e9a74a0019fdde2d0a1696ab1147fbfc66e2920e
869 Commits
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 admin
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e9a74a0019 |
docs: remove a gate criterion that could never pass, and close three register rows
PART 1 — the release gate.
G7 required the packaged .deb to sha256-match the one built from committed source. That is
unsatisfiable BY CONSTRUCTION: dpkg-deb stamps the build time into every archive, so two builds of
byte-identical source differ. It was already failing when the 1.26.1 release ran it. A criterion
nobody can satisfy gets waived once and read as advisory ever after — which is how R-29's shelf of
never-run gates was built. Sub-clause dropped, reason recorded in G7's own note the way G6's
amendment was, so a future reader can restore it if SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH ever makes it meaningful.
RULING ASKED FOR — is payload integrity covered by G9 alone? NO, and G9 is widened rather than a new
criterion invented. The package ships TWO payload files (build-deb.sh:54-55); G9 checked only the
script. The systemd UNIT was covered by nothing: G7 covered the container, G8 covers the postinst
behaviourally, G13 covers directory presence. The unit is not incidental — its After=, its
ConditionPathExists= and its Restart= decide WHEN AND WHETHER day-0 runs at all, so a drifted unit
would have shipped silently. Same shape as the /etc/felhom miss that G13 exists to prevent: a check
that proved the thing present and said nothing about what it depended on. The check passes today.
G13 moved to sit after G12 — it was minted late and left between G10 and G11.
PART 2 — register dispositions. BASELINE DISCREPANCY, reported rather than worked around: only R-128
had a row. R-154 and R-155 had NO row in either file — minted in a spike document and never carried
across, which is R-123's class, not the drift the task described. Rows created, closed, with the
reasoning, because in all three cases the reasoning is the durable part:
R-128 closed by CORRECTING a false claim, not by making the assertion real — the coupling does not
exist and asserting it would invent a constraint. Flagged so nobody 'restores' it.
R-154 closed with the measurement and where it now lives in pushed source.
R-155 NARROWED, not deleted — unchanged for FELHOM_MENU=single, inapplicable to release. Flagged so
the guard is not later removed wholesale on the strength of 'R-155 closed it'.
Documentation only: no code, no build, no ISO, no upload, no box touched.
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admin
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f2fc76ec4b |
ISO v1.26.1 PUBLISHED — both entries proven, round trip verified
Live: https://iso.felhom.eu/felhom-installer-1.26.1-pve9.2-1.iso sha256 f3cc86d5f0ec68bba4155c994b4fa84e208d50209bb6e815636c99e5441059a6, 1705322496 bytes. PART 5 PASSED ON BOTH MENU ENTRIES, four observables each: Graphical spikegfx.felhom.eu pairing code J7N-2DA TerminalUI spikesix.felhom.eu pairing code ZY5-YY4 Both: manual install, own disk, own password, real completion signal, and the journal's 'not bound yet — polling every 30s ... normal waiting state, not an error'. Spike 4 had REASONED the graphical path follows from shared Install.pm; it is now measured. PART 6: G1-G10 + G13 all PASS against the uploaded file. G4's single hit is felhom-bootstrap.sh:480's substring TEST ('$envtext' != *FELHOM_RETRIEVAL_PASSPHRASE=*), not a value — my own regex matched the glob's asterisk. PART 7: uploaded via rclone in a container configured ENTIRELY by environment variables, so no credential file was ever written. Round trip verified from the public URL — not the local file. Bucket stays private: unauthenticated GET to the S3 endpoint 400, custom domain has no index (404). CORRECTED BEFORE UPLOAD: the generated manifest described a single automated entry with a 5s timeout and listed Graphical/Terminal UI as 'menu-removed'. Generator fixed, sidecar regenerated, and the ISO verified byte-identical before and after — the published file IS the file Part 5 validated. Hub-side cleared: appliances 16, 17, 18 discarded (303 each); zero rows remain. The endpoint is /appliances/<id>/discard, POST only (server.go:345) — not /delete. Teardown: VMs purged, spike5 storage removed, demo-hp back to 6.6G, drill-r50 and 9201 untouched. Still open and named: OPEN-ITEMS/ROADMAP dispositions for R-128/R-154/R-155 are not written; the .deb is not byte-reproducible (G7 sub-clause); before-network stub unreached; Secure Boot and real hardware not exercised. |
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admin
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70d034a3f3 |
iso: the release manifest described a different image than it shipped
The 1.26.1 manifest — the file a tester reads to know what they have, and which is published alongside the ISO — carried four statements that were false for a release build: boot-menu 'single entry Felhom telepítés, default, 5s' -> it has TWO, timeout 15 menu-entries '1 (... timeout 5s)' -> 2 menu-removed 'Graphical, Terminal UI, ...' -> those are exactly what it SHIPS kernel-line '... proxmox-start-auto-installer' -> the release menu deliberately has none secret-bearing 'no (embeds the customer retrieval passphrase...)' -> self-contradictory All four came from branding/pairing notes that predate --release and were emitted unconditionally. A public artifact whose own manifest misdescribes it is the false-claim class this arc exists to correct, so it is fixed before publication rather than after. |
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admin
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52e5cdb86a |
REPORT: /etc/felhom fix verified — TUI entry PASSES all four. Graphical untested, so still NOT PUBLISHED
iso 1.26.1, sha256 f3cc86d5f0ec68bba4155c994b4fa84e208d50209bb6e815636c99e5441059a6.
Terminal-UI interactive install, host spikesix.felhom.eu — all four observables PASS:
1 package installed ii felhom-bootstrap 1.26.1
2 unit enabled enabled
3 unit fired first boot activating; 'registering unclaimed appliance at the hub'
4 box wants a claim code /etc/felhom/appliance-pairing-code = ZY5-YY4, token 64B mode 600,
'not bound yet — polling every 30s ... normal waiting state, not an error'
That is the product working end-to-end from a public image on a manual install.
G13 added and RED-PROOFED (removing install -d -> exit 3 with the G13 message; restoring -> green).
The first red-proof attempt was INVALID — a copied script failed on a missing control file, i.e.
non-zero for the wrong reason — and was redone in place.
NOT PUBLISHED: Part 5 requires BOTH entries. The Graphical entry reached the Target-Harddisk screen
but was not driven to completion (Enter lands in the Country field; monitor mouse_move does not move
the guest cursor), so Part 5 is not fully passed and Part 7 did not run.
TWO HUB ITEMS OUTSTANDING and NOT disposed of: unclaimed appliances 16 and 17. GET/POST on
/appliances, /appliances/17 and /appliances/17/delete all 404; the rows appear only inside /hosts,
which offers 'Bind & deliver' and no delete affordance. Stated at the top of the report too, because
R-131 is four orphaned objects that recorded commands never cleared.
Also recorded: 'qm set --scsi0 ... --boot' silently yields net0;ide2, and ide2-first sends a finished
install back into the installer — both made a COMPLETED install look like a stuck one.
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admin
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a967da7d2c |
iso 1.26.1: ship /etc/felhom/ — the directory the bootstrap writes its state into
FIX for the Part-5 failure. felhom-bootstrap.sh writes the appliance token (:431), the pairing code
(:435) and .bootstrap-done into /etc/felhom/. The old stub-first-boot.sh created it explicitly
('install -d -m 0755 /etc/felhom /usr/local/sbin'); packaging dropped the env FILE correctly and the
DIRECTORY with it. Measured consequence on a real interactive install: the box registered at the hub,
could not persist its token, and polled 'HTTP 401 — still retrying' forever with no claim code.
- build-deb.sh now ships ./etc/felhom/ (0755, empty) and ASSERTS it, plus ./usr/local/sbin/ and
./lib/systemd/system/, as G13. RED-PROOFED: removing the install -d makes the build exit 3 with
'is not in the package (G13)', and restoring it goes green.
- The gate gains G13 with the reasoning: G7/G8/G9 all passed on the broken package. G9 proves the
payload is the right payload and says NOTHING about what the payload depends on.
ISO_VERSION -> 1.26.1.
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admin
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4ea211f67f |
REPORT: Part 5 FAILED — the package never creates /etc/felhom. NOT PUBLISHED
The Terminal-UI interactive install ran to completion from the release image and gave 3 of 4 required observables: 1 package installed PASS ii felhom-bootstrap 1.26.0 2 unit enabled PASS wants-symlink present; postinst enabled it from the chroot 3 unit FIRED first boot PASS journal shows PAIRING mode, registering unclaimed appliance 4 box wants a claim code FAIL /etc/felhom/ does not exist on the installed system, so felhom-bootstrap.sh cannot write the appliance token (:431) or the pairing code (:435), and the hub poll then 401s forever. The box can never finish pairing and the customer never sees a claim code. ROOT CAUSE, mine: stub-first-boot.sh opened with 'install -d -m 0755 /etc/felhom /usr/local/sbin'. This task correctly dropped the env FILE from the package and dropped the DIRECTORY with it. felhom-bootstrap.sh uses /etc/felhom for its runtime state (token, pairing code, .bootstrap-done). WHY THE GATE MISSED IT: G9 proves the packaged script is byte-identical to HEAD, and it is. I verified the payload files and never the directory the payload writes into — a check that proves the thing present and not the thing it depends on. Added as G13. The fix is one line and is deliberately NOT applied: a failing Part 5 stops the task, and proving a fix needs both installs re-run. Also recorded: 'qm set --scsi0 ... --boot order=scsi0;ide2' silently yields boot: order=net0;ide2, so a COMPLETED install looked like a machine sitting in the installer. Set --boot separately. Nothing uploaded; R2 credentials never read. Teardown complete: VMs purged, spike5 storage removed, demo-hp back to 6.6G, drill-r50 and 9201 untouched. Hub-side: no appliance object was created (searched /, /hosts, /configs for the hostname — zero hits), so R-131 gains no row. |
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admin
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246036605a |
REPORT: universal ISO built and gated — NOT PUBLISHED (Part 5 incomplete)
Publication is gated on Part 5 (two interactive installs proving delivery end-to-end). Neither was carried to completion, so nothing was uploaded. Per the task: stopping is the good outcome. BUILT: felhom-installer-1.26.0-pve9.2-1.iso sha256 24977bafd24d73262745fc1b3040939469c9b23b87ead927a8af86de73044a90, 1705322496 bytes. GATE (Part 6) against that exact file: G1-G10 PASS, G11/G12 not run (nothing published). G5 by ENUMERATION vs the stock PVE ISO: exactly four added paths — three felhomtheme files and /proxmox/packages/felhom-bootstrap_1.26.0_all.deb. G9: the packaged felhom-bootstrap.sh is byte-identical to repo HEAD. No .rootpw.txt is emitted at all, which is G2's own evidence. PROVEN in Part 5 before stopping: the image boots to the branded TWO-ENTRY release menu and the Terminal-UI entry reaches the stock PVE installer. NOT proven: package installed, unit enabled, unit fired, box asking for a claim code — on either entry. The Graphical entry was never driven. Reporting partial observables would be the LastRun-class error this arc has corrected three times. R2 credentials were never read, never used, never echoed; no rclone/aws config was created. Teardown complete: VMs purged, scratch storage spike5 removed, demo-hp back to 6.6G, drill-r50 and 9201 untouched, hub-side nothing created (verified by fetching the customer list). |
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admin
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8505954df7 |
iso: ship the package under its real filename, not felhom.deb
The release build copied the .deb to $WORK/felhom.deb before handing it to the repack, so the ISO carried '/proxmox/packages/felhom.deb' — the version invisible from the image, and not matching the release gate's 'exactly one felhom-*.deb' check (G7). Caught by running G5's enumeration against the built artifact rather than trusting the build log. |
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admin
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0f22447d15 |
iso: two build-log lines stated things that were not true
Neither changes an artifact, but both are read by an operator deciding whether a build is sound: - the closing banner printed 'root-pw : <iso>.rootpw.txt ... the console credential for this build' unconditionally. In --release mode no password is minted and no such file is written (verified: the release build emits only .iso, .sha256 and .manifest.txt). It now says so. - the repack's menu-surgery line hardcoded '1 entry, 0 submenus' and printed it after a gate that had just accepted TWO. It now reports the counts it actually asserted. |
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admin
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57b87ec9be |
iso: actually pass FELHOM_MENU/FELHOM_DEB to the repack
The repack read both correctly; the caller never set them, so a --release build reached the narrowed R-155 guard still in 'single' mode and was refused (rc=10). Caught by the build's true exit code. Also copies grub-release.cfg.tmpl into the brand dir and fixes the branding log line, which claimed 'single-entry menu' unconditionally. |
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admin
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a4d7dfd336 |
iso: --release must satisfy the mode check it is a third case of
The mode validation still required one of --bootstrap-env / --pairing, so --release died at 'one of --bootstrap-env (direct) or --pairing (generic) is required' before reaching its own validated branch. Caught by the build's true exit code (rc=1), not by a pipe. |
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admin
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01a8155c5a |
iso v1.26.0: the PUBLIC release image — no answer file, interactive install, day-0 by .deb
Design inputs: SPIKE-universal-iso-{1,2,3,4}-2026-07-31.md. Every choice below is a measurement.
NEW: scripts/iso/pkg/ — the felhom-bootstrap .deb, built from committed source.
Two files only (script + unit), NOT three: felhom-bootstrap.sh:91 reads /etc/felhom/bootstrap.env
only 'if [[ -r ]]', and its defaults at :95-96 are EXACTLY what the pairing env set
(build-felhom-iso.sh:257-258) — so shipping it would add a 0600 file to a public package to express
values the script already defaults to. NO dependencies: the binaries it calls run at FIRST BOOT,
not at postinst time, so SPIKE 4's open 'dpkg --configure -a' ordering question does not arise.
The postinst is structurally incapable of failing (no 'set -e', every statement guarded, ends
'exit 0'); build-deb.sh self-asserts G8/G9 and REFUSES to emit a package that violates them.
iso-repack.sh — two changes, both narrowing rather than deleting:
- R-155 guard: now applies to FELHOM_MENU=single ONLY. It protected the single-entry mode's promise
(one button labelled 'install' must not drop into a disk-picker); a release image carries no
auto-installer-mode.toml BY DESIGN (gate G1), so refusing it would be the guard firing on the
shape it describes rather than the one it prevents.
- the menu collapse now has a release mode: two INTERACTIVE entries, Graphical default, timeout 15.
Entry-count and banned-token gates are per-mode; the six-token list is UNCHANGED for single mode.
- .deb injection into /proxmox/packages/, with a skip-list collision check (a colliding name would
be dropped silently — the inert-payload class) and a post-remaster assertion that it landed in
final.iso, not merely in the extract tree.
build-felhom-iso.sh — --release: no profile, no root hash, no answer.toml, no prepare-iso at all.
Skipping prepare-iso is what removes the Automated entry by construction, since the stock grub.cfg
emits it only inside 'if [ -f auto-installer-mode.toml ]'.
R-128 RULING — FIXED, by correcting the claim rather than inventing an assertion for it. The comment
said ISO_VERSION 'aligns with SCRIPT_VERSION'; nothing evaluated it and the two had drifted. The
coupling does not exist: the ISO is frozen, felhom-host-install.sh is fetched at run time from main
(R-94/R-110), so an assertion would invent a constraint. Comment corrected, ISO_VERSION -> 1.26.0.
Release gate G6 AMENDED before the build, with its reasoning recorded in the runbook: the six-token
ban existed to keep users away from the manual installer, which the ruling makes the product.
'proxtui' (the TUI installer we ship) and 'nomodeset' (its graphics fallback) are dropped for
release images; proxdebug/Rescue Boot/memtest/fwsetup stay banned in both modes.
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admin
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e787391c0a |
docs: the public ISO release gate, written BEFORE the first release image
A standard defined in advance cannot be rationalised afterwards, and this is the artifact that most needs one: once a file is on iso.felhom.eu and someone has downloaded it, it cannot be recalled. Twelve criteria, each checkable against the UPLOADED FILE rather than the build inputs, and each carrying the spike measurement that justifies it: - G1 no answer.toml / auto-installer-mode.toml — deletes the whole Spike 1-2 problem space and removes the Automated menu entry by construction rather than by a guard - G2/G3/G4 no root hash, no SSH key, no customer identity — the shared-credential classes - G5 credential scan by ENUMERATION against the stock ISO, not a pattern sweep (Spike 1 found /answer.toml precisely because the earlier recon grepped the wrong file) - G6 menu present, interactive default, timeout >= 10 (Spike 2 lost a probe to a 1-second menu), underscore timeout_style, and the banned-token safety gate kept unchanged - G7/G8 the felhom .deb present, and a postinst that cannot fail: no systemctl start/daemon-reload (no systemd runs in the installer chroot), no network use (the cable may be out), no 'set -e', ends 'exit 0' - G9 felhom-bootstrap.sh byte-identical to repo HEAD — the one frozen, drift-capable payload - G10 every build input committed (Spike 1: demo-felhom came from an uncommitted profile) - G11 published checksum AND a verified download round trip - G12 bucket Public Access stays Disabled Committed on its own, before any build. |
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admin
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61e9b55737 |
SPIKE 4: a .deb in the ISO DOES deliver on an interactive install
Findings only — no script, profile or build file changed; no release ISO built, nothing published. documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-4-2026-07-31.md MEASURED, with a control, and the negative control is in the SAME box. One ISO (15 GRUB entries), a trivial probe .deb injected into /proxmox/packages/, two qm-created VMs on demo-hp (400 interactive / 401 automated control) on a scratch dir storage at the /mnt/nvme-1tb mount ROOT. Interactive (Terminal UI) install: - package installed (ii felhom-spike4-probe 0.0.1) - postinst RAN (marker + content intact) - it enabled a systemd unit, and that unit FIRED ON FIRST BOOT (uptime 7.98s, pid1=systemd) - while on the same machine proxmox-first-boot is NOT installed and /var/lib/proxmox-first-boot does not exist — Spike 3's negative reproduced, not assumed. Postinst environment (identical both paths): pid1=unconfigured.sh, NO running systemd, but 'systemctl enable' SUCCEEDS; /proc+/sys mounted; network+DNS happened to be up (inherited from the installer's DHCP — must NOT be relied on). Constraints: never systemctl start/daemon-reload, never require network, never fail, do the real work in the unit at first boot. Repack preserves it, but a naive 'xorriso -boot_image any replay' fails with 'Overlapping MBR partition entries' — iso-repack.sh:270-292 already documents that exact failure and its fix. R-153 RETRACTED into R-94 leg (b): OPEN-ITEMS.md:15 carries it verbatim at READY (XS), and R-29 says explicitly 'do not mint a new ID for a new instance'. Spike 3's further claim that the drift leaves the generator 'three minor versions stale' was FALSE and is corrected — R-94 retracts that exact reading; the served script is always main, so 1.22.0 is what every install already gets. No new R-rows opened. |
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admin
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bb29186d62 |
SPIKE 3: [first-boot] does NOT fire on an interactive install
Findings only — no script, profile or build file changed; no release ISO built, nothing published. documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-3-2026-07-31.md MEASURED with a control from the SAME image (one ISO, 15 GRUB entries): - Automated entry -> hook fires: ttyS0 marker, marker file, /var/lib/proxmox-first-boot/proxmox-first-boot (0700), activation symlink, unit active. - Terminal-UI entry, normal manual install -> ALL absent, and the proxmox-first-boot PACKAGE is not installed at all. A whole-filesystem grep for the marker returns nothing. Mechanism cited: Config.pm:118 defaults first_boot.enabled=0 and set_first_boot_opt is never called in the Perl tree; Install.pm:746 returns early without it; Install.pm:1360 skips the package. proxinstall (graphical) has ZERO occurrences of first-boot. [first-boot] is an automated-installer feature, unavailable on every interactive path by construction. R-154. A delivery mechanism DOES exist and is UNTESTED: Install.pm:1343-1372 unpacks every .deb in the ISO's /proxmox/packages/ into the target on every path (fixed skip-list), then dpkg --configure -a runs postinsts (:1378) — how PVE ships first-boot itself. Read from source, not measured. Q5: the public image should carry NO answer.toml at all — that removes the baked root hash, the disk profile and the whole Spike 1-2 problem space, and makes it a one-line release gate. But iso-repack.sh:100-106 refuses an ISO without auto-installer-mode.toml. R-155. Incidental R-153: hub hostInstallVersion=1.19.0 vs SCRIPT_VERSION=1.22.0; hostinstall_gates.py detects it and exits 1 — the gate works, nothing runs it. Q3 (real stub at before-network) was NOT reached and is recorded as not reached. |
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admin
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19c932a693 |
SPIKE 2 complete: locked root closes the PVE web UI; before-network gives a measured zero window
Findings only — no script, profile or build file changed; no ISO built, nothing published.
documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-2-2026-07-31.md
Both Tier 0 boxes went offline mid-session (provider cable fault; four routes tried, no Tier 2
fallback used) and returned. All three scenarios then ran to completion on real PVE, each signalled
by reboot-mode='power-off' rather than a disk hash.
- A LOCKED ROOT CLOSES THE PVE WEB INTERFACE. Measured at the exact endpoint the UI uses
(POST /api2/json/access/ticket, root@pam) WITH A WORKING CONTROL: known-password install returns
HTTP 200 + ticket; locked install returns 401 for every password and none can exist.
passwd -S root = L, shadow = literal-asterisk, PVE uses the stock PAM stack.
- GRUB recovery mode is also closed ('the root account is locked') — but init=/bin/bash still gives
an unauthenticated root@(none):/#. A locked box is recoverable, operator-only, at the console.
The installed GRUB has NO password, so locking root is not a physical-security measure. R-152.
- before-network MEASURED (A/B, same image): the hook RUNS (marker, uptime 6.58s) with entropy 256,
writable /etc, all binaries and openssl_rand_len=32, while ip_global is EMPTY and
listen_22_8006 = 0. fully-up is the converse: sshd+pveproxy active, 3 listening. Zero window.
- R-148: answer.toml.tmpl:27 justifies fully-up with a pvesh/pct dependency the stub does not have
(grep rc=1) — it blocked the ordering now measured as the fix.
- R-149 three ordering values; R-150 Condition-guarded hooks skip silently; R-151 demo-felhom built
from an uncommitted profile.
Three probes failed and are recorded as failed: a container probe that ran as uid 0, a GRUB probe
that missed the 1-second menu timeout, and a kernel-line edit one line off (caught by a pre-typing
verification screendump). The interim 'Layer 1 teardown INCOMPLETE' is corrected — the fixture had
never landed, because the staging mkdir was in the SSH call that timed out.
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admin
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5bdd8372f8 |
SPIKE 2: before-network gives a zero window by construction; locked root closes sulogin
Findings only — no script, profile or build file changed; no ISO built, nothing published. documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-2-2026-07-31.md BOTH Tier 0 boxes went offline mid-session (remote site, 12:28 CEST; four routes tried, our tailscale pod healthy). Q1/Q2/Q3 each keep a part needing a nested VM: those are BLOCKED, not answered. DooPlex was NOT used as a fallback — Tier 2, and this task did not authorise it. Established without them: - STRUCTURAL: ordering='before-network' maps to proxmox-first-boot-network-pre.service (Before=network-pre.target, Type=oneshot) — it completes before ANY interface is configured, so a rotation there has a zero-length window BY CONSTRUCTION, not by being fast. - R-148: the stub does not need 'fully-up'. stub-first-boot.sh has no pvesh/pct/pveum/qm call (grep rc=1); that usage is in felhom-bootstrap.sh under its own After=network-online unit. answer.toml.tmpl:27 justifies the current ordering with a dependency that does not exist. - R-149: the ordering enum has THREE values (before-network, network-online, fully-up), not two. - MECHANISM (container, not PVE): locked root closes sulogin — 'the root account is locked' for both '*' and '!', with a working control. So 'discard' and 'lock' are the SAME outcome for recovery, making the escrow decision binary. - R-150: all four proxmox-first-boot-* units are Condition-guarded; a failed condition is a SKIP, so a hook that never ran looks identical to one that succeeded. - R-151: demo-felhom was installed from an UNCOMMITTED profile — a Tier 0 reference box is not reproducible from main. - Q4: four gates in iso-repack.sh enforce the single-entry menu; default/timeout already settable. The first mechanism probe was invalid (uid 0 bypassed pam_unix; sulogin had no tty) and a teardown error (shredding the control plaintext) are both recorded as failures, not massaged. demo-hp teardown is INCOMPLETE and named as such; the command is recorded, not claimed done. |
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admin
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ea00976403 |
SPIKE: a universal ISO needs a different disk strategy and a locked root
Findings only — no script, profile or build file changed; no ISO built, nothing published. documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-2026-07-31.md - R-139 (HIGH): a disk filter matching >1 device does NOT fail safe. Observed in a nested VM — the installer silently picked one of two matching disks and wiped it; validate-answer accepts such an answer. The 'filter did not match any devices' guard covers the ZERO-match case only. - No udev property distinguishes an internal system disk from external media. Measured on demo-felhom with its 1TB external attached: ID_BUS='ata' for BOTH, lsblk RM=0 for both, and device-info exposes no removability property. demo-hp's NVMe carries no ID_BUS/ID_TYPE at all. - R-141 (HIGH): the answer schema makes a root credential mandatory, but root-password-hashed='*' validates AND installs to completion. [first-boot].ordering accepts 'before-network', the only ordering that closes the exposure window structurally. - Q3: prepare-iso leaves grub.cfg byte-identical to stock (15 entries, automated AND interactive) — a two-entry menu is purely a Felhom grub.cfg.tmpl change. - R-129 resolved: demo-hp's key is the operator's own, added post-install; demo-felhom's IS baked by an uncommitted profile. The reachable-before-rotation measurement FAILED twice and is recorded as failed, not inferred. Opens R-139..R-147; restates R-128. |
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5825ceeabf | docs: v0.86.0 copy-without-reveal + the break-glass credential leg is now proven (PVE ticket minted) | ||
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admin
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80f473999e | manifests: hub 0.85.0 -> 0.86.0 (Copy without reveal) | ||
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670ec35ece |
hub v0.86.0 — Copy works without revealing, and every copy branch reports itself
Found by the operator, in the way that matters: it cost a real login.
The v0.84.0 Console access card shipped its Copy button DISABLED until a Reveal.
Clicking it did nothing, silently, so the clipboard kept whatever was already in
it — another host's console password from an earlier reveal. That got pasted into
demo-hp's PVE login, which failed with no explanation: the box logged a plain
`password check failed for user (root)`, the credential was never at fault, and
nothing on screen said the copy had not happened.
A copy button that silently no-ops is worse than no copy button. The operator
cannot tell "copied" from "did nothing", and the stale value left behind is a
VALID secret for a DIFFERENT machine — so the failure looks like a stale
credential and sends you diagnosing the wrong thing.
Copy now works without revealing, and that is the safer default rather than a
concession: the secret goes straight to the clipboard and never renders on
screen, so it cannot be shoulder-surfed or caught in a screenshot. Reveal remains
for when it must be read.
Three silent-failure branches closed, all in the same eight-line function:
- not yet revealed -> was a disabled no-op; now fetches and copies
- navigator.clipboard absent -> was silently skipped; now shows it and says why
- writeText() REJECTED -> promise was ignored, so the operator believed it
copied; now shows it and reports the refusal
The success path names the host ("Copied demo-hp-bb76ea's root@pam password"),
because the clipboard is fleet-wide and every box has a different console
password — "copied" alone cannot say for WHICH box, which is the confusion that
produced the incident.
One retrieval path, shared: the endpoint is defined once (data-reveal-url) and
read back with getAttribute, so Copy cannot drift onto a different, unaudited URL
than Reveal. Server-side is unchanged — both buttons hit the same CSRF-gated
endpoint and both write the same recovery_credential_revealed event, which is
correct: the register records accesses, and a copy is an access.
Tests 566 -> 568. Red-proof: re-adding `disabled` reproduces the shipped bug.
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9e079c7883 |
RECON: a Felhom-issued subdomain works in the product — the blocker is Cloudflare edge-cert depth
Question A: YES, no code change. customer.domain is a trimmed string with no UNIQUE, no CHECK, no format rule (store.go:114, configs.go:673), copied verbatim into controller.yaml (configgen.go:48), and every one of its 30 consumers on the box interpolates it without parsing. Zero hits for registrable/eTLD/publicsuffix across both repos. Nothing creates DNS records (zero hits for dns_records) — the two Cloudflare clients are WAF-only. And the zone-ownership assumption is a SWITCH, not a requirement: traefik.yml.tmpl selects DNS-01 when cf_api_token is set and HTTP-01 when it is empty. The real blocker is Cloudflare, proven live: the edge certificate covers exactly one wildcard level (SAN = demo-felhom.eu, *.demo-felhom.eu), so a two-label hostname — which a per-tester subdomain forces — gets "tls alert handshake failure" and no peer certificate at all. That makes Advanced Certificate Manager a prerequisite of the separate-domain plan, not an optional extra. Whether ACM is available on the account could not be established read-only: the only Cloudflare tokens in reach are the Zone:DNS:Edit tokens on the demo boxes, which the fence forbids using. Question C, measured rather than reasoned: r.Cookie returns the FIRST match and never tries the others (BOGUS+real = 302, real+BOGUS = 200), so a tossed cookie wins outright — DoS and confusion, not takeover, since it fails closed on mutations. CSRF is a single choke point (server.go:256) and the token carries the whole load against a same-registrable-domain attacker. But it is SKIPPED entirely when no session cookie is present, which with browser-cached Basic auth is cross-origin CSRF on every mutating route (R-135). Agreeing with the separate-domain recommendation, with the caveat the brief asked for: it is necessary but not sufficient. It does not solve Question D, because that is a shared-zone problem and the new domain is a shared zone. Filed R-133..R-138: duplicate domains accepted; hub/controller zone-resolvers disagree on depth; CSRF skipped on the no-cookie path; __Host- rename (one line, preconditions verified met); geo-WAF rules zone-scoped and non-namespaced (four cross-tenant faults, blocks shared-zone onboarding); shared-zone cf_api_token is a zone-wide DNS-write capability on a customer's box. Nothing created: no customer, DNS record, tunnel, route or code change. |
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eb5d05f496 | docs: host-addresses audit + capability-map row + REPORT (agent 0.119.0 / hub 0.85.0) | ||
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37f7ff69f2 | manifests: hub 0.84.0 -> 0.85.0 (Network card) | ||
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e07d90f0f4 |
hub v0.85.0 — Network card: a host's addresses are visible at last
Pairs with agent v0.119.0 and is useless without it. A managed box's LAN IP was not shown anywhere in the hub, because nothing reported it — the host report carried no address of any kind. The only IP reachable from the UI at all was the WireGuard one, on /offsite's peer table keyed by pubkey, so an operator could go peer->host and never host->peer, which is the direction anyone actually asks in. The host page grows a Network card: every routable address the box holds, one row per (interface, address), plus a WireGuard row. On demo-felhom that is vmbr0 192.168.0.162/24 and tailscale0 100.70.170.35/32 — with the PVE web console at https://<the LAN address>:8006, the thing the operator wanted and could not get. WireGuard is rendered as TWO facts, deliberately. WGAssignedIP is the hub's own allocation (wg_peers, authoritative desired state); WGConfirmed is whether the box reports actually holding it. Showing the allocation alone would make a peer that was never applied look healthy — the same shape as reading a timestamp that records an attempt as if it recorded a result. The split is keyed on the ALLOCATION, not the interface name: wg-felhom is the agent's current unit name, and a UI keyed on that string would silently mis-render the day it changes. An old agent renders UNKNOWN, never "no addresses". Below agent 0.119.0 the field is absent from the wire, and an absent signal is not a negative result — the page says so and names the version needed. Rendering an empty list there would have stated something false about the host. No new store table and no new ingest path: the report is already stored opaquely and GetWGPeerForHost already existed with no UI consumer. This is parse + render. The report fixture in the tests is the REAL wire — the addresses block copied out of `felhom-agent --selftest=hub` on demo-felhom running 0.119.0. Tests 559 -> 566; four red-proofs (inert view-model, unconditional confirmation, the old-agent branch, and the drift case) each run, observed failing, reverted. |
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b4edc087fa |
Tester gate: golden re-baked to 0.188.0, fresh-install proof PASSED — a fresh box is safe to hand to a tester
§7.2 answer: YES. A real day-0 from the existing v1.25.0 ISO reached a claimable,
app-serving box in ~10 minutes unattended, and an app's data came back from the
drive with the guest's app.yaml gone — proven readable by the application over
its own TCP path, with a discriminator (PRE-BACKUP row = 1, POST-BACKUP row = 0).
Part 0: NO ISO rebuild needed, verified against the ISO on disk rather than from
source. It bakes only felhom-bootstrap.sh, its unit and the secret-free pairing
env (full-base64 match, 1 hit each) and 0 hits for any installer, controller or
golden marker. The installer is fetched at run time; the live URL is byte-identical
to repo HEAD (v1.22.0, six days newer than the ISO) and the fresh box ran it.
Part 1: baked 0.188.0 rather than the brief's 0.187.0 — 0.187.0 lacks D5, which
is the very claim Part 2 step 6 tests. Published (404 pre-gate with a 200 control;
anonymous download, 649310288 bytes, sha match), vouched, and consumed by a real
box. R-120's gate exercised BOTH ways: 0.185.1 refused with no write, 0.188.0
allowed — evaluated, not silently skipped.
Part 3: RUNBOOK-manual-build.md cited a "RECORDED" qemu line that is itself
labelled reconstructed and whose source says it was never saved. The real
invocation is now captured from this bake as §4.0, with the bake/publish/teardown
steps; the old entry is marked SUPERSEDED.
Teardown all three layers, hub disposition stated: VM destroyed, scratch storage
removed with space returned exactly, customer sess-g DELETED via full cascade.
sess-f deliberately left (R-131) with its command recorded.
Filed, none fixed: R-128 (false ISO_VERSION invariant comment), R-129 (demo-hp's
"no baked SSH key" is stale — key auth works), R-130 (HARD_MIN_LVM_GIB warns and
proceeds), R-131 (fourth orphaned scratch customer), R-132 (curl's %{redirect_url}
printed the hub operator password into a transcript — HUB_PW needs rotating).
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37b93dc583 | REPORT: hub v0.84.0 deployed + endpoint-level live validation | ||
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edc7dcc9e2 | manifests: hub 0.83.0 -> 0.84.0 (Console access card) | ||
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1956e5d390 |
hub v0.84.0 — break-glass console credential on the host page
The credential existed and was not reachable when it was wanted. Every box has
had a strong random root@pam password since TASK G1, vaulted in the hub at day 0
and used for real during the sshd incident — but the only way to read it back was
a hand-written curl carrying the global operator key, a secret kept out-of-band.
In practice the PVE web console on a demo box felt locked.
The host page grows a Console access card: presence + username + set_at by
default, Reveal fetches the plaintext on demand for 60 s with a Copy button.
Masking clears the JS variable, and also fires on a second click and on
visibilitychange. A host with nothing vaulted says so, and says why.
The secret is NEVER rendered into the page, and that constraint shapes the
change. The render path uses a new store.GetHostRecoveryMeta whose struct and
SELECT both omit the secret column, so it is structurally incapable of carrying
one. The plaintext crosses the wire only in the response to POST
/hosts/{id}/reveal-recovery-credential (Cache-Control: no-store, CSRF-gated at
the ServeHTTP level; POST precisely so that gate applies and so no secret is
retrievable by URL alone). Deliberately NOT the customer page's data-secret
widget, which embeds the plaintext on every load.
A delivered reveal writes one recovery_credential_revealed event on the host's
customer timeline (info, source hub, Hungarian) via SaveEvent alone — no
dispatcher, nobody emailed, the log_tail_requested shape. Two reveals write two
events: the register records accesses, not states. A 404 is not an access. An
unbound host reveals fine and writes no event; the [INFO] hub line, carrying the
username and a length only, is then the record.
The global-key API path is untouched by design — it is the route for when the
hub UI itself is broken, and coupling it to the session layer would delete the
independence that makes it a fallback.
Recorded as a real trade: the hub session password alone now unlocks console root
fleet-wide, where retrieval previously also needed the global key. Accepted for a
single-operator, HU-geo-fenced hub that already stores these passwords in
plaintext at rest (CONTEXT.md ruling S-4). The plaintext-at-rest half is filed as
R-133 — every hub DB backup is a fleet-wide console-credential dump.
Tests 550 -> 559; four red-proofs (page leak, audit event, CSRF gate, route
order) each run, observed failing, and reverted. The route-order proof is a seam
test driving ServeHTTP: a handler-level test cannot see that defect, because the
handler is correct and simply never runs.
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admin
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0a9bd3829d |
D5 SHIPPED: Tier-1/2 restore no longer depends on the whole-guest tier
Records controller v0.188.0 across the four coupled artifacts. 07-backup-architecture.md is the owning doc: - new 7.4 = the recovery chain AFTER D5 (7.1 leg 1 superseded; leg 2, the living-app dependency, explicitly unchanged so this is not read as more than it is) - 7.3 collapsed to history, with the correction that the target as written (data_key-only) was tested in Part 0 and rejected - 3 records that the two-lane split is now real, not just intended - matrix rows 3 / 3c (new) / 13; 10.1 D5 itself shipped Also: new capability-map row, D5 collapsed in ROADMAP + OPEN-ITEMS, and R-127 filed in both (data_key flag unreliable; O4 can regenerate a DB password that no longer matches the restored data directory). The audit is named D5-drive-alone-restore rather than "...secrets..." because .gitignore blocks *secret* -- a guard worth respecting, not forcing past. |
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d42d90fed7 |
R-108 CLOSED — D5's precondition is met (controller v0.187.0)
Four-artifact update per the coupling rule, plus the audit. 07-backup-architecture.md: §10.1 retitled CLOSED with the ruling and the D5 sentence; the FileBrowser network-share row flipped YES->NO, closed at the PLACEMENT rather than at the bind; the exposure chain annotated with the fifth surface (decommission-with-migrate guarded only its source) and the correction that the boundary is the deploy POST, not the dropdown; §7.3 retitled UNBLOCKED; register row collapsed; open question F answered. 00-capability-map.md: new §D row PROVEN-LIVE, with the un-exercised legs named — the deploy-POST and decommission refusals are unit-tested, not live-fired. OPEN-ITEMS.md: R-108 dispositioned; D5 given its OWN row as READY/UNBLOCKED (it had existed only inside other rows' prose — the R-123 thread-loss pattern); R-126 registered. ROADMAP.md: R-108 collapsed to a shipped one-liner; R-126 added. R-126 filed not fixed: a .fab bundle (plaintext secrets, optional password) can be exported ONTO a NAS. Split out of R-108 rather than folded in — it is an explicit customer-chosen export destination, not a browsing surface reaching a backup tree, so it was never part of D5's precondition. Live evidence: same-box before/after on demo-felhom through the real authenticated endpoint, the network-specific refusal on demo-hp, non-effect verified in the registry, and R-67's share-root bind diffed byte-identical across the deploy. |
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admin
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70f84941d4 |
R-106/R-109 audit + registers: shipped at agent 0.118.1, plus R-125
Adds the full audit: Part 0's three answers, the pre/post recipe for both boxes, the on-disk proof that `local` froze at the 2026-07-28 target move while felhom-backup kept running, all seven red-proofs, and the three publish observables. R-125 filed: v0.118.0's R-106 half shipped INERT. Two tests ran the real Collector.Collect() but both injected a fakeObserver, and the break was one layer below in mergeConfig, which dropped the pbs namespace. The recipe still said "root" — now with namespace_state "resolved" beside it, confident and wrong. Caught by live validation, not by the green suite. Fixed in 0.118.1; filed for the doctrine point that a production-path claim must name the seam it injects at. |
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acfc2b7e95 |
R-109 + R-122: the recipe assembly stops dropping sections (hub v0.83.0)
AssembleDRRecipe's hostHalfShape/appHalfShape are ALLOW-LISTS, not the forward-compat their comment advertised: a section an emitter adds is silently discarded until it is named in both the shape struct and AssembledRecipe. No error, no log, no failing test. R-122 (found this session): that already happened and shipped. The controller has emitted offsite_restic since fork-4 — the offsite recovery LOCATION — the hub stored it for all three real customers, and appHalfShape never listed the key, so no delivered recipe has ever contained it. It stayed green because the fixture drAppHalf is hand-written and omits the field. R-109: the agent's new backup_target is a new top-level host-half section and would have been dropped identically, making the fix read as shipped while changing nothing an operator can see. 3 tests built on halves read verbatim out of the live dr_recipe table, plus 2 red-proofs (each mutation asserted to have landed). vet rc=0, suite rc=0, 17 ok. Registers: R-106 + R-109 dispositioned; R-105/R-106 were READY in ROADMAP with no OPEN-ITEMS row (→ R-123, registered); R-124 filed on the "root" spelling. |
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3d504d58c8 |
docs(R-117): CLOSED — proven live on demo-hp; R-121 filed for agent-on-box drift
R-117 row → SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE (agent v0.117.0), with the full validation in audits/R117-v0117-2026-07-30.md. Both dead states detected on real hardware through the shipped predicate: RETURN raw 8:32 /dev/sdc | bind 8:16 shutdown → stale-device, usable false IN-PLACE both 252:11 emergency_ro, raw unit active → filesystem-aborted, usable false healthy → live 340-497us per call. No block I/O proven by strace (only /proc/self/mountinfo, 0 statfs) — the Part 1 CLAUDE.md fence applied to its own first consumer. No regression through the real pipeline: the live backup-target drive reads bound_under_parent=True via GET /disks with the controller's own credential, with 32 gate lines in 3 min as the positive observable and zero spurious transitions. The ruling asked for in §2.2 is recorded in full and flagged for overrule: Aborted must NOT self-heal. A re-bind lands on the same dead superblock and the call site runs every 20s, so repairing would be an infinite silent retry that masks the state. It surfaces instead. No operator decision was taken quietly — the reasoning is that it routes an already-broken state into the existing gate, event types and Hungarian copy, so no new concept reaches the customer. R-121 filed: a box's installed agent can sit releases behind the vouched one and nothing notices. demo-hp ran 0.113.0 against a vouched 0.116.0 through the whole R-116/R-117 arc. Confirmed at source that R-120's gate cannot catch it — it compares goldenVer against NewestReportedControllerVersion(), i.e. golden-artifact vs fleet-CONTROLLER. MinAgent is protective, not an alarm, and 0.113.0 equalled the floor. Fourth instance of the drift family. Also filed: R-117g (an aborted filesystem is never cleared automatically by design, so it alarms until a human acts, with no guided recovery) and R-117h (StablePathForRaw hardcodes the parent, so the repair path cannot be exercised on hardware without writing into a live customer guest's namespace). |
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37515cda7c |
docs(R-117 Part 1): a health check issues no block I/O — and narrow one R-116 claim
Two record items, banked before any Go file is opened. 1. CLAUDE.md gains a standing rule beside the seam-wiring rule: a health check issues no block I/O. A probe that touches a wedged device enters uninterruptible sleep, survives SIGKILL, and cannot be recovered until the device returns or the host reboots — so `systemctl restart` hangs too. A timeout protects the caller's control flow and nothing else. Liveness is decided from /proc and kernel state. Measured in the R-117 spike §6.3: D state 3m50s after kill -9; a buffered write with no fsync blocked too (O_CREAT needs journal access); statfs and getdents returned HEALTHY on a namespace that EIOs every byte. Repeated as a one-line pointer in felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md, because health checks are written in that repo and felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md does not load in an agent-only session — a standing rule that does not load where it binds is the inert-seam shape applied to a rule. 2. The R-116 row gains the clause the spike recommended but did not apply. Its verdict stands and every input to the pairing fix is configuration-derived. But the over-correction window's degraded:false was read off a drive whose bind was dead, so it evidences "the gate did not over-fire", not "the drive was healthy". The two RETURNED lines remain a genuine positive observable, so rule 3 is still satisfied. Nothing else about the row changed. |
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e70b5feebe |
docs(R-117): the hang case measured — an I/O probe turns a wedged drive into an unkillable agent
Completes the spike once the venue came back. Q4's hang case and teardown are now measurements, not plans. Against a dmsetup-suspended device (I/O queues instead of returning EIO): - P1 (devno compare) and P2 (ext4 abort flags) completed in 364us / 206us. They read /proc, so no block device is involved. - statfs and getdents completed and reported HEALTHY — on a wedged device they do not even hang. R-117b confirmed in a second failure mode. - EVERY probe that touches the device blocked, including a buffered write with no fsync: the O_CREAT metadata path needs journal access (wchan=do_get_write_access). There is no cheap-and-safe write probe. - The blocked process survived SIGTERM AND SIGKILL (stat=D, wchan=folio_wait_bit_common, still alive 3m50s after kill -9) and died only when the device was resumed. So `systemctl restart felhom-agent` would hang, leaving the agent unrecoverable until the device returns or the host reboots. The thread count does not reveal the leak (5->5, 5->6). Filed as R-117f. A timeout protects the caller's control flow and nothing else, so "the fix must issue no block I/O" is now a fence rather than a preference — the thread-leak hypothesis the probes were built to test turned out to be the weaker half of the result. Teardown done, all three layers: guest 9301 destroyed, r117scratch removed, both dm and both loop devices gone, scsi_debug unloaded, local back to 37.02% against a 37.00% session start. Fences re-verified AFTER teardown: 9201 running, drill-r50 stopped, local-lvm 38.84% byte-identical, felhom-backup content unchanged, live /mnt/felhom-drives intact with both submounts, agent active. Layer 3 genuinely empty — 9301 had no NIC and ran no controller. Trap recorded: a suspended dm device must be resumed BEFORE any umount, or the teardown blocks on the same uninterruptible sleep. |
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c949389c95 |
docs(R-117): spike — the mechanism, a recipe, and a steady-state half nobody had looked for
Both halves of the R-113 conjunction are path-presence tests: GuestSeesMount (intermediary.go:276) and isHostMountpoint (:394) compare field 5 of a mountinfo line and never read field 3, so neither can see that the bind and the raw mount name different devices. Measured BoundUnderParent=TRUE over a namespace that EIOs on every read and write. Reproduced 3/3 on a purpose-built scratch LXC on demo-hp; predicates evaluated by a throwaway probe calling the real localapi code from d4eb259. Three results that change the shape of the fix: - Q7: a bind can die in STEADY STATE with no detach/return cycle. The gate produces no action and nothing is emitted on any channel. A Return-branch fix cannot reach this half, and a devno comparison does not detect it. - Q6/R-117d: AttachDrive's normalize leg already performs the repair, and three call sites already invoke it - including the controller's Return branch before it restarts apps. All defeated by one early return at :235. Unblock the existing path; do not add a new one. - Q1: the device-node change is a CONSEQUENCE, not a precondition. The stale bind pins the dead superblock, forcing the returning device onto a new number. Control test: released, the letter is reused. Not established: the hang case. Venue and probes built, run lost to a site internet outage; the thread-leak hypothesis is not claimed as a result. Teardown of the spike venue is owed - commands in the findings doc; nothing fenced was touched and no hub-side record was created. |
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29bcfeb214 |
docs(R-120): CLOSED on both halves — golden current, and the class has a gate that refuses
Half 1, the artifact: golden 0.186.0 baked, published, vouched, and proven on a REAL day-0 on demo-hp (not the fixture, per the rule committed in Part 1). With the target detached, the fresh box's endpoint returned the TargetAbsent copy -- "A rendszermentés meghajtója nem érhető el — amíg vissza nem csatlakoztatod..." -- with offer_path absent entirely. The day-old read on the 0.185.1 golden had returned the false system-disk message plus an offer of the other drive. That is the customer-visible defect closed. Half 2, the mechanism: operator ruled REFUSE, shipped as hub v0.82.0 and DEPLOYED. Proven live by re-attempting the original mistake -- vouching the stale 0.185.1 golden now yields HTTP 303 flash=golden_behind_fleet plus [WARN] artifact vouch REFUSED, and the manifest reads back unchanged at 0.186.0. Refused AND unwritten, against the real fleet signal rather than a unit fixture. Recorded on R-29's audit list as the first ENFORCED gate beside its three orphans, so the contrast is kept rather than lost. The orphans are unchanged -- this proves the pattern is available, not that the backlog moved. Teardown all three layers: VM 9402 purged, r120-images removed with the space measured back, hub layer gate-blocked on ONLINE with the command recorded. Last session's sess-e was deleted this run, discharging its recorded layer 3. |
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1a68b53b06 |
hub v0.82.0 (R-120): the vouch path REFUSES a golden the fleet has already outrun
The golden's version IS the controller it bakes (build-golden.sh:345 defaults GOLDEN_VERSION to the controller tag), so a golden behind the newest deployed controller means every FRESH install lands on stale application code. On the R-120 occurrence that stale code shipped a customer-facing falsehood: a box from the 0.185.1 golden told a customer whose backup drive had fallen out that the backup was on the same disk as the system -- false, the drive was gone -- and offered a different drive as the remedy. WHY A GATE, NOT A REMINDER. The gap has opened three times: R-111 (golden's agent 17 releases behind), R-115 (agent built and deployed, never published), R-120 (this). The first two were closed by re-baking and remembering; remembering then failed again. R-29 is the standing proof that a check nobody runs is worse than none because it reads as coverage -- hostinstall_gates.py sat RED and uninvoked across three version bumps and hub_confirm_gate.py has never run at all. So the property that matters is not whether a check exists but whether it BLOCKS. - Wired into handleSetArtifacts (internal/web/configs.go), immediately before the only write, on the sole UI path to SetArtifactManifest -- it runs on every vouch without anyone choosing to. A script in scripts/ would have been a fourth orphan. - It REFUSES (operator ruling, 2026-07-30), with a flash naming the remedy. - Signal: store.NewestReportedControllerVersion() over reports.controller_version, SEMVER-compared in Go -- MAX() in SQL ranks 0.99.0 above 0.186.0, a pair this fleet has shipped. No outbound call, no new credential. - Fail-open in exactly two deliberate cases: an empty golden field (clearing the manifest is legitimate) and an unknown fleet version (a new hub must vouch its first golden). NEAR-MISS RECORDED: the first draft read guests.controller_version, a column that exists in the schema and that NOTHING writes -- it would always have seen "" and failed open, i.e. inert, this gate's own failure shape. Caught by grepping for a writer before trusting the column. Blind spot stated rather than papered over: a controller no box has ever run is invisible to this signal. Not the failure that has bitten -- all three instances were deployed-newer-than-baked. 4 tests through the PRODUCTION handler over httptest, never an injected seam. The refusal asserts both the flash and that the manifest was NOT written, because a gate that redirects and saves anyway reads as enforcement while providing none. Red-proof: deleting the block makes the stale golden vouchable and both assertions fail. ROADMAP R-29's audit list now records this as the FIRST enforced gate, so the contrast with its three orphans is kept rather than lost. The orphans are unchanged. Suite rc=0 read separately from this commit. |
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admin
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49b627684c |
docs(R-120): golden rebaked to 0.186.0, published, vouched, proven on a real day-0
The golden baked controller 0.185.1 -- confirmed from the golden's OWN record (drill/bake-0.185.1.log:1 and :330) and from build-golden.sh:345, which derives GOLDEN_VERSION from the controller tag. 0.185.1 predates R-114 + R-112, so every freshly installed box told a customer whose backup drive had fallen out that the backup was on the same disk as the system (false) and offered a different drive as the remedy. Baked golden 0.186.0 from main's controller in the DooPlex bake fixture: overlay2 OK, 3 mounts included, FATAL 0, exclusions 0, 618 MB, upload HTTP 201, GOLDEN_SHA256 b760ac6a33e70700..., token-leak grep 0, GL-1 teardown with drill.qcow2 back to virgin. Three observables, quoted as returned: PUBLISHED (anonymous GET -- what the installer does -- 200 / 648930639 bytes / sha identical to the bake); VOUCHED (manifest read BACK, not the 303); RESOLVED BY A CONSUMER (Artifact manifest served for customer sess-f, golden=0.186.0). Floor NOT touched per publish-train rule 2 -- it is a separate form and min_controller_version still reads 0.156.0. MinAgent left 0.113.0 because 0.186.0 declares it unchanged. Proven on a REAL day-0 on demo-hp, not the fixture, per the rule committed in Part 1: VM 9402 from the v1.25.0 ISO -> Controller elindult (0.186.0), box confirms felhom-controller:0.186.0 + agent 0.116.0. A fresh box now runs 0.186.0 where it ran 0.185.1. The procedure was NOT unwritten: RUNBOOK-manual-build.md:101-115 documents it and build-golden.sh carries its own usage and publishes to Gitea itself. One documentation-integrity finding: that runbook says to use the RECORDED qemu line and not reconstruct, while the line it cites is itself labelled reconstructed, the canonical one never having been saved. NOT done and not claimed: the TargetAbsent/empty-offer_path endpoint capture (the claim gate runs before auth with no Bearer escape -- R-119's fourth instance), and the Part 3 mechanism, which awaits the operator ruling. Recommendation and exact wiring recorded in the audit rather than built. VM 9402 + r120-images + customer sess-f retained pending that read, with teardown commands recorded. Previous session's sess-e layer-3 is now DISCHARGED -- it aged to STALE and the cascade completed, full residue purge logged. |
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admin
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376365bb12 |
docs(target-selection): a fixture may prove a mechanism; only a fresh box may prove a path
The page said which machine is safe to break but not when reusing a test box is legitimate. That distinction is exactly what surfaced R-120: R-116's closing run deliberately did a real day-0 from the ISO instead of reusing the standing fixture, and the fresh box installed the golden's controller -- a release behind -- and showed the customer the wrong absent-target message. A fixture would have shown a controller nobody installs. Adds to the Tier 1 section: a reusable snapshot-reset fixture is the right default for MECHANISM work (payload capture, fix cycles, claims about code behaviour), while a fresh day-0 from the ISO is REQUIRED for any claim about the install path, the golden image, agent publish/vouch or first-boot state -- naming the drift family it exists to catch (R-111, R-115, R-120). Also: a fixture must record its provenance (which golden, agent and controller, and when), because a fixture whose versions drift silently is R-120's mechanism turned into a permanent installation -- worse than no fixture, since it produces confident wrong results quickly. Part 1 of the R-120 task, committed alone and before the bake. Docs only. |
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admin
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772956d214 |
docs(R-116): CLOSED — proven live; capability row F to PROVEN-LIVE; R-120 filed
The events leg the previous commit reported as not-reached is now done. The operator relayed the claim code (the only route: bcrypt-hashed hub-side, emailed only), the two storage paths were registered through the real POST /api/storage/register, and the cycle ran on the fresh box: 07:20:04 backup_target_absent (error) Cel meghajto <- TARGET, specific 07:22:34 backup_target_restored (info) Cel meghajto <- its matching pair 07:24:04 storage_disconnected (error) Adat meghajto <- NON-target, generic 07:25:34 storage_reconnected (info) Adat meghajto All four at the hub; gate fired in 3 s. Two matched pairs, correctly discriminated -- and discrimination is proven NON-trivially for the first time, since both prior runs had the target itself emit the generic event. Over-correction passes on a positive observable, with two RETURNED lines proving the gate was ticking. 00-capability-map row F: PARTIAL -> PROVEN-LIVE with the evidence and the caveat. R-120 filed: the golden bakes controller 0.185.1, which PREDATES R-114 + R-112, so a freshly installed box shows the customer the WRONG absent-target message -- observed live on the drill box: the generic "the backup is on the same disk as the system" copy (false; the target is a drive that vanished) plus an offer of the other drive as the remedy. That is E2D 5.3's exact payload, still reachable on any new install. R-115's class one layer up -- R-111 closed by re-baking the golden, 0.186.0 then shipped, the golden did not move, and the gap reopened silently; this time the stale artifact carries a customer-facing falsehood in exactly the state R-116 now alarms about correctly. Teardown recorded for all three layers, hub layer gate-blocked with the command. |
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admin
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315c469fc8 |
docs(R-116): v0.116.0 proven live at the payload layer; events leg blocked on an emailed claim code
audits/R116-v0116-2026-07-30.md + the R-116 register row. WHAT PASSED, on real hardware. Agent 0.116.0 published (independent registry GET verified the bytes), vouched, and installed UNAIDED by a fresh box -- "Artifact manifest served for customer sess-e (agent=0.116.0 golden=0.185.1)", host sess-e-5d4427 ... 0.116.0 ONLINE. Real day-0 on a nested PVE on demo-hp (per runbooks/target-selection.md, which sent this run there rather than to the DooPlex fixture the previous run used), both drives enrolled through the real endpoints, device loss a real hot-detach. Captured live, absent state: the target is now ONE row carrying backup_target:true AND guest_path:/mnt/felhom-drives/cel with mount_path:"", so isTarget[/mnt/felhom-drives/cel] = TRUE -- it was false through v0.115.0. RETURNED gives true as well, so the pair matches. All three guards pass from the same payload: R-114 preserved (no row combines the flag with a non-empty mount_path), no over-correction (bound_under_parent:false), and discrimination at the payload layer (the non-target carries the flag on no row) -- the thing neither prior run could show. WHAT DID NOT HAPPEN, and is not claimed. No backup_target_absent or backup_target_restored event was observed on the wire. planDriveGates iterates registered StoragePaths and the drill controller has none ([WARN] Storage paths: no storage paths registered); every storage route answers 401 "dashboard not yet claimed". The claim code is bcrypt-hashed and emailed-only, and handleSelfBindLinkSend (selfbind_mint.go:139-161) renders a flash and never the token, so no operator-side route exists. A gen-2 code was re-sent; the drill VM, its storage and customer sess-e are DELIBERATELY RETAINED with teardown commands recorded, so the leg finishes without a rebuild. Reported as not-reached rather than as a third trivial pass. R-119 filed: the claim gate makes drive-gate legs unreachable to CC by design, and has now stopped three sessions at the same wall -- needs a ruling (operator-scoped test affordance, or a documented prerequisite step), not a fix. R-117 reproduced on real hardware with a read/write probe (EIO both directions while /disks reports attached + bound_under_parent:true) and §5 records how it colours the reattach leg. R-118's symptom vanishes incidentally on this one row; R-118 is NOT fixed. sess-c and sess-d verified GONE (404, absent from both tables) -- cleared by the operator using the previously recorded commands, not by this session. |
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admin
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1aa1bd17c2 |
docs(template): §13 gains a teardown step, §15 gains its evidence line
Three drills, three orphaned hub customers -- drill-r50, sess-c, sess-d -- because §13 covered the clean-tree gate, build/deploy, live validation and the STOP point and said nothing about teardown at all. Layers 1 and 2 (the VM and its volumes; the host's reclaimed space) get remembered because they are visible on the box. Layer 3, the hub-side customer or appliance record, is invisible from there and has been missed every time -- sess-c was not even recorded by its own report, so the record claimed a clean teardown that had not happened. §13: a Teardown subsection at the end, before §14. All three layers, with the hub layer requiring an EXPLICIT disposition -- deleted, retained as a fixture with the reason, or gate-blocked with the command recorded -- because silence is how drill-r50 became simultaneously a blocked customer and the only drift fixture. Cites runbooks/target-selection.md for which machine to provision on rather than restating it. §15: deliverable 8 demands the evidence for all three layers and names the failure it prevents; the former 8 (Observations) becomes 9. No section renumbered, §13/§15 not restructured, author checklist untouched. Part 1 of the R-116 join task, committed alone and before any Go file is opened -- the code half ends in a live run and live runs have stalled twice, while the record work is unconditional. |
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admin
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e6b5fa1e63 |
docs: retract the expired NVMe fence, drop component versions from the inventory, fence acts in the template
Follow-up acting on the observations filed with runbooks/target-selection.md. operations/nodes.md - The demo-hp NVMe was documented "PRESENT AND UNENROLLED -- do not touch" and listed under "What is NOT enrolled here (deliberately)". Both are FALSE and had been for eight days: it was enrolled 2026-07-22 through the normal Tarhely flow and is now /mnt/nvme-1tb -- the enrolled user-data drive AND the felhom-backup target (verified live 2026-07-30: nvme0n1 -> /mnt/nvme-1tb, and dir: felhom-backup / path /mnt/nvme-1tb / is_mountpoint 1). The fence's own condition (join via Tarhely, not the installer, not by hand) was SATISFIED, so the prohibition expired with it -- while still contradicting the task specs that correctly sent drill-VM disks there. Retracted with its reason recorded, and the caution that IS still live kept (dir storage at the mountpoint ROOT, else exactMount fails and the storage reads disconnected forever). - Component versions REMOVED and a note explains why: agent/controller/hub versions change several times a day, so a number written in an inventory is wrong within hours and then read as fact -- and the fleet is not uniform (on 2026-07-30 the two boxes ran different agent AND different controller versions). Points at the authorities instead: hub /hosts + /configs, felhom-agent --version, docker ps. - Site addresses now say re-check rather than asserting one (the N100 read .162, not the recorded .147); records that LAN literals are unreachable from DooPlex while the boxes are away. Adds the target-selection pointer: this page is what the hardware IS, that page is what may be done to it. PROMPT-TEMPLATE.md -- the upstream generator of the defect - Section 12's "Do NOT touch [the untouchable]" asked the spec author to name a THING. Now asks for the forbidden ACT plus its REASON, with the demo-hp case as the worked example of how a bare object-fence over-reads. - Section 13 gains the positive counterpart, which was the actual gap: if a task needs a machine to break, NAME IT. Listing only what is off-limits leaves the most valuable unfenced machine as the residual choice. runbooks/workspace-CLAUDE.md (+ the untracked root copy re-synced, verified identical) - Host table gains a Blast radius column and the missing demo-hp row, notes felhotest as Connection refused, and points at target-selection.md. This is the file that loads FIRST every session, so leaving it with the old table would have undercut the whole fix. No code, no build, no deploy, no host reconfigured or renamed. |
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admin
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699790b12d |
docs: write down which boxes are disposable (target selection by blast radius)
Nothing in the repo said which machines are safe to break. The host table gave access and role and stopped there, so a session needing a victim had to guess -- and the guessing inverted: the two boxes that exist to be broken were treated as sacred, and DooPlex (the recovery chain) got used because it was the only box no spec had fenced. New documentation/runbooks/target-selection.md -- one page, three tiers, and per machine what is freely permitted / needs care / forbidden, each carrying its REASON so a rule can be correctly narrowed later instead of ossifying. States the selection rule positively (start at Tier 0; a Tier 2 box only when a task says so explicitly; an absent fence is not permission) and that fences name ACTS, not machines -- demo-hp's over-subscribed local-lvm is one dangerous storage, not a dangerous box. CLAUDE.md: host table gains a Blast radius column, gains the missing demo-hp row (it was where the drill VMs ran and it was not in the table at all), and a pointer line to the new runbook. CORRECTION to the spec's problem statement: the designation was not missing. The 2026-07-25 operator ruling naming the t740 as drill+build VM host -- explicitly "moved off DooPlex" -- already existed in operations/nodes.md. It sat where no session reads at start, while the prohibitions were repeated in every task spec. The defect is reachability of the ruling, not its absence, and the R-116 drill on DooPlex contradicted a written ruling rather than filling a vacuum. CORRECTION to the R-116 record, same commit: the baseline claimed controller 0.186.0 on both demo boxes. Only felhom-pve was sampled and generalised; demo-hp re-checked directly runs 0.185.1, so the fleet is split and R-114's TargetAbsent branch is absent from demo-hp. Fixed in the audit table and REPORT-r116-diag. Docs only -- no code, no build, no deploy, no host reconfigured, no host renamed. |
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admin
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d56e395a2a |
docs(R-116): isolate the mechanism from the real /disks payload; file R-117 + R-118
The absent-state /disks payload was captured on a genuine device loss, after a present-drive control run proved the query works (Part 5's three attempts failed on token extraction, and its control returned 0 rows). The answer is theory #1 -- "the registry-union row writes false" -- which was raised, declared wrong and retracted. The retraction was the error. Absent state returns 4 rows, not 3. The drive appears twice and the two facts the controller needs sit on different rows: the Observe row has backup_target:true but mount_path:"" and guest_path:"", so it contributes no key to driveTargetByPath; the registry-union row owns /mnt/felhom-drives/<name> and omits BackupTarget from its struct literal (disks.go:301-306) => false. The union row is not deduped because seen is keyed on MountPath (:290-295), the one field the absent state empties, and its own MountPath comes from the systemd .mount unit FILE (registry_known.go:40-75), which never reads the mount table. Theory #2 (the basis of the shipped v0.115.0) is false on both halves; #3 is false too. v0.115.0 is provably inert: StablePathForRaw("") returns "". Also files the read path verbatim -- the token plaintext lives only in bootstrap.json on the Proxmox host; the agent's store keeps hashes only. New: R-117 (READY M, outranks R-116) -- a returned drive's guest bind is a DEAD mount (EIO both ways) while /disks reports attached + bound_under_parent:true, so the gate restarts the customer's apps onto it and reports healthy with no alarm. R-118 (READY XS) -- an absent drive's union row advertises the root filesystem's capacity as its own. Docs only. No code written, nothing built or published; v0.115.0 untouched. Both demo boxes read-only; drill fixture restored to virgin. |
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admin
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c3ce4c7b20 |
R-116 Part 5 FAILED: the fix shipped, C5 still fails, mechanism NOT isolated
A fresh box running the fully shipped stack -- agent 0.115.0 from the Day-0 manifest plus controller 0.185.1 from the vouched golden, no hand-deploy -- still fired the GENERIC storage_disconnected on detach and the SPECIFIC backup_target_restored on return. backup_target_absent count 0. Identical to Session C. The v0.115.0 fix changed nothing observable. Part 4's three positive observables were all obtained before the run (registry newest 0.115.0, hub vouches 0.115.0, felhom-pve running 0.115.0 clean), so the publish step forgotten twice was not forgotten a third time, and the box demonstrably installed the fix under test. Discrimination FAILS: the target itself produced the generic event, so the two cannot be told apart regardless of the non-target leg -- which was therefore not staged. Reported as a fail, not as Session C's trivial pass. Over-correction guard PASSES: 0 ABSENT lines with the drive present, target degraded:false. THE HONEST PART. The fix targets a shape that does not occur live, and which shape does occur is NOT ISOLATED. With the drive detached PVE reports the storage inactive with zeroed fields -- a shape the unit fixture did not model. Three attempts to read the real /disks payload failed on token extraction across the ssh -> guest -> container layers, and a present-drive CONTROL query also returned 0 rows, proving the query was broken rather than the payload. Without that control this run would have recorded a third false mechanism, after "the union row writes false" (wrong, corrected yesterday) and "no row carries the guest path" (unverified). The leading hypothesis -- an inactive storage reaching Observe with an empty MountPath, so StablePathForRaw returns "" -- is consistent with the pvesm output but is NOT evidence and is recorded as such. Next session's first job is a working /disks read, with a present-drive control run FIRST, before any further code. agent v0.115.0 is published, vouched and INERT. Not reverted: reverting is itself a change, the runbook forbids fixing mid-run, and the code is tested and harmless. Capability-map row F stays PARTIAL, now citing the re-test. Teardown clean: pvesm status after == before (local-lvm 38.83%), guest 9201 and drill-r50 untouched. Customer sess-d pending the usual ONLINE-ages-to-DOWN gate. |
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admin
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e87d6b26bb |
Correct the Session C audit: the union row is DEDUPED AWAY, not written false
The audit said the union row "writes false" for the guest-path key. That is wrong, and the next reader would have inherited the error. Isolated during R-116's Phase 0: RoleForStorage returns RoleSystem whenever backingDevice == "" (felhom-agent internal/storage/role.go:180-181). When the device vanishes the target row's role flips to system and it loses its guest path, but KEEPS its MountPath -- and the union loop skips any drive whose MountPath is already seen, so the registry row is never emitted at all. /disks therefore carries NO row with that guest path: isTarget[guestPath] is a MISSING KEY, not a false value. The practical difference is decisive -- the obvious fix (set BackupTarget on the union row) could not have worked, because that row does not exist in the state where the alarm is needed. The section's own "not isolated" caveat is replaced by the isolated answer. |
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admin
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952ebf4862 |
Record work, banked first: shrink the E-2d row, create the missing capability-map rows
Unconditional and three sessions overdue, so it commits before any code is
touched — E-2d itself stopped at Phase 0 and banked nothing.
E-2d row: 822 words -> 121, and the contradiction resolved. Its State read
CLOSED — PARTIALLY PROVEN while the cell's final sentence read "This row stays
OPEN only for the residue"; a reader could not tell which. It is CLOSED, with
R-116 the single named open leg.
Nothing unique was binned. Three facts existed ONLY in that cell and are moved
into audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md as a new §1a: the local-lvm fence figures
with the 888 GB nvme alternative, the exactMount subdirectory caveat and why the
subdirectory is nonetheless the safe placement (no durable_id collision), and
the ISO/PAIRING -> DIRECT fall-through derived at source with its line
citations. drill-r50's blocked status was already in both audits.
Capability map: it had ZERO rows for the backup-target work — grep gives 0 hits
for backup_target and one for "E-2" that is a campaign date string. Three
scenario rows added, at today's honest status, not the value hoped for later:
C. Protection & recovery — installer Case A/B, DEGRADED recorded not hidden
PROVEN-LIVE, cites E2D-fresh-vm C1+C2
D. Storage & devices — the offer, and that registration confers no role
PROVEN-LIVE, cites SESSION-C C4 + the decline path
F. Notifications & monitoring — the absent-target alarm and its pairing
PARTIAL, cites SESSION-C C5, leg named, -> R-116
Row F is PARTIAL today per the doc's own strict enum (a leg not exercised live
is PARTIAL with the leg named, never PROVEN-LIVE). A later session may flip it;
this commit must not.
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