v0.127.0: a mount Felhom itself made is not 'something else' (R-220)

After a rebuild the customer's own drives could not be re-attached: candidates
returned initialize:[] attach:[] while both drives sat there, and the deploy
refused with 'choose an attached drive from the list' — a list that was empty.
Measured live three times.

Mechanism: enrolment mounts a drive TWICE, at /mnt/felhom-drives/<name> and at
the raw /mnt/<name> it creates on the host. The host survives a guest rebuild;
the controller's registry does not. So classifyClaim saw a mount outside the
managed prefix and concluded 'claimed by something else' — about our own mount.

The fix is CORROBORATED, not a widened prefix: a non-managed mountpoint is
forgiven only when the SAME device is also mounted under the managed path, a
pairing only our enrolment produces. A disk another system uses — /srv/data,
/media/x, even /mnt/someone-elses-disk — has no counterpart and is STILL
refused, with its own test and a red-proof showing an over-wide fix offering it
for formatting.

Read from /proc/mounts deliberately: the lsblk invocation is pinned verbatim in
configs/felhom-agent.sudoers, so using the plural MOUNTPOINTS would have coupled
this to a sudoers rollout. /proc/mounts is world-readable — no sudo, no new
allowlisted command, no config change.

Fail-safe: an unreadable mount table corroborates NOTHING, so the device
classifies exactly as before. 'Could not corroborate' must never read as 'ours'.

29 packages ok, vet clean, agent gates OK.

.claude/rules/backup.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/backup/**", "internal/pbs/**", "internal/pbsdr/**", "internal/dr/**"]
+---
+
+# Backup, PBS and DR
+
+`internal/backup/` is the vzdump runner, restore-test scheduler and report store. `internal/pbs/` is
+the fingerprint-pinned PBS-API client plus the verify maintenance loop. `internal/pbsdr/` and
+`internal/dr/` carry the DR tier and recipe halves.
+
+## The three PBS laws
+
+1. **Set-only.** `pvesm remove` **DELETES the encryption key**. Re-apply configuration; never remove
+   and re-add a PBS storage to change it.
+2. **Secret on stdin.** A token secret is passed on stdin, never as an argv the process table shows.
+3. **Verify the pin BEFORE consuming the secret.** A fingerprint check after the secret has been sent
+   protects nothing.
+
+## Verify is server-side, and its default skips the work
+
+The agent drives verification **remotely** via the PBS API; `proxmox-backup-client` has **no** verify
+subcommand. `POST .../verify` defaults to **`ignore-verified=true`, which SKIPS already-verified
+snapshots** — send `ignore-verified=false` to actually re-read and detect corruption. A verify that
+skipped everything reports success.
+
+## Presence is not success
+
+A timestamp recording an **attempt** is not evidence of a **result**. Where a status field travels
+beside a timestamp, the verdict must consult **both** — or the timestamp must record only successes.
+Ask of any timestamp: *what exactly must have happened for this to be set?* If the answer is "we
+tried", it cannot answer "did it work".
+
+**Corollary:** when a verdict changes which field it counts from, the alarm text changes with it.
+Leaving a message reading `last run 8h ago` while alarming on a six-day-old **success** turns a true
+alarm into one the operator dismisses.
+
+## Prune is server-side now
+
+`DatastoreBackup` carries **no** `Datastore.Prune`. Boxes set `keep_last: 0` and the off-site endpoint
+runs the prune jobs. **Box tokens stay write-only — never widen that grant** (R-89).
+
+<!--
+The ignore-verified default is the sharpest instance of the "absent log line" class in this repo: a
+verify that silently skipped every snapshot completes fast, exits clean, and reports the same shape
+as one that read every byte.
+-->

.claude/rules/health-checks.md

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/capability/**", "internal/storage/**", "internal/localapi/**", "internal/hub/**", "internal/guesthook/**"]
+---
+
+# A health check issues no block I/O
+
+No `statfs`, no `getdents`, no read, write or `fsync` — **not even behind a timeout**.
+
+A probe that touches a wedged device enters uninterruptible sleep, survives `SIGKILL`, and cannot be
+recovered until the device returns or the host reboots — so `systemctl restart` hangs too. A timeout
+protects the caller's control flow and nothing else: the blocked thread remains.
+
+**Liveness is decided from `/proc` and the kernel's own state**, never by reading or writing the
+filesystem.
+
+<!--
+Measured, R-117 spike §6.3 (felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-r117-bind-liveness-2026-07-30.md):
+a probe stayed in D state 3m50s after kill -9; a buffered write with no fsync blocked too (O_CREAT
+needs journal access); and statfs/getdents returned HEALTHY on a namespace that EIOs every byte —
+fast, and wrong.
+
+This rule used to be duplicated verbatim in felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md with a note explaining that
+felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md "does not load in an agent-only session". That reasoning was correct before
+path-scoped rules existed. The single source is now felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md "Code quality rules"; this
+file is the scoped copy that loads exactly where health checks are written. (2026-08-06)
+-->

.claude/rules/localapi.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/localapi/**", "internal/authz/**", "internal/guesthook/**"]
+---
+
+# Local API, authz and guest hooks — the per-guest blast radius
+
+`internal/localapi/` is the narrow per-guest local API: token store, disks/format, guest binds,
+controller swap, stale-lock recovery, pinned self-signed leaf. `internal/authz/` is the operator
+signed-op verifier (SSHSIG) plus the durable nonce store. `internal/guesthook/` installs the
+pre-start self-heal hookscript.
+
+> **Overlap note:** `health-checks.md` also matches `internal/localapi/**` and
+> `internal/guesthook/**`. That is deliberate — both rules apply there and both load. Neither
+> supersedes the other.
+
+## Scoping is the whole security property
+
+This API is reachable **from inside a customer guest**. Every route must be scoped to the guest that
+called it — a route that can name another guest's id has escaped its blast radius. Fail **safe to
+protected**: an unrecognised or unresolvable caller gets less access, never more.
+
+## Replay protection must survive a restart
+
+**`authz.MemoryNonceStore` on a real host is a defect** — replay protection dies on restart. Use
+`authz.FileNonceStore`. The memory store exists for tests.
+
+## The token is a hash on disk, plaintext only at mint
+
+The store keeps **hashes**. The plaintext token exists in exactly one place, `bootstrap.json` on the
+PVE host — so a "read the token" step means reading that file, and a lost token is re-minted, never
+recovered.
+
+## Binds can brick guest boot
+
+| Do not | Because | Use |
+|---|---|---|
+| `GuestBinder.AttachBind`/`DetachBind` (per-drive `pct set -mpN`) | legacy model; a missing bind source can **brick guest boot** (C1) | `AttachDrive`/`DetachDrive` (intermediary model) |
+| `isHostMountpoint` to reconcile bind state | a boolean cannot converge stacked double-binds (the `/mnt` doubling bug) | `countHostMounts` normalization inside `AttachDrive` |
+
+<!--
+Why fail-safe-to-protected rather than fail-closed: this API also carries the recovery paths. A hard
+refusal on an unresolvable caller would make a half-broken guest unrecoverable through the very
+interface built to recover it. Less access, never none.
+-->

.claude/rules/proxmox.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/proxmox/**", "internal/reconcile/**", "internal/signedjobs/**"]
+---
+
+# Proxmox — the API contract, and how destructive work is gated
+
+`internal/proxmox/` is the API-first `Client` plus the fenced root-CLI `Privileged`.
+`internal/reconcile/` is the reconcile engine, reversibility gate, op journal and crash recovery.
+`internal/signedjobs/` holds the operator-signed destructive executors (wipe, decommission).
+
+## A 200 on the POST is not success
+
+**Every mutating op is async**: it returns a **UPID**, and `WaitTask` must assert
+`exitstatus == "OK"`. Authorization can fail at *task execution* long after the HTTP call returned
+200. Treating the POST's status as the result is how a failed destroy reads as a successful one.
+
+## The privsep token gotcha
+
+A `--privsep 1` token's rights are the **intersection** of the backing user's permissions **and** the
+token's own ACLs. The role must be granted on **both** or every call 403s. The same intersection rule
+bites on PBS (`token ∩ user`).
+
+## TLS
+
+**SHA-256 leaf-cert pinning** against the self-signed host cert. **No insecure default**, ever. The
+pin is the raw leaf-DER sha — the SAN is never checked, so a cert rotation changes the pin and the
+agent must be re-pinned.
+
+## The destructive path — never the direct call
+
+| Do not | Because | Use |
+|---|---|---|
+| `Client.DestroyLXC` / `Vzdump` / `SetConfig` ad-hoc | skips classification, signature, per-guest serialization, crash recovery | `reconcile.Engine` paths / `RunSignedJob`; queue via `Queue.Submit` |
+| add a method to `proxmox.Privileged` | breaks the 3-exception root-CLI fence (`routing_test.go`) | `proxmox.Runner` + a new sudoers `Cmnd_Alias` + `validate.go`-style checks |
+| treat `ListLXC` output as "guests we own" | audit A1 — pre-v0.62.0 the stale-lock reaper did exactly this, contained only by the pool-scoped token | intersect with `Client.Pool` membership (`staleLockController.Guests()`); **fail safe on read failure** |
+
+Full trap table: `REUSE.md` §3. Every guest joins the `felhom` pool — `VM.Audit` comes from the
+`/pool` grant, not from a per-guest ACL.
+
+<!--
+The fence is not stylistic. It is what makes this component auditable: two types, one of which can
+only speak HTTP and one of which can only shell out, with a test asserting neither crosses. A single
+convenience method on Privileged that also makes an HTTP call would end that property silently.
+-->

.claude/rules/storage.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/storage/**", "internal/escrow/**"]
+---
+
+# Storage and escrow — format safety and zero-knowledge recovery
+
+`internal/storage/` is the storage observer, durable IDs, role/claim classifiers, `SudoHostOps` and
+the watchdog. `internal/escrow/` is the PBS-key escrow with its zero-knowledge recovery code.
+
+> **Overlap note:** `health-checks.md` also matches `internal/storage/**`. Deliberate — both rules
+> apply there and both load.
+
+## Never format the device you inspected
+
+**AGENT-001 is a TOCTOU:** acting on the caller's `req.Device` (or any remembered `/dev` path) after
+inspection lets `/dev` re-enumeration retarget the node to a **different physical disk**. Format the
+**re-resolved** device — `Server.reresolveWipe` / `reresolveBlank`.
+
+**Never exec raw `mkfs.*`** (including `Binaries.MkfsExt4`/`MkfsXfs`): sudoers no longer allowlists
+raw mkfs, and going direct bypasses the claim filter and the wrapper's re-checks. Use
+`SudoHostOps.Format`, which routes through `felhom-mkfs-guarded`.
+
+## The two durable-ID schemes refuse each other
+
+They are not interchangeable, and each returns a `binding_mismatch` for the other's scheme:
+
+| Purpose | Scheme | Resolver |
+|---|---|---|
+| wipe confirmation | `byid:` / `byuuid:` | `ResolveDurableDevice`, `DiskInfo.WipeDurableID` |
+| enrolled-storage remount | `uuid:` | `ResolveStorageDevice` |
+
+Using `DiskInfo.DurableID` (a `uuid:`) as a wipe-confirmation id is F20-BUG2.
+
+## Drive data is never taken by force
+
+Plain `umount` only — **never `-l`, never `-f`**, and never any format operation under
+`/mnt/felhom-drives`.
+
+## Escrow is zero-knowledge, and a fetch failure is not a wrong code
+
+The server holds no client key; a no-key restore fails with `missing key`. **A fetch failure must
+never be reported as a wrong recovery code** — that told a customer their correct code was bad, in
+hundredths of a second, when checking a code actually takes about one. Distinguish "we could not
+reach the store" from "the code did not match", always.
+
+<!--
+The escrow recovery-code "flake" was a REAL defect, not a flake. "Known flake, re-run" needs evidence
+before it is said out loud — that phrase cost this project a real finding once.
+-->

.githooks/pre-push

@@ -29,6 +29,41 @@ root=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null) || {
 }
 cd "$root" || exit 1
 
+# ── WORKSPACE-ROOT ASSERTION (2026-08-05, R-204 rider) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+# Refuse a push from a clone outside the felhom workspace.
+#
+# WHY THIS IS A HOOK AND NOT A LINE IN A DOCUMENT: the workspace root is ALREADY written down, in
+# documentation/runbooks/workspace-CLAUDE.md and in the workspace-root CLAUDE.md ("stay inside it"),
+# and work drifted into a home directory anyway. A rule that has failed once as a reminder is not
+# fixed by writing it down again — it has to be asserted where it can bite.
+#
+# A PUSH IS THE RIGHT TRIGGER, deliberately: throwaway clones under /tmp for probes and red-proofs
+# never push, so nothing legitimate breaks. Reads and builds elsewhere stay unaffected.
+#
+# Symlinks are resolved on BOTH sides before comparison, so a symlinked path neither falsely passes
+# nor falsely fails. If the workspace root does not exist on this machine the check is SKIPPED, not
+# failed — this hook must not brick a legitimate clone on a different host.
+#
+# The only bypass is the documented `git push --no-verify`, whose use is already reportable.
+FELHOM_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu
+if [ -d "$FELHOM_WORKSPACE_ROOT" ]; then
+    ws_real=$(cd "$FELHOM_WORKSPACE_ROOT" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P) || ws_real=""
+    root_real=$(pwd -P) || root_real=""
+    if [ -n "$ws_real" ] && [ -n "$root_real" ]; then
+        case "$root_real/" in
+            "$ws_real"/*) : ;;  # inside the workspace — proceed
+            *)
+                echo "pre-push: PUSH REFUSED - this clone is OUTSIDE the felhom workspace." >&2
+                echo "          clone:    $root_real" >&2
+                echo "          expected: under $ws_real (repos live in $ws_real/git/<repo>)" >&2
+                echo "          Work in the workspace clone, or bypass with 'git push --no-verify'" >&2
+                echo "          and state that you did in the session report." >&2
+                exit 1
+                ;;
+        esac
+    fi
+fi
+
 if ! command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     echo "pre-push: FAIL - python3 not found, so the gates CANNOT run. This is a failure, never a" >&2
     echo "          pass by default. Install python3, or push with --no-verify and say so." >&2

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,140 @@
+## v0.127.0 — a mount Felhom itself made is not "something else" (2026-08-06, R-220)
+
+**After a rebuild the customer's own drives could not be re-attached, and the refusal named an action
+they could not perform.** `GET /api/disks/candidates` returned `initialize: [], attach: []` while both
+drives sat there, and the deploy refused with *"choose an attached drive from the list"* — a list that
+was empty. Measured live **three times**: CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 1, and twice on the R-201 re-walk.
+
+**The mechanism.** Enrolment mounts a drive **twice** — at the managed `/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` and
+at the raw `/mnt/<name>` it creates on the host. **The host survives a guest rebuild; the controller's
+registry does not.** So `classifyClaim` saw a mount outside the managed prefix and correctly concluded
+"claimed by something else" — about Felhom's own mount.
+
+**The fix is CORROBORATED, not a widened prefix.** A mountpoint outside `/mnt/felhom-drives` is
+forgiven **only when the same device is ALSO mounted under the managed path** — a pairing that only
+Felhom's own enrolment produces. A disk another system is using, at `/srv/data` or `/media/x` or even
+`/mnt/someone-elses-disk`, has no such counterpart and **is still refused**. That fence has its own
+test, and its red-proof shows an over-wide fix offering `/mnt/someone-elses-disk` for formatting.
+
+**Read from `/proc/mounts`, deliberately.** The lsblk invocation is pinned **verbatim** in
+`configs/felhom-agent.sudoers` (`lsblk -J -o NAME,FSTYPE,PTTYPE,MOUNTPOINT /dev/*`), so switching it to
+the plural `MOUNTPOINTS` would have meant shipping a sudoers change with the binary — a far larger
+blast radius than this finding warrants. `/proc/mounts` is world-readable: **no sudo, no new allowlisted
+command, no config change.**
+
+**Fail-safe:** an unreadable mount table corroborates **nothing**, so the device classifies exactly as
+it did before this change — refused. "We could not corroborate" must never read as "it is ours".
+
+Tests: `claim_r220_test.go` — the own-drive case, the foreign-mount fence over four paths, and the
+corroboration itself (both mounts required; a lone raw mount vouches for nothing; another device's
+managed mount does not vouch for this one; an unreadable table corroborates nothing).
+**Red-proofs:** removing the exemption refuses the customer's own drive again
+(*"device is mounted at /mnt/adatok (sdb)"*); over-widening it to any `/mnt/*` path breaks the fence.
+
+## docs — CLAUDE.md becomes a core plus path-scoped rules (2026-08-06, R-229 leg (b)) — no version bump
+
+**Documentation only. No Go changed, nothing built, nothing deployed.** `go build`/`vet`/`test` green
+and unchanged.
+
+**175 -> 99 effective lines** (207 -> 103 raw, 14,093 -> 6,267 bytes). The release/publish-train
+section was the largest block and the `felhom-build-deploy` skill already carries the procedure, so
+the core points at it instead of restating a table that drifts from the script. The package layout
+went the same way as the controller's: `REUSE.md` and the tree are its home, and the per-package
+annotations that were doing real work moved into the rule file for the area they describe rather than
+being deleted.
+
+**New:** `.claude/rules/{proxmox,localapi,backup,storage}.md`, all `paths:`-scoped, all <=46 effective
+lines, joining the existing `health-checks.md`.
+
+**Kept in the core deliberately** — it is the only part re-injected after `/compact`: the root-CLI
+fence and its three named exceptions (breaching it is how this component stops being auditable), the
+destructive-op gate, the prove-ownership rule from audit A1, the gate entry point, the F9
+live-validation fence, trunk-based with its revert-and-report escape hatch, and the end-of-session
+checklist.
+
+**Glob overlap, stated rather than silently resolved:** `health-checks.md` matches
+`internal/{localapi,guesthook}/**` and `internal/storage/**`, which `localapi.md` and `storage.md`
+also match. Both rules load in those directories and neither supersedes the other; each new file says
+so in its own text so a reader who sees two rules fire is not left guessing which wins.
+
+## docs — the "CI is still owed" claim was stale; corrected (2026-08-06, R-229 part 2) — no version bump
+
+**One sentence, no code.** This file asserted that continuous integration was still owed
+(`felhom.eu` `OPEN-ITEMS.md` R-168). **R-168 was CLOSED on 2026-08-02** — a Gitea Actions runner
+re-runs each repo's gate entry point on every push and emails the operator on failure. Found while
+confirming this session's own push by run ID, which is the check that caught it.
+
+The same stale sentence was in four instruction files across all four repos and is corrected in all
+four. In `felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md` it **contradicted the same file's release section**, which already
+said R-168 mails the failure — a contradiction inside one instruction file, which is the exact class
+the R-229 work exists to find.
+
+## docs — expired and contradictory blocks removed from CLAUDE.md (2026-08-06, R-229) — no version bump
+
+**Documentation and gate registration only. No Go changed, nothing built, nothing deployed.**
+
+Surgical corrections; the file was deliberately **not** restructured (that is deferred, R-229).
+
+- **Deleted the expired TEMPORARY block.** It read *"felhom-pve is at a remote site (until
+  ~2026-08-02) … Delete this block on return"* and was still being read as current fact on
+  **2026-08-06**, four days past its own deadline — while `felhom-controller/CLAUDE.md` asserted the
+  opposite. The location-independence fact worth keeping (`localapi` binds `169.254.253.1:8443` on
+  `vmbr9` since the R-50 island migration) moved to an HTML comment.
+- **Every component version literal is gone** from effective text, including
+  `felhom-agent --version → 0.115.0` and the `go.mod` Go directive. Versions change several times a
+  day; ask the hub's `/hosts` + `/configs` or the box.
+- The drill-VM claim and the host addresses now point at `documentation/operations/nodes.md`, which
+  already stated both correctly. **This file's drill-VM claim was the correct one** — confirmed by
+  `qm list` on demo-hp.
+- The R-115/R-188/R-186 release **narratives** moved to an HTML comment and to the
+  `felhom-build-deploy` skill; the **directives** stayed (never hand-roll the build; the
+  build → tag → publish → push order; reproducible `-trimpath -buildvcs=false`).
+- The health-check block-I/O rule became `.claude/rules/health-checks.md`, scoped to the five
+  packages where health checks are written. It had been duplicated from `felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md` *with a
+  note explaining that that file does not load in an agent-only session* — correct reasoning, made
+  obsolete by path-scoped rules.
+
+`agent_gates.py` now registers **`instructions`** (shared, `felhom.eu/scripts/`, never copied).
+
+Full accounting: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/LEDGER-instruction-trim-2026-08-06.md`.
+
+## v0.126.0 — a fetch failure is not a wrong recovery code (2026-08-06, R-224)
+
+**A hub the agent could not reach was reported to the customer as a bad recovery code.** Measured live
+on 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11 F3): with the hub REJECTed at the appliance's firewall and a **correct,
+current** recovery code, the customer was told their code did not open their package — **in 0.0556 s**,
+against ~1.0 s for a genuine unseal. No unseal was attempted. F4 produced the same message in 0.0299 s
+with this agent stopped.
+
+**The discriminator existed here the whole time and this boundary threw it away.** `recover.go` fails
+at four distinguishable points; the local-api handler had cases for two of them and a `default` that
+answered *"the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle, or the bundle could not be fetched"* —
+one sentence for two situations, only one of which is the customer's doing.
+
+**The fix is a value, not a log line.** `escrow.ErrBundleFetch` joins the fetch leg's error, and the
+handler routes it to **502** with its own words: *"the sealed recovery bundle could not be fetched from
+the hub — the recovery code was NOT used and nothing was written."* 502 rather than 4xx because the
+request was not bad; an upstream dependency failed. The `default` now carries **only** the fail-closed
+wrong-code case and says so without the "or".
+
+Four situations, four statuses — **502** fetch failed · **400** the bundle was fetched and refused the
+code · **404** the hub holds no bundle · **409** the bundle predates the repository-password field.
+The controller classifies on the STATUS and must never parse these sentences.
+
+⚠ **A GREEN TEST NAMED THIS DEFECT AND DID NOT PREVENT IT.**
+`TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_FetchErrorIsDistinct` has said since v0.125.0 that *"the operator must
+not be sent to re-read their recovery code because the hub was unreachable"* — and it passed
+throughout, because it asserted this package's error **string** one layer below where the merge
+happened, and a string is something no caller can branch on. It now asserts the sentinel, and its
+consequence-level twin asserts the STATUS at the boundary the customer's message is derived from.
+**Prefer the test that asserts the consequence over the one that asserts the mechanism.**
+
+Tests: `recover_test.go` (fetch classifies as `ErrBundleFetch`; a wrong code does **not**; an absent
+blob keeps its own identity) and `localapi/escrow_recover_class_test.go` (each situation's status, and
+a standalone assertion that fetch-failure and wrong-code never share one). **Red-proofs:** removing the
+`%w` join fails the sentinel test; deleting the handler case makes both answer `400` with the
+wrong-code sentence — the exact pre-fix code, and the exact defect CAMPAIGN-11 measured.
+
 ## v0.125.0 — the agent opens the sealed bundle and returns one field (2026-08-04, R-199 links 7–8)
 
 **Link 7 had one production caller and it was a `--selftest`.** `UnwrapIdentityBundle` has existed

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1,216 +1,103 @@
 # CLAUDE.md — `felhom-agent`
 
-> Loads when Claude Code touches this repo. Stable orientation only — **current state lives in
-> `CONTEXT.md` and the top of `CHANGELOG.md`**, never here. Cross-repo orientation: workspace-root
-> `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/git/CLAUDE.md`.
+> Stable orientation only — **current state lives in `CONTEXT.md` and the top of `CHANGELOG.md`**,
+> never here. Cross-repo conventions (artifact taxonomy, access, clean-tree gate, secrets,
+> CHANGELOG/REPORT): workspace-root `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/git/CLAUDE.md`. Path-scoped detail:
+> `.claude/rules/`.
 
 ## What this repo is
 
-`felhom-agent` is the operator-tier **host agent** that runs on each Proxmox host and owns **all**
-Proxmox interaction: provision/restore guests, host storage, backup/restore orchestration, the hub
-control loop, and a narrow per-guest local API. It is the **most privilege-sensitive** component.
+The operator-tier **host agent**, one per Proxmox host, owning **all** Proxmox interaction:
+provision/restore guests, host storage, backup/restore orchestration, the hub control loop, and a
+narrow per-guest local API. It is the **most privilege-sensitive component in the system**.
 
-- Renamed former `proxmox-controller` repo.
-- **Distinct from `felhom-controller`** — that is the *in-guest* controller (Docker-only, no Proxmox
-  creds). Do not confuse them.
-- Control plane, not data plane: if the agent dies, apps keep serving; only management degrades.
+- Renamed from `proxmox-controller`.
+- **Distinct from `felhom-controller`** — that is the *in-guest* controller, Docker-only, holding no
+  Proxmox credentials. Do not confuse them.
+- **Control plane, not data plane:** if the agent dies, apps keep serving; only management degrades.
+- Pure Go stdlib + `golang.org/x/crypto`. No web frameworks.
 
-## Read before writing code
+## Doing X → read Y
 
-- **`REUSE.md`** — canonical helpers, format-safety guards, traps, seams. Check it first; update it
-  in the same commit that changes a shared helper or pattern.
-- `CONTEXT.md` (current state + open threads) and the top `CHANGELOG.md` entry (authoritative history).
-- Design doc: `felhom.eu/documentation/architecture/03-host-agent.md` (locked). Platform facts:
-  `felhom.eu/documentation/proxmox-platform.md` + `tests/phase{0,1-2,3,4}-findings.md`.
+| Doing | Read |
+|---|---|
+| writing any new code | `REUSE.md` — helpers, format-safety guards, traps, seams |
+| needing current state / open threads | `CONTEXT.md` + the top `CHANGELOG.md` entry |
+| Proxmox, reconcile or signed jobs | loads itself: `.claude/rules/proxmox.md` |
+| local API, authz or guest hooks | loads itself: `.claude/rules/localapi.md` |
+| backup, PBS or DR | loads itself: `.claude/rules/backup.md` |
+| storage or escrow | loads itself: `.claude/rules/storage.md` |
+| writing a health check | loads itself: `.claude/rules/health-checks.md` |
+| **release, build, publish, deploy, verify a version** | the **`felhom-build-deploy`** skill — **never hand-roll it** |
+| writing or reviewing a test, fixing a bug | the **`felhom-testing`** skill |
+| host addresses, break-glass, node facts | `felhom.eu/documentation/operations/nodes.md` — never restate them |
+| which box may I break | `felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/target-selection.md` |
+| what version is live anywhere | ask the hub (`/hosts`, `/configs`) or the box — **never a doc** |
+| the authoritative design | `felhom.eu/documentation/architecture/03-host-agent.md` (locked) |
 
-## Layout (verified against the tree)
+## The root-CLI fence — API-first, exactly three exceptions
 
-```
-cmd/felhom-agent/    main + flags + --selftest modes + the daemon entry
-cmd/felhom-opsign/   offline operator signing CLI (SSHSIG)
-internal/authz/      operator signed-op verifier (SSHSIG) + durable FileNonceStore
-internal/backup/     vzdump backup runner + restore-test scheduler + report store
-internal/capability/ live sudo-policy capability probe (degradation visibility)
-internal/config/     JSON config + FELHOM_AGENT_* env overlay; secrets redacted (Redacted())
-internal/desired/    hub desired-state syncer (envelope observer)
-internal/escrow/     PBS-key escrow (zero-knowledge recovery code)
-internal/guesthook/  pre-start self-heal hookscript install
-internal/hub/        daemon: HostReport collector + Bearer client + resilient Loop
-internal/lanresolver/ split-horizon DNS on guest IP change (dnsmasq RESTART, not reload)
-internal/localapi/   per-guest local API: token store, disks/format, guest binds, controller swap,
-                     stale-lock recovery, pinned self-signed leaf
-internal/log/        slog setup
-internal/pbs/        PBS-API client (fingerprint-pinned) + verify maintenance loop
-internal/provision/  guest bootstrap back-half (token mint → bootstrap.json → pct bind)
-internal/proxmox/    API-first Client + fenced root-CLI Privileged + UPID WaitTask
-internal/reconcile/  reconcile engine + reversibility gate + op journal + crash recovery
-internal/signedjobs/ operator-signed destructive executors (wipe, decommission)
-internal/storage/    storage observer + durable ids + role/claim classifiers + SudoHostOps + watchdog
-```
-
-## Build / run
-
-- Module `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent`; binary `felhom-agent` (`cmd/felhom-agent/`).
-- **Pure Go stdlib + `golang.org/x/crypto` only** — no web frameworks. `go.mod` directive go 1.25.0;
-  DooPlex (192.168.0.180, where CC runs) has the Go toolchain and is on the same LAN as the demo
-  host — build and run live tests locally.
-- Version via `-ldflags "-X main.version=<v>"`; `--version` flag. Bump on meaningful changes + CHANGELOG entry.
-- **Full build/deploy/publish runbook: use the `felhom-build-deploy` skill.** Summary:
-
-> **Clean-tree gate before any build:** `git status --porcelain` must be empty and
-> `git rev-parse HEAD` must equal `git rev-parse origin/main` in the repo being built. An unpushed
-> change does not exist — never build a dirty or unpushed tree. The `git pull` in the build step
-> stays (it is a no-op when you work in this tree, and load-bearing if anything was pushed from
-> elsewhere).
-
-> **RELEASING IS ONE COMMAND, AND IT PUBLISHES (R-115).** There used to be a raw `go build` line
-> here and a *separate* "Publish" row, so publishing was a step someone had to remember — and it was
-> **forgotten three times in five days**, the last leaving agent v0.120.0 deployed on both demo hosts
-> and undownloadable, where a documented-path reinstall would have silently downgraded them while
-> reporting success. Do not hand-roll the build: the script also creates the `v<version>` git TAG
-> that `felhom-host-install.sh` fetches this version's sixteen config files from (R-183), and it
-> verifies by an **independent download** rather than trusting the publish step's own output.
-> `scripts/publish-agent.sh` still exists and is still correct — the release script CALLS it rather
-> than reimplementing it.
->
-> **THE ORDER IS build → tag LOCALLY → publish → push tag, and each step protects something (R-188,
-> R-186).** The tag is created before the publish so the build and the tag describe the same commit;
-> it is *pushed* after, because the push is what wakes CI (`on: [push]`) and a tag visible before its
-> package makes the published-versions gate correctly fail a correct release — it did, on roughly
-> every second release, and R-168 sends that failure to you by mail. The invariant the old order
-> protected is asserted directly instead: the gate now also refuses a **published version with no
-> tag**. If the push fails after a successful publish the script says so loudly and prints the
-> one-line recovery; if the *publish* fails it removes the local-only tag so a retry is clean.
->
-> **A RELEASED BINARY IS INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIABLE (R-186).** The build uses `-trimpath
-> -buildvcs=false` so the same source produces the same bytes whether or not the tag exists yet —
-> before this, a rebuild could not reproduce the sha you were vouching. To check any published
-> version yourself:
->
-> ```bash
-> V=0.122.0
-> git checkout "v$V" && go build -trimpath -buildvcs=false -ldflags "-X main.version=$V" \
->     -o /tmp/felhom-agent-check ./cmd/felhom-agent
-> sha256sum /tmp/felhom-agent-check
-> curl -fsSL "https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/$V/felhom-agent" | sha256sum
-> ```
->
-> The two hashes must match. `publish-agent.sh`'s fallback build uses the **same** flags — it used to
-> force `CGO_ENABLED=0` and produce a 74 KB-smaller binary for the same version; if either build line
-> ever changes, change both or one version name means two binaries again.
-
-| Step | Where | One-liner |
-|---|---|---|
-| **Release** (build + tag + publish + verify) | DooPlex (local) | `GITEA_USER=admin GITEA_TOKEN=<tok> scripts/release-agent.sh <ver>` — refuses a dirty/unpushed tree and refuses to re-release an existing version |
-| Copy | local → felhom-pve | `scp /tmp/felhom-agent-<v> felhom-pve:/tmp/` (one hop) |
-| Deploy | felhom-pve | backup `.bak-<old>` → `install -m0755` → `systemctl restart felhom-agent` (non-root `felhom-agent` user, config `/etc/felhom-agent/agent.json`) |
-| Ship configs | felhom-pve | sudoers (`/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent`) + guarded-mkfs wrapper WITH the binary when `configs/` changed |
-| **Verify** (anyone, any time) | anywhere with the repo + Go | `git checkout v<ver> && go build -trimpath -buildvcs=false -ldflags "-X main.version=<ver>" -o /tmp/a ./cmd/felhom-agent && sha256sum /tmp/a` — must equal `curl -fsSL <pkg-url> \| sha256sum` |
-| **Vouch** | hub operator UI | Configs → Day-0 artifacts. **Deliberately NOT automated** — vouching is what points machines at a version, and it stays your act (prove-then-vouch) |
-| Verify | felhom-pve | `felhom-agent --version` + journal (clean ReassertGuestBinds, no capability degradation) |
-
-## Proxmox model (the load-bearing rules)
+This is in the core because breaching it is how this component stops being auditable.
 
 - **API-first** via a scoped `FelhomAgent` token. Raw root-CLI is **fenced to exactly 3 exceptions**:
-  keyctl `pct create` (golden image), USB mount/fstab, SMART/sensors. `Client` never shells out;
-  `Privileged` never makes HTTP calls (asserted by `routing_test.go`). Keep that fence.
-- **Every mutating op is async** → returns a UPID → `WaitTask` asserts `exitstatus == "OK"`. A 200 on
-  the POST is **not** success; authorization can fail at task execution.
-- **TLS:** SHA-256 leaf-cert pinning (self-signed host cert). No insecure default.
-- **Privsep token gotcha:** a `--privsep 1` token's rights = intersection of the backing user's perms
-  AND the token's ACLs — the role must be granted on **both**, or every call 403s.
-- Destructive ops go through the reconcile gate / signed-jobs path — never call `Client.DestroyLXC`/
-  `Vzdump`/`SetConfig` ad-hoc (REUSE.md §3).
+  keyctl `pct create` (golden image), USB mount/fstab, SMART/sensors.
+- **`Client` never shells out; `Privileged` never makes HTTP calls** — asserted by `routing_test.go`.
+  Adding a method to `proxmox.Privileged` breaks the fence; use `proxmox.Runner` plus a new sudoers
+  `Cmnd_Alias` and `validate.go`-style checks (`REUSE.md` §3).
+- **Destructive ops go through the reconcile gate / signed-jobs path.** Never call
+  `Client.DestroyLXC` / `Vzdump` / `SetConfig` ad-hoc — that skips classification, signature,
+  per-guest serialization and crash recovery.
+- **Ownership must be PROVEN, never assumed.** A raw `ListLXC` list is not "guests the agent owns";
+  intersect with `Client.Pool` membership and fail safe on a read failure (audit A1).
 
-## Demo host (for live tests)
+## Gates — ONE entry point
 
-Node **`demo-felhom`**, API `https://192.168.0.162:8006`. SSH alias `felhom-pve` (root@pam) —
-available to CC as plain `ssh felhom-pve`. A **second demo node `demo-hp`** (HP t740, node name
-`felhom-host`, `ssh demo-hp` — no baked key; break-glass root via hub `host_recovery/demo-hp-bb76ea` +
-`sshpass`) is the **designated drill+build VM host** per the 2026-07-25 operator ruling, and that ruling
-is **realized** — it hosts drill VM `300` (`drill-r50`), so **start there**, not on DooPlex. (The
-historical golden-bake `drill.qcow2` still lives on DooPlex and is a bake fixture, not a drill target.)
-**Which box is safe to break, and what may be done to each:
-`felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/target-selection.md`** — read it before any destructive test. Both
-nodes + the break-glass recipe: `felhom.eu/documentation/operations/nodes.md`. The agent pins the served leaf cert — verify the
-fingerprint still matches before a live run. Selftest modes (run locally on DooPlex, pointed at the
-demo API): `--selftest[=read|task|hub|storage|backup|restore-test|pbs-verify]`; no flag = the daemon.
+**Run `python3 scripts/agent_gates.py` from the repo root after ANY change here.** It runs this
+repo's gates — `reuse_refs_check` and `instructions_gate`, both the **shared** copies in
+`felhom.eu/scripts/`, never copied into this repo (a copy recreates the drift they detect; an absent
+sibling clone FAILS). `--fast` selects the gates touching no network and no container runtime; today
+that is all of them. **A missing gate is a FAILURE, never a skip.**
 
-> **TEMPORARY — felhom-pve is at a remote site (until ~2026-08-02).** The home-LAN literal
-> `192.168.0.162` is NOT reachable from DooPlex for the duration. Access via Tailscale:
-> felhom-pve = 100.70.170.35; the `Host felhom-pve` entry in `~/.ssh/config` on DooPlex already
-> points there (the direct-LAN path stays available as `Host felhom-pve-lan`). Delete this block on
-> return. All documented `ssh felhom-pve` / `pct exec` workflows are unchanged. Path is **direct**
-> (not DERP), ~37 ms rtt per hop. At the remote site the host is on **DHCP**; re-check its address
-> rather than trusting one written here (`ip -br addr show vmbr0` — it read `192.168.0.162/24` on
-> 2026-07-30, and `felhom-pve-lan` from DooPlex is still `No route to host`). Details + findings:
-> `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md`
->
-> **The "agent does not run at the remote site" warning this block used to carry is RETRACTED
-> (2026-07-30) — it was true before R-50 and is false now.** `localapi` no longer binds a LAN literal:
-> since the R-50 island migration (2026-07-25) it binds `169.254.253.1:8443` on `vmbr9`, which is
-> location-independent by design, and `proxmox.endpoint` is `https://127.0.0.1:8006`. Verified live:
-> `systemctl is-active felhom-agent` → `active`, `felhom-agent --version` → 0.115.0, and the per-guest
-> local API answered `GET /disks` over the island. No config edit and no Viktor GO are outstanding.
+**The pre-push hook** (`.githooks/pre-push`) runs it with `--fast` and refuses a failing push. It is
+**per-clone** — switch it on once with `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`, and a manual run WARNS
+when this clone is unarmed. `git push --no-verify` bypasses it deliberately; **say so in the session
+report when you use it** — CI re-runs the same entry point on every push and **emails the operator on
+failure**, so a bypass is noticed even though it is not blocked (R-168, CLOSED 2026-08-02).
 
-> **Legacy: Windows workstation.** Until 2026-07-19 CC ran on Windows 11; `pct` commands over SSH
-> needed `export MSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1`, and every remote command used
-> `SSH=/c/Windows/System32/OpenSSH/ssh.exe`. Agent deploy was a two-hop copy via the Windows box
-> (`cygpath -w` for the local scp path; CRLF hazard on config files).
+<!--
+WHY ONE ENTRY POINT (2026-08-02, R-29): a census of all gates across the four repos found every check
+a CLAUDE.md names was passing, and two of the four nobody is told to run were failing. This repo was
+the extreme case — nothing ran against it at all, and 90 cited paths were checked by no one.
+-->
+
+## Live validation — the fence
+
+Exercise the **SERVER-SIDE PIPELINE** a real user triggers, end-to-end. **The forbidden shortcut is
+BYPASSING it** — the F9 episode was a raw guest-attach with hand-set state, and it proved nothing.
+
+`claude-in-chrome` is NOT available on DooPlex. Invoking the exact endpoint the UI invokes is an
+acceptable proxy — **say which method was used**. Low-level mechanism tests where the direct call IS
+the mechanism are exempt.
 
 ## Conventions
 
-### Trunk-based — no branches
-
-All shippable work commits **directly to `main`**; `main` equals what is deployed.
-- Report-only artifacts (audits, findings, fixspecs) → `felhom.eu/documentation/` (`audits/`, `backlog/`).
-- Risky/supervised fixes are spec'd, then implemented **during the supervised session, on `main`**.
-- Unattended escape hatch: if a fix can't be cleanly verified/shipped, revert + report — never park on a branch.
-
-> **In every repository where you make a change, update both files in that repo:**
-> - **`CHANGELOG.md`** — cumulative log, newest on top.
-> - **`REPORT.md`** — **overwrite** with the most recent implementation/validation summary only.
->
-> **Never write secrets** into any committed file — reference them as "stored out-of-band".
-
-- Code quality: verify generated code for bugs/edge cases; add debug logging; **ask rather than
-  guess** when you'd otherwise invent input/output.
-- **A health check issues no block I/O** — no `statfs`, no `getdents`, no read, write or `fsync`, **not
-  even behind a timeout**. Liveness is decided from `/proc` and kernel state. The full rule + the
-  measurement lives in `felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md` "Code quality rules"; it is repeated here because health
-  checks are written in THIS repo and that file does not load in an agent-only session. R-117 spike §6.3.
-- Update `REUSE.md` if you added/changed/deprecated a shared helper or pattern (same commit).
-- **Run `python3 scripts/agent_gates.py` from the repo root after ANY change in this repo.** It is
-  the ONE entry point for this repo's gates. Today it runs one — `reuse_refs_check` over this
-  repo's `REUSE.md` — and it exists at one gate on purpose: a census on 2026-08-02 found that every
-  check a `CLAUDE.md` names was passing and two of the four nobody is told to run were failing, and
-  this repo was the extreme case, with nothing running against it at all and 90 cited paths checked
-  by no one. It grows when the agent grows a second check. `--fast` selects the gates that touch no
-  network and no container runtime; today that is all of them. A missing gate is a FAILURE, never a
-  skip. **The shared `reuse_refs_check.py` lives in `felhom.eu/scripts/` and is never copied here**
-  — a copy would recreate the drift it detects; an absent sibling clone FAILS the gate.
-  **The pre-push hook** (`.githooks/pre-push`) runs it with `--fast` and refuses a failing push. It
-  is per-clone — switch it on once with `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`, and a manual run
-  WARNS when this clone is unarmed. `git push --no-verify` bypasses it deliberately; **say so in the
-  session report when you use it.** Both facts are why CI is still owed (`OPEN-ITEMS.md` R-168).
-- Testing doctrine (non-hollow tests, red-proofs, seams): use the `felhom-testing` skill.
-- **Logging**: the slog logger fans out to journald (configured level) + the always-DEBUG `applog.Ring`
-  (remote pulls) — English, keys-never-values, durations on outcomes; full rules in
+- **Trunk-based — no branches.** All shippable work commits directly to `main`; `main` equals what is
+  deployed. Report-only artifacts (audits, findings, fixspecs) go to `felhom.eu/documentation/`.
+- **Unattended escape hatch:** if a fix cannot be cleanly verified and shipped, **revert and report**
+  — never park it on a branch.
+- **Logging**: the slog logger fans out to journald (configured level) plus the always-DEBUG
+  `applog.Ring` (remote pulls). English, keys-never-values, durations on outcomes. Full rules:
   `felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/logging-conventions.md`.
+- Update `REUSE.md` in the same commit that adds, changes or deprecates a shared helper or pattern.
 
-### Live validation
+## End-of-session checklist
 
-Exercise the SERVER-SIDE PIPELINE a real user triggers, end-to-end. The forbidden shortcut is
-BYPASSING it (the F9 episode: raw guest-attach + hand-set state). Invoking the exact endpoint the UI
-invokes is an acceptable proxy when a browser isn't available — say which method was used. Low-level
-mechanism tests where the direct call IS the mechanism are exempt.
-
-## Workflow & artifacts
-
-- Implement **`TASK.md` / `TASK-*.md`** specs (when placed as `TASK.md` or told to), then push +
-  CHANGELOG + REPORT.md.
-- **`RUNBOOK-*.md`** — an operational procedure. CC executes the steps it has access and capability
-  for, including live validation on the demo Proxmox host (CC has root@felhom-pve SSH + the
-  felhom-agent token). Mark a step HUMAN only when it genuinely needs physical presence, a real-world
-  decision, or credentials CC truly lacks. Judgment still applies: confirm before irreversible ops on
-  real customer data — demo scratch guests are fair game.
+- **`CHANGELOG.md`** (cumulative, newest on top) and **`REPORT.md`** (overwritten with this run only)
+  — in every repo touched.
+- **`CONTEXT.md`** — decisions, state, what is next.
+- **`REUSE.md`** — if a shared helper or pattern moved.
+- **A finding goes in `felhom.eu/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` first**, never only in a report
+  or an audit.
+- **Confirm your own last push's CI run went green, by run ID** — CI mails on failure, which is a PUSH
+  signal; this is the PULL check that catches a lost or unread mail. An unchecked green is an
+  assumption, not an observation.

CONTEXT.md

@@ -3,6 +3,40 @@
 > Snapshot of the current state + open threads. Authoritative history lives in `CHANGELOG.md` (top
 > entry = current); the end-of-task detail lives in `REPORT.md`.
 
+## R-199 (v0.125.0) — links 6–8 of the recovery chain, assembled and walked
+
+`POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password` (pinned local API, `withGuest`): the controller supplies the
+customer's recovery code, the agent fetches THIS host's own sealed blob from the hub
+(`hub.Client.FetchIdentityEscrow` → `GET /hosts/{id}/escrow`, hub >= v0.94.0, self-scoped by the
+per-host key), unseals it via `escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer`, and returns **only** the offsite restic
+repository password plus its sha256.
+
+**Rules that must not erode:**
+- **Only that field.** Not the tunnel token, not the PBS token, not the WG key — the controller is a
+  trust tier down and needs none of them. Narrowing cost nothing and is not recoverable later.
+- **The unseal stays in the agent.** `age` is an agent runtime dependency (`/usr/bin/age` — hardcoded,
+  no config override; 1.2.1 on demo-felhom) and is deliberately absent from the controller image.
+- **R:** in memory for one call, cleared on the success path AND every failure path, never on disk,
+  never in argv, never logged at any level including inside an error, never echoed. Verified live: 0
+  log lines, 0 files, 0 leftover `felhom-idesc-*` dirs, with a positive control proving the search worked.
+- **Three distinct outcomes**, not one generic failure: no blob (404), a bundle that opens but predates
+  the field (409 — pre-fork-4, cannot be retro-fitted), a code that does not open it (400 — fail-closed
+  at age's KDF, nothing written).
+- **The wiring is pinned by an AST walk** (`cmd/felhom-agent/escrow_recover_wiring_test.go`):
+  `main` → `runDaemon` → `buildLocalAPIServer`, an `escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer` constructed there, the
+  `Options.EscrowRecovery` field present, and the fetcher calling the DAEMON's own `hubClient` (the
+  self-scoping that makes cross-host retrieval impossible is a property of WHICH key is used).
+  Links 6 and 7 were two of this project's six built-but-never-wired instances.
+
+**Proven live on demo-felhom 2026-08-04:** recovered sha256 == on-disk sha256 == the hub's stored hash.
+A wrong code five minutes earlier failed closed. **The chain stops at link 8** — nothing installs a
+recovered password, reopens a repository, or restores a file.
+
+**§8.6, fixed while here:** `runSelftestIdentityConsume`'s success line used to recite
+"tunnel_token + pbs_token", which became a misstatement when v0.77.0 sealed the repository password
+into the same bundle — anyone reading it would conclude the password was not there. It now names what
+THIS bundle carried and what it did not.
+
 ## Current
 
 - **2026-08-03 — v0.123.0 (R-185): a tier the box cannot READ now says so.** The agent's token had

REPORT.md

@@ -1,205 +1,41 @@
-# REPORT — R-185: a tier the box cannot READ must say so
+# REPORT — felhom-agent v0.127.0: a mount Felhom made is not foreign (R-220)
 
-**Date:** 2026-08-03 · **Repos:** `felhom-agent` **v0.122.0 → v0.123.0** (`fe14bc6`) · `felhom.eu`
-installer **1.23.0 → 1.24.0** (`688470c`, tag `installer-v1.24.0`, manifest bump `311dc06`) ·
-**no hub change and no hub bump** — the hub already alerts on a degraded critical capability, which is
-why that mechanism was chosen.
+**Scope: the host half of R-220.** The customer-facing refusal message is the controller's half and
+ships as felhom-controller v0.203.0.
 
----
+## What changed
 
-## 1. Baselines, re-read on arrival
-
-| Repo | `main` @ commit | Version | Matched §1? |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `felhom-agent` | `0b28eae7bb14` | `v0.122.0` | **yes** |
-| `felhom.eu` | `7a5694341d59` | installer `1.23.0`, both `--ref=installer-v1.23.0` (lines 327, 372) | **yes** |
-
-Highest register ID in use **R-189**; R-190+ confirmed free by grep, and none was needed.
-
-## 2. Part 0 — the measurements, before anything was designed against them
-
-**The row's three-way observation, reproduced unchanged:**
-
-| leg | result |
+| File | Change |
 |---|---|
-| root, `pvesh … /storage/felhom-backup/content` | **3 archives** — 6.1 / 6.2 / 6.3 GB, dated 08-01, 08-02, 08-03 |
-| the **agent's token**, same endpoint | `{"data":[]}` |
-| the agent's token, `/storage/local/content` | **8 entries** — the token works where it is granted |
+| `internal/storage/claim.go` | `claimFacts.felhomOwnedMounts`; `classifyClaim` forgives a non-managed mountpoint **only when corroborated**; `felhomOwnedMounts()` + `procMounts()` |
+| `internal/storage/hostops.go` | `mountTable` seam (nil ⇒ real `/proc/mounts`) |
+| `internal/storage/claim_r220_test.go` | new — the own-drive case, the fence, and the corroboration's four edges |
 
-So the token is the variable, not the storage. Two further checks removed the obvious alternative
-explanation: guest **9201 IS in the `felhom` pool** (so `VM.Backup` is not the discriminator), and
-`pveum acl list` showed ACL rows for `/storage/{local,local-lvm,felhom-pbs}` and **none** for
-`/storage/felhom-backup`.
+## The shape chosen, and why (§7.3)
 
-**The permission query, asked by the token itself — and the obvious reading is wrong:**
+**Candidate (b): the claimed check distinguishes a mount Felhom made from a foreign one** — the task
+called it "nearer the truth" and it is, because the host and its knowledge survive the rebuild while
+the guest's registry does not. Candidate (a) — having the rebuild path clear the raw mounts — would
+have made correctness depend on a cleanup step running, and a cleanup that does not run leaves exactly
+today's defect.
 
-```
-/storage/felhom-pbs     → {"Datastore.Allocate":1,"Datastore.AllocateSpace":1}
-/storage/felhom-backup  → {"Sys.Audit":1,"SDN.Use":1,"Datastore.Audit":1}
-```
+**The discriminator is corroboration, not a path prefix**: the same device must ALSO be mounted under
+`/mnt/felhom-drives`. Only enrolment produces that pairing.
 
-The ungranted path answers **neither empty nor 403**. It answers with the privileges **inherited**
-from the box-wide `/` grant. A probe asking *"did the path come back?"* — or *"does it hold
-`Datastore.Audit`?"* — would have reported the blinded storage **healthy**. This is exactly what §3
-required to be measured rather than assumed, and it changed the design: the probe tests
-`Datastore.AllocateSpace` specifically, and a red-proof pins that choice.
+**`/proc/mounts` rather than `lsblk MOUNTPOINTS`**, because the lsblk invocation is pinned verbatim in
+the sudoers file; changing it would have coupled this fix to a config rollout. `/proc/mounts` is
+world-readable and needs neither.
 
-## 3. The probe
+## Green gate
 
-`Client.Permissions` reads `/access/permissions?path=/storage/<target>` **as the agent's own token**
-(asking as root answers a different question and always says yes). `storeGrantStatuses` emits one
-`capability.Status` per configured tier.
+`go build` · `go vet` clean · `go test ./...` → **29 packages ok** · `agent_gates.py --fast` → all OK.
 
-**Deviation from §5/§8.1, stated because a recommendation not followed gets a line:** the spec asked
-for the sudo `Prober` to be minimally generalised. This repo already has the better-established
-pattern for exactly this — `poolReadStatus`, composed **around** the prober, with the comment *"an API
-read does not belong inside the sudo-policy probe"* (v0.62.0, audit A1). The probe follows that
-precedent instead. `capability.Status` is untouched either way, which is the constraint that mattered.
-
-**Decisions:**
-
-- **The probed set comes from the box's own `BackupTiers()`**, never a fixed list — a hardcoded probe
-  list is the defect reproduced inside the fix.
-- **Critical** (§8.3): the hub alerts only on critical, so a non-critical entry would ride the report
-  and alert nobody — the same silence with extra steps. **Except** the `local` fallback target, which
-  host-install's own comment calls the DEGRADED configuration: still probed, still reported, but it
-  does not page. Turning an ordinary documented setup into an alert is how a signal becomes something
-  an operator archives unread.
-- **It never consults content**, so it cannot alarm on a newborn tier by construction — a stronger
-  guarantee than gating on emptiness would be.
-- **It never reports ok when it could not ask.** Unreachable PVE is degraded: a self-check that fails
-  open converts *"I do not know"* into *"fine"*.
-
-## 4. The installer — the root cause was not where the row or the task expected
-
-Both assumed `PVE_STORAGES` (the fixed grant list) was the culprit. **It is not.**
-`configure_backup_target` has two arms:
-
-- **Case A** creates the storage and calls `felhom-backup-target-apply grant` in the same breath — a
-  box that builds its own target has always been correct.
-- **The Scenario-F arm** — *"the target already exists, leave it exactly as it is"* — **returned
-  without granting**.
-
-So a box whose `felhom-backup` pre-dated the install (created by the vzdump-target-move runbook, or
-surviving a reinstall — which is both demo boxes) pointed `local_backup_target` at a storage its own
-token could not read. The reuse arm now ensures the ACL through the same guarded wrapper.
-
-**Scenario F is unviolated:** the storage DEFINITION is still untouched. Granting the role the agent is
-supposed to have on the target this same script is about to write into `agent.json` is finishing the
-job, not retargeting the box; `pveum acl modify` is idempotent, so a box that already has it is
-unchanged and a box whose token was rotated gets it back.
-
-**`$BACKUP_TARGET_ID` is deliberately still NOT in `PVE_STORAGES`,** and the comment now says why: that
-list is granted in step 4/5, *before* `configure_backup_target` runs in step 6, and `--acl-storages`
-entries are preflight-checked for existence. Adding it there would grant on a storage that may not yet
-exist and would split ownership of the decision across two places.
-
-**A gate now asserts it:** every arm of `configure_backup_target` that resolves the target must also
-grant on it — the check that would have caught this.
-
-## 5. Live validation, in order
-
-| # | evidence |
+| Red-proof | Result |
 |---|---|
-| 1 | Part 0's measurements above, taken **before** any change |
-| 2 | **The signal that has never existed**, on the still-blind box: `capability DEGRADED … capability=pve:store-grant:felhom-backup … reason="the agent token lacks Datastore.AllocateSpace on /storage/felhom-backup (grant FelhomAgentStore there) — this tier's archives are INVISIBLE to the agent and it is never restore-tested" critical=true`, with `ok=69 total=70 degraded=1`. The hub: `Host capability: demo-felhom-8363b5 ok → degraded (agent_capability_degraded)` and **`Operator email sent`** |
-| 3 | Grant applied (user **and** token — a privsep token's rights are the intersection); the token then lists **3 archives** where it listed none, and the permission answer becomes `{"Datastore.AllocateSpace":1,"Datastore.Allocate":1}` |
-| 4 | `capabilities self-check ok=70 total=70 degraded=0`; the hub: `degraded → ok (agent_capability_recovered)` |
-| 5 | **The host tier is a due-check candidate for the first time on that box**: `tier=felhom-backup due=true archive="…2026_08_02-04_42_14.tar.zst" proven=""` — and the settle rule applies to it exactly as to the others, selecting the **08-02** archive because the 08-03 one has not settled 24 h |
-| 6 | The served installer over HTTPS: `SCRIPT_VERSION="1.24.0"`, and the served bytes carry the fix itself, not merely the version |
+| remove the `felhomOwnedMounts` exemption | **FAILS** — "device is mounted at /mnt/adatok (sdb)", the pre-fix refusal |
+| over-widen the exemption to any `/mnt/*` | **FAILS** — "/mnt/someone-elses-disk was offered for formatting" |
 
-## 6. The other machines
+## Not changed
 
-- **demo-hp CARRIES THE SAME DRIFT — and was fixed.** `local_backup_target=felhom-backup`, ACL rows for
-  `local`, `local-lvm`, `felhom-pbs` only. §8.6 assumed a single affected box; the same one-line,
-  additive, path-scoped, idempotent grant applies to the other, and leaving a known-blind backup tier
-  on a Tier-0 box after finding it would be this row happening twice. Granted (user + token); its
-  token now lists **4 archives**. It still runs agent `0.120.0`, so it has no probe yet — that arrives
-  when you vouch.
-- **The tester's box was NOT touched** (Tier 2, protected). **What is known without connecting to it:**
-  it very likely carries the same drift — the mechanism is the Scenario-F reuse arm, which fires on
-  any box whose target pre-dated its install, and its target was moved by the very runbook that
-  creates that condition. It is due for reinstall, and installer 1.24.0 fixes it on the way in.
-
-## 7. Tests and red-proofs
-
-Green gate: `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` — rc=0, plus `agent_gates.py` and
-`repo_gates.py` all OK. Test runs and commits were always separate commands.
-
-| # | Test | Asserts | Mutation | Observed |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
-| A | `TestStoreGrant_ForbiddenStorageIsDegradedAndNamed` | degraded, critical, naming storage **and** role | probe removed from `probeAll` | **FAIL** — `main.go never calls storeGrantStatuses` (via the seam test); with the wrong-privilege mutation: `must be DEGRADED, not "ok"` |
-| A′ | `TestStoreGrant_InheritedPrivilegesAreNotAGrant` | the measured trap: inherited ≠ granted | probe `Datastore.Audit` instead | **FAIL** — `checking for the wrong privilege reports a blinded storage healthy; got "ok"` |
-| B | `TestStoreGrant_GrantedButEmptyIsHealthy` | a readable-but-empty tier is healthy | — (it never reads content, so emptiness cannot reach it) | pass |
-| B′ | `TestStoreGrant_TheFallbackTargetIsNotCritical` | `local` is reported but does not page | gating removed (`return true`) | **FAIL** — `must not page the operator about an ordinary, documented configuration` |
-| C | `TestStoreGrant_ForbiddenAndNewbornAreDistinguishable` | different status **and** different capability id | — | pass |
-| — | `TestStoreGrant_UnreachablePVEIsDegradedNotOK` | unknown ≠ ok | — | pass |
-| F | `hostinstall_gates.py` backup-target assertion | every resolving arm also grants | reuse arm reverted | **FAIL** — `resolves the backup target in 2 place(s) but grants in only 1` |
-| H | `TestMainWiresTheStoreGrantProbe` | **AST** of `main.go` | call commented out | **FAIL** — a `strings.Contains` check would have passed |
-
-**A hollow test caught and fixed before it shipped:** the first draft of `storegrant_test.go`
-re-implemented the verdict branch inside the test. It passed, and would have kept passing while
-production diverged. The decision was extracted into `storeGrantVerdict` and the tests now call it.
-
-**Scenario B's red-proof, honestly:** the spec asked for "degrade on an empty content listing" as the
-mutation. That is not a mutation of this code — the probe never looks at content, which is a stronger
-guarantee than gating on emptiness. The gating red-proof above (`storeGrantCritical`) is the one that
-exercises the guard that does exist, and it fails as required.
-
-## 8. Files, commits, tag
-
-`internal/proxmox/query.go` (`Permissions`), `cmd/felhom-agent/main.go` (`storeGrantStatuses`,
-`storeGrantVerdict`, `storeGrantCritical`, `storeGrantRequiredPriv`, wiring),
-`cmd/felhom-agent/storegrant_test.go`, `CHANGELOG.md`, `CONTEXT.md`, `REUSE.md`, `REPORT.md`.
-`felhom.eu`: `scripts/felhom-host-install.sh`, `scripts/hostinstall_gates.py`, `scripts/CHANGELOG.md`,
-`manifests/webpage.yaml`, `CONTEXT.md`, `STATUS.md`, `documentation/architecture/00-capability-map.md`,
-`documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`, `documentation/runbooks/RUNBOOK-vzdump-target-move-2026-07-29.md`.
-
-**Commits** — `felhom-agent`: `fe14bc6` (v0.123.0). `felhom.eu`: `688470c` (installer 1.24.0), `311dc06`
-(manifest refs), `e3187c8` (docs). **Installer tag:** `installer-v1.24.0`.
-
-## 9. Deployment
-
-Agent released through `release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.123.0`, sha256
-`74910135ac4feb1b7f0ad4dbd1541d965cbc0fe70d4f47b62ebf7e4bfb962453`, round-trip verified. The
-**published bytes** were downloaded and deployed: the running binary's sha matches the published one.
-`felhom-agent --version` → **0.123.0**, `systemctl is-active` → active, prior kept as `.bak-0.122.0`.
-**NOT VOUCHED** — that stays the operator's act.
-
-## 10. Registers
-
-- **R-185 → CLOSED** (shipped + proven live on both demo boxes), with the corrected root cause
-  recorded on the row.
-- No new IDs minted; `ROADMAP.md` contains no R-185 row, so there was nothing to collapse.
-- **The capability map's whole-guest row was OPTIMISTIC and now says so:** every live restore-test it
-  cited is on the OFFSITE tier, and the HOST tier was not merely unproven but *unprovable* on both
-  demo boxes. It now records that, the closure, and that it will carry a host-tier live proof when one
-  runs.
-- The vzdump-target-move runbook's item 5 **predicted this** and is annotated, not rewritten: it
-  expected a 403 on backup, and the reason it did not surface that way is that `vzdump` writes through
-  a root path, so backups kept landing while the agent's *read* stayed blind.
-- `CONTEXT.md`: agent-side entry, plus `felhom.eu` **S-21** (empty ≠ forbidden; the measured trap) and
-  **S-22** (the Scenario-F arm must finish the job).
-
-## 11. Teardown
-
-**Nothing was provisioned.** No scratch storage, no fixture grant, no probe tag, no scratch package
-version. The two ACL grants are the intended durable change; the only other mutation was the
-installer label, which is reversible by moving the tag.
-
-## 12. Observations — noticed, recorded, NOT acted on
-
-- **Both demo boxes are now due for a host-tier restore-test**, which has never run on either. The
-  scheduler will pick it up within 6 h unattended (a ~6 GB local restore — fast, and cheaper than the
-  offsite ones). Expected, not a defect, and the first host-tier proof this fleet will have.
-- **`--acl-storages` semantics are unchanged and the automatic grant does not consult it.** If an
-  operator passes `--acl-storages` deliberately excluding the backup target, the target is still
-  granted by the resolution path. That is the correct precedence — a box cannot function with an
-  unreadable backup target — but it is a place where an override is not absolute, and it is written
-  here rather than left to be discovered.
-- **`storeGrantRequiredPriv` is a single privilege**, chosen from measurement. If PVE ever changes
-  which privilege gates content listing, the probe would report healthy while the tier is blind. The
-  test asserts the constant's value so a change forces a re-measurement, but nothing detects a change
-  on PVE's side.
-- **Ten pre-existing `gofmt`-unclean files** remain in the agent repo (unchanged from yesterday's
-  observation); every file touched here is clean.
+No sudoers, no allowlisted command, no PVE surface, no format path. Every other claim signal
+(system disk, read-only, LVM PV, ZFS member, member FSTYPEs, empty-topology backstop) is untouched.

internal/escrow/recover.go

@@ -19,10 +19,27 @@ import (
 // keeps that property: it takes R as an argument, passes it straight through, and holds no copy.
 // Callers must clear their own reference (the `R = ""` discipline in cmd/felhom-agent).
 //
-// The errors below are DISTINCT on purpose. "no blob", "wrong code" and "the blob predates the field"
-// are three different situations for the operator and only one of them is a fault.
+// The errors below are DISTINCT on purpose. "could not fetch", "no blob", "wrong code" and "the blob
+// predates the field" are FOUR different situations for the operator and only one of them is a fault.
+//
+// ⚠ THERE WERE THREE, AND THE FOURTH WAS THE DEFECT (R-224, 2026-08-06). This comment said "three"
+// and named "no blob", "wrong code" and "predates the field" — while a FAILED FETCH was wrapped as an
+// anonymous error and fell through the caller's `default` branch into the wrong-code message. So a
+// hub that could not be reached was reported to the customer as a bad recovery code.
+//
+// Measured live on 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11 F3): with the hub REJECTed at the appliance's firewall and
+// a CORRECT current recovery code, the customer was told the code did not open their package — in
+// 0.0556 s, when a real unseal costs ~1 s of scrypt. The agent's own log carried the truth the whole
+// time (`escrow: fetching the sealed bundle: hub: transport error: … no route to host`) and the HTTP
+// boundary threw it away.
+//
+// The discriminator therefore has to be a VALUE, not a log line — that is what ErrBundleFetch is.
 
 var (
+	// ErrBundleFetch — the sealed bundle could not be FETCHED (the hub refused, was unreachable, or
+	// the transport failed). **The recovery code was never used**, so nothing about it is known and
+	// nothing may be said about it. Wraps the underlying cause for the operator log; carries no secret.
+	ErrBundleFetch = errors.New("escrow: the sealed bundle could not be fetched")
 	// ErrNoEscrowBlob — the hub holds no sealed bundle for this host. Not a fault: no ceremony has run.
 	ErrNoEscrowBlob = errors.New("escrow: the hub holds no sealed identity bundle for this host (no ceremony has run)")
 	// ErrNoResticPassword — the bundle opened, but carries no repository password. Real and expected
@@ -58,7 +75,11 @@ func (r OffsiteKeyRecoverer) RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(ctx context.Context, rec
 	}
 	blob, present, err := r.Fetch(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("escrow: fetching the sealed bundle: %w", err) // carries no secret
+		// R-224: joined with ErrBundleFetch so the caller can classify by VALUE. The cause stays
+		// wrapped for the operator log; neither carries a secret. Before this, the fetch failure was
+		// an anonymous error and the local-api handler's `default` branch reported it to the customer
+		// as a wrong recovery code.
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrBundleFetch, err)
 	}
 	if !present || len(blob) == 0 {
 		return "", ErrNoEscrowBlob

internal/escrow/recover_test.go

@@ -175,15 +175,93 @@ func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_RLeavesNoTrace(t *testing.T) {
 
 // A fetch failure surfaces as a fetch failure, not as a wrong-code error — the operator must not be
 // sent to re-read their recovery code because the hub was unreachable.
+//
+// ⚠ THIS TEST WAS GREEN THROUGHOUT THE DEFECT IT DESCRIBES (R-224, 2026-08-06). Its sentence is
+// exactly right and it did not prevent anything, for two reasons worth keeping:
+//
+//  1. **It asserted the MECHANISM, one layer below the consequence.** It checked this package's error
+//     STRING. The merge happened one layer up, in the local-api handler's `default` branch, which
+//     answered a fetch failure with "the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle". The customer
+//     never sees this string; they see that one. The project's own rule — prefer the test that asserts
+//     the CONSEQUENCE (does the customer get blamed?) over the one that asserts the MECHANISM (is the
+//     error distinct here?) — names this case precisely.
+//  2. **It asserted on TEXT.** `strings.Contains(err.Error(), …)` cannot be consumed by a caller, so
+//     it pinned something no production code could branch on. The distinction it checked was real and
+//     unusable.
+//
+// It now asserts the SENTINEL, which is what the handler branches on, and its consequence-level twin
+// lives in `internal/localapi/escrow_recover_class_test.go` where the status is asserted.
 func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_FetchErrorIsDistinct(t *testing.T) {
 	rec := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: func(context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) {
 		return nil, false, errors.New("hub: connection refused")
 	}}
 	_, err := rec.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "fetching the sealed bundle") {
-		t.Fatalf("a fetch failure must say so, got %v", err)
+	if err == nil || !errors.Is(err, ErrBundleFetch) {
+		t.Fatalf("a fetch failure must classify as ErrBundleFetch, got %v", err)
 	}
 	if errors.Is(err, ErrNoEscrowBlob) || errors.Is(err, ErrNoResticPassword) {
 		t.Fatal("a transport failure must not masquerade as a content verdict")
 	}
 }
+
+// ── R-224 — A FAILED FETCH IS NOT A WRONG CODE ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// CAMPAIGN-11 F3 measured the consequence of these two being indistinguishable: with the hub
+// firewalled off and a CORRECT current recovery code, the customer was told the code did not open
+// their package, in 0.0556 s — no unseal was attempted at all.
+//
+// The pair below is the whole point. Asserting only the first would pass with a `return ErrBundleFetch`
+// stuck on every error path, which is the same defect pointing the other way.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_FetchFailureIsClassifiedAsFetch(t *testing.T) {
+	boom := errors.New("hub: transport error: dial tcp 37.191.56.193:443: connect: no route to host")
+	r := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: func(context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) { return nil, false, boom }}
+
+	_, err := r.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a failing fetch must return an error")
+	}
+	// RED-PROOF: drop the `%w: %w` join in RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword (return the bare wrapped cause,
+	// as it was before R-224) → this FAILS, and the local-api handler falls back to the wrong-code
+	// message exactly as it did on 2026-08-05.
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrBundleFetch) {
+		t.Fatalf("a failed fetch must classify as ErrBundleFetch, got %v", err)
+	}
+	// The underlying cause survives for the operator log.
+	if !errors.Is(err, boom) {
+		t.Fatalf("the fetch cause must stay wrapped for the operator, got %v", err)
+	}
+	// And it must NOT be mistaken for either of the bundle-content situations.
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrNoEscrowBlob) || errors.Is(err, ErrNoResticPassword) {
+		t.Fatalf("a transport failure is neither of the bundle-content errors: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The other half: a genuinely wrong code must NOT classify as a fetch failure, or the fix trades one
+// misattribution for its mirror image and the customer is told the hub is down when they mistyped.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_WrongCodeIsNotAFetchFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	ensureAge(t)
+	blob := sealBundle(t, IdentityBundle{ResticRepoPassword: "0123456789abcdef"}, testR)
+	r := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: fetcherFor(blob)}
+
+	_, err := r.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(),
+		"wrong horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a wrong recovery code must fail closed")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrBundleFetch) {
+		t.Fatalf("a wrong code must NOT classify as a fetch failure, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// A clean "the hub holds nothing" keeps its own identity too — it is not a fetch failure, and the
+// customer must not be told the hub was unreachable when it answered perfectly well.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_AbsentBlobIsNotAFetchFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	r := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: func(context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) { return nil, false, nil }}
+	_, err := r.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoEscrowBlob) {
+		t.Fatalf("an absent blob must stay ErrNoEscrowBlob, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrBundleFetch) {
+		t.Fatalf("an absent blob is not a fetch FAILURE, got %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/localapi/escrow_recover.go

@@ -75,6 +75,26 @@ func (s *Server) handleRecoverOffsitePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 	if err != nil {
 		// Each situation gets its own status and its own words. None of them names a secret.
 		switch {
+		// ── R-224 (2026-08-06) — THE FETCH FAILURE IS NOT A WRONG CODE. ────────────────────────
+		//
+		// This case did not exist, and its absence is the defect. A failed fetch fell through to the
+		// `default` below and was answered with "the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle" —
+		// so a hub that could not be reached was reported to the customer as a bad recovery code, on
+		// the one screen whose whole purpose is to be believed about their backups.
+		//
+		// Measured live 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11 F3 and F4): a CORRECT current code returned that
+		// message in 0.0556 s with the hub firewalled off, and in 0.0299 s with this agent stopped —
+		// against ~1.0 s for a genuine unseal. No unseal was attempted in either case.
+		//
+		// 502 rather than 400: 4xx says "your request was bad", and the request was not bad — an
+		// upstream dependency failed. The status is the machine-readable half; the controller
+		// classifies on it and must never parse this sentence.
+		//
+		// ⚠ THE CODE WAS NOT USED. Nothing may be said about it — not that it was wrong, and not
+		// that it was right.
+		case errors.Is(err, escrow.ErrBundleFetch):
+			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery: the sealed bundle could not be FETCHED — the recovery code was never used", "vmid", vmid, "err", err)
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "the sealed recovery bundle could not be fetched from the hub — the recovery code was NOT used and nothing was written")
 		case errors.Is(err, escrow.ErrNoEscrowBlob):
 			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery: the hub holds no sealed bundle for this host", "vmid", vmid)
 			writeErr(w, http.StatusNotFound, "the hub holds no sealed recovery bundle for this host — no escrow ceremony has run")
@@ -82,9 +102,11 @@ func (s *Server) handleRecoverOffsitePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery: the bundle opened but predates the repository-password field", "vmid", vmid)
 			writeErr(w, http.StatusConflict, "the recovery code opened the bundle, but it carries NO offsite repository password (sealed before that field existed; it cannot be retro-fitted)")
 		default:
-			// Includes the fail-closed wrong-code case. The agent log records the STEP, never the code.
-			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery FAILED (wrong recovery code, or the blob could not be fetched)", "vmid", vmid, "err", err)
-			writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle, or the bundle could not be fetched — nothing was written")
+			// The fail-closed WRONG-CODE case, and only it: the bundle was fetched and `age -d`
+			// refused it. Every other situation above has its own status. The agent log records the
+			// STEP, never the code.
+			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery: the fetched bundle did not open with the supplied recovery code", "vmid", vmid, "err", err)
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle — nothing was written")
 		}
 		return
 	}

internal/localapi/escrow_recover_class_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package localapi
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/escrow"
+)
+
+// R-224 — THE STATUS IS THE DISCRIMINATOR, and this test asserts the CONSEQUENCE (what the HTTP
+// boundary answers) rather than the mechanism (that the sentinel exists).
+//
+// The controller one trust tier down classifies on the STATUS and must never parse the sentence. So
+// the contract this pins is: four distinguishable situations, four distinct statuses, and the
+// wrong-code message reachable ONLY from a real refusal.
+//
+// Before R-224 the first and last rows both answered 400 with the same sentence — which is how
+// CAMPAIGN-11 F3 told a customer holding a CORRECT code that it did not open their package.
+
+type fakeRecoverer struct{ err error }
+
+func (f fakeRecoverer) RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Context, string) (string, error) {
+	if f.err != nil {
+		return "", f.err
+	}
+	return "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", nil
+}
+
+func TestRecoverOffsitePassword_EachSituationGetsItsOwnStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name       string
+		err        error
+		wantStatus int
+		// mustNotSay guards the specific misattribution each status exists to prevent.
+		mustNotSay []string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "fetch failed — the code was NEVER used",
+			err:        errors.Join(escrow.ErrBundleFetch, errors.New("hub: transport error: no route to host")),
+			wantStatus: 502,
+			mustNotSay: []string{"did not open"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "wrong code — the bundle WAS fetched and refused it",
+			err:        errors.New("escrow: the recovery code did not unwrap the identity escrow"),
+			wantStatus: 400,
+			mustNotSay: []string{"could not be fetched"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "the hub holds no bundle",
+			err:        escrow.ErrNoEscrowBlob,
+			wantStatus: 404,
+			mustNotSay: []string{"did not open"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "the bundle predates the repository-password field",
+			err:        escrow.ErrNoResticPassword,
+			wantStatus: 409,
+			mustNotSay: []string{"could not be fetched"},
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			srv := newTestServerS(t, &fakeGuests{}, &fakeBackups{}, &fakeStore{}, nil)
+			srv.escrowRecovery = fakeRecoverer{err: tc.err}
+			w := do(t, srv.Handler(), "POST", "/escrow/recover-offsite-password", "A",
+				`{"vmid":8200,"recovery_code":"correct horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel"}`)
+			if w.Code != tc.wantStatus {
+				t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want %d — body=%s", w.Code, tc.wantStatus, w.Body.String())
+			}
+			for _, phrase := range tc.mustNotSay {
+				if strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), phrase) {
+					t.Fatalf("the %d answer must not say %q — body=%s", tc.wantStatus, phrase, w.Body.String())
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The pair that matters most, stated as its own assertion so a regression cannot hide inside a table:
+// a fetch failure and a wrong code must never answer with the SAME status. Collapsing them is the
+// whole of R-224.
+func TestRecoverOffsitePassword_FetchFailureAndWrongCodeDiffer(t *testing.T) {
+	status := func(err error) int {
+		srv := newTestServerS(t, &fakeGuests{}, &fakeBackups{}, &fakeStore{}, nil)
+		srv.escrowRecovery = fakeRecoverer{err: err}
+		return do(t, srv.Handler(), "POST", "/escrow/recover-offsite-password", "A",
+			`{"vmid":8200,"recovery_code":"correct horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel"}`).Code
+	}
+	fetch := status(errors.Join(escrow.ErrBundleFetch, errors.New("no route to host")))
+	wrong := status(errors.New("escrow: the recovery code did not unwrap the identity escrow"))
+	// RED-PROOF: delete the ErrBundleFetch case from handleRecoverOffsitePassword → both become 400
+	// → this FAILS. That is the exact pre-R-224 code, and the exact defect CAMPAIGN-11 measured.
+	if fetch == wrong {
+		t.Fatalf("a failed fetch and a wrong code must not share a status (both %d)", fetch)
+	}
+}

internal/storage/claim.go

@@ -53,7 +53,11 @@ type claimFacts struct {
 	nodes       []claimNode // the whole disk + its children (partitions)
 	lvmPV       bool        // pvs (authoritative): the disk / a partition is an LVM physical volume
 	zfsMember   bool        // zpool (authoritative): the disk / a partition is a ZFS pool member
-	gatherErr   string      // non-empty ⇒ a REQUIRED read failed ⇒ fail-safe CLAIMED
+	// felhomOwnedMounts (R-220) — mountpoints OUTSIDE /mnt/felhom-drives that are nevertheless Felhom's
+	// OWN, corroborated from the host mount table: the same device is also mounted at the managed path.
+	// Empty means "nothing corroborated", which is the fail-safe direction.
+	felhomOwnedMounts map[string]bool
+	gatherErr         string // non-empty ⇒ a REQUIRED read failed ⇒ fail-safe CLAIMED
 }
 
 // classifyClaim is the pure guard verdict. unclaimed=true ONLY when the device is provably free for
@@ -81,7 +85,20 @@ func classifyClaim(f claimFacts) (unclaimed bool, reason string) {
 		if memberFSTypes[n.fstype] {
 			return false, "device holds a " + n.fstype + " (" + n.name + ")"
 		}
-		if n.mountpoint != "" && !underFelhomDrives(n.mountpoint) {
+		// ── R-220 — A MOUNT FELHOM ITSELF MADE IS NOT "SOMETHING ELSE". ───────────────────────
+		//
+		// Enrolment mounts a drive TWICE: at the managed path `/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` and at the
+		// raw `/mnt/<name>` it creates on the host. The host — and therefore that raw mount — survives
+		// a guest rebuild, while the controller's registry does not. So after a rebuild the customer's
+		// own drives looked foreign, `attach` returned an empty list, and the refusal told them to
+		// choose from it. Measured live three times (CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 1, and the R-201 re-walk twice);
+		// unmounting only the raw mounts flipped `attach: []` to both drives every time.
+		//
+		// The fence this must NOT breach: a disk genuinely in use by something else stays refused. So
+		// the exemption is not "any /mnt/* path" — it is CORROBORATED: the same device must ALSO be
+		// mounted at Felhom's managed path, which is a state only Felhom's own enrolment produces.
+		// A foreign disk at /srv/data or /media/x has no such counterpart and is still refused.
+		if n.mountpoint != "" && !underFelhomDrives(n.mountpoint) && !f.felhomOwnedMounts[n.mountpoint] {
 			return false, "device is mounted at " + n.mountpoint + " (" + n.name + ")"
 		}
 	}
@@ -154,6 +171,8 @@ func (h *SudoHostOps) gatherClaimFacts(ctx context.Context, device string) claim
 		return f
 	}
 	f.nodes = nodes
+	// R-220: corroborate which non-managed mountpoints are nevertheless Felhom's own.
+	f.felhomOwnedMounts = felhomOwnedMounts(device, nodes, h.mountTable)
 
 	// LVM PV (authoritative). pvs installed but erroring ⇒ fail-safe claimed; absent ⇒ rely on lsblk's
 	// LVM2_member FSTYPE (already in nodes).
@@ -285,3 +304,71 @@ func (h *SudoHostOps) zfsMembers(ctx context.Context, nodes []claimNode, wholeDi
 	}
 	return false, nil
 }
+
+// mountTableSource yields the host mount table as (device, mountpoint) pairs. A seam so the R-220
+// corroboration is unit-testable without a host. nil ⇒ the real /proc/mounts.
+type mountTableSource func() ([][2]string, error)
+
+// procMounts reads /proc/mounts — WORLD-READABLE, so this needs no sudo and no allowlisted command.
+// That matters: the lsblk invocation is pinned verbatim in the sudoers file
+// (`lsblk -J -o NAME,FSTYPE,PTTYPE,MOUNTPOINT /dev/*`), so switching it to the plural MOUNTPOINTS
+// would have meant shipping a sudoers change with the binary — a far larger blast radius than this
+// finding warrants. Reading the mount table directly sidesteps that entirely.
+func procMounts() ([][2]string, error) {
+	data, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/mounts")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var out [][2]string
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(data), "\n") {
+		fields := strings.Fields(line)
+		if len(fields) < 2 {
+			continue
+		}
+		// /proc/mounts escapes spaces as \040; unescape so a path with a space still compares.
+		out = append(out, [2]string{fields[0], strings.ReplaceAll(fields[1], `\040`, " ")})
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// felhomOwnedMounts returns the mountpoints of `device` (and its children) that sit OUTSIDE
+// /mnt/felhom-drives but are still Felhom's own, corroborated by the same device also being mounted
+// UNDER /mnt/felhom-drives. That pairing is what enrolment produces and nothing else does.
+//
+// ⚠ FAIL-SAFE: an unreadable mount table returns an EMPTY set, never a permissive one. The device then
+// classifies exactly as it did before R-220 — refused — because "we could not corroborate" must never
+// read as "it is ours".
+func felhomOwnedMounts(device string, nodes []claimNode, src mountTableSource) map[string]bool {
+	if src == nil {
+		src = procMounts
+	}
+	table, err := src()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil // unreadable ⇒ corroborate nothing
+	}
+	// Every device name this disk answers to: the whole disk and each child node.
+	devs := map[string]bool{device: true}
+	if wd, ok := wholeDiskOf(device); ok {
+		devs[wd] = true
+	}
+	for _, n := range nodes {
+		devs["/dev/"+n.name] = true
+	}
+	// A device is Felhom-managed only if it is mounted under the managed prefix.
+	managed := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, row := range table {
+		if devs[row[0]] && underFelhomDrives(row[1]) {
+			managed[row[0]] = true
+		}
+	}
+	if len(managed) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	owned := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, row := range table {
+		if managed[row[0]] && !underFelhomDrives(row[1]) {
+			owned[path.Clean(row[1])] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return owned
+}

internal/storage/claim_r220_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+package storage
+
+import "testing"
+
+// ── R-220 — A MOUNT FELHOM ITSELF MADE IS NOT "SOMETHING ELSE" ──────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Enrolment mounts a drive twice: at `/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` and at the raw `/mnt/<name>` it
+// creates on the host. The host survives a guest rebuild; the controller's registry does not. So after
+// a rebuild the customer's own drives read as claimed-by-something-else, `attach` came back empty, and
+// the refusal told them to pick from the empty list. Measured three times live.
+//
+// The fence: a disk genuinely in use elsewhere must STILL be refused. These assert both directions.
+
+// ── SCENARIO E — the customer's own drive is offered again after a rebuild ───────────────────────
+//
+// RED-PROOF: drop `&& !f.felhomOwnedMounts[n.mountpoint]` from classifyClaim — the pre-R-220 check —
+// and this FAILS with the drive refused and the list empty again.
+func TestClassifyClaim_R220_FelhomsOwnRawMountIsNotForeign(t *testing.T) {
+	f := claimFacts{
+		device: "/dev/sdb", wholeDisk: "/dev/sdb", wholeDiskOK: true,
+		nodes: []claimNode{{name: "sdb", fstype: "ext4", mountpoint: "/mnt/adatok"}},
+		// corroborated: the SAME device is also mounted at the managed path
+		felhomOwnedMounts: map[string]bool{"/mnt/adatok": true},
+	}
+	unclaimed, reason := classifyClaim(f)
+	if !unclaimed {
+		t.Fatalf("R-220 RETURNED: the customer's own drive is refused after a rebuild — %q", reason)
+	}
+}
+
+// ── SCENARIO F — a genuinely foreign mount is STILL refused ──────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// RED-PROOF: over-widen the fix to exempt any /mnt/* path (or to skip the mountpoint check entirely)
+// and this FAILS — a disk another system is using would be offered for formatting.
+func TestClassifyClaim_R220_ForeignMountIsStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, mp := range []string{"/srv/data", "/media/photos", "/mnt/someone-elses-disk", "/var/lib/other"} {
+		f := claimFacts{
+			device: "/dev/sdb", wholeDisk: "/dev/sdb", wholeDiskOK: true,
+			nodes:             []claimNode{{name: "sdb", fstype: "ext4", mountpoint: mp}},
+			felhomOwnedMounts: nil, // nothing corroborated it as ours
+		}
+		unclaimed, reason := classifyClaim(f)
+		if unclaimed {
+			t.Fatalf("THE FENCE BROKE: a disk mounted at %s was offered for formatting", mp)
+		}
+		if reason == "" {
+			t.Fatalf("a refusal must carry a reason (%s)", mp)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The corroboration itself: it must require BOTH mounts of the SAME device, and fail safe.
+func TestFelhomOwnedMounts_RequiresTheManagedCounterpart(t *testing.T) {
+	nodes := []claimNode{{name: "sdb"}}
+
+	t.Run("both mounts present -> the raw one is ours", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := func() ([][2]string, error) {
+			return [][2]string{
+				{"/dev/sdb", "/mnt/adatok"},
+				{"/dev/sdb", "/mnt/felhom-drives/adatok"},
+			}, nil
+		}
+		got := felhomOwnedMounts("/dev/sdb", nodes, src)
+		if !got["/mnt/adatok"] {
+			t.Fatal("the raw enrolment mount was not recognised as Felhom's own")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("only the raw mount -> corroborates NOTHING", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := func() ([][2]string, error) {
+			return [][2]string{{"/dev/sdb", "/mnt/adatok"}}, nil
+		}
+		if got := felhomOwnedMounts("/dev/sdb", nodes, src); len(got) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("a lone /mnt/<name> mount must corroborate nothing, got %v", got)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("a DIFFERENT device under the managed path does not vouch for this one", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := func() ([][2]string, error) {
+			return [][2]string{
+				{"/dev/sdb", "/srv/data"},
+				{"/dev/sdc", "/mnt/felhom-drives/mentes"}, // someone else's, not sdb's
+			}, nil
+		}
+		if got := felhomOwnedMounts("/dev/sdb", nodes, src); got["/srv/data"] {
+			t.Fatal("another device's managed mount vouched for a foreign one")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("an unreadable mount table corroborates NOTHING (fail-safe)", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := func() ([][2]string, error) { return nil, errRead }
+		if got := felhomOwnedMounts("/dev/sdb", nodes, src); len(got) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("an unreadable mount table must corroborate nothing, got %v", got)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+var errRead = errNoMountTable{}
+
+type errNoMountTable struct{}
+
+func (errNoMountTable) Error() string { return "mount table unreadable" }

internal/storage/hostops.go

@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ type SudoHostOps struct {
 	// UNPRIVILEGED read (`systemctl is-failed`) — seam-injected so the reassert's F10 reset-failed path
 	// is unit-testable without a real systemd. Default set in NewSudoHostOps.
 	unitFailed func(ctx context.Context, unit string) bool
+	// mountTable (R-220) yields the host mount table for the "is this mount Felhom's own?"
+	// corroboration. nil ⇒ the real /proc/mounts; tests inject.
+	mountTable mountTableSource
 }
 
 // SudoHostOpsConfig configures a SudoHostOps.

scripts/agent_gates.py

@@ -41,10 +41,13 @@ import sys
 
 ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
 SHARED_REUSE = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(ROOT), "felhom.eu", "scripts", "reuse_refs_check.py")
+SHARED_INSTRUCTIONS = os.path.join(
+    os.path.dirname(ROOT), "felhom.eu", "scripts", "instructions_gate.py")
 
 # (label, absolute script path, args, fast)
 GATES = [
     ("reuse-refs", SHARED_REUSE, [ROOT], True),
+    ("instructions", SHARED_INSTRUCTIONS, [ROOT], True),
     ("published", os.path.join(ROOT, "scripts", "check-published-versions.py"), [], False),
 ]