Files
felhom-agent/internal/localapi/escrow_recover_class_test.go
T
admin a2e914f683
gates / gates (push) Successful in 7s
v0.126.0: a fetch failure is not a wrong recovery code (R-224)
A hub the agent could not reach was reported to the customer as a bad recovery
code. Measured live 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11 F3): hub firewalled off, a CORRECT
current code, and the customer told it did not open their package — in 0.0556s
against ~1.0s for a real unseal. No unseal was attempted.

The discriminator existed here and this boundary threw it away: recover.go
fails at four distinguishable points and the local-api handler had cases for
two, with a default answering 'the recovery code did not open the sealed
bundle, OR the bundle could not be fetched'.

escrow.ErrBundleFetch now joins the fetch leg and the handler routes it to 502
with its own words — the code was NOT used. 502 not 4xx: the request was not
bad, an upstream dependency failed. Four situations, four statuses: 502 fetch /
400 fetched-and-refused / 404 no bundle / 409 predates the field. The
controller classifies on the STATUS and never parses the sentence.

A GREEN TEST NAMED THIS DEFECT AND DID NOT PREVENT IT.
TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_FetchErrorIsDistinct has said since v0.125.0
that the operator must not be sent to re-read their code because the hub was
unreachable — and passed throughout, because it asserted this package's error
STRING one layer below the merge, and a string is not something a caller can
branch on. Re-pointed at the sentinel, with a consequence-level twin asserting
the status.

Red-proofs: removing the %w join fails the sentinel test; deleting the handler
case makes fetch and wrong-code both answer 400 with the wrong-code sentence.

29 packages ok, vet clean, agent gates OK.
2026-08-06 07:55:15 +02:00

100 lines
3.8 KiB
Go

package localapi
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/escrow"
)
// R-224 — THE STATUS IS THE DISCRIMINATOR, and this test asserts the CONSEQUENCE (what the HTTP
// boundary answers) rather than the mechanism (that the sentinel exists).
//
// The controller one trust tier down classifies on the STATUS and must never parse the sentence. So
// the contract this pins is: four distinguishable situations, four distinct statuses, and the
// wrong-code message reachable ONLY from a real refusal.
//
// Before R-224 the first and last rows both answered 400 with the same sentence — which is how
// CAMPAIGN-11 F3 told a customer holding a CORRECT code that it did not open their package.
type fakeRecoverer struct{ err error }
func (f fakeRecoverer) RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Context, string) (string, error) {
if f.err != nil {
return "", f.err
}
return "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", nil
}
func TestRecoverOffsitePassword_EachSituationGetsItsOwnStatus(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
err error
wantStatus int
// mustNotSay guards the specific misattribution each status exists to prevent.
mustNotSay []string
}{
{
name: "fetch failed — the code was NEVER used",
err: errors.Join(escrow.ErrBundleFetch, errors.New("hub: transport error: no route to host")),
wantStatus: 502,
mustNotSay: []string{"did not open"},
},
{
name: "wrong code — the bundle WAS fetched and refused it",
err: errors.New("escrow: the recovery code did not unwrap the identity escrow"),
wantStatus: 400,
mustNotSay: []string{"could not be fetched"},
},
{
name: "the hub holds no bundle",
err: escrow.ErrNoEscrowBlob,
wantStatus: 404,
mustNotSay: []string{"did not open"},
},
{
name: "the bundle predates the repository-password field",
err: escrow.ErrNoResticPassword,
wantStatus: 409,
mustNotSay: []string{"could not be fetched"},
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
srv := newTestServerS(t, &fakeGuests{}, &fakeBackups{}, &fakeStore{}, nil)
srv.escrowRecovery = fakeRecoverer{err: tc.err}
w := do(t, srv.Handler(), "POST", "/escrow/recover-offsite-password", "A",
`{"vmid":8200,"recovery_code":"correct horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel"}`)
if w.Code != tc.wantStatus {
t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want %d — body=%s", w.Code, tc.wantStatus, w.Body.String())
}
for _, phrase := range tc.mustNotSay {
if strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), phrase) {
t.Fatalf("the %d answer must not say %q — body=%s", tc.wantStatus, phrase, w.Body.String())
}
}
})
}
}
// The pair that matters most, stated as its own assertion so a regression cannot hide inside a table:
// a fetch failure and a wrong code must never answer with the SAME status. Collapsing them is the
// whole of R-224.
func TestRecoverOffsitePassword_FetchFailureAndWrongCodeDiffer(t *testing.T) {
status := func(err error) int {
srv := newTestServerS(t, &fakeGuests{}, &fakeBackups{}, &fakeStore{}, nil)
srv.escrowRecovery = fakeRecoverer{err: err}
return do(t, srv.Handler(), "POST", "/escrow/recover-offsite-password", "A",
`{"vmid":8200,"recovery_code":"correct horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel"}`).Code
}
fetch := status(errors.Join(escrow.ErrBundleFetch, errors.New("no route to host")))
wrong := status(errors.New("escrow: the recovery code did not unwrap the identity escrow"))
// RED-PROOF: delete the ErrBundleFetch case from handleRecoverOffsitePassword → both become 400
// → this FAILS. That is the exact pre-R-224 code, and the exact defect CAMPAIGN-11 measured.
if fetch == wrong {
t.Fatalf("a failed fetch and a wrong code must not share a status (both %d)", fetch)
}
}