# Runbook — the hub database in a backup that is NOT on DooPlex (R-173, R-232) — IN FORCE since 2026-10-05 > **Status: IN FORCE 2026-10-05** (option A, `09` decision 125). Steps 0–7 DONE, each marked below; §3 is a tested > procedure. Evidence: `audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/` (part A–D). The readings the plan rested on: > `audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partC/readings.txt`. **Corrections found while doing it are marked „Corrected".** ## 1. What is true today (measured 2026-10-05) | Question | Answer | |---|---| | Where the hub database lives | `/data/hub.db` (+ `-wal`, `-shm`) in the hub pod, PVC `hub-data` (Longhorn, **2 Gi since 2026-10-05**, was 1 Gi; replicas on DooPlex's `sdb1`). 357 MiB; a snapshot is 353 MiB. | | Is it in a backup? | **Yes, but only on DooPlex.** Longhorn's `backup-daily` (04:00) and `backup-weekly` (Sun 05:00), `retain=1`, write to `nfs://192.168.0.180:/mnt/5_hdd/backup/longhorn-pvc` — DooPlex's own `sda1`. Last: 2026-10-05 02:06 UTC, Completed. | | Why R-173 said "excluded" | The PVC carries `recurring-job-group.longhorn.io/default: disabled` (git, `manifests/hub.yaml`, commit `868e8465` of 2026-02-16, no reason given). The live Longhorn **Volume** carries `enabled` — set by hand at some point, so the backups run. **This is drift:** the PVC label is the source of truth (Longhorn syncs PVC → Volume), so the backups can stop at any sync without anyone seeing it. **Corrected 2026-10-05:** the Volume kept `enabled` through every sync since February while the PVC said `disabled` — Longhorn did NOT copy the PVC label down. The PVC now says `enabled` too (Step 1), so the two agree; which one Longhorn reads was not measured. | | What DooPlex's own backup covers | `dooplex-backup.timer` (03:19): k3s state, k8s Secrets (GPG files), Gitea mirrors, user data, PostgreSQL dumps — **all onto `sda1`, the same machine.** Nothing leaves DooPlex (`audits/RECON-dooplex-backup-2026-08-06.md`, R-232). | | What tells anyone a backup failed | **Nothing.** `NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_URL` is commented out, so `notify_failure` is a no-op. No Prometheus rule watches a Longhorn backup's success or age, nor `dooplex-backup.service`. | | What the database holds | Box→hub API keys, customer configs (incl. the owner passphrase), escrow custody blobs (opaque), the PBS-DR token values, the off-site sub-account passwords and — since hub v0.135.0 — the console passwords **sealed** under `OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY`. | | What a copy is worth without the key | The sealed columns (console passwords, off-site passwords) are useless without `OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY`. **The key lives only in `Secret/offsite-secret-key` on DooPlex** (and in the GPG secrets export on the same disk). A backup off DooPlex without a key off DooPlex restores a hub that cannot open any console password. | ## 2. The plan (option A — my pick): a nightly, encrypted, consistent copy on ep0's PBS ep0 is already off-site (Hetzner), already runs PBS, and DooPlex already reaches it through `felhom-ep0-pbs-tunnel` (127.0.0.1:18007). ep0's datastore is also pulled back to DooPlex nightly (`ep0-copy`), so the copy exists in two places, one of them off DooPlex. The copy is encrypted on DooPlex with a key ep0 never sees. ### Step 0 — the keys go off DooPlex first (operator, at the keyboard, 5 min) — DONE 2026-10-05 (operator: both saved) Without these, every later step backs up something nobody can open after a DooPlex loss. ```bash # 1. the hub's seal key → the operator's password manager (never a file, never a chat) sudo kubectl -n felhom-system get secret offsite-secret-key -o jsonpath='{.data.OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY}' | base64 -d; echo # 2. (after Step 2) the backup encryption key's paper copy → the password manager sudo proxmox-backup-client key paperkey /etc/felhom-hub-backup/enc.key --output-format text ``` **The `data` field of that output is enough** (the key has no passphrase, `kdf: null`): a key file rebuilt from it alone — `{"kdf": null, "created": "", "modified": "", "data": ""}` — restored and decrypted the copy on 2026-10-05 (`audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/partD/token-limits-and-paperkey.txt`). Note: `proxmox-backup-client key show` prints a fingerprint only when the file stores one, so it cannot check a rebuilt key — a restore can. ### Step 1 — end the label drift (CC, a felhom.eu commit + ArgoCD sync; reversible) — DONE 2026-10-05 `manifests/hub.yaml`: `recurring-job-group.longhorn.io/default: disabled` → `enabled`. Sync. Check: `sudo kubectl -n felhom-system get pvc hub-data -o jsonpath='{.metadata.labels}'` and the Volume label both read `enabled`. This keeps today's on-DooPlex copy alive; it is not the off-site copy. Done with the volume growth to 2 Gi (two snapshots of 353 MiB do not fit in 1 Gi). **The online growth failed** — Longhorn's `instance-manager` (116 days up) called a host PID that no longer existed (`nsenter: cannot open /host/proc/196610/ns/mnt`); an offline growth was impossible too (the expansion holds its own attachment ticket). The operator approved restarting the instance-manager: all 77 DooPlex volumes back `attached/healthy` in 110 s, the volume grew, and one app (zipline, on `:latest`) came back on a newer release that refused its database — pinned to 4.7.0 (homelab-manifests). Evidence: `audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/partA/step1-*.txt`. ### Step 2 — a write-only place on ep0 (on ep0, root; the operator's go for an ep0 change) — DONE 2026-10-05 What was run (PBS 4.2.8 on ep0; the proposal's commands were wrong in three places, corrected here): ```bash proxmox-backup-manager user create dooplex-hub@pbs --comment "..." # no password: cannot log in proxmox-backup-debug api create /admin/datastore/felhom-offsite/namespace --name operator # (the CLI crashes AFTER creating it, printing the result — 'not implemented'; check it exists, don't re-run) # two tokens, each secret file → file into a root 0600 file on DooPlex, never printed: ssh root@ "proxmox-backup-debug api create /access/users/dooplex-hub@pbs/token/push --output-format json" \ | python3 -c '' | sudo sh -c 'umask 077; cat > /etc/felhom-hub-backup/token-push' # (same for token/restore → token-restore; `user generate-token` has no --output-format) P=/datastore/felhom-offsite/operator proxmox-backup-manager acl update $P DatastoreBackup --auth-id dooplex-hub@pbs # a token's rights are cut proxmox-backup-manager acl update $P DatastoreReader --auth-id dooplex-hub@pbs # down by its user's rights proxmox-backup-manager acl update $P DatastoreBackup --auth-id 'dooplex-hub@pbs!push' proxmox-backup-manager acl update $P DatastoreReader --auth-id 'dooplex-hub@pbs!restore' proxmox-backup-manager prune-job create prune-operator-hubdb --store felhom-offsite --ns operator --max-depth 0 \ --schedule '03:45' --keep-daily 14 --keep-weekly 8 # 'daily 03:45' is not a PBS calendar event ``` Measured (`partB/`, `partD/token-limits-and-paperkey.txt`): neither token can forget a snapshot or list the datastore root (the households); the restore token cannot write. **Corrected: the push token CAN restore its own copies** — PBS lets a backup's owner read it back (`DatastoreBackup` = `Datastore.Backup`, owner-scoped). It reaches only `operator`, and everything it can read is encrypted with a key ep0 never sees. The households' two prune jobs and the Sunday GC are unchanged (before/after in `partB/`). ### Step 3 — a consistent snapshot of the live database (CC, a hub release) — DONE, hub v0.136.0 (`05` §16.3) `hub.db` is in WAL mode and is written every few seconds; copying the three files is not one point in time. The hub gets a nightly `VACUUM INTO '/data/snapshots/hub-.db'` (keeps 2, logs size and duration) — one SQLite statement, consistent by construction, WAL-aware. No `sqlite3` exists in the hub image, so the copy is made by the hub itself. **Corrected:** one snapshot took 44 s on the live volume (0.63 s on a local scratch copy), 353 MiB. ### Step 4 — the push (on DooPlex, root; `felhom-hub-db-backup.service` + `.timer` 02:30) — DONE 2026-10-05 **The real script is `scripts/hub-db-backup/felhom-hub-db-backup`** (versioned, R-231; installed by `install.sh`; 15 tests in `test_hub_db_backup.py`, run by hand — not in CI). It adds to the sketch below: it refuses a snapshot older than 26 h (the hub stopped snapshotting), a copy whose size differs from the pod's file, and a copy with no hosts; it encrypts with `--crypt-mode encrypt`. The sketch, as proposed: ```bash #!/bin/sh -eu # /usr/local/sbin/felhom-hub-db-backup — push the newest hub snapshot to ep0 (R-173). Root, 0755. STAGE=/var/lib/felhom-hub-backup/stage; mkdir -p "$STAGE"; chmod 700 "$STAGE" SNAP=$(kubectl -n felhom-system exec deploy/hub -- sh -c 'ls -1t /data/snapshots/hub-*.db | head -1') kubectl -n felhom-system exec deploy/hub -- cat "$SNAP" > "$STAGE/hub.db" sqlite3 -readonly "$STAGE/hub.db" 'PRAGMA integrity_check' | grep -qx ok # never push a broken copy export PBS_PASSWORD_FILE=/etc/felhom-hub-backup/token PBS_FINGERPRINT= proxmox-backup-client backup hubdb.pxar:"$STAGE" --ns operator --backup-id dooplex-hub \ --keyfile /etc/felhom-hub-backup/enc.key --repository 'dooplex-hub@pbs!push@127.0.0.1:18007:felhom-offsite' shred -u "$STAGE/hub.db" # the positive signal the alarm reads (written ONLY on success): echo "felhom_hub_db_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds $(date +%s)" > /var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector/felhom_hub_db.prom.$$ \ && mv /var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector/felhom_hub_db.prom.$$ /var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector/felhom_hub_db.prom ``` ### Step 5 — the restore test (weekly, Sun 04:30, same unit family) — DONE 2026-10-05 **The real script is `scripts/hub-db-backup/felhom-hub-db-restore-test`**, with the READ-ONLY token. It also refuses a newest copy older than 50 h. The sketch, as proposed: ```bash T=$(mktemp -d); chmod 700 "$T" proxmox-backup-client restore "host/dooplex-hub/$(newest snapshot)" hubdb.pxar "$T" --ns operator \ --keyfile /etc/felhom-hub-backup/enc.key --repository 'dooplex-hub@pbs!push@127.0.0.1:18007:felhom-offsite' sqlite3 -readonly "$T/hub.db" 'PRAGMA integrity_check' | grep -qx ok test "$(sqlite3 -readonly "$T/hub.db" 'SELECT COUNT(*) FROM hosts')" -gt 0 test "$(sqlite3 -readonly "$T/hub.db" "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM host_recovery WHERE secret NOT LIKE 'enc:v1:%'")" -eq 0 shred -u "$T/hub.db"*; rmdir "$T" echo "felhom_hub_db_restore_test_last_success_timestamp_seconds $(date +%s)" > …/felhom_hub_db_restore.prom # same tmp+mv ``` Done with a second, read-only token (`token-restore`). ### Step 6 — the alarm (homelab-manifests `prometheus-rules`, then `POST /-/reload` — the Prometheus there has no reloader) — DONE 2026-10-05 In the `backup-freshness` group; `promtool test rules` proves it (`partC/bf_test.yml`, two red-proofs). The Prometheus Deployment is OutOfSync in ArgoCD for a reason unrelated to this; only the rules ConfigMap was synced. ```yaml - alert: HubDBBackupStale expr: time() - felhom_hub_db_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds > 26*3600 or absent(felhom_hub_db_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds) for: 30m labels: {severity: critical} annotations: {summary: "The hub database has not reached ep0 for 26 h (R-173)"} - alert: HubDBRestoreTestStale expr: time() - felhom_hub_db_restore_test_last_success_timestamp_seconds > 8*24*3600 or absent(felhom_hub_db_restore_test_last_success_timestamp_seconds) for: 1h labels: {severity: warning} ``` Both reach the existing `email-notifications` receiver. `absent()` makes "the script never ran" an alarm too — an empty log is not a success. ### Step 7 — prove it once (CC, with the operator's go) — DONE 2026-10-05 (`partD/`) Run the unit by hand; read the snapshot on ep0 (`proxmox-backup-client snapshot list --ns operator`); run the restore test by hand; stop the timer for a day on purpose and see `HubDBBackupStale` mail arrive (positive observable), then start it again. ## 3. Bringing the hub back from this copy (the procedure the plan exists for) — TESTED 2026-10-05 Steps 1–3 were run on 2026-10-05 against the real copy on ep0 (`audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/partD/restore-procedure/drill.txt`): 4 hosts, **4 of 4 console passwords opened with the saved seal key, 0 of 4 with a random key**. Steps 4–5 (into a live PVC) were NOT run — that needs the hub down; they are the ordinary scale-copy-scale. What you need, all from the password manager: the seal key (`OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY`), the backup key's `data` field, and the read-only token (or ep0 root to mint a new one: Step 2). 1. **The backup key file.** On the machine doing the restore, as root, `umask 077`, write `{"kdf": null, "created": "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00", "modified": "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00", "data": ""}` to `enc.key` (Step 0 note). A copy of DooPlex's `/etc/felhom-hub-backup/enc.key` works as is. 2. **Restore the newest copy** (from any machine that reaches ep0's PBS on 8007 — DooPlex uses the tunnel 127.0.0.1:18007): ```bash export PBS_PASSWORD_FILE= PBS_FINGERPRINT= R='dooplex-hub@pbs!restore@:8007:felhom-offsite' proxmox-backup-client snapshot list host/dooplex-hub --ns operator --repository "$R" # pick the newest proxmox-backup-client restore host/dooplex-hub/