hub/CHANGELOG v0.87.0 + scripts/CHANGELOG gate-enforcement entry. CONTEXT gains S-6 (the
hub renders no host-install version and the gate pins its absence) and S-7 (gates run from
one entry point per repo; reuse_refs_check was fixed rather than the REUSE.md convention,
with both rejected alternatives recorded).
OPEN-ITEMS: R-94 CLOSED all three legs, leg (a) by DELETION with its reason; R-29 leg (a)
CLOSED and leg (b) HALF-SHIPPED with the census result written into the row (13 gates; every
gate a CLAUDE.md names was green, two of the four unnamed were red); R-161 gains its
successor pointer. NEW R-168 (grep established R-167 was the highest in use): Gitea Actions
runner — measured 2026-08-02 as Gitea 1.26.2, Actions enabled on all four repos, 0 runners,
0 workflow runs, 0 branch protections, and the consequence that trunk-based direct-to-main
pushes leave no merge for a status check to gate, so CI here can detect but not block.
BLOCKED on a spike over host-mode vs privileged DinD on DooPlex and whether the workflow can
avoid JavaScript actions.
ROADMAP: R-94 collapsed to its one-liner, R-29 updated, R-168 added.
Documentation only — no code, no box, no build.
STATUS.md (repo root, 652 words / 67 lines): what works · what's broken ·
what we're working on · waiting on you · changed since. A VIEW of
OPEN-ITEMS.md, holding nothing of its own; not CONTEXT.md, and both files
now say why they stay separate. No R-n is the subject of a sentence —
identifiers are bracketed pointers only.
CONTEXT.md S-5 records the four operator decisions taken 2026-08-02
(D-a … D-d), none of them implemented:
D-a merge mp1 into mp0 rather than resize it — before any external
install, and D-c ships in the same step → R-165
D-b desired/observed app state in its own store, with the state-store
safety rule verbatim → R-166 (BLOCKED)
D-c customer fill warning + operator backup-failure alert → R-167
D-d only DooPlex and Peti's box are protected → target-selection.md
R-163 RE-FRAMED, not closed: the sizing question is withdrawn rather than
answered; the row survives as the record of the constraint until R-165
lands. R-156's papra referral RESOLVED — deployed nowhere, so the template
fix strands nothing; the docker ps evidence is recorded with its
provenance and its scope limit.
target-selection.md: two protected machines, everything else disposable.
ep0 is no longer Tier 2 but is not scratch (it holds the only off-premises
copy of real customer data) — flagged for explicit operator confirmation.
The demo-box backup-target fence drops from prohibition to stated cost,
because D-d spends that reference anyway.
CLAUDE.md gains an End-of-session checklist carrying the STATUS.md
maintenance rule and "a finding goes in OPEN-ITEMS.md first".
The credential existed and was not reachable when it was wanted. Every box has
had a strong random root@pam password since TASK G1, vaulted in the hub at day 0
and used for real during the sshd incident — but the only way to read it back was
a hand-written curl carrying the global operator key, a secret kept out-of-band.
In practice the PVE web console on a demo box felt locked.
The host page grows a Console access card: presence + username + set_at by
default, Reveal fetches the plaintext on demand for 60 s with a Copy button.
Masking clears the JS variable, and also fires on a second click and on
visibilitychange. A host with nothing vaulted says so, and says why.
The secret is NEVER rendered into the page, and that constraint shapes the
change. The render path uses a new store.GetHostRecoveryMeta whose struct and
SELECT both omit the secret column, so it is structurally incapable of carrying
one. The plaintext crosses the wire only in the response to POST
/hosts/{id}/reveal-recovery-credential (Cache-Control: no-store, CSRF-gated at
the ServeHTTP level; POST precisely so that gate applies and so no secret is
retrievable by URL alone). Deliberately NOT the customer page's data-secret
widget, which embeds the plaintext on every load.
A delivered reveal writes one recovery_credential_revealed event on the host's
customer timeline (info, source hub, Hungarian) via SaveEvent alone — no
dispatcher, nobody emailed, the log_tail_requested shape. Two reveals write two
events: the register records accesses, not states. A 404 is not an access. An
unbound host reveals fine and writes no event; the [INFO] hub line, carrying the
username and a length only, is then the record.
The global-key API path is untouched by design — it is the route for when the
hub UI itself is broken, and coupling it to the session layer would delete the
independence that makes it a fallback.
Recorded as a real trade: the hub session password alone now unlocks console root
fleet-wide, where retrieval previously also needed the global key. Accepted for a
single-operator, HU-geo-fenced hub that already stores these passwords in
plaintext at rest (CONTEXT.md ruling S-4). The plaintext-at-rest half is filed as
R-133 — every hub DB backup is a fleet-wide console-credential dump.
Tests 550 -> 559; four red-proofs (page leak, audit event, CSRF gate, route
order) each run, observed failing, and reverted. The route-order proof is a seam
test driving ServeHTTP: a handler-level test cannot see that defect, because the
handler is correct and simply never runs.
Closes the record-hygiene rider. Part 3 of the spec (documenting a
ROADMAP/OPEN-ITEMS state convention) is deliberately NOT done — its stated
evidence is false; see REPORT-record-correction-2026-07-29.md.
- CONTEXT.md:540 — "scripts/hub_confirm_gate.py enforces" was present tense
about a gate invoked by nothing. Now says it asserts but is not enforced
(R-29). Third instance of the class after :564 and configs.go:27.
- REUSE.md:62 — same claim, "enforces zero". The RULE stays (never native
confirm()/prompt() is correct guidance and this is a reuse-reference row);
only the enforcement claim changes, and it now says the rule holds only as
long as you keep it.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md:4 — root REPORT.md is the overwritten per-session file;
REPORT-<topic>.md is the non-clobbering sibling form (CLAUDE.md:82-87), of
which 14 exist. The prohibition on durable content living only there stays.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md:55 — "Why the READY rows rank this way" promised a complete
ordering and listed 5 of ~15 open rows. Scoped to TOP, with a half-sentence
saying it is deliberately not a full ordering. No row added to the list.
hub/internal/web/configs.go:27 left alone (R-94 leg (b), needs a hub build).
No gate wired, run or fixed. Documentation only, no version bump, no CHANGELOG.
d4c07873 filed "hostinstall_gates.py is invoked by nothing" as a novel
observation. It is not novel — R-29 already names the class (green gates are
enforced nowhere; one sat RED for 16 releases while every REPORT said green),
and R-29 was missing from OPEN-ITEMS.md entirely, having never been carried
across the 2026-07-27 register rebuild. An open item about work not getting
done was absent from the page that decides what gets done.
Ruling on whether R-29 is the right home for a non-design-v2 gate: YES. Its
title says design-v2, but its own audit list already spans mount-safety,
secrets and dedup gates across four repos, and its part (b) — "the systemic
half is the real item" — is about the enforcement mechanism, which is
gate-agnostic. hub_confirm_gate.py is already on its list and sits in the same
scripts/ directory. No new ID minted; R-29's own text forbids it, and this is
the third re-raise it has absorbed.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: open R-29 (READY, S(a)/M(b)), with the orphan evidence and
the two separable parts R-29 already defines.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: R-94 leg (b) now points at R-29 as its class.
- ROADMAP.md:158: audit list extended with hostinstall_gates.py (RED today,
1.19.0 != 1.22.0) + hub_confirm_gate.py verified orphan. Entry not rewritten.
- ROADMAP.md:147: cited a non-existent R-164 — it means controller v0.164.0.
- CONTEXT.md:564: asserted in the present tense that the version cross-check is
"gated by scripts/hostinstall_gates.py". It exists, is red, and runs nowhere.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: READY #1/#3/#4 markers dropped — they duplicated ranked-list
positions and the gap was left by the row merged in d4c07873.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: E-2d citation :322-341 widened to :322-343; the invocation it
describes is at :343, two lines outside the old range.
- backlog/README.md: two-line lead naming OPEN-ITEMS.md and ROADMAP.md.
- REPORT-record-correction-2026-07-29.md: the report CLAUDE.md:82-87 requires
for both commits. Root REPORT.md (E-2 increment 1) untouched.
No gate wired, fixed, run or deleted — that is R-29 part (b), its own task.
Documentation only. No version bump, no CHANGELOG entry, no box touched.
Replaces the 2026-07-14 DRAFT entirely - it was verified against controller v0.132.0,
51 versions stale, while being cited as authoritative. Now verified against controller
0.183.0 / agent 0.110.0 / hub 0.80.0 / catalog 4252121. NOT ratified.
Every statement is labelled [DESIGN] (a decision from the architecture discussion) or
[FACT] (file:line, live output, or a citation to _recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md).
Phase 0 verified D5's premise and it FAILED. Ten read surfaces were checked; nine are
clean (SMB under both namespace shapes, FileBrowser for local drives, .fab import and
download, /api/debug/*, all three ServeFile sites, registering the backup dir as a
drive). One is not: FileBrowser binds a NETWORK share at its ROOT while local drives
are userdata-scoped, and no IsNetwork() filter guards the deploy dropdown, the per-app
migrate targets, or handleStorageMigrateApp. So an app namespace - and under D5 its
plaintext secrets - can land somewhere a browsing surface serves with download:true.
Not a leak today (the unit's app.yaml is secret-stripped); it becomes one under D5.
D5 is therefore written as a BLOCKED target, not as settled. -> R-108
Core artifact is the failure -> recovery matrix (15 rows). RTO cells carry only
measured durations; 12 are blank and each blank is listed explicitly as a finding.
RPO cells carry the configured cadence that bounds RPO, labelled as such - no RPO has
ever been measured from an incident and none is invented.
The 7/53 vs 9/43/1 Tier-2 coverage counts are both recorded, unresolved; neither adopted.
Coupling (S-1): capability map section C now cites the matrix instead of restating
routes; ROADMAP gains R-102..R-108; OPEN-ITEMS gains only the in-flight R-108 plus
C9-F1b/F3/F4 -> R-n cross-references; CONTEXT records D1-D6 as standing ruling S-3.
No code, no version bump, no deploy, no box touched.
R-97 collapsed to its shipped one-liner in ROADMAP and closed in OPEN-ITEMS.
PROMPT-TEMPLATE N.5 now names FOUR coupled artifacts instead of two: the
capability map, ROADMAP, the owning architecture doc (ruled as S-1 in CONTEXT.md
but never reflected in the template CC actually reads, so it bound nobody), and
OPEN-ITEMS.md. Tasks must now report which register rows they opened, closed or
re-ranked.
Ops: R-90 swap done (interim; CX33 still blocked), R-95 mitigation armed but zero
snapshots taken so it moves to WATCHING rather than closed, R-91 gate still not
satisfied. CONTEXT.md datastore path corrected to /mnt/pbs-datastore.
Open state was spread across ROADMAP, CONTEXT.md, four audits/, three runbooks,
per-session REPORT.md files and a chat log. This is the one page to read first:
every row has a state (BLOCKED/READY/WAITING-ON-OPERATOR/WATCHING) and an owner,
and the READY rows are ranked with reasoning.
R-88 is the recommended next task — quiesce's nil-age fail-open stops every app
stack every 5 minutes with no backoff and bypasses the maintenance window, and
its trigger (a PBS read failure) is live given ep0's demonstrated OOM.
CONTEXT.md now records that OPEN-ITEMS.md is authoritative and that REPORT.md is
overwritten per session.
Supervised runbook execution. No code, no version bump.
The felhom-pbs tier had reported `job errors` on EVERY demo-hp backup
since the tier was created on 07-26, while the data landed correctly
every time: `DatastoreBackup` grants Datastore.Backup but not
Datastore.Prune, so the box's keep_last=2 prune was denied.
Operator ruling: retention is a COMMERCIAL attribute owned by the hub;
ep0 executes. Box tokens therefore stay write-only - a compromised box
must not be able to delete its own offsite backups. No grant was widened
and felhom-tenantsync.sh is unchanged (the ruling makes it correct).
Increment 1:
- boxes stop attempting prune. allowPBSPrune is DERIVED
(`!t.Primary && t.KeepLast > 0`), so keep_last: 0 on the PBS tier
disables both the --prune-backups value and the gate in one config
edit, and the tier stays armed. Verified prune_pbs_allowed=false on
both boxes with no tier REJECTED line.
- per-namespace prune jobs on ep0, keep-last 2, daily 03:30 UTC
(05:30 CEST), dry-run gated. demo-hp 3->2, demo-felhom untouched,
chunk count unchanged (prune removes indexes, not chunks).
Write proof CLOSED: 08:25:47 job errors -> 09:37:29 TASK OK, snapshot
2026-07-27T09:37:29Z, chunks 9787->9813, prune step absent entirely.
Driven through POST /api/guest-backup/trigger (the UI path), not
--selftest and not raw vzdump. Hub gauge evidence explicitly NOT
satisfied - the delta is below its 0.1 GB display granularity.
GC scheduled sun 04:30 UTC and deliberately NOT run: every chunk still
carries a fresh atime from the migration copy, so a run today would
reclaim nothing. verify-new enabled per operator ruling, turning an
inert hub alarm live.
Legacy demo-felhom-01 namespace deleted with its two ACL entries and its
token (operator ruling, confirmed twice) so nothing dangles.
R-89 records the target architecture and carries the unanswered parallel
question: does the restic key on storage-box-pool-1 have DELETE rights?
If so the daily app-data tier has the identical exposure and append-only
is the equivalent answer.
ep0 is Etc/UTC, not CEST - corrected in the record.
- ROADMAP: R-85 row. Code SHIPPED; rotation NOT YET OBSERVED LIVE, stated as
such rather than written as done.
- Capability map: a new row for UNATTENDED restore-proof, IMPLEMENTED not
PROVEN-LIVE, kept distinct from the R-82 row that a MANUAL selftest earned.
That distinction is the same one the activation-vs-arrival split made.
- 03-host-agent §8: the scheduler covers every tier, oldest-proven first; the
spec is per-run; a restore-test joins the one-heavy-op gate. The safety
properties that must not be re-derived are listed.
- 07: restore-proof recorded as a per-tier property. Doc still NOT ratified.
- 06: corrects S4.1's 'the offsite restore-test now runs unattended' — it
silently stopped being true when local_backup_target was retargeted to 'local',
the SECOND time in that doc that a correct mechanism was broken by its input
changing underneath it.
- CONTEXT + REUSE.
Hub gate green (17 packages, rc=0).
R-84 resolved by asking the STORAGE rather than persisting the store: ground
truth, so a pruned archive correctly stops counting where a persisted record
would keep claiming a backup that no longer exists. Proven live on both boxes
with the in-memory store cold.
demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB) — the R-82 finding closed
on the box where it was worst. Controller v0.175.0 deployed to both boxes.
Slice D.1 — host-install 1.20.0: a FRESH box defaults to local-daily +
offsite-weekly (felhom-pbs, 604800s, keep_last=2). setdefault semantics proven
both ways: fresh gets the tier, an UPGRADE preserves the existing backup block
verbatim — so an in-place upgrade can never silently start writing to an
offsite datastore. Existing boxes are migrated explicitly.
Slice E:
- 07-backup-architecture.md: honest status header per CONTEXT ruling S-2, with
an explicit STALE-outside-the-PBS-tier verdict (the controller tiers were last
verified 41 controller versions ago). The PBS row claimed 'PBS on DooPlex'
(the retired spike store) with no cadence; it now names felhom-pbs ->
felhom-offsite on ep0 over wg-felhom, weekly, keep_last=2. NOT marked
ratified — that is Viktor's review of the section 10 list. Discharges R-83.
- 06-offsite-connectivity.md: the target-split remaining-work note collapsed
(shipped), and records HOW S4.1's tier-aware timeout silently regressed — the
mechanism was never removed, its INPUT changed when local_backup_target was
retargeted to 'local'. Also notes S4.1 already diagnosed the teardown 403 as a
phantom (a timeout consequence, not an ACL gap).
- capability map: new row for recurring offsite backups actually LANDING, as
distinct from the existing row proving ACTIVATION. IMPLEMENTED, not
PROVEN-LIVE — the restore round-trip has not completed under the fixed code.
- ROADMAP: R-82 SHIPPED with its remaining gate named, R-83 DISCHARGED, R-84
left open.
- CONTEXT + REPORT: the arc, including the mid-arc correction I had to make.
Third instance of one class (hub v0.12.0, v0.73.0, this), fixed as a class.
On 2026-07-26 03:00 UTC expected_backup_missed fired on demo-felhom, demo-hp
and drill-r50 at once; the demo-felhom one reached the CUSTOMER channel
claiming "newest backup is 176h0m0s old". Nothing was wrong — three vzdump
archives were on disk. Cause: the agent backup store is in-memory, so the
R-50 fleet restart emptied `backups` until the next run, and the hub read
empty as "no backup exists".
- assessBackupFreshness returns OK/UNKNOWN/MISSED instead of `missed bool`;
absence is UNKNOWN until it outlives an anchored window. Still pure.
- store.GetHostReportsSince + monitor.newestBackupEvidence read the hubs own
retained history (bounded 7-day lookback, early-exit on fresh evidence) —
"when did I last SEE evidence of a backup?" The anchor was free: the hub
already retains 90 days. No agent change, no new persisted state.
- store.GetFirstHostReportAt anchors absence at first contact, reusing the
existing 26h threshold as the grace (no new knob, the v0.73.0 shape).
- Deferrals logged + counted; reason strings kept distinct.
- backupStaleAfter untouched; landmine recorded (a weekly PBS snapshot would
alarm six days in seven) and owned by R-82.
Tests 493->508. Red-proofs A/B/C observed and restored; A reproduces the live
message verbatim. Replayed the real 03:00 reports (600/417/77 rows): all
three now silent.
Source: documentation/audits/DIAG-backup-missed-2026-07-26.md
New documentation/operations/nodes.md: HP t740 hardware, disks (SanDisk system
SSD 182195804614; Toshiba 1TB NVMe 58BS11AFT8MQ PRESENT AND UNENROLLED, still
NTFS, do not touch), the five-NIC map and the trap that cost the first install,
and the access path - no SSH key is baked, auth is the hub-vaulted G1
break-glass password.
tailscale.md gains demo-hp, the operator-lab-exception warning so a future
product-shape audit does not conclude the product ships tailscale, and the
--accept-dns evidence: the join omitted the flag, MagicDNS rewrote
/etc/resolv.conf, and it was reverted. Harmless at the vacation site, would
have bitten silently at home where split-horizon matters.
OPEN: key expiry still enabled on demo-hp (2027-01-17) - needs an admin-console
toggle or an API token; a pre-auth key cannot do it.
felhom-pve joins the tailnet as a host package (100.70.170.35, expiry
disabled); DooPlex already advertised 192.168.0.0/24 via its GitOps k3s
tailscale pod (100.107.87.53). ssh felhom-pve now targets the tailnet IP
(direct-over-LAN at home, tunnel when away); felhom-pve-lan = LAN fallback.
--accept-dns=false on the host. Host converted static->DHCP (reservation
keeps .162 at home). Measured: --accept-routes hairpins the local subnet
at home -> travel-only opt-in. PBS is offsite (own WireGuard tunnel), needs
none of this. Recorded not fixed: controller<->agent plane hard-pinned to
192.168.0.162 (agent listen_addr + guest bootstrap.json) -> not yet portable
off-LAN. No code changed. Full doc: documentation/operations/tailscale.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XMForrE4c1wZxd9LukxYVt
Live through the real ingress: public /bind/ renders logged-out with the
no-oracle expired state (200-not-500 proves selfbind_tokens migrated);
gate intact (/ and /hosts -> /login); CSRF exemption is /bind/-only
(POST /bind/ no-CSRF 200 vs POST /customers/x/block no-CSRF 302).
Operator-minted full walk + new-ISO console banner remain operator/R-1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp
Let a customer bind their own freshly-installed appliance without the
operator: operator "Send self-bind link" mints a 7-day tokenized
capability link, emailed (Hungarian, sibling sender) to the customer, who
opens a public /bind/<token> page and proves two factors — the console
pairing code shown on the box screen + their retrieval passphrase — and
the hub stages the bind via the same BindAppliance (provenance
customer_selfbind). The box's ~30s appliance poll delivers.
Viktor's three rulings verbatim: console pairing code (no appliance list
ever rendered), operator-sent tokenized link, 5-attempt lockout ->
"call support". Wrong code == wrong passphrase (one generic failure, no
oracle, both factors compared unconditionally); expiry falls back to
operator-bind unchanged.
THE TRAP: one public prefix /bind/, exempt from auth+CSRF at both /login
gate sites via a single isPublicBindPath predicate (tight trailing-slash
match; ServeMux ..-cleans; handler rejects '/' in token). 9 tests
(Scenarios A-F + F1/F2); 4 red-proofs verified red-then-green (lockout,
oracle, widened-prefix, single-active). GC verdict: no appliance GC ->
the 7-day TTL stands alone. Controller/agent untouched; R-27b deferred.
Green: full hub build/vet/test (17 ok) + bash -n + hub confirm gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp
Closes N100 F1 (HIGH): cheap AMI (AN3PLUS 0.01-class) UEFI firmware can't
relocate the ISO's stock signed GRUB from USB (relocation 0x0). The run's live
grub-mkimage workaround is now a first-class pipeline mode.
- build-felhom-iso.sh: --loader shim|mkimage (default shim, byte-for-byte
unchanged; profile-settable FELHOM_LOADER; --loader wins). Loud banner +
manifest loader:/grub-mkimage: fields + -mkimage filename suffix.
- mkimage-surgery.sh (new): post-prepare-iso, in the assistant container. Builds
a monolithic grub-mkimage loader from the ISO's own GRUB (module set from its
grub.cfg; embedded search --fs-uuid -> configfile the real menu). Swaps it into
the ISO9660 tree (real lowercase path) + the efi.img ESP; xorriso re-master
preserves BIOS-hybrid + UEFI + GPT-ESP, drops only Apple HFS+/APM. Recipe from
the N100 run evidence, not re-derived.
- Dockerfile.assistant: grub-common + grub-efi-amd64-bin + mtools + dosfstools.
profiles/n100.profile (new, mkimage + SB-off note).
- Validated on nested VM 311 (RUNBOOK-B legs): leg1 shim boots+installs under
OVMF SB-enforcing + SeaBIOS; leg2 mkimage boots+installs under SB-off; leg3
(red-proof) mkimage under SB-enforcing FAILS Access Denied (unsigned -> SB must
be OFF); leg4 surgery byte-identical payload. bash -n + shellcheck clean.
Physical N100 closure folds into the rehearsal (n100-safety match-nothing ISO
built + sha-recorded, unbooted). PXE stays a deferred R-21 note.
- DeleteHost(deleteEscrow) demotes current host_escrow into host_escrow_superseded (copy-before-delete, same tx), spares existing; one shared demoteCurrentEscrowTx (reused by SaveHostEscrow). F-14 provenance/gate unchanged.
- DeleteCustomerConfig now purges both escrow tables for all the customer's hosts incl. already-deleted (F-14 provenance UNION) — the one true purge point.
- Wording: checkbox/refusal/Danger-zone → demotion. S6b OBSOLETE. Red-proofs TestDeleteHost_Demotes + TestDeleteCustomer_Purges + wording guard.
F2 claim re-issue on clean-slate re-enroll (ReissueForReenroll, host-enroll mint path,
single-bump, reset code; hub never stores the password so fork B). F3 offsite re-issue on
re-enroll (ReissueOffsiteForCustomer, same machinery as the manual button). 2.3 escrow honesty
(red-proofed): re-issuing offsite marks the escrow stale (MarkEscrowStale), withholds the
mismatched restic hash from auto-confirm, DR checklist shows stale not done. Events:
claim_reissued_reenroll / offsite_reissued / escrow_stale.
Controller + scripts unchanged (source contradicted both premises): the controller reads escrow
prereqs live from the agent; the installer can't know the descriptor-provisioned storage id. F4
root fix is agent-side -> ROADMAP R-22; demo unblocked live (Part 0 ACL grant). VALIDATION doc
F2 erratum + F3/F4 dispositions. Green gate + Scenario-C red-proof pass.
Supervised clean-slate reinstall of the demo N100 from a pipeline-built Felhom ISO +
onboarding rehearsal. Core objectives GREEN: first-boot chain reached rc-0 on the first
attempt on real hardware (closes slice A's operator-gated boundary), serial-filter safety
proven on metal, PBS-DR reconciler self-healed on the reused peer, DMI verdict -> key on
MAC+UUID. Hard obstacle was firmware not the pipeline: this cheap AMI AN3PLUS 0.01 board
won't UEFI-boot the ISO's GRUB from USB (relocation 0x0; SB-off + shim-bypass don't help),
worked around live with a grub-mkimage loader from the box's own GRUB (slice-B input).
7 findings logged (F1 firmware loader HIGH; F2/F3/F4 reused-customer edges -> R-1/Peti;
F5 guest-RAM, F6 drive-init mount, F7 back-route). Full doc in documentation/tests/;
ROADMAP R-21 + REPORT + CONTEXT updated. No production code changed.
scripts/iso/: a DooPlex pipeline (build-felhom-iso.sh + Dockerfile.assistant) that
turns the official PVE ISO into a Felhom auto-install ISO whose first-boot stub
installs a retry-forever felhom-bootstrap unit which unattended-fetches
felhom-host-install.sh from the public felhom.eu/scripts channel and runs it until the
host is enrolled + a guest provisioned. host-install is UNMODIFIED (invoked only).
- build gates the answer on validate-answer OUTPUT text, never $? (spike S1 exit-0 trap)
- stub is from-iso, fully-up, exactly-once; retry unit owns all network work (S8a)
- retry-vs-resume encoded once: plain first, --resume when install state exists (v1.11.3)
- secret-bearing (embeds the retrieval passphrase): supervised/single-use; env shredded on success
Validated on VM 310: build gate + red-proof, disk-filter fail-safe, chain + retry,
resume-decision, exactly-once, no-net retry+recovery. Terminal host-install rc-0 success
operator-gated (drill customer needs the password-gated create-UI). scripts v1.16.0;
ROADMAP R-21 -> in-progress. Detail in REPORT.md.
Audit doc for the Day-0 VM drill: appliance install, floor-at-first-report,
escrow ceremony + auto-confirm FIRST LIVE FIRING (~7.5 min, zero clicks),
offsite backup + restore round-trip, PBS-DR/WG fork (Peti-sequence rehearsal).
Corrects day0-install.md A.2 (git creds optional since v1.11.2, anonymous
fetch is the normal shape) and RUNBOOK-escrow-ceremony.md (identity-only mode
does NOT exist — F-6; age prereq — F-10). REPORT.md overwritten; CONTEXT.md
one-liner added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NptTCFtu7dz2Ru89qHRagN
journalctl proved boot -1 came up at 23:31 WITHOUT networking: the agent automount
template's After/Wants=network-online.target cycles with local-fs.target and systemd
deleted networking.service to break it; the 06:45 power-cycle boot hit the same cycle
and deleted the automount instead. Every boot with an enrolled share is a coin flip
until the template drops that ordering. Recovery executed: automount started, apps
healed, privatebin removed via real flow, verification backup green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017CDMFpFx84pfviCTVuGGhf
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