Controller v0.190.0. Docs only here; no hub change, no hub version bump.
- audits/DIAG-bootrecon-drive-absent-2026-08-02.md — NEW. The Part 0 diagnosis,
including the run that produced a FALSE NEGATIVE and the mechanism behind it
(the agent re-binds an unmounted drive within ~60s, so the drive gate's startup
reconcile restarted the apps one second before the sweep looked). Records that
the write hazard was blocked only by an ACCIDENTAL filesystem permission that no
code owns and no test pins.
- architecture/02 §0a — the boot-recovery contract (S-1): both gates read desired
state; the sweep observes a SETTLED fleet and each sample must refresh first;
nothing is started without asking, fail-safe. Plus the durable warning:
Manager.StartStack has no gate of its own.
- 00-capability-map — the boot-recovery row, with the repeat count cited per N.5
(6 of 6 hard resets) rather than a bare PROVEN-LIVE.
- OPEN-ITEMS / ROADMAP — R-157 CLOSED (both mechanisms), R-170 CLOSED, R-171 NEW
and closed the same session, marked a regression from v0.189.0.
- STATUS.md — the power-cut line moved from "What's broken" to "What works right
now" with its repeat count; one dated bullet in the change log.
- CONTEXT.md S-13 — the lessons worth carrying: "it didn't happen this time" is
not a disproof; widening a window makes previously-unreachable overlaps
reachable; and a settle detector is only as good as the freshness of what it
samples — the fix's own defect, found live rather than by review.
Controller v0.189.0 implements operator decision D-b. Docs only here; no hub
change and no hub version bump.
- architecture/02-controller-module-map.md §0a — NEW, and it is the S-1 contract:
desired (app.yaml) / in-flight (own marker file) / observed (not persisted),
with the rule that ties them — never derive one from another. Absent desired
state means UNKNOWN, never "running". One file, one writer. D-b's binding
safety rule quoted verbatim.
- 00-capability-map.md — the boot-recovery row now rests on a recorded signal,
with the three live flows from 9201. The interrupted-operation half is marked
IMPLEMENTED, not PROVEN-LIVE: nobody killed the controller mid-backup on metal.
- OPEN-ITEMS/ROADMAP — R-166 SHIPPED with both blocking facts and their answers;
R-157 mechanism B CLOSED and A restated as the whole item; R-170 NEW (the
drive-backed boot gate still infers a Stop from a container count).
- STATUS.md — the "an app can stay switched off and nothing says so" line
rewritten to what is actually left: timing.
- CLAUDE.md — end-of-session checklist gains: confirm your own last push's CI run
went green, BY RUN ID. The failure email is a push signal; this is the pull check.
- CONTEXT.md S-12 — the rulings, and the two lessons worth carrying: a test that
constructs the thing it should prove the caller constructs is hollow (its
red-proof will say so), and a field-by-field struct rebuild in a save path is a
defect on sight.
SPIKE-ci-runner-2026-08-02.md: all six probes with method, measurement and ruling; none
STOPped. P2 (stock image has git but no python3) and P6 (a runner that loses its state
re-registers and orphans the old record) changed the design; P5 (a failed run signals
NOTHING) is why the alarm exists at all.
R-168 SHIPPED with its evidence. R-29 CLOSED — on the demonstrated alarm and not on a green
run, as required: the class it opened is answered at both ends, the hook refusing locally and
CI catching a --no-verify bypass and emailing. R-161 noted: its automatic half now exists for
the STATIC gate, while its original scope, the runtime gate, is deliberately still not
automatic and should stay that way.
NEW R-169 (grep established R-168 was the highest in use): CI can only report, because there
is no gate in the road. Making it blocking needs branch protection plus a PR workflow, both
of which change how the operator works — so it is theirs to decide, and the row states the
cost honestly rather than recommending it.
CONTEXT gains S-8 (CI detects, does not block, and why that is structural), S-9 (a detector
that tells no one is not finished, plus the curl and Cloudflare-1010 traps), S-10 (the runner
is unprivileged because DooPlex is Tier 2), S-11 (CI reproduces the sibling layout).
CLAUDE.md gains the rule earned by red-proofing: a go test -run pattern that matches no test
prints ok and exits 0, and an instrument that can silently drop results is not a measurement.
hub/CHANGELOG v0.87.0 + scripts/CHANGELOG gate-enforcement entry. CONTEXT gains S-6 (the
hub renders no host-install version and the gate pins its absence) and S-7 (gates run from
one entry point per repo; reuse_refs_check was fixed rather than the REUSE.md convention,
with both rejected alternatives recorded).
OPEN-ITEMS: R-94 CLOSED all three legs, leg (a) by DELETION with its reason; R-29 leg (a)
CLOSED and leg (b) HALF-SHIPPED with the census result written into the row (13 gates; every
gate a CLAUDE.md names was green, two of the four unnamed were red); R-161 gains its
successor pointer. NEW R-168 (grep established R-167 was the highest in use): Gitea Actions
runner — measured 2026-08-02 as Gitea 1.26.2, Actions enabled on all four repos, 0 runners,
0 workflow runs, 0 branch protections, and the consequence that trunk-based direct-to-main
pushes leave no merge for a status check to gate, so CI here can detect but not block.
BLOCKED on a spike over host-mode vs privileged DinD on DooPlex and whether the workflow can
avoid JavaScript actions.
ROADMAP: R-94 collapsed to its one-liner, R-29 updated, R-168 added.
Documentation only — no code, no box, no build.
STATUS.md (repo root, 652 words / 67 lines): what works · what's broken ·
what we're working on · waiting on you · changed since. A VIEW of
OPEN-ITEMS.md, holding nothing of its own; not CONTEXT.md, and both files
now say why they stay separate. No R-n is the subject of a sentence —
identifiers are bracketed pointers only.
CONTEXT.md S-5 records the four operator decisions taken 2026-08-02
(D-a … D-d), none of them implemented:
D-a merge mp1 into mp0 rather than resize it — before any external
install, and D-c ships in the same step → R-165
D-b desired/observed app state in its own store, with the state-store
safety rule verbatim → R-166 (BLOCKED)
D-c customer fill warning + operator backup-failure alert → R-167
D-d only DooPlex and Peti's box are protected → target-selection.md
R-163 RE-FRAMED, not closed: the sizing question is withdrawn rather than
answered; the row survives as the record of the constraint until R-165
lands. R-156's papra referral RESOLVED — deployed nowhere, so the template
fix strands nothing; the docker ps evidence is recorded with its
provenance and its scope limit.
target-selection.md: two protected machines, everything else disposable.
ep0 is no longer Tier 2 but is not scratch (it holds the only off-premises
copy of real customer data) — flagged for explicit operator confirmation.
The demo-box backup-target fence drops from prohibition to stated cost,
because D-d spends that reference anyway.
CLAUDE.md gains an End-of-session checklist carrying the STATUS.md
maintenance rule and "a finding goes in OPEN-ITEMS.md first".
The credential existed and was not reachable when it was wanted. Every box has
had a strong random root@pam password since TASK G1, vaulted in the hub at day 0
and used for real during the sshd incident — but the only way to read it back was
a hand-written curl carrying the global operator key, a secret kept out-of-band.
In practice the PVE web console on a demo box felt locked.
The host page grows a Console access card: presence + username + set_at by
default, Reveal fetches the plaintext on demand for 60 s with a Copy button.
Masking clears the JS variable, and also fires on a second click and on
visibilitychange. A host with nothing vaulted says so, and says why.
The secret is NEVER rendered into the page, and that constraint shapes the
change. The render path uses a new store.GetHostRecoveryMeta whose struct and
SELECT both omit the secret column, so it is structurally incapable of carrying
one. The plaintext crosses the wire only in the response to POST
/hosts/{id}/reveal-recovery-credential (Cache-Control: no-store, CSRF-gated at
the ServeHTTP level; POST precisely so that gate applies and so no secret is
retrievable by URL alone). Deliberately NOT the customer page's data-secret
widget, which embeds the plaintext on every load.
A delivered reveal writes one recovery_credential_revealed event on the host's
customer timeline (info, source hub, Hungarian) via SaveEvent alone — no
dispatcher, nobody emailed, the log_tail_requested shape. Two reveals write two
events: the register records accesses, not states. A 404 is not an access. An
unbound host reveals fine and writes no event; the [INFO] hub line, carrying the
username and a length only, is then the record.
The global-key API path is untouched by design — it is the route for when the
hub UI itself is broken, and coupling it to the session layer would delete the
independence that makes it a fallback.
Recorded as a real trade: the hub session password alone now unlocks console root
fleet-wide, where retrieval previously also needed the global key. Accepted for a
single-operator, HU-geo-fenced hub that already stores these passwords in
plaintext at rest (CONTEXT.md ruling S-4). The plaintext-at-rest half is filed as
R-133 — every hub DB backup is a fleet-wide console-credential dump.
Tests 550 -> 559; four red-proofs (page leak, audit event, CSRF gate, route
order) each run, observed failing, and reverted. The route-order proof is a seam
test driving ServeHTTP: a handler-level test cannot see that defect, because the
handler is correct and simply never runs.
Closes the record-hygiene rider. Part 3 of the spec (documenting a
ROADMAP/OPEN-ITEMS state convention) is deliberately NOT done — its stated
evidence is false; see REPORT-record-correction-2026-07-29.md.
- CONTEXT.md:540 — "scripts/hub_confirm_gate.py enforces" was present tense
about a gate invoked by nothing. Now says it asserts but is not enforced
(R-29). Third instance of the class after :564 and configs.go:27.
- REUSE.md:62 — same claim, "enforces zero". The RULE stays (never native
confirm()/prompt() is correct guidance and this is a reuse-reference row);
only the enforcement claim changes, and it now says the rule holds only as
long as you keep it.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md:4 — root REPORT.md is the overwritten per-session file;
REPORT-<topic>.md is the non-clobbering sibling form (CLAUDE.md:82-87), of
which 14 exist. The prohibition on durable content living only there stays.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md:55 — "Why the READY rows rank this way" promised a complete
ordering and listed 5 of ~15 open rows. Scoped to TOP, with a half-sentence
saying it is deliberately not a full ordering. No row added to the list.
hub/internal/web/configs.go:27 left alone (R-94 leg (b), needs a hub build).
No gate wired, run or fixed. Documentation only, no version bump, no CHANGELOG.
d4c07873 filed "hostinstall_gates.py is invoked by nothing" as a novel
observation. It is not novel — R-29 already names the class (green gates are
enforced nowhere; one sat RED for 16 releases while every REPORT said green),
and R-29 was missing from OPEN-ITEMS.md entirely, having never been carried
across the 2026-07-27 register rebuild. An open item about work not getting
done was absent from the page that decides what gets done.
Ruling on whether R-29 is the right home for a non-design-v2 gate: YES. Its
title says design-v2, but its own audit list already spans mount-safety,
secrets and dedup gates across four repos, and its part (b) — "the systemic
half is the real item" — is about the enforcement mechanism, which is
gate-agnostic. hub_confirm_gate.py is already on its list and sits in the same
scripts/ directory. No new ID minted; R-29's own text forbids it, and this is
the third re-raise it has absorbed.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: open R-29 (READY, S(a)/M(b)), with the orphan evidence and
the two separable parts R-29 already defines.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: R-94 leg (b) now points at R-29 as its class.
- ROADMAP.md:158: audit list extended with hostinstall_gates.py (RED today,
1.19.0 != 1.22.0) + hub_confirm_gate.py verified orphan. Entry not rewritten.
- ROADMAP.md:147: cited a non-existent R-164 — it means controller v0.164.0.
- CONTEXT.md:564: asserted in the present tense that the version cross-check is
"gated by scripts/hostinstall_gates.py". It exists, is red, and runs nowhere.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: READY #1/#3/#4 markers dropped — they duplicated ranked-list
positions and the gap was left by the row merged in d4c07873.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: E-2d citation :322-341 widened to :322-343; the invocation it
describes is at :343, two lines outside the old range.
- backlog/README.md: two-line lead naming OPEN-ITEMS.md and ROADMAP.md.
- REPORT-record-correction-2026-07-29.md: the report CLAUDE.md:82-87 requires
for both commits. Root REPORT.md (E-2 increment 1) untouched.
No gate wired, fixed, run or deleted — that is R-29 part (b), its own task.
Documentation only. No version bump, no CHANGELOG entry, no box touched.
Replaces the 2026-07-14 DRAFT entirely - it was verified against controller v0.132.0,
51 versions stale, while being cited as authoritative. Now verified against controller
0.183.0 / agent 0.110.0 / hub 0.80.0 / catalog 4252121. NOT ratified.
Every statement is labelled [DESIGN] (a decision from the architecture discussion) or
[FACT] (file:line, live output, or a citation to _recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md).
Phase 0 verified D5's premise and it FAILED. Ten read surfaces were checked; nine are
clean (SMB under both namespace shapes, FileBrowser for local drives, .fab import and
download, /api/debug/*, all three ServeFile sites, registering the backup dir as a
drive). One is not: FileBrowser binds a NETWORK share at its ROOT while local drives
are userdata-scoped, and no IsNetwork() filter guards the deploy dropdown, the per-app
migrate targets, or handleStorageMigrateApp. So an app namespace - and under D5 its
plaintext secrets - can land somewhere a browsing surface serves with download:true.
Not a leak today (the unit's app.yaml is secret-stripped); it becomes one under D5.
D5 is therefore written as a BLOCKED target, not as settled. -> R-108
Core artifact is the failure -> recovery matrix (15 rows). RTO cells carry only
measured durations; 12 are blank and each blank is listed explicitly as a finding.
RPO cells carry the configured cadence that bounds RPO, labelled as such - no RPO has
ever been measured from an incident and none is invented.
The 7/53 vs 9/43/1 Tier-2 coverage counts are both recorded, unresolved; neither adopted.
Coupling (S-1): capability map section C now cites the matrix instead of restating
routes; ROADMAP gains R-102..R-108; OPEN-ITEMS gains only the in-flight R-108 plus
C9-F1b/F3/F4 -> R-n cross-references; CONTEXT records D1-D6 as standing ruling S-3.
No code, no version bump, no deploy, no box touched.
R-97 collapsed to its shipped one-liner in ROADMAP and closed in OPEN-ITEMS.
PROMPT-TEMPLATE N.5 now names FOUR coupled artifacts instead of two: the
capability map, ROADMAP, the owning architecture doc (ruled as S-1 in CONTEXT.md
but never reflected in the template CC actually reads, so it bound nobody), and
OPEN-ITEMS.md. Tasks must now report which register rows they opened, closed or
re-ranked.
Ops: R-90 swap done (interim; CX33 still blocked), R-95 mitigation armed but zero
snapshots taken so it moves to WATCHING rather than closed, R-91 gate still not
satisfied. CONTEXT.md datastore path corrected to /mnt/pbs-datastore.
Open state was spread across ROADMAP, CONTEXT.md, four audits/, three runbooks,
per-session REPORT.md files and a chat log. This is the one page to read first:
every row has a state (BLOCKED/READY/WAITING-ON-OPERATOR/WATCHING) and an owner,
and the READY rows are ranked with reasoning.
R-88 is the recommended next task — quiesce's nil-age fail-open stops every app
stack every 5 minutes with no backoff and bypasses the maintenance window, and
its trigger (a PBS read failure) is live given ep0's demonstrated OOM.
CONTEXT.md now records that OPEN-ITEMS.md is authoritative and that REPORT.md is
overwritten per session.
Supervised runbook execution. No code, no version bump.
The felhom-pbs tier had reported `job errors` on EVERY demo-hp backup
since the tier was created on 07-26, while the data landed correctly
every time: `DatastoreBackup` grants Datastore.Backup but not
Datastore.Prune, so the box's keep_last=2 prune was denied.
Operator ruling: retention is a COMMERCIAL attribute owned by the hub;
ep0 executes. Box tokens therefore stay write-only - a compromised box
must not be able to delete its own offsite backups. No grant was widened
and felhom-tenantsync.sh is unchanged (the ruling makes it correct).
Increment 1:
- boxes stop attempting prune. allowPBSPrune is DERIVED
(`!t.Primary && t.KeepLast > 0`), so keep_last: 0 on the PBS tier
disables both the --prune-backups value and the gate in one config
edit, and the tier stays armed. Verified prune_pbs_allowed=false on
both boxes with no tier REJECTED line.
- per-namespace prune jobs on ep0, keep-last 2, daily 03:30 UTC
(05:30 CEST), dry-run gated. demo-hp 3->2, demo-felhom untouched,
chunk count unchanged (prune removes indexes, not chunks).
Write proof CLOSED: 08:25:47 job errors -> 09:37:29 TASK OK, snapshot
2026-07-27T09:37:29Z, chunks 9787->9813, prune step absent entirely.
Driven through POST /api/guest-backup/trigger (the UI path), not
--selftest and not raw vzdump. Hub gauge evidence explicitly NOT
satisfied - the delta is below its 0.1 GB display granularity.
GC scheduled sun 04:30 UTC and deliberately NOT run: every chunk still
carries a fresh atime from the migration copy, so a run today would
reclaim nothing. verify-new enabled per operator ruling, turning an
inert hub alarm live.
Legacy demo-felhom-01 namespace deleted with its two ACL entries and its
token (operator ruling, confirmed twice) so nothing dangles.
R-89 records the target architecture and carries the unanswered parallel
question: does the restic key on storage-box-pool-1 have DELETE rights?
If so the daily app-data tier has the identical exposure and append-only
is the equivalent answer.
ep0 is Etc/UTC, not CEST - corrected in the record.
- ROADMAP: R-85 row. Code SHIPPED; rotation NOT YET OBSERVED LIVE, stated as
such rather than written as done.
- Capability map: a new row for UNATTENDED restore-proof, IMPLEMENTED not
PROVEN-LIVE, kept distinct from the R-82 row that a MANUAL selftest earned.
That distinction is the same one the activation-vs-arrival split made.
- 03-host-agent §8: the scheduler covers every tier, oldest-proven first; the
spec is per-run; a restore-test joins the one-heavy-op gate. The safety
properties that must not be re-derived are listed.
- 07: restore-proof recorded as a per-tier property. Doc still NOT ratified.
- 06: corrects S4.1's 'the offsite restore-test now runs unattended' — it
silently stopped being true when local_backup_target was retargeted to 'local',
the SECOND time in that doc that a correct mechanism was broken by its input
changing underneath it.
- CONTEXT + REUSE.
Hub gate green (17 packages, rc=0).
R-84 resolved by asking the STORAGE rather than persisting the store: ground
truth, so a pruned archive correctly stops counting where a persisted record
would keep claiming a backup that no longer exists. Proven live on both boxes
with the in-memory store cold.
demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB) — the R-82 finding closed
on the box where it was worst. Controller v0.175.0 deployed to both boxes.
Slice D.1 — host-install 1.20.0: a FRESH box defaults to local-daily +
offsite-weekly (felhom-pbs, 604800s, keep_last=2). setdefault semantics proven
both ways: fresh gets the tier, an UPGRADE preserves the existing backup block
verbatim — so an in-place upgrade can never silently start writing to an
offsite datastore. Existing boxes are migrated explicitly.
Slice E:
- 07-backup-architecture.md: honest status header per CONTEXT ruling S-2, with
an explicit STALE-outside-the-PBS-tier verdict (the controller tiers were last
verified 41 controller versions ago). The PBS row claimed 'PBS on DooPlex'
(the retired spike store) with no cadence; it now names felhom-pbs ->
felhom-offsite on ep0 over wg-felhom, weekly, keep_last=2. NOT marked
ratified — that is Viktor's review of the section 10 list. Discharges R-83.
- 06-offsite-connectivity.md: the target-split remaining-work note collapsed
(shipped), and records HOW S4.1's tier-aware timeout silently regressed — the
mechanism was never removed, its INPUT changed when local_backup_target was
retargeted to 'local'. Also notes S4.1 already diagnosed the teardown 403 as a
phantom (a timeout consequence, not an ACL gap).
- capability map: new row for recurring offsite backups actually LANDING, as
distinct from the existing row proving ACTIVATION. IMPLEMENTED, not
PROVEN-LIVE — the restore round-trip has not completed under the fixed code.
- ROADMAP: R-82 SHIPPED with its remaining gate named, R-83 DISCHARGED, R-84
left open.
- CONTEXT + REPORT: the arc, including the mid-arc correction I had to make.
Third instance of one class (hub v0.12.0, v0.73.0, this), fixed as a class.
On 2026-07-26 03:00 UTC expected_backup_missed fired on demo-felhom, demo-hp
and drill-r50 at once; the demo-felhom one reached the CUSTOMER channel
claiming "newest backup is 176h0m0s old". Nothing was wrong — three vzdump
archives were on disk. Cause: the agent backup store is in-memory, so the
R-50 fleet restart emptied `backups` until the next run, and the hub read
empty as "no backup exists".
- assessBackupFreshness returns OK/UNKNOWN/MISSED instead of `missed bool`;
absence is UNKNOWN until it outlives an anchored window. Still pure.
- store.GetHostReportsSince + monitor.newestBackupEvidence read the hubs own
retained history (bounded 7-day lookback, early-exit on fresh evidence) —
"when did I last SEE evidence of a backup?" The anchor was free: the hub
already retains 90 days. No agent change, no new persisted state.
- store.GetFirstHostReportAt anchors absence at first contact, reusing the
existing 26h threshold as the grace (no new knob, the v0.73.0 shape).
- Deferrals logged + counted; reason strings kept distinct.
- backupStaleAfter untouched; landmine recorded (a weekly PBS snapshot would
alarm six days in seven) and owned by R-82.
Tests 493->508. Red-proofs A/B/C observed and restored; A reproduces the live
message verbatim. Replayed the real 03:00 reports (600/417/77 rows): all
three now silent.
Source: documentation/audits/DIAG-backup-missed-2026-07-26.md
New documentation/operations/nodes.md: HP t740 hardware, disks (SanDisk system
SSD 182195804614; Toshiba 1TB NVMe 58BS11AFT8MQ PRESENT AND UNENROLLED, still
NTFS, do not touch), the five-NIC map and the trap that cost the first install,
and the access path - no SSH key is baked, auth is the hub-vaulted G1
break-glass password.
tailscale.md gains demo-hp, the operator-lab-exception warning so a future
product-shape audit does not conclude the product ships tailscale, and the
--accept-dns evidence: the join omitted the flag, MagicDNS rewrote
/etc/resolv.conf, and it was reverted. Harmless at the vacation site, would
have bitten silently at home where split-horizon matters.
OPEN: key expiry still enabled on demo-hp (2027-01-17) - needs an admin-console
toggle or an API token; a pre-auth key cannot do it.
felhom-pve joins the tailnet as a host package (100.70.170.35, expiry
disabled); DooPlex already advertised 192.168.0.0/24 via its GitOps k3s
tailscale pod (100.107.87.53). ssh felhom-pve now targets the tailnet IP
(direct-over-LAN at home, tunnel when away); felhom-pve-lan = LAN fallback.
--accept-dns=false on the host. Host converted static->DHCP (reservation
keeps .162 at home). Measured: --accept-routes hairpins the local subnet
at home -> travel-only opt-in. PBS is offsite (own WireGuard tunnel), needs
none of this. Recorded not fixed: controller<->agent plane hard-pinned to
192.168.0.162 (agent listen_addr + guest bootstrap.json) -> not yet portable
off-LAN. No code changed. Full doc: documentation/operations/tailscale.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XMForrE4c1wZxd9LukxYVt
Live through the real ingress: public /bind/ renders logged-out with the
no-oracle expired state (200-not-500 proves selfbind_tokens migrated);
gate intact (/ and /hosts -> /login); CSRF exemption is /bind/-only
(POST /bind/ no-CSRF 200 vs POST /customers/x/block no-CSRF 302).
Operator-minted full walk + new-ISO console banner remain operator/R-1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp
Let a customer bind their own freshly-installed appliance without the
operator: operator "Send self-bind link" mints a 7-day tokenized
capability link, emailed (Hungarian, sibling sender) to the customer, who
opens a public /bind/<token> page and proves two factors — the console
pairing code shown on the box screen + their retrieval passphrase — and
the hub stages the bind via the same BindAppliance (provenance
customer_selfbind). The box's ~30s appliance poll delivers.
Viktor's three rulings verbatim: console pairing code (no appliance list
ever rendered), operator-sent tokenized link, 5-attempt lockout ->
"call support". Wrong code == wrong passphrase (one generic failure, no
oracle, both factors compared unconditionally); expiry falls back to
operator-bind unchanged.
THE TRAP: one public prefix /bind/, exempt from auth+CSRF at both /login
gate sites via a single isPublicBindPath predicate (tight trailing-slash
match; ServeMux ..-cleans; handler rejects '/' in token). 9 tests
(Scenarios A-F + F1/F2); 4 red-proofs verified red-then-green (lockout,
oracle, widened-prefix, single-active). GC verdict: no appliance GC ->
the 7-day TTL stands alone. Controller/agent untouched; R-27b deferred.
Green: full hub build/vet/test (17 ok) + bash -n + hub confirm gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp
Closes N100 F1 (HIGH): cheap AMI (AN3PLUS 0.01-class) UEFI firmware can't
relocate the ISO's stock signed GRUB from USB (relocation 0x0). The run's live
grub-mkimage workaround is now a first-class pipeline mode.
- build-felhom-iso.sh: --loader shim|mkimage (default shim, byte-for-byte
unchanged; profile-settable FELHOM_LOADER; --loader wins). Loud banner +
manifest loader:/grub-mkimage: fields + -mkimage filename suffix.
- mkimage-surgery.sh (new): post-prepare-iso, in the assistant container. Builds
a monolithic grub-mkimage loader from the ISO's own GRUB (module set from its
grub.cfg; embedded search --fs-uuid -> configfile the real menu). Swaps it into
the ISO9660 tree (real lowercase path) + the efi.img ESP; xorriso re-master
preserves BIOS-hybrid + UEFI + GPT-ESP, drops only Apple HFS+/APM. Recipe from
the N100 run evidence, not re-derived.
- Dockerfile.assistant: grub-common + grub-efi-amd64-bin + mtools + dosfstools.
profiles/n100.profile (new, mkimage + SB-off note).
- Validated on nested VM 311 (RUNBOOK-B legs): leg1 shim boots+installs under
OVMF SB-enforcing + SeaBIOS; leg2 mkimage boots+installs under SB-off; leg3
(red-proof) mkimage under SB-enforcing FAILS Access Denied (unsigned -> SB must
be OFF); leg4 surgery byte-identical payload. bash -n + shellcheck clean.
Physical N100 closure folds into the rehearsal (n100-safety match-nothing ISO
built + sha-recorded, unbooted). PXE stays a deferred R-21 note.
- DeleteHost(deleteEscrow) demotes current host_escrow into host_escrow_superseded (copy-before-delete, same tx), spares existing; one shared demoteCurrentEscrowTx (reused by SaveHostEscrow). F-14 provenance/gate unchanged.
- DeleteCustomerConfig now purges both escrow tables for all the customer's hosts incl. already-deleted (F-14 provenance UNION) — the one true purge point.
- Wording: checkbox/refusal/Danger-zone → demotion. S6b OBSOLETE. Red-proofs TestDeleteHost_Demotes + TestDeleteCustomer_Purges + wording guard.
F2 claim re-issue on clean-slate re-enroll (ReissueForReenroll, host-enroll mint path,
single-bump, reset code; hub never stores the password so fork B). F3 offsite re-issue on
re-enroll (ReissueOffsiteForCustomer, same machinery as the manual button). 2.3 escrow honesty
(red-proofed): re-issuing offsite marks the escrow stale (MarkEscrowStale), withholds the
mismatched restic hash from auto-confirm, DR checklist shows stale not done. Events:
claim_reissued_reenroll / offsite_reissued / escrow_stale.
Controller + scripts unchanged (source contradicted both premises): the controller reads escrow
prereqs live from the agent; the installer can't know the descriptor-provisioned storage id. F4
root fix is agent-side -> ROADMAP R-22; demo unblocked live (Part 0 ACL grant). VALIDATION doc
F2 erratum + F3/F4 dispositions. Green gate + Scenario-C red-proof pass.
Supervised clean-slate reinstall of the demo N100 from a pipeline-built Felhom ISO +
onboarding rehearsal. Core objectives GREEN: first-boot chain reached rc-0 on the first
attempt on real hardware (closes slice A's operator-gated boundary), serial-filter safety
proven on metal, PBS-DR reconciler self-healed on the reused peer, DMI verdict -> key on
MAC+UUID. Hard obstacle was firmware not the pipeline: this cheap AMI AN3PLUS 0.01 board
won't UEFI-boot the ISO's GRUB from USB (relocation 0x0; SB-off + shim-bypass don't help),
worked around live with a grub-mkimage loader from the box's own GRUB (slice-B input).
7 findings logged (F1 firmware loader HIGH; F2/F3/F4 reused-customer edges -> R-1/Peti;
F5 guest-RAM, F6 drive-init mount, F7 back-route). Full doc in documentation/tests/;
ROADMAP R-21 + REPORT + CONTEXT updated. No production code changed.
scripts/iso/: a DooPlex pipeline (build-felhom-iso.sh + Dockerfile.assistant) that
turns the official PVE ISO into a Felhom auto-install ISO whose first-boot stub
installs a retry-forever felhom-bootstrap unit which unattended-fetches
felhom-host-install.sh from the public felhom.eu/scripts channel and runs it until the
host is enrolled + a guest provisioned. host-install is UNMODIFIED (invoked only).
- build gates the answer on validate-answer OUTPUT text, never $? (spike S1 exit-0 trap)
- stub is from-iso, fully-up, exactly-once; retry unit owns all network work (S8a)
- retry-vs-resume encoded once: plain first, --resume when install state exists (v1.11.3)
- secret-bearing (embeds the retrieval passphrase): supervised/single-use; env shredded on success
Validated on VM 310: build gate + red-proof, disk-filter fail-safe, chain + retry,
resume-decision, exactly-once, no-net retry+recovery. Terminal host-install rc-0 success
operator-gated (drill customer needs the password-gated create-UI). scripts v1.16.0;
ROADMAP R-21 -> in-progress. Detail in REPORT.md.
Audit doc for the Day-0 VM drill: appliance install, floor-at-first-report,
escrow ceremony + auto-confirm FIRST LIVE FIRING (~7.5 min, zero clicks),
offsite backup + restore round-trip, PBS-DR/WG fork (Peti-sequence rehearsal).
Corrects day0-install.md A.2 (git creds optional since v1.11.2, anonymous
fetch is the normal shape) and RUNBOOK-escrow-ceremony.md (identity-only mode
does NOT exist — F-6; age prereq — F-10). REPORT.md overwritten; CONTEXT.md
one-liner added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NptTCFtu7dz2Ru89qHRagN
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