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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
196 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
196 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
# Runbook — the hub database in a backup that is NOT on DooPlex (R-173, R-232) — IN FORCE since 2026-10-05
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> **Status: IN FORCE 2026-10-05** (option A, `09` decision 125). Steps 0–7 DONE, each marked below; §3 is a tested
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> procedure. Evidence: `audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/` (part A–D). The readings the plan rested on:
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> `audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partC/readings.txt`. **Corrections found while doing it are marked „Corrected".**
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## 1. What is true today (measured 2026-10-05)
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| Question | Answer |
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| Where the hub database lives | `/data/hub.db` (+ `-wal`, `-shm`) in the hub pod, PVC `hub-data` (Longhorn, **2 Gi since 2026-10-05**, was 1 Gi; replicas on DooPlex's `sdb1`). 357 MiB; a snapshot is 353 MiB. |
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| Is it in a backup? | **Yes, but only on DooPlex.** Longhorn's `backup-daily` (04:00) and `backup-weekly` (Sun 05:00), `retain=1`, write to `nfs://192.168.0.180:/mnt/5_hdd/backup/longhorn-pvc` — DooPlex's own `sda1`. Last: 2026-10-05 02:06 UTC, Completed. |
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| Why R-173 said "excluded" | The PVC carries `recurring-job-group.longhorn.io/default: disabled` (git, `manifests/hub.yaml`, commit `868e8465` of 2026-02-16, no reason given). The live Longhorn **Volume** carries `enabled` — set by hand at some point, so the backups run. **This is drift:** the PVC label is the source of truth (Longhorn syncs PVC → Volume), so the backups can stop at any sync without anyone seeing it. **Corrected 2026-10-05:** the Volume kept `enabled` through every sync since February while the PVC said `disabled` — Longhorn did NOT copy the PVC label down. The PVC now says `enabled` too (Step 1), so the two agree; which one Longhorn reads was not measured. |
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| What DooPlex's own backup covers | `dooplex-backup.timer` (03:19): k3s state, k8s Secrets (GPG files), Gitea mirrors, user data, PostgreSQL dumps — **all onto `sda1`, the same machine.** Nothing leaves DooPlex (`audits/RECON-dooplex-backup-2026-08-06.md`, R-232). |
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| What tells anyone a backup failed | **Nothing.** `NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_URL` is commented out, so `notify_failure` is a no-op. No Prometheus rule watches a Longhorn backup's success or age, nor `dooplex-backup.service`. |
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| What the database holds | Box→hub API keys, customer configs (incl. the owner passphrase), escrow custody blobs (opaque), the PBS-DR token values, the off-site sub-account passwords and — since hub v0.135.0 — the console passwords **sealed** under `OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY`. |
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| What a copy is worth without the key | The sealed columns (console passwords, off-site passwords) are useless without `OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY`. **The key lives only in `Secret/offsite-secret-key` on DooPlex** (and in the GPG secrets export on the same disk). A backup off DooPlex without a key off DooPlex restores a hub that cannot open any console password. |
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## 2. The plan (option A — my pick): a nightly, encrypted, consistent copy on ep0's PBS
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ep0 is already off-site (Hetzner), already runs PBS, and DooPlex already reaches it through `felhom-ep0-pbs-tunnel`
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(127.0.0.1:18007). ep0's datastore is also pulled back to DooPlex nightly (`ep0-copy`), so the copy exists in two places,
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one of them off DooPlex. The copy is encrypted on DooPlex with a key ep0 never sees.
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### Step 0 — the keys go off DooPlex first (operator, at the keyboard, 5 min) — DONE 2026-10-05 (operator: both saved)
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Without these, every later step backs up something nobody can open after a DooPlex loss.
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```bash
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# 1. the hub's seal key → the operator's password manager (never a file, never a chat)
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sudo kubectl -n felhom-system get secret offsite-secret-key -o jsonpath='{.data.OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY}' | base64 -d; echo
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# 2. (after Step 2) the backup encryption key's paper copy → the password manager
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sudo proxmox-backup-client key paperkey /etc/felhom-hub-backup/enc.key --output-format text
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```
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**The `data` field of that output is enough** (the key has no passphrase, `kdf: null`): a key file rebuilt from it alone —
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`{"kdf": null, "created": "<any RFC 3339 time>", "modified": "<same>", "data": "<saved value>"}` — restored and
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decrypted the copy on 2026-10-05 (`audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/partD/token-limits-and-paperkey.txt`). Note:
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`proxmox-backup-client key show` prints a fingerprint only when the file stores one, so it cannot check a rebuilt key —
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a restore can.
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### Step 1 — end the label drift (CC, a felhom.eu commit + ArgoCD sync; reversible) — DONE 2026-10-05
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`manifests/hub.yaml`: `recurring-job-group.longhorn.io/default: disabled` → `enabled`. Sync. Check:
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`sudo kubectl -n felhom-system get pvc hub-data -o jsonpath='{.metadata.labels}'` and the Volume label both read `enabled`.
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This keeps today's on-DooPlex copy alive; it is not the off-site copy.
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Done with the volume growth to 2 Gi (two snapshots of 353 MiB do not fit in 1 Gi). **The online growth failed** — Longhorn's
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`instance-manager` (116 days up) called a host PID that no longer existed (`nsenter: cannot open /host/proc/196610/ns/mnt`);
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an offline growth was impossible too (the expansion holds its own attachment ticket). The operator approved restarting
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the instance-manager: all 77 DooPlex volumes back `attached/healthy` in 110 s, the volume grew, and one app (zipline, on
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`:latest`) came back on a newer release that refused its database — pinned to 4.7.0 (homelab-manifests). Evidence:
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`audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/partA/step1-*.txt`.
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### Step 2 — a write-only place on ep0 (on ep0, root; the operator's go for an ep0 change) — DONE 2026-10-05
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What was run (PBS 4.2.8 on ep0; the proposal's commands were wrong in three places, corrected here):
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```bash
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proxmox-backup-manager user create dooplex-hub@pbs --comment "..." # no password: cannot log in
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proxmox-backup-debug api create /admin/datastore/felhom-offsite/namespace --name operator
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# (the CLI crashes AFTER creating it, printing the result — 'not implemented'; check it exists, don't re-run)
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# two tokens, each secret file → file into a root 0600 file on DooPlex, never printed:
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ssh root@<ep0> "proxmox-backup-debug api create /access/users/dooplex-hub@pbs/token/push --output-format json" \
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| python3 -c '<print json["value"]>' | sudo sh -c 'umask 077; cat > /etc/felhom-hub-backup/token-push'
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# (same for token/restore → token-restore; `user generate-token` has no --output-format)
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P=/datastore/felhom-offsite/operator
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proxmox-backup-manager acl update $P DatastoreBackup --auth-id dooplex-hub@pbs # a token's rights are cut
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proxmox-backup-manager acl update $P DatastoreReader --auth-id dooplex-hub@pbs # down by its user's rights
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proxmox-backup-manager acl update $P DatastoreBackup --auth-id 'dooplex-hub@pbs!push'
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proxmox-backup-manager acl update $P DatastoreReader --auth-id 'dooplex-hub@pbs!restore'
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proxmox-backup-manager prune-job create prune-operator-hubdb --store felhom-offsite --ns operator --max-depth 0 \
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--schedule '03:45' --keep-daily 14 --keep-weekly 8 # 'daily 03:45' is not a PBS calendar event
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```
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Measured (`partB/`, `partD/token-limits-and-paperkey.txt`): neither token can forget a snapshot or list the datastore
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root (the households); the restore token cannot write. **Corrected: the push token CAN restore its own copies** — PBS
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lets a backup's owner read it back (`DatastoreBackup` = `Datastore.Backup`, owner-scoped). It reaches only `operator`,
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and everything it can read is encrypted with a key ep0 never sees. The households' two prune jobs and the Sunday GC
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are unchanged (before/after in `partB/`).
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### Step 3 — a consistent snapshot of the live database (CC, a hub release) — DONE, hub v0.136.0 (`05` §16.3)
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`hub.db` is in WAL mode and is written every few seconds; copying the three files is not one point in time. The hub
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gets a nightly `VACUUM INTO '/data/snapshots/hub-<UTC date>.db'` (keeps 2, logs size and duration) — one SQLite
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statement, consistent by construction, WAL-aware. No `sqlite3` exists in the hub image, so the copy is made by the hub
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itself. **Corrected:** one snapshot took 44 s on the live volume (0.63 s on a local scratch copy), 353 MiB.
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### Step 4 — the push (on DooPlex, root; `felhom-hub-db-backup.service` + `.timer` 02:30) — DONE 2026-10-05
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**The real script is `scripts/hub-db-backup/felhom-hub-db-backup`** (versioned, R-231; installed by `install.sh`;
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15 tests in `test_hub_db_backup.py`, run by hand — not in CI). It adds to the sketch below: it refuses a snapshot older
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than 26 h (the hub stopped snapshotting), a copy whose size differs from the pod's file, and a copy with no hosts; it
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encrypts with `--crypt-mode encrypt`. The sketch, as proposed:
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```bash
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#!/bin/sh -eu
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# /usr/local/sbin/felhom-hub-db-backup — push the newest hub snapshot to ep0 (R-173). Root, 0755.
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STAGE=/var/lib/felhom-hub-backup/stage; mkdir -p "$STAGE"; chmod 700 "$STAGE"
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SNAP=$(kubectl -n felhom-system exec deploy/hub -- sh -c 'ls -1t /data/snapshots/hub-*.db | head -1')
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kubectl -n felhom-system exec deploy/hub -- cat "$SNAP" > "$STAGE/hub.db"
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sqlite3 -readonly "$STAGE/hub.db" 'PRAGMA integrity_check' | grep -qx ok # never push a broken copy
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export PBS_PASSWORD_FILE=/etc/felhom-hub-backup/token PBS_FINGERPRINT=<ep0 cert fingerprint, as in ep0-datastore-copy.md>
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proxmox-backup-client backup hubdb.pxar:"$STAGE" --ns operator --backup-id dooplex-hub \
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--keyfile /etc/felhom-hub-backup/enc.key --repository 'dooplex-hub@pbs!push@127.0.0.1:18007:felhom-offsite'
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shred -u "$STAGE/hub.db"
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# the positive signal the alarm reads (written ONLY on success):
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echo "felhom_hub_db_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds $(date +%s)" > /var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector/felhom_hub_db.prom.$$ \
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&& mv /var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector/felhom_hub_db.prom.$$ /var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector/felhom_hub_db.prom
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```
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### Step 5 — the restore test (weekly, Sun 04:30, same unit family) — DONE 2026-10-05
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**The real script is `scripts/hub-db-backup/felhom-hub-db-restore-test`**, with the READ-ONLY token. It also refuses a
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newest copy older than 50 h. The sketch, as proposed:
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```bash
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T=$(mktemp -d); chmod 700 "$T"
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proxmox-backup-client restore "host/dooplex-hub/$(newest snapshot)" hubdb.pxar "$T" --ns operator \
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--keyfile /etc/felhom-hub-backup/enc.key --repository 'dooplex-hub@pbs!push@127.0.0.1:18007:felhom-offsite'
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sqlite3 -readonly "$T/hub.db" 'PRAGMA integrity_check' | grep -qx ok
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test "$(sqlite3 -readonly "$T/hub.db" 'SELECT COUNT(*) FROM hosts')" -gt 0
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test "$(sqlite3 -readonly "$T/hub.db" "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM host_recovery WHERE secret NOT LIKE 'enc:v1:%'")" -eq 0
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shred -u "$T/hub.db"*; rmdir "$T"
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echo "felhom_hub_db_restore_test_last_success_timestamp_seconds $(date +%s)" > …/felhom_hub_db_restore.prom # same tmp+mv
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```
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Done with a second, read-only token (`token-restore`).
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### Step 6 — the alarm (homelab-manifests `prometheus-rules`, then `POST /-/reload` — the Prometheus there has no reloader) — DONE 2026-10-05
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In the `backup-freshness` group; `promtool test rules` proves it (`partC/bf_test.yml`, two red-proofs). The Prometheus
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Deployment is OutOfSync in ArgoCD for a reason unrelated to this; only the rules ConfigMap was synced.
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```yaml
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- alert: HubDBBackupStale
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expr: time() - felhom_hub_db_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds > 26*3600 or absent(felhom_hub_db_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds)
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for: 30m
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labels: {severity: critical}
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annotations: {summary: "The hub database has not reached ep0 for 26 h (R-173)"}
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- alert: HubDBRestoreTestStale
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expr: time() - felhom_hub_db_restore_test_last_success_timestamp_seconds > 8*24*3600 or absent(felhom_hub_db_restore_test_last_success_timestamp_seconds)
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for: 1h
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labels: {severity: warning}
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```
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Both reach the existing `email-notifications` receiver. `absent()` makes "the script never ran" an alarm too — an empty
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log is not a success.
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### Step 7 — prove it once (CC, with the operator's go) — DONE 2026-10-05 (`partD/`)
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Run the unit by hand; read the snapshot on ep0 (`proxmox-backup-client snapshot list --ns operator`); run the restore
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test by hand; stop the timer for a day on purpose and see `HubDBBackupStale` mail arrive (positive observable), then
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start it again.
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## 3. Bringing the hub back from this copy (the procedure the plan exists for) — TESTED 2026-10-05
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Steps 1–3 were run on 2026-10-05 against the real copy on ep0 (`audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/partD/restore-procedure/drill.txt`):
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4 hosts, **4 of 4 console passwords opened with the saved seal key, 0 of 4 with a random key**. Steps 4–5 (into a live
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PVC) were NOT run — that needs the hub down; they are the ordinary scale-copy-scale.
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What you need, all from the password manager: the seal key (`OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY`), the backup key's `data` field, and
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the read-only token (or ep0 root to mint a new one: Step 2).
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1. **The backup key file.** On the machine doing the restore, as root, `umask 077`, write
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`{"kdf": null, "created": "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00", "modified": "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00", "data": "<data>"}`
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to `enc.key` (Step 0 note). A copy of DooPlex's `/etc/felhom-hub-backup/enc.key` works as is.
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2. **Restore the newest copy** (from any machine that reaches ep0's PBS on 8007 — DooPlex uses the tunnel 127.0.0.1:18007):
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```bash
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export PBS_PASSWORD_FILE=<token-restore file> PBS_FINGERPRINT=<ep0 cert fingerprint, /etc/felhom-hub-backup/env>
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R='dooplex-hub@pbs!restore@<ep0>:8007:felhom-offsite'
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proxmox-backup-client snapshot list host/dooplex-hub --ns operator --repository "$R" # pick the newest
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proxmox-backup-client restore host/dooplex-hub/<time> hubdb.pxar ./out --ns operator --keyfile enc.key --repository "$R"
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sqlite3 -readonly out/hub.db 'PRAGMA integrity_check' # must print: ok
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```
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If DooPlex's `ep0-copy` datastore survived, the same copy is there too (pulled nightly).
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3. **Prove the seal key matches BEFORE putting the copy in place** — on a COPY of `out/hub.db` (the check migrates it):
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```bash
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cd felhom.eu/hub && go build -o hubdb-check ./cmd/hubdb-check
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printf '%s' "<OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY>" > k; chmod 600 k # from the password manager — not on a command line in a shared shell
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./hubdb-check copy-of-hub.db k # want: hosts=N console_passwords_opened=N failed=0; exit 0
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```
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`failed>0` means the wrong seal key: the hub would start but could open no console password (`05` §16.2).
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4. **A k3s with the `felhom` ArgoCD app**, and `Secret/offsite-secret-key` recreated with the SAME value:
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`kubectl -n felhom-system create secret generic offsite-secret-key --from-file=OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY=k`.
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5. **Into the PVC:** scale `deploy/hub` to 0; put `out/hub.db` into the volume as `/data/hub.db` (a helper pod mounting
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`hub-data`; delete any `hub.db-wal`/`-shm` there — the snapshot is a whole database); scale to 1. The start-up log
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line `console passwords sealed at rest (0 legacy plaintext row(s) sealed now)` and one reveal on a host page confirm it.
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6. Shred `k`, `enc.key` copies and `out/` when done.
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## 4. Option B (not my pick): restic to a dedicated Hetzner Storage Box sub-account
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Same Steps 0, 1, 3, 5, 6; the push is `restic backup` to a new sub-account with the R-820 append-only key pin. Costs a
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new sub-account and its own key custody; the Storage Box sub-account shell can `rm` (memory: storagebox-subaccount-shell)
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unless the pin is right. ep0 already has the server-side prune and the return copy, so A is less new machinery.
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