felhom.eu/REPORT.md

# REPORT — hub v0.93.0: the retention keeps the key it was built to keep (R-198) + the honesty pass (R-197, R-192, R-196)

**Date:** 2026-08-04 · **Class:** implementation. One additive schema change, no destructive operation.
**Deployed:** `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub:0.93.0`, ArgoCD **Synced**, rollout complete, schema
change **confirmed applied on the live database**.

> Supersedes the earlier 2026-08-04 report (the RECON session), per the overwrite convention. Nothing
> durable from it lived only here — it is in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md`,
> `OPEN-ITEMS.md` R-198…R-202 and the capability map.

---

## 1. Confirmed baselines, and the three landmarks

| Repo | on arrival | end state |
|---|---|---|
| `felhom.eu` | `3f2b7bc02386`, clean, == `origin/main`, hub v0.92.0 | `40687b0`, hub **v0.93.0** deployed |
| `felhom-controller` | `0887fd676d60`, clean | **untouched** — Part 5 hit its gate (§7) |

**§3's three landmarks, re-confirmed in the real source before editing — none had drifted:**

1. `host_escrow_superseded` (`store.go:377`) had `blob` and **no** `identity_blob`.
2. `identity_blob` was added to `host_escrow` by a **later** `ALTER TABLE` (`store.go:414`).
3. `demoteCurrentEscrowTx` (`store.go:2547`) selected six columns and not that one.

**Highest register ID on arrival: R-201.** Grepped `OPEN-ITEMS.md`, `ROADMAP.md`, `STATUS.md`,
`CONTEXT.md` before minting. One new item: **R-202**.

## 2. §8.1's two facts — both LOOKED AT on the live database, not deduced

Read from a `hub.db` + `-wal` + `-shm` snapshot taken after the deploy (`PRAGMA integrity_check` →
`ok`; freshness proven positively: `MAX(host_reports.received_at)` = `2026-08-04 10:45:39` vs
`datetime('now')` = `10:58:59`).

**(a) Nothing is backfillable, and here is the looking:**

| id | host_id | `identity_blob IS NOT NULL` | superseded_at |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | `demo-hp-bb76ea` | **0** | `2026-08-04 07:15:36` |
| 4 | `demo-felhom-8363b5` | **0** | `2026-08-04 07:20:08` |

Both retained rows are empty of it, and their source rows were overwritten at those same timestamps —
`host_escrow` now holds the *new* generation. **No path preserved them.** (The prompt asked me to check
whether some path had, because that would have been a better answer than expected. It had not.)

**(b) Who the fix protects, i.e. whose NEXT ceremony now retains a recoverable off-site key:**

| host_id | identity blob present | bytes |
|---|---|---|
| `demo-felhom-8363b5` | yes | 572 |
| `demo-hp-bb76ea` | yes | 572 |

**2 of 2 hosts with a current escrow.** Both were one ceremony away from losing their repository
password again.

**Schema change confirmed applied live** — `PRAGMA table_info(host_escrow_superseded)` on the running
pod's database returns `identity_blob BLOB` as column 8. It runs at startup, so this is the check that
the startup actually did it rather than the code merely containing it.

## 3. Files modified, and the commits

**Commit `91cabdd`** — code + docs:

| File | Change |
|---|---|
| `hub/internal/store/store.go` | `identity_blob` on `host_escrow_superseded` (CREATE + additive `ALTER`); carried in `demoteCurrentEscrowTx`; `ListSupersededEscrow` reads it; `HostEscrow.IdentityBlob`; new `CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity`; `SaveHostEscrow` returns the replaced hash; the table comment rewritten to describe what the code now does **and** to record that it once did not; three R-196 comment corrections |
| `hub/internal/api/handler.go` | `maybeEmitRepoKeyChanged` + `eventRepoKeyChanged`; wired into the superseded branch of the escrow PUT; one R-196 comment correction |
| `hub/internal/monitor/offsite_delivery.go` | `deliveryShape` (burned/regressed); two-shape message; `offsite_reports_since_consume` in the details; `recordHealRefusal`; refusal branches split so each names its reason |
| `hub/internal/notify/dispatcher.go` | `offsite_repo_key_changed`, `offsite_delivery_stuck`, `offsite_credential_restaged` → `operatorOnlyEvents` |
| `hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go` | one R-196 comment correction |
| new: `store/escrow_identity_retention_test.go`, `api/escrow_repo_key_changed_test.go`, `monitor/offsite_delivery_honesty_test.go` | Scenarios A–G |
| 11 existing `_test.go` files | mechanical: `SaveHostEscrow` now returns three values |
| `hub/CHANGELOG.md`, `CONTEXT.md` (S-28), `REUSE.md`, `STATUS.md`, `00-capability-map.md`, `03-host-agent.md`, `OPEN-ITEMS.md`, `ROADMAP.md` | docs |

**Commit `40687b0`** — `manifests/hub.yaml` `0.92.0` → `0.93.0`.

## 4. Tests, and every red-proof outcome

Green gate after each phase: `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` in `hub/` — **rc=0**,
full suite, run separately from every commit (never combined).

| Group | Scenario | Result | Red-proof — mutation → outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | re-escrow retains both keys | PASS | drop `identity_blob` from the shared copy routine (**= production ≤ v0.92.0**) → **FAIL**: *"the retained row carries NO identity blob — the off-site repository password was destroyed by the ceremony that was supposed to preserve it"* |
| B | host delete demotes both | PASS | same mutation → **FAIL**. **Plus the §8.2 mutation**: fix only the re-escrow caller (patch the retained row in `SaveHostEscrow` instead of the shared routine) → **A passes, B FAILS** — the "fixed one caller" mistake, demonstrated |
| C | legacy host with no identity blob supersedes cleanly | PASS | — (a nullable-column check; no guard to remove) |
| D | changed key raises one signal, host named, no hash values | PASS | remove the comparison from the escrow PUT → **FAIL**: *"the repository key demonstrably changed and NO signal was raised"*, while E still passes |
| E | unchanged key is silent | PASS | — |
| F | message states the measured state | PASS | restore the single hardcoded sentence → **both message tests FAIL** |
| G | heal refusal leaves a durable record | PASS | replace the regressed branch with a bare `return` (**= production ≤ v0.92.0**) → **FAIL**, and its cadence test with it |
| — | `IsOperatorOnly` for all three event types | PASS | — |
| — | `CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity` census | PASS | — |

**A mutation that did not remove every guard, recorded because rule §9.12 requires it.** My first
Scenario-F mutation kept the `switch`'s `default` branch, so the *regressed* test passed for the wrong
reason and only the *burned* one failed. That is not a red-proof. The mutation that does fail both is
deleting the shape switch entirely and emitting the one v0.92.0 sentence — done, observed, recorded.

**Both callers proven separately** (§8.2): `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsIdentityBlob` (re-escrow) and
`TestDeleteHost_DemotesIdentityBlob` (host delete). The pre-existing
`TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded` stayed **green throughout the two months the bug existed**,
because it asserts the mechanism (a retained row exists, carrying the old K-blob). The new tests assert
the consequence (the retained row can still yield a repository password) — `CLAUDE.md`'s rule, applied
to the case that earned it.

**Every `-run` filter was verified to have matched** (`-v`, `=== RUN` lines counted) before any result
was read as a proof.

## 5. The exact operator message text, quoted for review

**R-197 — `offsite_repo_key_changed`** (warning, operator-only, edge-triggered once per supersession):

> Offsite repository key CHANGED for host `<host_id>`: the new escrow seals a different repository
> password than the one it replaced. The previous off-site history is no longer opened by this box's
> current key. The superseding blob was retained (`<N>` held), so that history stays recoverable with
> the recovery code that sealed it — verify the box's off-site tier reports a repository rather than an
> orphan card, and expect the next backup to start a fresh history.

Details JSON: `{"host_id": "...", "retained_count": N, "repo_key": "changed"}` — **no hash values**.

**R-192 — `offsite_delivery_stuck`, burned shape** (unchanged in intent, corrected in wording):

> Offsite delivery stuck (BURNED-credential shape): the one-time password was consumed `<age>` ago; of
> the first `<N>` report(s) after that consume, NONE carried an offbox target, and the latest report
> carries none either. The credential never reached a persisted apply. Re-issue delivers a fresh one.

**R-192 — regressed shape** (the demo-hp case, which previously got the burned text):

> Offsite delivery stuck (REGRESSED-apply shape): the one-time password was consumed `<age>` ago; of
> the first `<N>` report(s) after that consume, `<M>` DID carry an offbox target — and the latest report
> carries none. The credential was applied and worked; the target was lost afterwards. Re-issue is NOT
> the indicated action: find what removed the offbox target (a guest rebuild does, R-193). Automatic
> restage is deliberately withheld for this shape. NOTE: the counts cover at most the first 500 reports
> after the consume, so on a long-lived box they describe the start of the window, not now (R-192, open).

**R-192 — the refusal record** (`notification_log`, channel `operator`, status `refused`), message
*"Automatic offsite credential restage was NOT performed."* with the reason in `error_message`, e.g.:

> regressed-apply shape: `<M>` of the first `<N>` report(s) after the consume DID carry an offbox
> target, so a burned credential is ruled out — a restage would treat a symptom whose cause is
> elsewhere. Operator's call (R-193).

## 6. The corrected comments — FIVE, not three, with their locations as found

The spec expected three and named two; a census of every `restic` mention in the hub found **five**.

| # | Location | What it claimed |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | `hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go:198` | *"the restic repo password just changed"* as the justification for `MarkEscrowStale` |
| 2 | `hub/internal/api/handler.go:1067` | *"The re-issuer resets the restic repo password, which makes the OLD escrow blob stale"* |
| 3 | `hub/internal/store/store.go:423` (the `stale_at` ALTER) | *"stale_at is set when the offsite repo password is re-issued"* |
| 4 | `hub/internal/store/store.go` `MarkEscrowStale` doc comment | *"called when the offsite repo password is re-issued"* |
| 5 | `hub/internal/store/store.go` `EscrowStatus.Stale` field comment | *"true when the offsite password was re-issued"* |

All five now state what the code does, name the correction with its date and item, and cite the recon.
The staleness mark is documented as **precautionary** — the box's re-apply may mint a fresh repository
password — with R-197's measured signal named as the evidential one. **The behaviour is unchanged and
R-196 stays OPEN**, because the false-staleness alarm is a behaviour change that must not ride a
comment-correction release. It also matters *more* now than when filed: under R-198 an unnecessary
ceremony is no longer harmless bookkeeping, it supersedes a blob.

## 7. Part 5 — the gate was hit; the card is untouched; R-202 filed

**The gate:** ship it iff the hub can tell a box what it needs with **one** additional boolean on the
escrow ACK it already sends.

**The hub can compute such a boolean cheaply** — *"≥1 retained blob for this host carries an identity
blob"*, one correlated predicate in `GetEscrowStatusForCustomer` — and the controller even has the right
seam already (`SetEscrowStale`/`StaleBlob` is exactly this shape). **But that boolean does not answer
the card's question.** The card renders on `RepoState == "orphaned"`, and its promise is about *the key
THIS orphaned repository was written under*. A box does not know which escrow generation the orphaned
remote belongs to. A box with a pre-v0.93.0 orphan and a post-v0.93.0 supersession would read the
boolean TRUE and the promise would still be false — a **conditional** falsehood that looks verified,
which on a customer-facing card is worse than today's hedged one. Making it truthful needs the orphan's
generation, which is the same knowledge R-199/R-201's unassembled chain needs.

**So: stopped, filed R-202, left the card alone**, per §8.6. **Stated plainly rather than buried: the
false sentence is still live**, in Hungarian, on both demo boxes. The cheapest honest interim — drop the
recoverability clause and say only that the old history is set aside and not deleted, which is true
unconditionally — is recorded in R-202 and **not taken here**, because it is a customer-copy change and
the gate said leave it alone.

## 8. Register

- **R-198 → SHIPPED** (hub v0.93.0), with the §8.1 facts and both red-proof outcomes recorded.
- **R-197 → SHIPPED** (hub v0.93.0).
- **R-192 → HALF SHIPPED**: both honesty halves done; **the guard's 500-oldest-reports scoping stays
  OPEN**, deliberately, because its correct shape depends on the recovery chain that is not yet
  assembled. The window is named inside the alert text so the limitation travels with the number.
- **R-196 → comments corrected; the BEHAVIOUR stays OPEN.**
- **R-193 → still open**, updated with the three operator rulings.
- **R-202 → NEW** (Part 5's gate).
- **R-199, R-200 and R-201 remain OPEN and untouched** — the hub's blob-serving endpoints still have no
  client, the injection seam still has no form, and nothing in the recovery path has ever been
  exercised. v0.93.0 makes the key survive; it does not assemble the chain that hands it back.
- **The three operator rulings of 2026-08-04 are recorded** in a dedicated block at the top of
  `OPEN-ITEMS.md` (a ruling that lives only in a conversation binds nobody — the R-96 rule):
  run the drill after R-198 (**R-198 has shipped; the drill is next**); **delete the orphaned
  ciphertext — STILL OWED**, deliberately not done here because a destructive act on a protected
  endpoint does not ride a schema-change release; and **accept the risk on R-193(c)**, which is what
  makes this retention load-bearing rather than tidy.
- Capability map, `03-host-agent.md` §8a (a new *Custody across generations* section — the contract
  changed, so S-1 applies), `CONTEXT.md` S-28, `REUSE.md` and `ROADMAP.md` all updated in the same
  commit.

## 9. Deploy & validation

- Clean-tree gate held per repo before the build; the image was built from a pushed tree.
- `./build.sh 0.93.0 --push` → `felhom-hub:0.93.0`, 25 MB. Manifest bumped in git, committed, pushed.
- ArgoCD hard-refresh + **deliberate sync** (never `kubectl set image`). **Synced**; `deploy/hub`
  rolled out; live image `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub:0.93.0`; startup log clean (all checkers
  initialized, `Listening on :8080`, no errors).
- **Live validation was structural, not manufactured** (§9.3): the schema column read from the running
  pod's database, and the two censuses in §2. **No ceremony was run on any box** — today, a ceremony is
  the act that destroys the key, and it is also the one thing that would have "proved" the retention by
  consuming a real customer's generation.
- Disk headroom checked before the build (`/mnt/5_hdd` 24%, `/` 86%).
- **Nothing provisioned; nothing to tear down.**
- Gates: `python3 scripts/repo_gates.py --fast` → all OK, after every docs change.

## 10. CI

- Code commit **`91cabdd`** and manifest commit **`40687b0`** — run numbers, task ids and conclusions
  quoted in the session summary; **`--no-verify` was NOT used** (the pre-push hook ran `repo_gates.py
  --fast` and passed on both pushes).

## 11. Observations — noticed, not acted on

1. **`ListSupersededEscrow` still has no production caller.** v0.93.0 makes it *return* the identity
   blob, so a retained key is reachable from Go for the first time — but nothing reads it. That is
   R-199's territory and was deliberately not widened here.
2. **`handleReEnroll` returns a freshly minted API key in its response body** on an endpoint nothing
   currently calls. Worth a look *before* anything starts calling it (R-199).
3. **`CountReportsOffsiteSince`'s `LIMIT 500` is the only instrument in the delivery checker**, and its
   window is now named in operator-facing text. If R-192's remaining half is ever fixed, that sentence
   must change with it — the R-100 corollary (an alarm whose text stopped matching what its verdict
   counts) applies directly.
4. **`offsite_delivery_stuck` had been reaching the customer channel by construction** for its whole
   life; the only reason no customer row exists is that the demo customers have no configured
   recipient. An absent notification row is not evidence a leg is blocked.
</content>