Tokens, component semantics (meter/tag/metarow/panel/list/section-h/
stats/buttons), the state truth tables incl. the stopped->neutral
exception-color change, vendored typography (latin-ext) + Lucide
iconography, chart palette, and the grep-gate enforcement list.
Shipped in controller v0.96.0; D1-D4 build from this document.
Companion to CAMPAIGN-pool-effects: red-teams the four axes the pool campaign
did not cover (provenance-gating of destructive ops, sudoers↔fine-gate coverage,
local-API within-scope blast radius, mkfs/claim classifier, signed-vs-self-serve
boundary). Verifies the v0.60.0 F1 fix is complete; finds no new HIGH/MED. One
F1-sibling (stale-lock pool-blind reaper, LOW) + LOW/INFO defense-in-depth
residuals. Read-only static trace against felhom-agent @cc93dae/v0.60.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Companion to felhom-agent v0.60.0 (proof-of-launch destroy gating + restore-
test band-advance). New documentation/runbooks/provisioning.md; campaign doc
updated with the resolution status and the operator manifest-bump follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full validation of the felhom pool + scoped-token migration on felhom-pve:
- Track A: complete agent op surface under the scoped token — 16/16 pass
- Track B: vmid origin traced (externally supplied); adversarial collision
probes prove the compensating rollback/teardown attempts to destroy a
guest the job never created (contained only by the pool ACL)
- Track C: containment + 3b-fix intact; Track D: no pool leaks, adopt/
uninstall pool handling correct
- Findings doc: documentation/audits/CAMPAIGN-pool-effects-2026-07-01.md
No code change, no version bump. Demo left as found.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Read-only spike on felhom-pve. Verdicts: (SQ1) customer drives need NOT be PVE
storages — track in the intent registry (durable-id + host mount + bind), the
dir-storage is legacy. (SQ2) an unclaimed-disk filter (OS/LVM-PV/ZFS/PVE-storage/
VM-CT/mounted/RO/registry signals, fail-safe exclude-on-unknown) returns EXACTLY
{/dev/sdd} on the demo, never sda/sdb/sdc. (SQ3) mkfs sudoers is /dev/* — the
agent code is the only guard; DataBearing (wipe-confirm) is insufficient (OS disk
is data-bearing), so a mandatory agent unclaimed-gate + guarded-mkfs-wrapper
sudoers + a shared-box operator gate for self-serve format. (SQ4) new
/disks/candidates raw-scan endpoint feeding both wizards, registry-based
enrollment. (SQ5) migrate existing drives to the registry. Implementation plan +
open risks included. No product code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Live supervised validation on felhom-pve: NO 403 on drive management under the
scoped token (agent has no storage-registration/pvesm path — all host-ops +
Datastore.Audit which is now box-wide). 3b-fix confirmed in the real UI (drives
Regisztrálva, no detach alert). A full physical wizard enroll couldn't complete
because a raw new device (SD-card reader, no PVE-storage entry) doesn't surface
in the init wizard (Observe() lists PVE storages only) — ACL-independent; flagged
as a separate new-drive-registration follow-up. No code change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Throwaway-token spike on felhom-pve: the agent's 16 privs scope from / to
/pool/felhom + /storage/<targets> (+Pool.Allocate) without breaking the flow.
CRUX proven: restore a fresh vmid INTO the pool works at /pool/felhom (T1 200).
T1-T7 all pass; blast radius contained (out-of-pool guests 403). Findings:
3-role layout (per-path subsets need separate roles); Datastore.Audit filters
so needn't be box-wide; Store scope MUST include felhom-pbs (offsite default);
restore-test scratch band (9990xx) not in pool → 3b must handle. All spike
objects cleaned up; live FelhomAgent/9201 untouched. No product code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Categorized STALE/DEAD/MISSING/POLISH/CORRECTNESS findings for the hub web
GUI. No GUI code changed, no version bump — findings doc only, for operator
prioritization.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxLA1mZurFq9kt8hneFeCs
Part A: hub-config operator_email/operator_enabled (committed earlier);
operator + customer email paths proven end-to-end via real Resend sends.
Append the "Findings closed" section to the TESTRUN audit (Part A proof,
F2-a root cause + deploy fix, F2-b fix + live validation, pending §D
supervised reboot) and remove the stale duplicate "Final state" block.
REPORT overwritten. hub/CHANGELOG entry. No hub image change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0162BnMpUXscPsUB1cU8Tr6K
Phase 1: capability->hub operator alert fired live (event captured, English, names cap+feature);
email is operator-config-gated in demo (not a defect). Phase 2: drive re-propagation + zero false
pages PASS, but TWO findings — F2-a the §4 doubling did NOT self-correct (boot script runs as root,
never needed the grant → hypothesis falsified), F2-b a vzdump backup in flight at reboot left a stale
snapshot-delete lock blocking guest autostart. Phase 3 referenced (host_leaf_changed proven on v0.22.1).
Final parity known-good.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pg8ANF97SEeKYSN5Jxw3qJ
Q1: 6 modes classified — pin-mismatch/401/refused/timeout/no-such-host are RUNTIME (per-call),
malformed-fp is a CONSTRUCTION error (latches via sync.Once). Q2: across a clean agent restart the
memoized /api/disks path self-heals in ~1s with NO controller restart (Up 7h); a fresh-client probe
agrees at every phase. Recommend: probe GET /storage via the memoized client, classify, N>=2 debounce
for transient reasons, hub relay. Throwaway probe removed, no config changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EPZ4GJ8L5Jqf8UiPwbn1kt
Empirical validation on a DooPlex-simulated NAS (SMB+NFS). Verdict READY for the
production network-storage TASK. Key findings: mount must be host-side (unprivileged
LXC blocks NFS/CIFS mount) + bind-propagated into the guest; NFS soft fails-clean +
auto-recovers (SMB hangs-but-contained); UID mapping = container uid + 100000 LXC
offset; ~128MB/s adequate; write integrity intact (atomic-write apps safe on soft);
restic-SFTP backup/restore works + fails-as-job not hang; systemd automount gives
on-demand + idle-unmount. Distinct network-storage class bypasses the drive lifecycle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resend send-scoped key was committed in plaintext in manifests/hub.yaml (ConfigMap)
and manifests/felhom.secret.yaml. Rotated to a new key and removed from git.
- hub: new RESEND_API_KEY env override (cmd/hub/main.go), mirrors REGISTRY_TOKEN;
ConfigMap resend_api_key now an empty placeholder; Deployment injects from
Secret/resend-api. Image 0.17.0.
- contact-mailer: secretKeyRef repointed contact-mailer-config -> resend-api.
- felhom.secret.yaml: contact-mailer-config Secret removed; healthchecks
EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD blanked (workload not deployed).
- documentation/runbooks/secrets.md: out-of-band secret model + create/rotate steps.
Secret/resend-api is created imperatively out-of-band and is NOT committed.
No secret value appears in this repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verdict READY. Real Vaultwarden test email travelled app → on-box go-smtp
shim → relay-leg → Resend → real inbox, From felhom.eu, TLS/DKIM-aligned,
Resend key never on the demo guest. Q4 central finding: raw-MIME passthrough
via Resend SMTP delivers faithfully; parse-then-API silently drops inline
(CID) images — hub leg should be SMTP passthrough, not the structured-API path.
Probe code throwaway (not committed); cleaned up from guest 9201 + host 180.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NB4fVgvEurdKgyG8KoQSzC
Operator-run Day-0 automation for a fresh PVE host: pveum token -> hub
POST /host-enroll (single secret, option C) -> agent config -> felhom-agent
--selftest=provision -> verify. Idempotent/resumable (state.json), --dry-run,
--resume, --force, --preserve-from; --mode dr is a documented 10D stub.
Live-validated on felhom-pve: authorized wipe of demo guest 9201 + full
re-provision from the golden -> controller config-pull + public tunnel HTTP 200
+ host-report of 9201; idempotent --resume no-op. Found+fixed one ordering bug
during the run (token ACL must be applied AFTER token rotation — token-remove
purges the ACL).
Adds scripts/README.md (operator runbook) + scripts/CHANGELOG.md; REPORT
overwritten; spike doc pointer added. No service code changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TtXesNa2LGbMmE4DNL6SE7
New POST /api/v1/host-enroll (handleHostEnroll): X-Retrieval-Password authed,
body {customer_id} -> {host_id, api_key}. Mint-once-reuse (201 first, 200
reuse) so re-running the host-bootstrap never orphans a running agent's key;
auth checked before any mint. Backed by new Store.GetHostByCustomer
(ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 1, idx_hosts_customer).
GET /config/{id} and global-key POST /admin/hosts left untouched. Exact-match
route (path == "/host-enroll") to avoid the /hosts/ prefix collision.
Tests: host_enroll_test.go (mint/reuse/401-no-mint/404/400) + GetHostByCustomer
store test; companion red-proof verified always-mint fails the reuse assertion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TtXesNa2LGbMmE4DNL6SE7
Empirically validates the composed Day-0 chain against the LIVE hub: host
mint (POST /admin/hosts), agent host-auth via the real internal/hub client
(host-report + FetchDesiredState), and controller config-pull
(GET /config/{id} + X-Retrieval-Password). All links + wrong-cases pass.
Option A works end-to-end with zero new code; option C (single-secret enroll)
feasible + recommended for cutover. Throwaway customer/host cleaned up.
No production code, no version bump (spike).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TtXesNa2LGbMmE4DNL6SE7
sys_drive=disk-2 distinct, selftest [PASS] System data path; disk-full ENOSPC
confined to disk-2 (/ + docker-data unaffected, apps healthy); mp1 in vzdump;
SSD-fallback app (radarr) data lands on disk-2. 2.5 size=50G; reboot-survival
in 3.3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017PsnU2ASocYrvzqE82YDYW
1.6 deploy/HDD_PATH stable, 1.7 eject clean stable removal (v0.80 ruled out) +
impact names apps, 1.9 migrate flips stable->stable w/ verify-before-cleanup,
1.10 decommission via raw agentWhere + reconnect restore, 1.11 backups under
stable namespace. FINDING F1: restic binary still apt-installed (Dockerfile:58)
though all restic code moved to agent — dead weight. navidrome now on flash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017PsnU2ASocYrvzqE82YDYW
Root cause: controller handleStorageRegister registers the raw /mnt/<name> path
instead of the stable /mnt/felhom-drives/<name> path the agent binds the drive at.
Drives ARE live in guest+container at the stable path; controller watches an empty
rootfs placeholder. Not v0.40.0 mp1; not stale agent state. Read-only diagnosis,
no fix applied. Recommended fix direction documented.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017PsnU2ASocYrvzqE82YDYW
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