbackup/dbdump.go:670-692`). Both DO surface the failure — H3's predicted 'quiet success' did NOT occur — but the STATE they leave differs, and that is the defect. **Measured 2026-08-22 on `demo-hp` with the same truncation on both engines.** Postgres: everything emptied, app crash-loops, `Restarting (1)` — visibly broken. MariaDB: the dump's DROP/CREATE/INSERT runs table by table, so tables it reached are rebuilt, tables it never reached keep their ORIGINAL data, and the table it died inside is left EMPTY. Result on `bookstack`: `entities` 1 (intact), `users` 2 (intact), **`migrations` 0 rows (wiped)** — the schema-version ledger — while `docker inspect` reported **`health=healthy running=true restarts=0`** and the app served HTTP. An empty `migrations` table means BookStack believes no migration has ever run; the next upgrade would re-run all 102 against an existing schema. **Nothing signals ongoing damage.** | **OPEN — HIGH** | — | Make a failed replay leave a KNOWN state rather than a partial one: wrap the MariaDB import so a failure is atomic, or re-apply the undo copy automatically on import failure (which needs R-379 first), or at minimum mark the app unhealthy so the dashboard stops saying it is fine. **The MariaDB client's default IS to abort on error — that was measured, not assumed — so this is not a missing flag; it is the absence of a transaction boundary.** | CC |
| **R-381** | **The restore-failure message pastes raw database-engine stderr — including the customer's own database rows — into a Hungarian customer-facing surface.** `ImportDump` truncates stderr to 300 chars and wraps it verbatim (`internal/appbackup/dbdump.go:700-706`); `offbox_reconstitute.go:436-441` wraps that again; the flash renders it in an `alert alert-error` block. **Measured verbatim 2026-08-22.** Postgres, **407 bytes**, of which ~250 are untranslated English psql output with a caret diagram and `exit status 3`. MariaDB, **615 bytes**, whose middle is an `INSERT INTO \`migrations\` VALUES (1,&#39;2014_10_12_000000_create_users_table&#39;,1),(2,...` listing — i.e. **actual table contents, HTML-escaped, shown to the customer**. On a real app that statement could be any row the dump died inside. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | Keep the engine text in the operator log where it belongs; give the customer the reason, the undo copy and the route. Same class as **R-79** (English on customer surfaces) and **R-257** (internal state names in customer copy), but a distinct producer and with a content-disclosure dimension neither has: this one can print rows. | CC |
| **R-382** | **The reconstitution's summary log line omits the volume count it already computed.** `offbox_reconstitute.go:452` logs `%d file(s) placed, %d DB dump(s) replayed, safety dump=%s, skewed=%v` — `res.VolumesReplayed` is set at line 412 and never printed. Measured 2026-08-22: `docmost` logged `0 file(s) placed, 1 DB dump(s) replayed` on a run that replayed **3** volumes including the entire 52 MB Postgres data directory; `bookstack` logged the same shape on a run that replayed 2 including a 161 MB one. The customer-facing flash DOES name the volumes („0 fájl és 1 adatkötet visszaállítva") — so the operator log is less informative than the customer message. This directly obstructed answering the 2026-08-22 drill's Q2 from the log and forced a planted discriminator instead. | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Add `%d volume(s) replayed` to the line. One format string. | CC |
| **R-229** | **The instruction-file rightsizing landed for `felhom-controller` and the workspace root; three pieces were deliberately deferred.** Done 2026-08-06: controller split into a 92-effective-line core plus four `paths:`-scoped `.claude/rules/*.md`; workspace root 208→142 effective lines with its versioned copy kept byte-identical; surgical corrections to `felhom-agent` and `felhom.eu` (expired TEMPORARY block, every version literal, the Legacy-Windows copies, the duplicated health-check rule); five contradictions resolved — including a drill-VM claim **measured live** (`qm list` on demo-hp shows VM 300 `drill-r50`; `felhom-agent` was right, `felhom-controller` was wrong); new shared `felhom.eu/scripts/instructions_gate.py` registered in `controller_gates.py` and `agent_gates.py`, 20 fixture tests + red-proof. **Leg (a) CLOSED 2026-08-06 (part 2):** `felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md` **227 → 115 effective lines**, split into a core plus `.claude/rules/{hub,website,manifests,docs}.md`; `instructions_gate` **registered in `scripts/repo_gates.py`** (six gates, all OK) in the required order — trim first, register second, because a registered-but-failing gate refuses every push. Scoping proven from the `InstructionsLoaded` hook log in two fresh sessions, not from frontmatter. **Still deferred:** (b) **CLOSED 2026-08-06 (close-out)** — `felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md` **175 → 99 effective lines** (measured 175, not 173: the CI correction added two), split into a core plus `.claude/rules/{proxmox,localapi,backup,storage}.md` beside the existing `health-checks.md`. The release section now points at the `felhom-build-deploy` skill instead of restating a table that drifts from the script. **Every `CLAUDE.md` in the workspace is now ≤120 effective lines except the workspace root at 142, which is deliberate — it is the only file re-injected after `/compact`.** (c) **CLOSED 2026-08-06 (part 2)** — all 44 orphans resolved with **zero deletions** (file count 158 before and after): 4 durable `reference`-type files indexed, 40 dated episode records moved to `.claude-memory/archive/`. `MEMORY.md` 145 → **150 lines / 17,977 bytes**, and `instructions_gate` check 6 now watches it (over-limit FAILS, orphan WARNS, absent store PASSES *printing its reason*). (d) **The spec-as-failing-test pilot** — moved to R-230. Full accounting: `audits/LEDGER-instruction-trim-2026-08-06.md` + `audits/LEDGER-instruction-trim-part2-2026-08-06.md` | **READY** — owner Viktor |
| **R-230** | **Three instruction/memory follow-ups deliberately left by the part-2 session (2026-08-06), each needing a decision rather than an implementation.** (a) **A ruling is owed on auto-written staleness.** The hand-written `CLAUDE.md` files are now clean of version literals and expired blocks — the gate enforces it — but `MEMORY.md`, which Claude writes and which is the LARGER half of what loads (8.4k tokens vs the root file's 6.6k), carries **21 lines with component version literals**, **5 with bare host addresses**, and an entry still reading *"demo boxes REMOTE till ~08-02"* — the same expired-TEMPORARY class the gate was built to kill, now surviving in the one file the gate's content rules do not cover. **Partly actioned 2026-08-06 (close-out), and the ruling is STILL OWED:** the **three statements that were actively false** were corrected — `R-193 decision open` (closed 2026-08-05), `demo boxes REMOTE till ~08-02` (the box answers on the home LAN), `OPEN R-25b` (shipped 2026-07-21) — and gate check 6 now **WARNs** on version literals, host addresses, expired statements and stale-open citations in the index. WARN, never FAIL: Claude writes that file between sessions, so a hard failure would refuse a human's push over a line no human typed, and the warning is read by the model that will next edit it. **The remaining 32 version literals and 4 host addresses were deliberately left** for that loop. What is still owed is the bulk-correction ruling. **Correcting the premise:** the earlier report's "three expired statements" were all FALSE POSITIVES — each matched an ISO date inside a markdown link target, i.e. a filename — while the one real expired claim carried no ISO date at all. (b) **CLOSED 2026-08-06 (close-out)** — the workspace-root `CLAUDE.md` **is now a relative symlink** to the versioned copy, so the divergence class is gone rather than policed. Check 5 learned two shapes: for a link it asserts the target resolves to a real file (**a dangling link is worse than a diverged copy — the instructions load NOTHING and there is no content left to notice is wrong**), for two files byte-identity as before, so a clone elsewhere is unaffected. **Proven, not assumed:** three fresh sessions logged `session_start` for the link path, and a fourth **with no tools at all** quoted standing rule 1 verbatim — the content reaches the model, not just the path. (c) **The spec-as-failing-test pilot**, approved in principle and not started (was R-229(d)). | **READY** — owner Viktor |
| **R-232** | **DooPlex's backup makes every copy inside the same box — and nothing tells anyone when it fails.** Surveyed read-only 2026-08-06 (`audits/RECON-dooplex-backup-2026-08-06.md`). **What works:** five sets, 14/14 successful runs in 14 days; a file was restored from the `data` repo and matched the live original **byte for byte**; every set except two is cross-disk; k3s is integrity-checked on every run. **What the matrix exposes, ranked:** (a) **`notify_failure` is a no-op** — `NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE=true` but `NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_URL` is commented out, so a failed backup notifies **nobody**; the project already has a working Resend path that CI uses. Cheapest item, and it makes every other failure visible. (b) **Nothing leaves the box** — no rclone, no remote repo, no off-site target anywhere; Longhorn's target is `nfs://192.168.0.180:` pointing at DooPlex itself, and the only outbound-looking cron pulls *inbound* from Hetzner for a different project. The machine that runs the hub managing the customers' off-site chain has no off-site copy of its own. (c) **The backup tree is a single writable path** and the restic repos are not append-only — one bad script or ransomware destroys every copy at once. (d) **Two same-disk sets**: `.claude-memory` and the PostgreSQL dumps, whose source directory sits *inside* the backup tree. (e) **Longhorn `retain=1`** — one generation per volume, so a corruption noticed a day late has no earlier copy. (f) **`/opt/backup/docs/BACKUP-RESTORE.md` does not exist** though the systemd unit advertises it. (g) **`secrets/restic-repo` has never held a snapshot** — `backup-secrets.sh` contains no `restic` call; the secrets are GPG files on `sda1` only. (h) **No restore has ever been run** beyond today's single-file probe — the matrix's "ever demonstrated?" column is otherwise entirely empty. **Not a finding:** the restic passphrase. The on-box copy is on `sdb1`, a different disk from the backups, and the **operator holds an offline copy out of band** — so a disk loss is recoverable. The narrow residual is that it is operator-held rather than system-held, unlike the customer case's hub-vaulted escrow, so it should be confirmed current and findable by someone else. **Nothing was changed by the recon.** | **READY** — owner Viktor |