Commit Graph

420 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
admin fad5573dd3 hub v0.41.0: OffsiteChecker (fill 90/95 + staleness >48h) + operator freeze lever (SLICE 4)
Sibling checker over the controller report's offsite object: quota-fill
warn/crit + the silently-stuck staleness detector (escrowed-only,
red-proofed; nil-safe on pre-v0.109 reports; same-second tie-guard).
SetOffsiteFrozen flips ONLY readonly on the exactly-1 labelled sub-account
(SSH preserved); Freeze/Unfreeze buttons — manual only, never automatic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 23:57:12 +02:00
admin cb26dc7e83 docs: SLICE 3 — hub README, REPORT, CONTEXT
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 23:26:16 +02:00
admin c24d4afeee manifests/hub: 0.39.0 -> 0.40.0 (SLICE 3 escrow status in ACK)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 23:21:37 +02:00
admin 49d1233391 hub v0.40.0: store escrow restic_pw_sha256 + serve escrow status in the report ACK (SLICE 3)
Additive host_escrow migration; SaveHostEscrow/HostEscrow gain the hash
(NULL-safe for legacy rows); GetEscrowStatusForCustomer joins hosts;
the report ACK gains escrow:{identity_blob_present,restic_pw_sha256,
created_at} (omitted without a row). Contract test mirrors the agent's
v0.79.0 emit struct.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 23:10:29 +02:00
admin e0d1733b85 docs: offsite hardening bundle — hub README, REPORT, CONTEXT
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 22:48:41 +02:00
admin 17d9af5c13 manifests/hub: 0.38.1 -> 0.39.0 (offsite hardening F4/F2/F5)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 22:40:41 +02:00
admin 17cc67f7cd hub v0.39.0: offsite hardening — F4 credential re-issue, F2 scan retry, F5 save UX
F4: ReissueCredentials — explicit operator recovery for consumed-password
dead-ends; resets the labelled resource's password (exactly-1 guard,
red-proofed), stores a fresh one-time secret, bumps ConfigVersion.
New hetznerapi.ResetBoxPassword for the dedicated path.
F2: host-key scan retry-with-backoff (~60s ladder, red-proofed) — first
save survives fresh-subaccount DNS lag.
F5: config form disables submits + shows an in-flight notice (the re-click
bait that caused live F1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 22:39:08 +02:00
admin ecf9185605 validation record: offsite provisioning live e2e PASS (2026-07-09) + CONTEXT/REPORT
Full hub->Hetzner->controller loop validated on demo-felhom against the new
dedicated-project pool box; 2 snapshots on the new box, key-only. F1/F3 fixed
mid-run (hub v0.38.1, controller v0.106.1); F2/F4/F5/F6 recorded open.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 22:04:44 +02:00
admin 6d5b3c1c38 manifests/hub: 0.38.0 -> 0.38.1 (offsite provisioning detached from client ctx)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 21:02:44 +02:00
admin 7c70c545d9 hub v0.38.1: offsite provisioning must survive a client disconnect (live F1)
First supervised live run: the ~25s spinner-less offsite save invited a
re-click; the abandoned first request's r.Context() was canceled between
CreateSubaccount and SaveOneTimeSecret, stranding sub-account 268985 with a
password lost forever (consume 404s permanently).

applyOffsite now provisions on context.WithoutCancel + 3-minute absolute
timeout: once the create starts, create->wait->store runs to completion.
Regression test with a ctx-honoring fake that cancels the request context
mid-create; red-proofed against the raw-ctx pre-fix shape (reproduces the
exact live error).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 21:00:27 +02:00
admin 0a65f2be5f manifests/hub: wire HETZNER_TOKEN + HETZNER_POOL_BOX_ID from Secret/storagebox (offsite provisioning)
Runbook Phase 0b. Values come from the out-of-band felhom-system/storagebox
secret; optional:true so the pod starts without it (hub degrades to offsite
disabled). HETZNER_LOCATION explicit fsn1. NOT synced yet — gated on the
secret holding the DEDICATED-project scoped token (the current one fails the
scope check: it sees the old project's ep0 box, not the new pool box).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 20:39:55 +02:00
admin 6e86eb6d51 added secret 2026-07-09 20:36:22 +02:00
admin 8cf42f22d7 updated gitignore 2026-07-09 20:13:01 +02:00
admin b0bf500967 deploy(hub): bump hub image to 0.38.0 (offsite SLICE 2 host-key fingerprint)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 19:16:12 +02:00
admin 229650b4ee hub v0.38.0: offsite SLICE 2 — capture the box host-key fingerprint
Descriptor.HostFingerprint (SHA256, non-secret), captured at provision via an
x/crypto/ssh keyscan (SSHHostKeyScanner — dials :23, grabs the host key from the
handshake, no ssh binary). Fail-closed: nil scanner or scan failure → error (don't
serve a descriptor the controller can't verify). Pairs with controller v0.106.0
which re-scans + refuses on mismatch (no blind TOFU).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 19:14:36 +02:00
admin cff3a30996 deploy(hub): bump hub image to 0.37.0 (offsite provisioning SLICE 1)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 18:40:21 +02:00
admin 44ec06b50f hub v0.37.0: offsite provisioning SLICE 1 — Cloud-API client + provisioning core
Hetzner storage-box provisioning against api.hetzner.com/v1 (NOT .cloud).
internal/hetznerapi (typed client + CloudAPI interface + Fake + WaitAction);
internal/offsite (Provisioner.ProvisionOffsite — idempotent by label, shared
sub-account/dedicated box, transient password, non-secret Descriptor,
fail-closed); one_time_secrets store (single-use Save/Consume); POST
/offsite/consume-password/{id} (customer-key auth, once); config-form Offsite
section → applyOffsite (502+no-save on error) → descriptor in ConfigJSON →
version bump. Token/passwords never logged/committed/in ConfigJSON. Tested vs a
faked Cloud API + fail-closed red-proof. NOT yet live-provisioned (needs the
dedicated-project scoped token; current token can delete ep0).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 18:38:24 +02:00
admin 996d403248 docs(audit): Hetzner API provisioning spike — both offsite models FIT
KEY: Storage Box API is api.hetzner.com/v1 (NOT api.hetzner.cloud/v1). Proven
live on spike-* (torn down): sub-account create/reset/readonly/delete + billable
bx11 box create/change_type/delete. Create takes a password (no ssh-key param) →
transient-pw→ssh-copy-id -s -f→restic reach→reset_subaccount_password (key-only
steady state). RepoPath /home/<repo>; quota levers (dedicated=box type, shared=
readonly+soft-quota); idempotency via label_selector. SECURITY: token is
project-wide unscopeable — can touch ep0 + SSH keys → move customer boxes to a
dedicated Hetzner project. No prod code; spike torn down clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 17:46:43 +02:00
admin c1cfbe817b docs(audit): fork-4 custody VALIDATED end-to-end live (supervised)
Full cycle on the demo: enable→stage→real escrow-create (K+restic-pw under a
fresh R, uploaded to hub, staged wiped, K byte-unchanged)→atomicity proof (run
skipped before confirm, proceeded after — gate opens exactly on confirm). DR
money shot: restic password recovered from the PRODUCTION hub blob (via
identity-consume with R) is byte-identical to the live pw (sha 24c44f49) and
decrypted the real box repo; inject→restore endpoints reproduced a 45MB db-dump
byte-perfect. Demo left escrowed (un-paused); R held out-of-band; no secret in
logs; repo_password unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 16:31:58 +02:00
admin febdc560f4 docs(audit): fork-4 restic-password custody spike — VALIDATED (escrow-under-R)
Money shot (Probe 3): a password recovered from an age-under-R escrow of the
real repo password DECRYPTED the real Storage-Box repo (listed immich +
audiobookshelf snapshots) — working key, not just byte-match. Probe 1:
round-trip byte-perfect + wrong-R fails closed (0 plaintext). Probe 2:
controller→agent POST-body transport already proven (withGuest) — stage
endpoint is additive. Probe 4: WriteOffboxSecrets honors a pre-placed password
(DR re-injection), but config endpoint carries no password → explicit inject
step needed. All probes throwaway/discarded; live password + repo untouched.
Impl blueprint for the fork-4 spec inside.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 14:15:01 +02:00
admin 463ea369c4 docs(audit): offbox v0.104.0 VALIDATED live against the Storage Box (supervised)
Real endpoints, fresh box sub-account. Discovery proof: immich (undeployed,
USB-only unit — the v0.103.0 mis-resolution case) → ok/1 snapshot on the USB
path; 45MB db-dump restore sha256-matched. No-silent-success on the live box:
0/N → error + backup_failed alert; partial → ok + LastWarning. Persists across
restart. Forks 1+2 confirmed (direct; sub-account /home/<name>, ssh-copy-id -s
-f, console key field still broken F3); fork-4 custody surface recorded, escrow
design OPEN (repo pw + key not independently recoverable). Kept as standing
demo-offsite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 13:17:52 +02:00
admin 9b250b97c9 docs(audit): restic→Storage Box direct-from-residential spike (FIT/IPv4)
Validated the controller offbox restic-SFTP tier direct from the residential
demo box (IPv4-only egress) end-to-end through the real endpoints: reach on
:23 (PASS), chown-immune restic init (works where PBS-direct failed),
config→run→restore green, sub-account isolation confirmed. Residential upload
~4.3 MB/s. Concentrator NOT needed. KEY BLOCKER F1: offbox reads recovery unit
from the app data-drive namespace root, not the actual backup-drive location →
silently backs up 0 apps (ok status) on multi-drive setups. Spike only,
synthetic data, torn down.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 11:05:36 +02:00
admin 3472b90368 docs(audit): ep0 Hetzner Storage Box SSHFS + PBS-datastore feasibility spike
Wired the 1TB BX11 Storage Box to ep0 as a durable key-auth SSHFS mount
(/mnt/pbs-storagebox, reboot-proven). Findings: direct PBS datastore UNFIT
(box rejects chown -> ChunkStore::create fails); loopback-ext4-on-SSHFS FIT
with caveats (GC 7s/verify 12s/restore 11s all green, no GC hang). Raw mount
~327MB/s write, ~69MB/s read. Spike only, synthetic data, torn down.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 09:48:57 +02:00
admin 0efdc78d75 docs: GL-7 closeout — tester agreement + hub 0.36.0 CHANGELOG/REPORT/CONTEXT + GO-LIVE G7 done
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 08:44:21 +02:00
admin 02c748eb2a deploy: hub 0.36.0 (GL-7 install-command generator + passphrase hardening)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 08:34:38 +02:00
admin 844fbfa749 GL-7 Part 2: install-command generator on the customer page
Replaces the static Option-1/2 Setup Command blocks with an interactive,
client-side builder: mode (required radio), cores/memory (required for byo,
optional for appliance), vmid, node, acl-storages (quote-wrapped),
operator-pubkey-file, preserve-state-from, and --dry-run/--preflight-only/
--skip-provision/--allow-new-leaf checkboxes. genFlags()/genUpdate() assemble
a live-updating download-then-run command (never curl|bash) + a local-run
variant, enforcing the script's own rules client-side (mode required; byo
requires caps → shows a warning + no runnable command; appliance hides the
caps requirement; allow-new-leaf shows its leaf-regen warning). Emits ONLY
real host-install v1.12.0 flags; the dangerous/operator-only set
(--force/--rotate-recovery/--enable-oob/--remove-golden/--uninstall/
--adopt-pool/--rescope-acl) is never offered. Graceful static fallback:
the server-rendered Option-1/2 commands keep --customer-id + a --mode
placeholder when JS is off. No framework/CDN/network; ScriptVersion (const,
in sync with SCRIPT_VERSION) drives the header. Render/structure test covers
the control ids, version, fallback, and the excluded-flag absence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 08:29:15 +02:00
admin b93dd03f0a GL-7 Part 1: passphrase hardening on the customer page (security)
The Setup Command panel rendered the per-customer retrieval passphrase (the
secret that fetches the WHOLE config) in cleartext twice — as #retrieval-pw
text and baked into the Option-3 curl's X-Retrieval-Password header — which
contradicts the panel's own "never on the command line" guidance. Now:
the retrieval password is MASKED by default (bullet run) with Reveal/Hide +
copy-secret controls (value lives in data-secret — the existing reveal
model); the Option-3 debug command carries a <YOUR-RETRIEVAL-PASSWORD>
placeholder, never the secret. Render test asserts the secret is not baked
into any command + is masked by default; red-proof (bake it back) FAILS.
(A zero-secret-in-DOM reveal-on-demand fetch is a noted follow-up, not this task.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 08:23:41 +02:00
admin fb8e5111cf docs: GL-8 wrap — runbook F3/F6 notes, findings FIXED, REPORT, decision log
day0-install: F3 (no --allow-new-leaf on a populated BYO host) + F6 (:53 must
be free, refusal + remediation). GO-LIVE-PACKAGE + DRILL-GL6 ledger flip
F1/F3/F6 -> FIXED v1.12.0; GL-7 unblocked; F2/F7 stay open. CONTEXT + REPORT.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 19:40:57 +02:00
admin 18a556a514 GL-8: BYO coexistence hardening (host-install v1.12.0) — F3/F6/F1
F3: the populated-host leaf guard now fires only when a FELHOM guest exists
(felhom_guests, not `pct list`) — a fresh byo install on a host running only
the OWNER's guests proceeds without --allow-new-leaf; the pin protection for
real Felhom guests is unchanged (guard still fires on a Felhom guest).

F6: byo preflight REFUSES (never mutates) when a foreign resolver is bound
to :53, with remediation — Felhom needs the guest reachable by name and will
not stop/mask the owner's DNS (the dnsmasq analog of the break-glass rule).
Viktor's ruling: refuse+instruct only, no stop/mask path. ss failure degrades
to a warn. Appliance mode untouched (the agent's lan_resolver owns :53).

F1: uninstall now purges the agent config's .bak* siblings (one GL-6 residue
held a live hub api_key), not just agent.json; WIPED statement updated.

Harness +GL8-F3/F6/F1 static + GL8-F1b behavioural + GL8-F6 live (byo
preflight refuses on felhom-pve's leftover dnsmasq — the real F6 scenario).
Red-proofs RP-F3/F6/F1 each fail their invariant. 36/36 on felhom-pve;
shellcheck clean; GL-2 Scenario-A + GL-4 Scenario-D regression green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 19:37:49 +02:00
admin 1dc86523b5 docs(pilot): GL-6 wrap-up — gates LIVE-VALIDATED, REPORT, decision log
G2/G4/G5/G6/G7 -> LIVE-VALIDATED; G1 -> DONE (armed-key round-trip proven,
manifest bump confirmed); G9 -> deferred to GL-7; G10 -> GL-7 prereq.
Findings F1/F2/F3/F6/F7 filed for a v1.11.4 installer follow-up (none block
Peti). REPORT.md = the GL-6 drill. Next: GL-7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 16:07:51 +02:00
admin 87ba30ae91 docs(pilot): GL-6 COMPLETE — Gate 6 GO, summary, findings ledger, deviations
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 16:04:54 +02:00
admin 3d91ce8fe3 docs(pilot): GL-6 Phase 6 — appliance reinstall + drive re-enroll + backup green
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 16:01:55 +02:00
admin 089fa70bbe docs(pilot): GL-6 Phase 5 PASS — clean byo exit, data intact 2nd time
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 15:33:23 +02:00
admin f29b8ab9cb docs(pilot): GL-6 Phase 4 PASS — C7 live-validated; F7 (R2 heal bring-up-only)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 15:27:21 +02:00
admin 37fafd04f0 docs(pilot): GL-6 Phase 3 PASS — armed-key update round-trip (real op key)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 15:19:36 +02:00
admin 9dfa247e04 docs(pilot): GL-6 2b — drive re-enroll+data-visible PASS; F6 dnsmasq; G10 open-dashboard
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 13:59:05 +02:00
admin 6d7061d9f4 docs(pilot): GL-6 F5 (dashboard public DNS absent post-reinstall); bridge OK
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 13:27:59 +02:00
admin 7d7f33b488 docs(pilot): GL-6 — F4 fixed (v1.11.3) + live-proven; drill record
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 13:03:30 +02:00
admin 98bf5a434f GL-6 F4 fix: v1.11.3 — --resume repopulates producer-step outputs
Live-found in the GL-6 drill: `should_skip X || step_X` fully skips a
completed step on --resume, but token/enroll/grows produce IN-MEMORY
outputs (pve token; hub host_id/api_key; volume grows) that later steps
consume — agent_config writes them into the config, provision passes the
grows as flags. A resume that had completed token/enroll but not
agent_config wrote a config missing hub.host_id/proxmox.token (daemon
crash-loop, "hub.host_id is required"); a resume past grows passed
`-rootfs-grow ""` (flag parse error). step_token even had an internal
resume-guard the `|| step_token` dispatch defeated.

Fix: token/enroll/grows now run every pass (all idempotent — token
reuses-or-rotates from the on-disk config, enroll is mint-once-reuse,
grows is a pure recompute); the guard uses _state_has (no misleading
SKIP log). golden's GOLDEN_VOLID is re-derived from the local archive in
the resume block so provision never gets an empty -archive. Harness
+GL6-F4 invariant; 27/27; shellcheck clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 13:01:33 +02:00
admin 4cb70ff88b docs(pilot): GL-6 Phases 0-2 evidence + findings F1-F4
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 12:52:07 +02:00
admin 0640aa06ea GL-6 Gate-0 ruling (G3): v1.11.2 — anonymous artifact fetch supported
Operator ruling at the GL-6 drill's Gate 0: the Felhom artifacts are
world-readable by design; an EMPTY git.username/git.token in the customer
config now WARNS and fetches anonymously instead of dying at step 5/8
(the hub-vouched sha256 stays the integrity root; a configured credential
is still used when present; curl auth args are conditional because -u with
an empty token 401s even on public content). All 12 installer fetch
targets validated 200 anonymously before shipping. Harness: +GL6-ANON
shape case; GL4-C2 assertion updated for the v1.11.1 pinned constants
(the benign overrides-notice is not a die). Drill record carries the
deviation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 12:28:51 +02:00
admin bd97bc3474 pin operator public keys (key ceremony) 2026-07-08 11:27:50 +02:00
admin e5617969ae docs(pilot): GL-5b shipped — new G12 (restore-test full-fidelity), bump target 0.76.0
Agent v0.76.0 live + published (9828c5f7..f50b, the exact felhom-pve bytes,
anon-fetch re-verified). Manifest bump goes straight to 0.76.0; 0.75.0
superseded unpublished; 0.74.0 must not be vouched (broken guest-loss DR).
Measured full-fidelity runtime: 3m4s local tier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 09:55:18 +02:00
admin 5debe02031 docs(pilot): GL-5 shipped — G8 flip + GL-4 status housekeeping + decision log
G8 -> implemented + scratch-DR live-validated (agent v0.75.0 b3446213);
G6 -> implemented-awaiting-GL-6; G1 key-pin plumbing -> done (ceremony
pending); manifest-bump guidance updated: publish + vouch 0.75.0 (0.74.0
ships broken guest-loss DR). Two live-discovered PVE restore rules recorded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 09:24:12 +02:00
admin bd4f735e98 added GL-1 2026-07-08 08:21:48 +02:00
admin f7cc6a720e GL-4: uninstaller gap-closure + operator-key day-0 fold (host-install v1.11.0)
Uninstall: NEW 4b4 removes the self-update artifacts (guarded wrapper,
.prev/.new.* A/B slots, rollback unit, limits drop-in — derived from
configs/felhom-selfupdate-guarded); enrolled drives under /mnt/felhom-drives
unmounted plain-umount-only (busy = warn+guidance, never -l/-f; root bind
guarded); both modes end with a KEPT-vs-WIPED statement (drives/PBS/hub
record/escrow/vaulted recovery credential live on); guest-only mode prints
the vmid's bind-store drives.

Key-pin: OPERATOR_KEY_* constants (empty until the operator ceremony) +
--operator-pubkey-file (argv-validated; comment=key_id required; file
overrides constants) -> authz.signers per the agent SignerKey schema;
no-keys-resolved KEEPS preserved signers; verify reports armed/dormant WARN.

Harness: +13 static cases + GL4-D parity + GL4-INV + PVE-tier GL4 H-U
(full-uninstall dry transcript vs live 9201). 28/28 on felhom-pve;
red-proofs RP-1..3 run->fail->revert. GO-LIVE-PACKAGE.md ABSENT AGAIN ->
status in CONTEXT.md. Live teardown/armed-pin = GL-6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 08:14:07 +02:00
admin a63cc7151b docs(pilot): RUNBOOK GL-1 executed — agent 0.74.0 + golden 0.103.0 published
Agent = the live felhom-pve bytes (sha 1ec3f588..76af05, round-trip verified);
golden baked clean-room in the drill VM (build-golden v2.0.0, controller
0.103.0, all integrity gates green, sha 8481e8a1..6026e) and published 201.
Both anon-fetch-verified (Gate 3c: packages world-readable -> G3 read-only
token rotation cannot break fetches; installer-side empty-token die is the
real precondition). Drill VM restored to virgin. OPERATOR NEXT: Day-0
manifest bump to the four recorded values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-07 21:07:15 +02:00
admin 02d63ed070 GL-2: --mode appliance|byo install profile (host-install v1.10.0) + harness
Mandatory install profile (no default): byo = a host the operator does not
own. Break-glass gated OFF at its call site in byo (root@pam never touched),
mandatory --cores/--memory, argv-time refusals (--enable-oob/--rotate-recovery,
non-9.x PVE, missing --acl-storages), host-mutation disclosure + typed-hostname
ack, byo config asserts (lan_resolver/wg_tunnel/oob off; byo flips the
lan_resolver write default to off), pool+ACL verify asserts in BOTH modes (R2),
--preflight-only (no state, PASS/FAIL verdict), resume mode-mismatch refusal,
FELHOM_INSTALL_STATE_DIR harness override.

NEW scripts/hostinstall-mode-harness.sh: static refusal matrix C1-C4 + grep
invariants + PVE tier (C5 + A/B dry transcripts). 16/16 PASS on felhom-pve
(C5 live); red-proofs RP-1..RP-3 run->fail->revert. shellcheck clean at
severity=warning. Docs: day0-install SC.5 byo section + trust model; REUSE row;
CONTEXT + REPORT. Live drill = GL-6 (supervised); STOP honored (no non-dry run).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-07 20:26:32 +02:00
admin 1a1e42addb docs: campaign-2 R1/R2 root-cause correction + DR bind-mount source spike
Correction: campaign-2's "R1" (bind-mount restore needs root) was a SYMPTOM of an
empty felhom pool -> agent lacked VM.Audit on 9201 -> restore-test's existing,
correct bindMountOverrides never ran. Live-proven: pool healed (Part A) ->
restore-test PASSES (neutralizes 2 binds, boot+running, clean teardown, 4m35s).
Report rec #1 (make pct restore work on bind mounts) superseded. Fixes shipped:
agent v0.74.0 (pool re-assertion), controller v0.103.0 (F-C2-1).

Spike (SPIKE-dr-bindmount-source-2026-07-07): DR bring-up source options — PBS
pct.conf.blob blocked by encryption under the non-root token; DR recipe lacks mpN;
mp8/mp9 are STRUCTURAL CONSTANTS -> recommend a small known-constant override
reusing bindMountOverrides.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-07 19:08:03 +02:00
admin 7714f1f6e4 docs(tests): Campaign 2 report + evidence — DR primitives, self-update, storage, faults, endurance
Full-system validation on demo 9201 (controller v0.102.0 / agent v0.73.0). Headline:
ONE genuine pilot-critical finding — the non-root agent cannot pct-restore the
standard Felhom guest because it has bind-mount mountpoints (mp8 /mnt/felhom-drives,
mp9 bootstrap) and pct restore refuses bind mounts unless root. This breaks BOTH
--selftest=restore-test AND the offsite DR bring-up (R1), linked to a missing
VM.Audit/VM.Allocate on the agent token (R2). The large raw FAIL count is dominated
by one harness bug (auth-session expiry mis-scoring P3-P9) plus D1-injection/soak-probe/
dryrun-journal/escrow-blob calibration issues; the product where actually exercised was
healthy with ZERO resource leaks over ~7h. Demo node healed to pre-campaign state
(auth off, notifications restored, no scratch leaks). No production code changed.

Evidence snapshot + README under campaign2-evidence-2026-07-07/ (cookie jars scrubbed).

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-07 14:26:52 +02:00