REPORT: hub v0.93.0 (R-198 retention fix, R-197 changed-key signal, R-192 honesty half, R-196 five comments, R-202 filed)

REPORT.md

@@ -1,121 +1,241 @@
-# REPORT — RECON: can a customer actually get their backups back? (2026-08-04)
+# REPORT — hub v0.93.0: the retention keeps the key it was built to keep (R-198) + the honesty pass (R-197, R-192, R-196)
 
-**Class:** recon / spike. **No production code. No build, no deploy, no version bump.**
-**Baselines re-read on arrival:** `felhom-agent` `856a127cd60b` (v0.124.1) · `felhom-controller`
-`0887fd676d60` (v0.194.0) · `felhom.eu` `d26f49ad680e` (hub v0.92.0). All three trees clean.
+**Date:** 2026-08-04 · **Class:** implementation. One additive schema change, no destructive operation.
+**Deployed:** `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub:0.93.0`, ArgoCD **Synced**, rollout complete, schema
+change **confirmed applied on the live database**.
 
-> Supersedes the earlier 2026-08-04 report (R-193/R-192 spike + R-195), per the overwrite convention.
-> Nothing durable from it lived only here — it is recorded in `hub/CHANGELOG.md`, `OPEN-ITEMS.md`
-> R-192/R-193/R-195/R-196/R-197 and `audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md`.
-
-**Deliverable:** `documentation/audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` — Q1–Q8 with method,
-measurement and ruling per question, the eleven-link chain table, the drill design, every query used,
-and the operator's open decisions.
+> Supersedes the earlier 2026-08-04 report (the RECON session), per the overwrite convention. Nothing
+> durable from it lived only here — it is in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md`,
+> `OPEN-ITEMS.md` R-198…R-202 and the capability map.
 
 ---
 
-## 1. What was established
+## 1. Confirmed baselines, and the three landmarks
 
-**The chain from a dead node to an open repository is not assembled, and the failure is deeper than
-"some links are manual".**
+| Repo | on arrival | end state |
+|---|---|---|
+| `felhom.eu` | `3f2b7bc02386`, clean, == `origin/main`, hub v0.92.0 | `40687b0`, hub **v0.93.0** deployed |
+| `felhom-controller` | `0887fd676d60`, clean | **untouched** — Part 5 hit its gate (§7) |
 
-1. **Links 1–4 are PROVEN-LIVE** — mint → stage to the agent → seal under R → store on the hub.
-2. **Link 5 is lossy, and this is the finding of the session.** `host_escrow_superseded` has **no
-   `identity_blob` column**, and `demoteCurrentEscrowTx` (`hub/internal/store/store.go:2547-2556`)
-   copies only the K-escrow `blob`. The **restic repository password lives in `identity_blob`** — so
-   the retention feature built for the reinstall-orphan incident does not retain the secret that
-   incident is about. The **next escrow ceremony destroys the last copy**, and that ceremony is exactly
-   what the system tells a rebuilt box's customer to run. Both demo boxes crossed that line on
-   2026-08-04 at 07:15:36 and 07:20:08. → **R-198**
-3. **Link 6 has no client anywhere.** `handleReEnroll` / `handleGetRestoreDirective` serve the blobs;
-   zero callers in the agent, the hub UI, any script or any runbook. Retrieval is `sqlite3` by hand on
-   the hub pod. → **R-199**
-4. **Links 7–8 are manual-only.** `UnwrapIdentityBundle`'s only production caller is
-   `--selftest=identity-consume`, reading R from `FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE`; nothing extracts
-   `restic_repo_password` from the recovered bundle.
-5. **Link 9's form does not exist.** `POST /backup/offbox/inject-password` is routed, handled and
-   unit-tested; **no template contains it.** → **R-200**
-6. **Link 11 has never happened.** No blob served, no fork-4 bundle unsealed with a real R outside a
-   unit test, no recovered password injected, no repo reopened, no restore. The one live round-trip
-   proof (2026-06-10) **predates the `ResticRepoPassword` field by a month**. → **R-201**
+**§3's three landmarks, re-confirmed in the real source before editing — none had drifted:**
 
-**And the most useful thing settled: a fail-closed refusal IS implementable.** The hub already sends
-every box `escrow{identity_blob_present, restic_pw_sha256, created_at}` on every report ACK
-(`api/handler.go:504-510`), and the controller **discards it** whenever no offbox target exists
-(`report/escrow_confirm.go:75-84`). Persisting it needs no new hub API and no new secret; the
-`ClaimSync` set-only pattern is the precedent.
+1. `host_escrow_superseded` (`store.go:377`) had `blob` and **no** `identity_blob`.
+2. `identity_blob` was added to `host_escrow` by a **later** `ALTER TABLE` (`store.go:414`).
+3. `demoteCurrentEscrowTx` (`store.go:2547`) selected six columns and not that one.
 
-**The operator's ruled recovery-screen shape is buildable** and is priced row by row in §9 of the
-findings doc: fresh-install signal exists (the mint branch's own `os.Stat`); hub-has-a-blob exists on
-the wire; the preview is cheap and genuinely read-only (`restic snapshots --json` +
-`stats --mode raw-data --json` are already the box's own counters); the one real cost is crossing
-agent→controller for the unseal, because the controller image ships no `age` — one new agent local-API
-endpoint mirroring `/escrow/ceremony/claim`, plus a narrow hub `GET /hosts/<id>/escrow`.
+**Highest register ID on arrival: R-201.** Grepped `OPEN-ITEMS.md`, `ROADMAP.md`, `STATUS.md`,
+`CONTEXT.md` before minting. One new item: **R-202**.
 
-## 2. Corrections owed and made
+## 2. §8.1's two facts — both LOOKED AT on the live database, not deduced
 
-- **Yesterday's spike annotated, not rewritten** (`audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md`):
-  a dated block at the top plus an inline note on Q8(b). Its candidate (b) verdict *"not implementable
-  against a zero-knowledge escrow"* is **too strong** — unattended recovery is impossible; a
-  customer-present recovery is not. Everything else in that spike stands, and its Q3 remains unmeasured.
-- **Capability map corrected** (`architecture/00-capability-map.md`, escrow-ceremony row): the hub
-  v0.60.0 retention claim *"a previous passphrase stays recoverable with its recovery code"* is struck
-  through and replaced with what the code does — K-escrow only, no read path, `ListSupersededEscrow`
-  has zero production callers.
-- **The same false promise is made to the customer in Hungarian** on the orphan card
-  (`controller/internal/web/templates/backups_remote.html:66,69`). Recorded in R-198; **not edited** —
-  this session ships no controller change.
-- **The prompt's Q4 premise is a conflation, and it is corrected in the doc:** `escrow_confirm.go`
-  **does** fire on a mint (pending branch, hash mismatch, one WARN). The "wired to the wrong path"
-  finding was about the hub's `escrow_stale` event (R-196), a different mechanism. What is missing is
-  not the detection but the consequence — the warning reaches a log file and prescribes the act that
-  closes the recovery window.
+Read from a `hub.db` + `-wal` + `-shm` snapshot taken after the deploy (`PRAGMA integrity_check` →
+`ok`; freshness proven positively: `MAX(host_reports.received_at)` = `2026-08-04 10:45:39` vs
+`datetime('now')` = `10:58:59`).
 
-## 3. Register
+**(a) Nothing is backfillable, and here is the looking:**
 
-- **New: R-198, R-199, R-200, R-201** (highest previous ID was R-197; grepped across `OPEN-ITEMS.md`,
-  `ROADMAP.md`, `STATUS.md`, `CONTEXT.md` before minting).
-- **Updated: R-193** (seven-part addendum: (b) overturned in part, the chain census, the retention
-  finding, fail-closed implementable, the operator ruling priced, the drill, Q3 still unmeasured) and
-  **R-192** (two inputs, no verdict change).
-- **`STATUS.md`** updated in operator language: two new "what's broken" entries, three new
-  "waiting on you" items, a "changed since" line.
+| id | host_id | `identity_blob IS NOT NULL` | superseded_at |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 3 | `demo-hp-bb76ea` | **0** | `2026-08-04 07:15:36` |
+| 4 | `demo-felhom-8363b5` | **0** | `2026-08-04 07:20:08` |
 
-## 4. Live measurements taken (read-only)
+Both retained rows are empty of it, and their source rows were overwritten at those same timestamps —
+`host_escrow` now holds the *new* generation. **No path preserved them.** (The prompt asked me to check
+whether some path had, because that would have been a better answer than expected. It had not.)
 
-Hub SQLite snapshot with the `-wal` (`kubectl exec … cat`), `PRAGMA integrity_check` → `ok`, freshness
-proven positively (`MAX(host_reports.received_at)` = `2026-08-04 10:00:40` vs `datetime('now')` =
-`10:03:48`). Escrow tables, `PRAGMA table_info` on both, latest-report `$.offsite.*` and `$.claimed`
-per customer, the `claimed` 1→0→1 transition across both rebuilds, and the events table since
-2026-08-03. Plus one `ls -la --time-style=full-iso` inside guest 9201 proving the data dir, the
-`encryption.key` and `offbox/repo_password` are all newborn as of `2026-08-03 07:17:25`–`07:18:02`.
-Every query with its field names and values is in §11 of the findings doc.
+**(b) Who the fix protects, i.e. whose NEXT ceremony now retains a recoverable off-site key:**
 
-**Nothing was written, run, rotated, re-issued, deleted or reconfigured anywhere.** No ceremony, no
-`selftest=identity-consume`, no touch on the storage endpoint.
+| host_id | identity blob present | bytes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `demo-felhom-8363b5` | yes | 572 |
+| `demo-hp-bb76ea` | yes | 572 |
 
-## 5. What could not be established
+**2 of 2 hosts with a current escrow.** Both were one ceremony away from losing their repository
+password again.
 
-The 2026-08-05 ~02:15 UTC run's outcome (still the decisive measurement; neither box has run —
-`last_run` absent on both); whether demo-hp's data dir was fresh (measured only on demo-felhom;
-demo-hp needs the break-glass credential this read-only session did not use); whether the orphaned
-ciphertext still exists at the provider; whether `age` is present on either demo host. Named in §12
-of the findings doc.
+**Schema change confirmed applied live** — `PRAGMA table_info(host_escrow_superseded)` on the running
+pod's database returns `identity_blob BLOB` as column 8. It runs at startup, so this is the check that
+the startup actually did it rather than the code merely containing it.
 
-## 6. Observations recorded, not acted on
+## 3. Files modified, and the commits
 
-A fresh `encryption.key` on every rebuild makes every pre-rebuild `app.yaml` `ENC:` secret
-undecryptable — circular dependency **C-1** of `_recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md`, which fired live on
-both demo boxes this week and is a strictly larger blast radius than the offsite repo. `Claimed`
-returning to 1 with no event means "the customer claimed this box" has no audit trail.
-`offboxRecordStats` persists `RepoSizeBytes` as a side effect of counting. `handleReEnroll` returns a
-freshly minted API key in its response body on an endpoint nothing currently calls.
+**Commit `91cabdd`** — code + docs:
 
-## 7. Conventions
+| File | Change |
+|---|---|
+| `hub/internal/store/store.go` | `identity_blob` on `host_escrow_superseded` (CREATE + additive `ALTER`); carried in `demoteCurrentEscrowTx`; `ListSupersededEscrow` reads it; `HostEscrow.IdentityBlob`; new `CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity`; `SaveHostEscrow` returns the replaced hash; the table comment rewritten to describe what the code now does **and** to record that it once did not; three R-196 comment corrections |
+| `hub/internal/api/handler.go` | `maybeEmitRepoKeyChanged` + `eventRepoKeyChanged`; wired into the superseded branch of the escrow PUT; one R-196 comment correction |
+| `hub/internal/monitor/offsite_delivery.go` | `deliveryShape` (burned/regressed); two-shape message; `offsite_reports_since_consume` in the details; `recordHealRefusal`; refusal branches split so each names its reason |
+| `hub/internal/notify/dispatcher.go` | `offsite_repo_key_changed`, `offsite_delivery_stuck`, `offsite_credential_restaged` → `operatorOnlyEvents` |
+| `hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go` | one R-196 comment correction |
+| new: `store/escrow_identity_retention_test.go`, `api/escrow_repo_key_changed_test.go`, `monitor/offsite_delivery_honesty_test.go` | Scenarios A–G |
+| 11 existing `_test.go` files | mechanical: `SaveHostEscrow` now returns three values |
+| `hub/CHANGELOG.md`, `CONTEXT.md` (S-28), `REUSE.md`, `STATUS.md`, `00-capability-map.md`, `03-host-agent.md`, `OPEN-ITEMS.md`, `ROADMAP.md` | docs |
 
-- **No `CHANGELOG.md` entry.** `felhom.eu` has no root changelog — they are per-area (`hub/`,
-  `scripts/`, `website/`) and log code changes. This session changed none of those areas. Stated
-  rather than silently skipped.
-- **`REUSE.md`** untouched — no shared helper or pattern moved.
-- **Gates + CI run id** are recorded in the session summary.
+**Commit `40687b0`** — `manifests/hub.yaml` `0.92.0` → `0.93.0`.
+
+## 4. Tests, and every red-proof outcome
+
+Green gate after each phase: `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` in `hub/` — **rc=0**,
+full suite, run separately from every commit (never combined).
+
+| Group | Scenario | Result | Red-proof — mutation → outcome |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| A | re-escrow retains both keys | PASS | drop `identity_blob` from the shared copy routine (**= production ≤ v0.92.0**) → **FAIL**: *"the retained row carries NO identity blob — the off-site repository password was destroyed by the ceremony that was supposed to preserve it"* |
+| B | host delete demotes both | PASS | same mutation → **FAIL**. **Plus the §8.2 mutation**: fix only the re-escrow caller (patch the retained row in `SaveHostEscrow` instead of the shared routine) → **A passes, B FAILS** — the "fixed one caller" mistake, demonstrated |
+| C | legacy host with no identity blob supersedes cleanly | PASS | — (a nullable-column check; no guard to remove) |
+| D | changed key raises one signal, host named, no hash values | PASS | remove the comparison from the escrow PUT → **FAIL**: *"the repository key demonstrably changed and NO signal was raised"*, while E still passes |
+| E | unchanged key is silent | PASS | — |
+| F | message states the measured state | PASS | restore the single hardcoded sentence → **both message tests FAIL** |
+| G | heal refusal leaves a durable record | PASS | replace the regressed branch with a bare `return` (**= production ≤ v0.92.0**) → **FAIL**, and its cadence test with it |
+| — | `IsOperatorOnly` for all three event types | PASS | — |
+| — | `CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity` census | PASS | — |
+
+**A mutation that did not remove every guard, recorded because rule §9.12 requires it.** My first
+Scenario-F mutation kept the `switch`'s `default` branch, so the *regressed* test passed for the wrong
+reason and only the *burned* one failed. That is not a red-proof. The mutation that does fail both is
+deleting the shape switch entirely and emitting the one v0.92.0 sentence — done, observed, recorded.
+
+**Both callers proven separately** (§8.2): `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsIdentityBlob` (re-escrow) and
+`TestDeleteHost_DemotesIdentityBlob` (host delete). The pre-existing
+`TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded` stayed **green throughout the two months the bug existed**,
+because it asserts the mechanism (a retained row exists, carrying the old K-blob). The new tests assert
+the consequence (the retained row can still yield a repository password) — `CLAUDE.md`'s rule, applied
+to the case that earned it.
+
+**Every `-run` filter was verified to have matched** (`-v`, `=== RUN` lines counted) before any result
+was read as a proof.
+
+## 5. The exact operator message text, quoted for review
+
+**R-197 — `offsite_repo_key_changed`** (warning, operator-only, edge-triggered once per supersession):
+
+> Offsite repository key CHANGED for host `<host_id>`: the new escrow seals a different repository
+> password than the one it replaced. The previous off-site history is no longer opened by this box's
+> current key. The superseding blob was retained (`<N>` held), so that history stays recoverable with
+> the recovery code that sealed it — verify the box's off-site tier reports a repository rather than an
+> orphan card, and expect the next backup to start a fresh history.
+
+Details JSON: `{"host_id": "...", "retained_count": N, "repo_key": "changed"}` — **no hash values**.
+
+**R-192 — `offsite_delivery_stuck`, burned shape** (unchanged in intent, corrected in wording):
+
+> Offsite delivery stuck (BURNED-credential shape): the one-time password was consumed `<age>` ago; of
+> the first `<N>` report(s) after that consume, NONE carried an offbox target, and the latest report
+> carries none either. The credential never reached a persisted apply. Re-issue delivers a fresh one.
+
+**R-192 — regressed shape** (the demo-hp case, which previously got the burned text):
+
+> Offsite delivery stuck (REGRESSED-apply shape): the one-time password was consumed `<age>` ago; of
+> the first `<N>` report(s) after that consume, `<M>` DID carry an offbox target — and the latest report
+> carries none. The credential was applied and worked; the target was lost afterwards. Re-issue is NOT
+> the indicated action: find what removed the offbox target (a guest rebuild does, R-193). Automatic
+> restage is deliberately withheld for this shape. NOTE: the counts cover at most the first 500 reports
+> after the consume, so on a long-lived box they describe the start of the window, not now (R-192, open).
+
+**R-192 — the refusal record** (`notification_log`, channel `operator`, status `refused`), message
+*"Automatic offsite credential restage was NOT performed."* with the reason in `error_message`, e.g.:
+
+> regressed-apply shape: `<M>` of the first `<N>` report(s) after the consume DID carry an offbox
+> target, so a burned credential is ruled out — a restage would treat a symptom whose cause is
+> elsewhere. Operator's call (R-193).
+
+## 6. The corrected comments — FIVE, not three, with their locations as found
+
+The spec expected three and named two; a census of every `restic` mention in the hub found **five**.
+
+| # | Location | What it claimed |
+|---|---|---|
+| 1 | `hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go:198` | *"the restic repo password just changed"* as the justification for `MarkEscrowStale` |
+| 2 | `hub/internal/api/handler.go:1067` | *"The re-issuer resets the restic repo password, which makes the OLD escrow blob stale"* |
+| 3 | `hub/internal/store/store.go:423` (the `stale_at` ALTER) | *"stale_at is set when the offsite repo password is re-issued"* |
+| 4 | `hub/internal/store/store.go` `MarkEscrowStale` doc comment | *"called when the offsite repo password is re-issued"* |
+| 5 | `hub/internal/store/store.go` `EscrowStatus.Stale` field comment | *"true when the offsite password was re-issued"* |
+
+All five now state what the code does, name the correction with its date and item, and cite the recon.
+The staleness mark is documented as **precautionary** — the box's re-apply may mint a fresh repository
+password — with R-197's measured signal named as the evidential one. **The behaviour is unchanged and
+R-196 stays OPEN**, because the false-staleness alarm is a behaviour change that must not ride a
+comment-correction release. It also matters *more* now than when filed: under R-198 an unnecessary
+ceremony is no longer harmless bookkeeping, it supersedes a blob.
+
+## 7. Part 5 — the gate was hit; the card is untouched; R-202 filed
+
+**The gate:** ship it iff the hub can tell a box what it needs with **one** additional boolean on the
+escrow ACK it already sends.
+
+**The hub can compute such a boolean cheaply** — *"≥1 retained blob for this host carries an identity
+blob"*, one correlated predicate in `GetEscrowStatusForCustomer` — and the controller even has the right
+seam already (`SetEscrowStale`/`StaleBlob` is exactly this shape). **But that boolean does not answer
+the card's question.** The card renders on `RepoState == "orphaned"`, and its promise is about *the key
+THIS orphaned repository was written under*. A box does not know which escrow generation the orphaned
+remote belongs to. A box with a pre-v0.93.0 orphan and a post-v0.93.0 supersession would read the
+boolean TRUE and the promise would still be false — a **conditional** falsehood that looks verified,
+which on a customer-facing card is worse than today's hedged one. Making it truthful needs the orphan's
+generation, which is the same knowledge R-199/R-201's unassembled chain needs.
+
+**So: stopped, filed R-202, left the card alone**, per §8.6. **Stated plainly rather than buried: the
+false sentence is still live**, in Hungarian, on both demo boxes. The cheapest honest interim — drop the
+recoverability clause and say only that the old history is set aside and not deleted, which is true
+unconditionally — is recorded in R-202 and **not taken here**, because it is a customer-copy change and
+the gate said leave it alone.
+
+## 8. Register
+
+- **R-198 → SHIPPED** (hub v0.93.0), with the §8.1 facts and both red-proof outcomes recorded.
+- **R-197 → SHIPPED** (hub v0.93.0).
+- **R-192 → HALF SHIPPED**: both honesty halves done; **the guard's 500-oldest-reports scoping stays
+  OPEN**, deliberately, because its correct shape depends on the recovery chain that is not yet
+  assembled. The window is named inside the alert text so the limitation travels with the number.
+- **R-196 → comments corrected; the BEHAVIOUR stays OPEN.**
+- **R-193 → still open**, updated with the three operator rulings.
+- **R-202 → NEW** (Part 5's gate).
+- **R-199, R-200 and R-201 remain OPEN and untouched** — the hub's blob-serving endpoints still have no
+  client, the injection seam still has no form, and nothing in the recovery path has ever been
+  exercised. v0.93.0 makes the key survive; it does not assemble the chain that hands it back.
+- **The three operator rulings of 2026-08-04 are recorded** in a dedicated block at the top of
+  `OPEN-ITEMS.md` (a ruling that lives only in a conversation binds nobody — the R-96 rule):
+  run the drill after R-198 (**R-198 has shipped; the drill is next**); **delete the orphaned
+  ciphertext — STILL OWED**, deliberately not done here because a destructive act on a protected
+  endpoint does not ride a schema-change release; and **accept the risk on R-193(c)**, which is what
+  makes this retention load-bearing rather than tidy.
+- Capability map, `03-host-agent.md` §8a (a new *Custody across generations* section — the contract
+  changed, so S-1 applies), `CONTEXT.md` S-28, `REUSE.md` and `ROADMAP.md` all updated in the same
+  commit.
+
+## 9. Deploy & validation
+
+- Clean-tree gate held per repo before the build; the image was built from a pushed tree.
+- `./build.sh 0.93.0 --push` → `felhom-hub:0.93.0`, 25 MB. Manifest bumped in git, committed, pushed.
+- ArgoCD hard-refresh + **deliberate sync** (never `kubectl set image`). **Synced**; `deploy/hub`
+  rolled out; live image `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub:0.93.0`; startup log clean (all checkers
+  initialized, `Listening on :8080`, no errors).
+- **Live validation was structural, not manufactured** (§9.3): the schema column read from the running
+  pod's database, and the two censuses in §2. **No ceremony was run on any box** — today, a ceremony is
+  the act that destroys the key, and it is also the one thing that would have "proved" the retention by
+  consuming a real customer's generation.
+- Disk headroom checked before the build (`/mnt/5_hdd` 24%, `/` 86%).
+- **Nothing provisioned; nothing to tear down.**
+- Gates: `python3 scripts/repo_gates.py --fast` → all OK, after every docs change.
+
+## 10. CI
+
+- Code commit **`91cabdd`** and manifest commit **`40687b0`** — run numbers, task ids and conclusions
+  quoted in the session summary; **`--no-verify` was NOT used** (the pre-push hook ran `repo_gates.py
+  --fast` and passed on both pushes).
+
+## 11. Observations — noticed, not acted on
+
+1. **`ListSupersededEscrow` still has no production caller.** v0.93.0 makes it *return* the identity
+   blob, so a retained key is reachable from Go for the first time — but nothing reads it. That is
+   R-199's territory and was deliberately not widened here.
+2. **`handleReEnroll` returns a freshly minted API key in its response body** on an endpoint nothing
+   currently calls. Worth a look *before* anything starts calling it (R-199).
+3. **`CountReportsOffsiteSince`'s `LIMIT 500` is the only instrument in the delivery checker**, and its
+   window is now named in operator-facing text. If R-192's remaining half is ever fixed, that sentence
+   must change with it — the R-100 corollary (an alarm whose text stopped matching what its verdict
+   counts) applies directly.
+4. **`offsite_delivery_stuck` had been reaching the customer channel by construction** for its whole
+   life; the only reason no customer row exists is that the demo customers have no configured
+   recipient. An absent notification row is not evidence a leg is blocked.
 </content>