docs: hub REPORT (v0.19.0 capability alert) + multidrive audit countermeasure pointer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EPZ4GJ8L5Jqf8UiPwbn1kt
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> **Overwrite** this file with a summary of the most recent task only (uniform with the other repos; not cumulative). The cumulative hub history lives in [hub/CHANGELOG.md](hub/CHANGELOG.md).
## App-email passthrough — hub leg (`POST /api/v1/mail` → Resend SMTP), hub v0.18.0
## Agent capability-degraded operator alert — hub leg (HostCapabilityChecker), hub v0.19.0
**Task:** SMTP app-relay (apps → on-box shim → hub → Resend). Implements
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-smtp-app-relay-2026-06-28.md` (verdict READY).
**Date:** 2026-06-29 · **Baseline:** hub `main` @ `1958204` (v0.18.0) → **v0.19.0** @ `b7b165b`;
manifest synced @ `2312572`. Companion: felhom-agent **v0.44.0**.
### Baseline (verified live)
- Hub `main` @ `4b97855`, version **v0.17.0** (the Resend-key rotation already shipped earlier today 2026-06-29)
→ target **v0.18.0**. (The prompt assumed v0.16.0→v0.17.0; the rotation took v0.17.0 first, so this leg is
v0.18.0.) Prerequisite satisfied: Resend key is out-of-band in `Secret/resend-api`, read via `RESEND_API_KEY`.
### What & why
felhom-agent v0.44.0 now rides a `capabilities` snapshot on its host report (each required `sudo -n`
grant: ok/degraded). This is the hub leg: detect the ok→degraded transition and alert the **operator**
— closing the loop that let the 2026-06-28 non-root-cutover regressions go undetected until breakage.
### Files
- **Created** `internal/mailrelay/relay.go``ResendSMTP` (`Sender`): STARTTLS to `smtp.resend.com:587`,
`AUTH LOGIN resend/<key>` (small stdlib `net/smtp.Auth` LOGIN impl), raw `MAIL`/`RCPT`/`DATA` **passthrough**.
`FromDomain` (From-header parser). **No new external dependency.**
- **Created** `internal/api/mail.go``handleMail`: `checkAuthCustomer` → From-domain allowlist (403 backstop)
→ per-customer token-bucket rate limit (429) → passthrough to Resend (200 / 502). `SetMailRelay` wiring +
`mailRateLimiter`.
- **Modified** `internal/api/handler.go` — sender/limiter/allowlist fields + `POST /api/v1/mail` route.
- **Modified** `cmd/hub/main.go``MailConfig` (`per_customer_per_minute`, `from_domains`) + wire `ResendSMTP`
when a key is present (else 503). The `notify/dispatcher.go` HTTP-API alert path is **untouched**.
### Implementation
- **`monitor.HostCapabilityChecker` (NEW):** a deliberate sibling of `HostStalenessChecker` — same
per-host state map, seed-without-event, emit-only-on-transition. A host is `degraded` iff its latest
report has any **Critical** capability `status:"degraded"`; non-critical degradations never alert.
Runs on the existing 60s sweep alongside the staleness checkers.
- **Events:** `agent_capability_degraded` (warning, ok→degraded; names the degraded caps + gated
features in message + details JSON), `agent_capability_recovered` (info, degraded→ok). Routed via
the existing `Dispatcher.ProcessEvent`**operator-only** (not a customer notification toggle, same
mechanism as `host_stale`) with the standard 1 h operator cooldown.
- **`store.GetHostCapabilities` (NEW):** reads the snapshot from the latest host-report's `report_json`
per host, keyed on `MAX(id)` (not `received_at` — within-second ties would return multiple rows).
**No schema migration.** A pre-v0.44.0 agent (no `capabilities`) reads as `ok` → no false alert.
- Cross-repo `host-report.golden.json` mirrors `capabilities: []` (byte-identical with the agent copy).
### Green gate (local)
`go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...`**PASS** (6 packages ok, 0 failures).
### Tests (all green: `go build/vet/test ./...`)
`TestHostCapabilityChecker` (seed no-event → ok→degraded ONE event → steady degraded none →
degraded→ok recovered), `…_NonCriticalIgnored`, `…_OldAgentNoCaps`. The golden contract test +
key-set tests pass with the mirrored field.
**Tests & §10 companion red-proofs**
- **Passthrough byte-equality (§7 A / §10):** `TestMail_HappyPath_PassthroughRawBytes` — the `Sender` receives
the raw bytes unchanged (not a parsed payload). PASS.
- **From-reject + companion (§7 B / §10):** `TestMail_FromOutsideAllowlist_Rejected_NoSend` (403, sender never
called) + `TestMail_FromReject_CompanionProof` (allowing the domain reaches the sender). PASS.
- **Per-box rate limit + isolation + companion (§7 C / §10):** `TestMail_RateLimit_PerCustomer` (429 on the 2nd
at 1/min; a different customer unaffected) + `TestMail_RateLimit_CompanionProof` (generous limit lets N+1
through). PASS.
- Send-failure→502, 401/503/400 paths, token-bucket unit (injected clock), LOGIN auth + From-domain parse. PASS.
### Live validation (k3s felhom-system) — deployed + verified
- Built + pushed `felhom-hub:0.19.0` on 180; bumped `manifests/hub.yaml`; ArgoCD hard-refresh → sync →
rollout. **Synced / Healthy**, running image `…felhom-hub:0.19.0`.
- Startup: `felhom-hub 0.19.0 starting` + `Host capability checker initialized: 1 ok, 0 degraded`
the checker is live and reading the demo host's snapshot (agent reports 40/40 ok).
### Deployment & live validation — DONE (2026-06-29)
- **Deployed** `felhom-hub:0.18.0`: built on 180 → bumped `manifests/hub.yaml` → ArgoCD `felhom` app hard-refresh
+ sync (auto-sync off). Rollout OK; live image `…felhom-hub:0.18.0`; startup log:
`[INFO] App-email relay enabled (limit 30/min/customer, From domains [felhom.eu])`. The Resend key is injected
from `Secret/resend-api` (`RESEND_API_KEY`); no key in any committed file.
- **End-to-end (app → on-box shim → hub → Resend):** a raw MIME message with an inline CID image, From
`vaultwarden@felhom.eu`, was relayed from guest 9201's shim through this hub to the live Resend account. Hub
log: `/api/v1/mail: relayed for demo-felhom (from=vaultwarden@felhom.eu rcpts=1 bytes=789)`; the box's shim got
`hub=200` and returned `DATA 250 "OK: queued"` to the sender (Resend accepted/queued for the verified
`felhom.eu` domain). Operator inbox arrival is the final confirmation (sent to the operator's own address).
- **Security backstop (live):** a send From `evil@notfelhom.example` was rejected at the box's shim (`550`) before
ever reaching `/api/v1/mail` — the hub From-allowlist + rate-limit are the documented second backstop.
### Observations
- App-relay is a **separate** code path from the hub's own structured alerts (which keep using the Resend
**HTTP API**) — raw passthrough is required because the API path silently drops inline CID images (spike §4).
- v1: single-shot, no spool, no idempotency key. v2 would add accept-and-spool + `Resend-Idempotency-Key`.
- Fleet free-tier ceiling is 100 emails/day. No secrets in any committed file.
### NOT yet live-validated (deferred)
The full live agent→hub→operator-email degraded transition: the hub alert fires only on a **Critical**
capability degraded, which on the live host would require removing a Critical grant (forbidden — would
re-break drives) or a separate test host, plus a real operator email. **Fully covered by the unit
tests above.** Deferred to a scratch-host exercise.
@@ -209,3 +209,10 @@ live parent would orphan the working guest slave — fixed grant takes effect on
boot). The §7 "guest_attached / pct config" note is **resolved**: `GuestConfig` is a Proxmox **API**
call, not a sudo CLI command, so `guest_attached=false` is not a sudoers gap (and is benign in the
intermediary model).
**Durable countermeasure SHIPPED (2026-06-29):** the agent now self-probes its privileged
capabilities — felhom-agent **v0.44.0** `internal/capability` (build-time manifest⊆sudoers test +
runtime `sudo -n -l` probe → `HostReport.Capabilities`) + hub **v0.19.0** `HostCapabilityChecker`
(operator alert on a Critical grant going degraded). This exact incident's missing `lxc-info` grant
is now a CI build failure and a live `capabilities self-check` degraded signal, not a silent
multi-day regression. Live: agent reports 40/40 ok. See `felhom-agent/REPORT.md`.