v0.203.0: the box collects what the hub staged for it (R-218 consume half) + R-220's message

R-218's declaration half shipped in v0.201.0 and works. Its consume half never
existed. Reconcile ran exactly twice per process — at start-up and when the
recovery screen drives it — and BOTH fire before the hub has anything staged,
because the hub stages in RESPONSE to the declaration those runs precede.

Measured on the R-201 re-walk: unlock reconcile 11:43:07, hub staged 11:44:57
saying 'next cycle', a full report cycle ran 11:55:46, still unconsumed at
12:06. A guest command line applied it in 18 seconds — everything correct except
the trigger.

Bridge.RetryIfDeclared re-runs the SAME reconcile on a 5-minute tick, driven from
the box's own published declaration (OffboxReportStatus().State) — the very
statement the hub acts on, so the two cannot disagree.

Poll, not an ACK flag, decided on the promise: the no-target message says 'amint
megvannak' (no deadline) and the card says 'within a day'. Five minutes is inside
both by a wide margin and needs no hub change.

It stops by construction — a healthy box does no work and logs nothing — and the
settle gate is deliberately kept via ReconcileWhenSettled.

The marker was investigated and left alone: applied_marker lives in the guest's
DataDir, which a rebuild destroys, so it cannot suppress a legitimate re-run.

R-220's customer half: the refusal no longer tells the customer to choose from a
list that may be empty. It names the rebuild, points at the Meghajtók page, and
promises no outcome.

Red-proofs: remove the retry -> credential uncollected (the dead end reproduced);
drop the stop condition -> a healthy box hammers the hub; call Reconcile instead
of ReconcileWhenSettled -> settle gate bypassed; restore the old sentence -> the
impossible action returns.

28 packages ok, vet clean, all controller gates OK.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,54 @@
+## v0.203.0 — the box collects what the hub staged for it (2026-08-06, R-218 consume half / R-220 message) — MinAgent 0.127.0
+
+**R-218's declaration half shipped in v0.201.0 and works. Its consume half never existed.**
+
+A stranded box says `offsite.state=needs_credential`; the hub's `offsiteheal` re-stages the one-time
+secret and logs *"the box re-consumes on its next cycle"*. **There was no next cycle.** `Reconcile`
+ran exactly twice in a process's life — once at start-up (whose own comment said *"retries on next
+config refresh/restart"*) and once when the recovery screen drives it (R-219) — and **both fire before
+the hub has anything staged, because the hub stages in RESPONSE to the declaration those runs
+precede.** So the hub held a credential the box would never fetch.
+
+**Measured on the R-201 re-walk, 2026-08-06:** unlock reconcile **11:43:07** · hub staged **11:44:57**
+saying "next cycle" · a full report cycle ran **11:55:46** · **still unconsumed at 12:06**. A guest
+command line applied it in **18 seconds** — proving the credential, the target and the key were all
+correct and only the trigger was missing. That was the first of the two dead ends that kept the
+recovery journey failing.
+
+**The fix: re-run the SAME reconcile, on a tick, for exactly as long as the box says it needs a
+credential.** `Bridge.RetryIfDeclared` is driven from the box's own published declaration
+(`OffboxReportStatus().State`) — **the very statement the hub acts on**, so the two can never disagree
+about whether a retry is wanted.
+
+**Why a poll and not an ACK flag.** The deciding criterion was the promise the customer is given: the
+no-target message says *"amint megvannak"* (no deadline) and the backups card says *"ha egy napon
+belül nem áll be"* — **within a day**. A 5-minute tick is inside both by a wide margin and needs **no
+hub change**. If either promise ever tightens to minutes, revisit.
+
+**It stops by construction.** The instant a target exists the declaration goes false: a healthy box
+does no work and **logs nothing** (asserted). **The settle gate is deliberately kept** — the retry goes
+through `ReconcileWhenSettled`, so the day-0 floor race it guards is unchanged.
+
+**The marker was investigated and left alone.** `applied_marker` lives at `<DataDir>/offbox/` — inside
+the guest's data dir, which a rebuild destroys — so it cannot suppress a legitimate post-rebuild
+re-run. It is not part of this defect.
+
+### R-220's customer-facing half — a refusal that named an impossible action
+
+The deploy refusal said *"Válasszon a listából csatlakoztatott meghajtót"* — choose an attached drive
+from the list — **while the list was empty**, on a rebuilt box, for a reason the customer had no part
+in. That is the I3 breach the campaign recorded. It now says what is true (the drive is not registered
+**on this machine**, which is what a rebuild causes), points at the page where re-attaching happens
+rather than at a possibly-empty list, and **promises no outcome**, because whether the drive can be
+re-attached is not knowable from there. The NAS refusal is a different situation and is untouched.
+
+Tests: `internal/offsiteapply/retry_test.go` (a credential staged after start-up is collected; a
+healthy box does nothing and logs nothing; a nil bridge is silent; the settle gate holds) and
+`internal/settings/refuse_message_test.go`. **Red-proofs:** removing the retry leaves the credential
+uncollected — the re-walk's dead end reproduced; dropping the stop condition makes a healthy box
+hammer the hub; calling `Reconcile` instead of `ReconcileWhenSettled` bypasses the settle gate;
+restoring the old sentence brings the impossible action back.
+
 ## docs — the "CI is still owed" claim was stale; corrected (2026-08-06, R-229 part 2) — no version bump
 
 **One sentence, no code.** This file asserted that continuous integration was still owed

controller/cmd/controller/main.go

@@ -756,6 +756,55 @@ func main() {
 			return err
 		})
 
+		// ── R-218, THE CONSUME HALF (v0.203.0) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+		//
+		// The declaration half shipped in v0.201.0 and works: a stranded box says
+		// `offsite.state=needs_credential`, and the hub's `offsiteheal` re-stages the one-time secret
+		// and logs *"the box re-consumes on its next cycle"*.
+		//
+		// **THERE WAS NO NEXT CYCLE.** `Reconcile` ran exactly twice in a process's life: once at
+		// start-up (the goroutine above, whose own comment says "retries on next config refresh/
+		// restart") and once when the recovery screen drives it (R-219). Both fire BEFORE the hub has
+		// anything staged, because the hub only stages in response to the declaration those runs
+		// precede.
+		//
+		// Measured on the R-201 re-walk, 2026-08-06: unlock reconcile 11:43:07 · hub staged 11:44:57
+		// saying "next cycle" · a full report cycle ran 11:55:46 · still unconsumed at 12:06. A guest
+		// command line moved it in **18 seconds**, which proves the credential, the target and the key
+		// were all fine and only the trigger was missing.
+		//
+		// So: re-run the SAME reconcile, on a tick, for exactly as long as the box itself says it needs
+		// a credential. The signal is the box's own `OffboxReportStatus().State` — the very statement
+		// the hub acts on, so the two can never disagree about whether a retry is wanted.
+		//
+		// WHY A POLL AND NOT AN ACK FLAG: the customer-facing text promises "amint megvannak" (no
+		// deadline) and the backups card promises "within a day"; a 5-minute tick is inside both by a
+		// wide margin, and it needs no hub change. If either promise ever tightens to minutes, revisit.
+		//
+		// IT STOPS BY CONSTRUCTION: the instant a target exists `OffboxReportStatus` stops returning
+		// the declared state, so a healthy box does no work and makes no noise. The settle gate is
+		// deliberately kept — `ReconcileWhenSettled` waits for floor knowledge exactly as at start-up.
+		sched.Every("offsite-credential-retry", 5*time.Minute, func(ctx context.Context) error {
+			if offsiteBridge == nil {
+				return nil // off-site not configured for this customer
+			}
+			attempted, err := offsiteBridge.RetryIfDeclared(ctx, func() bool {
+				st := backupMgr.OffboxReportStatus()
+				return st != nil && st.State == backup.OffsiteStateNeedsCredential
+			})
+			if !attempted {
+				return nil // a target exists (or we never needed one) — no work, and no log line
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				// NOT a job failure: the box still declares, so the next tick tries again. Logged at
+				// WARN because a credential that never arrives is exactly what this exists to surface.
+				logger.Printf("[WARN] [offsite-apply] credential retry: %v (the box still declares a need; retrying)", err)
+				return nil
+			}
+			logger.Printf("[INFO] [offsite-apply] credential retry: the staged credential was collected and the tier applied")
+			return nil
+		})
+
 		// Cache refresh: every 5 minutes. Recompute the effective window each pass so the cached
 		// "next DB dump" follows a runtime window change (the UI save also refreshes immediately).
 		sched.Every("backup-cache", 5*time.Minute, func(ctx context.Context) error {

controller/internal/offsiteapply/offsiteapply.go

@@ -341,3 +341,36 @@ func (b *Bridge) ReconcileWhenSettled(gateCtx context.Context) error {
 	defer cancel()
 	return b.Reconcile(ctx)
 }
+
+// ── R-218, THE CONSUME HALF ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// `Reconcile` was correct from the day it shipped and was simply never run again. It fires at
+// start-up and once more when the recovery screen drives it (R-219) — and BOTH precede the moment the
+// hub has anything staged, because the hub stages in RESPONSE to the declaration those runs come
+// before. So the hub held a credential the box would never fetch.
+//
+// Measured on the R-201 re-walk, 2026-08-06: unlock reconcile 11:43:07 · hub staged 11:44:57 saying
+// "the box re-consumes on its next cycle" · a full report cycle ran 11:55:46 · still unconsumed at
+// 12:06. A guest command line moved it in 18 seconds — everything was fine except the trigger.
+
+// NeedsCredentialFunc reports whether the box STILL declares it needs a transport credential. It is
+// deliberately the box's own published declaration (`backup.OffboxReportStatus().State`) rather than a
+// second predicate: the hub acts on that statement, so driving the retry from anything else would let
+// the two disagree about whether a retry is wanted.
+type NeedsCredentialFunc func() bool
+
+// RetryIfDeclared is ONE tick of the consume half.
+//
+// It reconciles **only while the box declares a need**, which is what makes it stop: the instant a
+// target exists the declaration goes false, this returns immediately, and a healthy box does no work
+// and logs nothing. The settle gate is deliberately preserved — `ReconcileWhenSettled` waits for floor
+// knowledge exactly as the start-up path does, because the day-0 race it guards is unchanged.
+//
+// Returns whether a reconcile was ATTEMPTED, so a caller (and a test) can tell "declined to run" from
+// "ran and failed" without reading the log.
+func (b *Bridge) RetryIfDeclared(ctx context.Context, declared NeedsCredentialFunc) (attempted bool, err error) {
+	if b == nil || declared == nil || !declared() {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	return true, b.ReconcileWhenSettled(ctx)
+}

controller/internal/offsiteapply/retry_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+package offsiteapply
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// ── R-218's CONSUME HALF ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Measured on the R-201 re-walk, 2026-08-06: the hub staged a credential at 11:44:57 and logged
+// "the box re-consumes on its next cycle"; a full report cycle ran at 11:55:46; at 12:06 it was still
+// unconsumed, and a guest command line applied it in 18 seconds. Everything was correct except that
+// nothing ever re-ran the reconcile.
+//
+// These assert the EFFECT — was a reconcile attempted, and did the tier get applied — not that a
+// helper returned a bool.
+
+// ── SCENARIO A — a credential staged AFTER start-up is collected, unaided ────────────────────────
+//
+// RED-PROOF: make RetryIfDeclared return (false, nil) unconditionally — i.e. remove the retry, which
+// is the pre-v0.203.0 world — and this FAILS with the credential still sitting unconsumed. That is
+// the re-walk's first dead end, reproduced.
+func TestRetryIfDeclared_CollectsACredentialStagedAfterStartup(t *testing.T) {
+	b, cons, _, en, _ := newBridge(t, goodOffsite())
+
+	// The box declares: it was rebuilt, has no target, and the hub holds a package for it.
+	attempted, err := b.RetryIfDeclared(context.Background(), func() bool { return true })
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("retry: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !attempted {
+		t.Fatal("R-218 RETURNED: the box declared a need and no reconcile was attempted")
+	}
+	// EFFECT: the one-time password was actually consumed and the tier configured.
+	if cons.calls == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("the staged credential was never collected")
+	}
+	if en.calls == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("the off-site tier was never configured after collecting the credential")
+	}
+}
+
+// ── SCENARIO C — a healthy box does not retry, and makes no noise ────────────────────────────────
+//
+// RED-PROOF: drop the `!declared()` guard so the tick always reconciles → this FAILS, and a box whose
+// tier already works hammers the hub forever.
+func TestRetryIfDeclared_HealthyBoxDoesNothing(t *testing.T) {
+	b, cons, inst, en, logbuf := newBridge(t, goodOffsite())
+
+	attempted, err := b.RetryIfDeclared(context.Background(), func() bool { return false })
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("retry: %v", err)
+	}
+	if attempted {
+		t.Fatal("a box that declares NO need must not reconcile")
+	}
+	if cons.calls != 0 || inst.calls != 0 || en.calls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("a healthy box touched the hub: consume=%d install=%d enable=%d", cons.calls, inst.calls, en.calls)
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(logbuf.String()) != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("a healthy box logged noise every tick: %q", logbuf.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// A nil bridge (off-site not configured for this customer) is a silent no-op, not a panic — main.go
+// wires nil in exactly that case.
+func TestRetryIfDeclared_NilBridgeIsSilent(t *testing.T) {
+	var b *Bridge
+	attempted, err := b.RetryIfDeclared(context.Background(), func() bool { return true })
+	if attempted || err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("a nil bridge must be a silent no-op, got attempted=%v err=%v", attempted, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// ── SCENARIO D — the settle gate still holds on the retry path ───────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The retry must not become a back door around the day-0 floor race the gate exists for. It goes
+// through ReconcileWhenSettled, so an unsettled box WAITS rather than reconciling immediately.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: change RetryIfDeclared to call Reconcile directly instead of ReconcileWhenSettled →
+// this FAILS, because the reconcile happens while the floor is still unknown.
+func TestRetryIfDeclared_HonoursTheSettleGate(t *testing.T) {
+	b, cons, _, _, _ := newBridge(t, goodOffsite())
+	// Floor never becomes known → the gate must hold the reconcile off until its own bound expires.
+	b.Settle = SettleFunc(func() (string, string, bool, bool) { return "0.203.0", "", false, false })
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel() // the gate observes a cancelled context and must not proceed to reconcile
+
+	attempted, err := b.RetryIfDeclared(ctx, func() bool { return true })
+	if !attempted {
+		t.Fatal("the box declared, so a retry attempt must be reported even when the gate stops it")
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a cancelled gate must surface an error, not silently reconcile")
+	}
+	if cons.calls != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("SETTLE GATE BYPASSED: the retry consumed a password while the floor was unknown")
+	}
+}

controller/internal/settings/refuse_message_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package settings
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// ── SCENARIO G (R-220) — AN EMPTY LIST MUST EXPLAIN ITSELF ──────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The old refusal said "choose an attached drive from the list" while the list was empty — on a
+// rebuilt box, for a reason the customer had no part in and could not see. Measured three times live.
+// A refusal that names an action the customer cannot perform is the I3 breach the campaign recorded.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: restore the old sentence and this FAILS on the impossible-action assertion.
+func TestRefuseAppNamespace_DoesNotNameAnImpossibleAction(t *testing.T) {
+	msg := refuseAppNamespaceUndeterminable
+
+	if strings.Contains(msg, "Válasszon a listából") {
+		t.Fatal("R-220's I3 breach RETURNED: the refusal tells the customer to choose from a list that may be empty")
+	}
+	// It must say WHY the list can be empty — the rebuild — so the state is explicable.
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "újratelepítettük") && !strings.Contains(msg, "újra") {
+		t.Fatalf("the refusal must explain why the drive is unregistered; got %q", msg)
+	}
+	// And point somewhere a customer can actually go.
+	if !strings.Contains(msg, "Meghajtók") {
+		t.Fatalf("the refusal must name where re-attaching happens; got %q", msg)
+	}
+	// It must not promise an outcome it cannot know.
+	for _, forbidden := range []string{"biztosan", "garantál", "mindig sikerül"} {
+		if strings.Contains(msg, forbidden) {
+			t.Errorf("the refusal promises an outcome it cannot know (%q)", forbidden)
+		}
+	}
+	// The NAS refusal is a different situation and keeps its own wording — it points at a list that
+	// genuinely does have entries, so it is not the same defect.
+	if !strings.Contains(refuseAppNamespaceNetwork, "Válasszon csatlakoztatott meghajtót") {
+		t.Fatal("the NAS refusal was changed; it is a different situation and was not part of R-220")
+	}
+}

controller/internal/settings/settings.go

@@ -1580,8 +1580,23 @@ func (s *Settings) RefuseAsAppNamespace(path string) (bool, string) {
 const (
 	refuseAppNamespaceNetwork = "Hálózati tárhelyen (NAS) nem futtatható alkalmazás adatkönyvtára — " +
 		"a NAS megosztás tallózásra és médiatárolásra használható. Válasszon csatlakoztatott meghajtót."
+	// ⚠ R-220 / SCENARIO G — THIS SENTENCE USED TO NAME AN IMPOSSIBLE ACTION.
+	//
+	// It said *"Válasszon a listából csatlakoztatott meghajtót"* — choose an attached drive from the
+	// list — and on a rebuilt box that list is EMPTY, for a reason the customer had no part in and no
+	// way to see. Measured three times live (CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 1, and twice on the R-201 re-walk).
+	// Telling someone to pick from an empty list is the I3 breach the campaign recorded: a refusal must
+	// name a reason a person can act on.
+	//
+	// It now says what is true — the drive is not registered ON THIS MACHINE, which is what a rebuild
+	// causes — and points at the page where re-attaching happens, rather than at a list that may hold
+	// nothing. It promises no outcome, because whether the drive can be re-attached is not knowable
+	// from here.
 	refuseAppNamespaceUndeterminable = "A megadott tárhely nem azonosítható regisztrált meghajtóként, " +
-		"ezért alkalmazás adatkönyvtáraként nem használható. Válasszon a listából csatlakoztatott meghajtót."
+		"ezért alkalmazás adatkönyvtáraként nem használható. Ha a gépet nemrég telepítettük újra, a " +
+		"meghajtóid megvannak, de még nincsenek újra csatlakoztatva ehhez a géphez — a Tárhely → " +
+		"Meghajtók oldalon csatlakoztathatod őket, és utána indítsd újra a telepítést. Ha ott sem " +
+		"látszanak, keresd a Felhom ügyfélszolgálatát."
 )
 
 // IsStoragePathSchedulable returns whether a path belongs to a registered,