v0.127.0: a mount Felhom itself made is not 'something else' (R-220)

After a rebuild the customer's own drives could not be re-attached: candidates
returned initialize:[] attach:[] while both drives sat there, and the deploy
refused with 'choose an attached drive from the list' — a list that was empty.
Measured live three times.

Mechanism: enrolment mounts a drive TWICE, at /mnt/felhom-drives/<name> and at
the raw /mnt/<name> it creates on the host. The host survives a guest rebuild;
the controller's registry does not. So classifyClaim saw a mount outside the
managed prefix and concluded 'claimed by something else' — about our own mount.

The fix is CORROBORATED, not a widened prefix: a non-managed mountpoint is
forgiven only when the SAME device is also mounted under the managed path, a
pairing only our enrolment produces. A disk another system uses — /srv/data,
/media/x, even /mnt/someone-elses-disk — has no counterpart and is STILL
refused, with its own test and a red-proof showing an over-wide fix offering it
for formatting.

Read from /proc/mounts deliberately: the lsblk invocation is pinned verbatim in
configs/felhom-agent.sudoers, so using the plural MOUNTPOINTS would have coupled
this to a sudoers rollout. /proc/mounts is world-readable — no sudo, no new
allowlisted command, no config change.

Fail-safe: an unreadable mount table corroborates NOTHING, so the device
classifies exactly as before. 'Could not corroborate' must never read as 'ours'.

29 packages ok, vet clean, agent gates OK.

.claude/rules/backup.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/backup/**", "internal/pbs/**", "internal/pbsdr/**", "internal/dr/**"]
+---
+
+# Backup, PBS and DR
+
+`internal/backup/` is the vzdump runner, restore-test scheduler and report store. `internal/pbs/` is
+the fingerprint-pinned PBS-API client plus the verify maintenance loop. `internal/pbsdr/` and
+`internal/dr/` carry the DR tier and recipe halves.
+
+## The three PBS laws
+
+1. **Set-only.** `pvesm remove` **DELETES the encryption key**. Re-apply configuration; never remove
+   and re-add a PBS storage to change it.
+2. **Secret on stdin.** A token secret is passed on stdin, never as an argv the process table shows.
+3. **Verify the pin BEFORE consuming the secret.** A fingerprint check after the secret has been sent
+   protects nothing.
+
+## Verify is server-side, and its default skips the work
+
+The agent drives verification **remotely** via the PBS API; `proxmox-backup-client` has **no** verify
+subcommand. `POST .../verify` defaults to **`ignore-verified=true`, which SKIPS already-verified
+snapshots** — send `ignore-verified=false` to actually re-read and detect corruption. A verify that
+skipped everything reports success.
+
+## Presence is not success
+
+A timestamp recording an **attempt** is not evidence of a **result**. Where a status field travels
+beside a timestamp, the verdict must consult **both** — or the timestamp must record only successes.
+Ask of any timestamp: *what exactly must have happened for this to be set?* If the answer is "we
+tried", it cannot answer "did it work".
+
+**Corollary:** when a verdict changes which field it counts from, the alarm text changes with it.
+Leaving a message reading `last run 8h ago` while alarming on a six-day-old **success** turns a true
+alarm into one the operator dismisses.
+
+## Prune is server-side now
+
+`DatastoreBackup` carries **no** `Datastore.Prune`. Boxes set `keep_last: 0` and the off-site endpoint
+runs the prune jobs. **Box tokens stay write-only — never widen that grant** (R-89).
+
+<!--
+The ignore-verified default is the sharpest instance of the "absent log line" class in this repo: a
+verify that silently skipped every snapshot completes fast, exits clean, and reports the same shape
+as one that read every byte.
+-->

.claude/rules/health-checks.md

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/capability/**", "internal/storage/**", "internal/localapi/**", "internal/hub/**", "internal/guesthook/**"]
+---
+
+# A health check issues no block I/O
+
+No `statfs`, no `getdents`, no read, write or `fsync` — **not even behind a timeout**.
+
+A probe that touches a wedged device enters uninterruptible sleep, survives `SIGKILL`, and cannot be
+recovered until the device returns or the host reboots — so `systemctl restart` hangs too. A timeout
+protects the caller's control flow and nothing else: the blocked thread remains.
+
+**Liveness is decided from `/proc` and the kernel's own state**, never by reading or writing the
+filesystem.
+
+<!--
+Measured, R-117 spike §6.3 (felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-r117-bind-liveness-2026-07-30.md):
+a probe stayed in D state 3m50s after kill -9; a buffered write with no fsync blocked too (O_CREAT
+needs journal access); and statfs/getdents returned HEALTHY on a namespace that EIOs every byte —
+fast, and wrong.
+
+This rule used to be duplicated verbatim in felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md with a note explaining that
+felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md "does not load in an agent-only session". That reasoning was correct before
+path-scoped rules existed. The single source is now felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md "Code quality rules"; this
+file is the scoped copy that loads exactly where health checks are written. (2026-08-06)
+-->

.claude/rules/localapi.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/localapi/**", "internal/authz/**", "internal/guesthook/**"]
+---
+
+# Local API, authz and guest hooks — the per-guest blast radius
+
+`internal/localapi/` is the narrow per-guest local API: token store, disks/format, guest binds,
+controller swap, stale-lock recovery, pinned self-signed leaf. `internal/authz/` is the operator
+signed-op verifier (SSHSIG) plus the durable nonce store. `internal/guesthook/` installs the
+pre-start self-heal hookscript.
+
+> **Overlap note:** `health-checks.md` also matches `internal/localapi/**` and
+> `internal/guesthook/**`. That is deliberate — both rules apply there and both load. Neither
+> supersedes the other.
+
+## Scoping is the whole security property
+
+This API is reachable **from inside a customer guest**. Every route must be scoped to the guest that
+called it — a route that can name another guest's id has escaped its blast radius. Fail **safe to
+protected**: an unrecognised or unresolvable caller gets less access, never more.
+
+## Replay protection must survive a restart
+
+**`authz.MemoryNonceStore` on a real host is a defect** — replay protection dies on restart. Use
+`authz.FileNonceStore`. The memory store exists for tests.
+
+## The token is a hash on disk, plaintext only at mint
+
+The store keeps **hashes**. The plaintext token exists in exactly one place, `bootstrap.json` on the
+PVE host — so a "read the token" step means reading that file, and a lost token is re-minted, never
+recovered.
+
+## Binds can brick guest boot
+
+| Do not | Because | Use |
+|---|---|---|
+| `GuestBinder.AttachBind`/`DetachBind` (per-drive `pct set -mpN`) | legacy model; a missing bind source can **brick guest boot** (C1) | `AttachDrive`/`DetachDrive` (intermediary model) |
+| `isHostMountpoint` to reconcile bind state | a boolean cannot converge stacked double-binds (the `/mnt` doubling bug) | `countHostMounts` normalization inside `AttachDrive` |
+
+<!--
+Why fail-safe-to-protected rather than fail-closed: this API also carries the recovery paths. A hard
+refusal on an unresolvable caller would make a half-broken guest unrecoverable through the very
+interface built to recover it. Less access, never none.
+-->

.claude/rules/proxmox.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/proxmox/**", "internal/reconcile/**", "internal/signedjobs/**"]
+---
+
+# Proxmox — the API contract, and how destructive work is gated
+
+`internal/proxmox/` is the API-first `Client` plus the fenced root-CLI `Privileged`.
+`internal/reconcile/` is the reconcile engine, reversibility gate, op journal and crash recovery.
+`internal/signedjobs/` holds the operator-signed destructive executors (wipe, decommission).
+
+## A 200 on the POST is not success
+
+**Every mutating op is async**: it returns a **UPID**, and `WaitTask` must assert
+`exitstatus == "OK"`. Authorization can fail at *task execution* long after the HTTP call returned
+200. Treating the POST's status as the result is how a failed destroy reads as a successful one.
+
+## The privsep token gotcha
+
+A `--privsep 1` token's rights are the **intersection** of the backing user's permissions **and** the
+token's own ACLs. The role must be granted on **both** or every call 403s. The same intersection rule
+bites on PBS (`token ∩ user`).
+
+## TLS
+
+**SHA-256 leaf-cert pinning** against the self-signed host cert. **No insecure default**, ever. The
+pin is the raw leaf-DER sha — the SAN is never checked, so a cert rotation changes the pin and the
+agent must be re-pinned.
+
+## The destructive path — never the direct call
+
+| Do not | Because | Use |
+|---|---|---|
+| `Client.DestroyLXC` / `Vzdump` / `SetConfig` ad-hoc | skips classification, signature, per-guest serialization, crash recovery | `reconcile.Engine` paths / `RunSignedJob`; queue via `Queue.Submit` |
+| add a method to `proxmox.Privileged` | breaks the 3-exception root-CLI fence (`routing_test.go`) | `proxmox.Runner` + a new sudoers `Cmnd_Alias` + `validate.go`-style checks |
+| treat `ListLXC` output as "guests we own" | audit A1 — pre-v0.62.0 the stale-lock reaper did exactly this, contained only by the pool-scoped token | intersect with `Client.Pool` membership (`staleLockController.Guests()`); **fail safe on read failure** |
+
+Full trap table: `REUSE.md` §3. Every guest joins the `felhom` pool — `VM.Audit` comes from the
+`/pool` grant, not from a per-guest ACL.
+
+<!--
+The fence is not stylistic. It is what makes this component auditable: two types, one of which can
+only speak HTTP and one of which can only shell out, with a test asserting neither crosses. A single
+convenience method on Privileged that also makes an HTTP call would end that property silently.
+-->

.claude/rules/storage.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+paths: ["internal/storage/**", "internal/escrow/**"]
+---
+
+# Storage and escrow — format safety and zero-knowledge recovery
+
+`internal/storage/` is the storage observer, durable IDs, role/claim classifiers, `SudoHostOps` and
+the watchdog. `internal/escrow/` is the PBS-key escrow with its zero-knowledge recovery code.
+
+> **Overlap note:** `health-checks.md` also matches `internal/storage/**`. Deliberate — both rules
+> apply there and both load.
+
+## Never format the device you inspected
+
+**AGENT-001 is a TOCTOU:** acting on the caller's `req.Device` (or any remembered `/dev` path) after
+inspection lets `/dev` re-enumeration retarget the node to a **different physical disk**. Format the
+**re-resolved** device — `Server.reresolveWipe` / `reresolveBlank`.
+
+**Never exec raw `mkfs.*`** (including `Binaries.MkfsExt4`/`MkfsXfs`): sudoers no longer allowlists
+raw mkfs, and going direct bypasses the claim filter and the wrapper's re-checks. Use
+`SudoHostOps.Format`, which routes through `felhom-mkfs-guarded`.
+
+## The two durable-ID schemes refuse each other
+
+They are not interchangeable, and each returns a `binding_mismatch` for the other's scheme:
+
+| Purpose | Scheme | Resolver |
+|---|---|---|
+| wipe confirmation | `byid:` / `byuuid:` | `ResolveDurableDevice`, `DiskInfo.WipeDurableID` |
+| enrolled-storage remount | `uuid:` | `ResolveStorageDevice` |
+
+Using `DiskInfo.DurableID` (a `uuid:`) as a wipe-confirmation id is F20-BUG2.
+
+## Drive data is never taken by force
+
+Plain `umount` only — **never `-l`, never `-f`**, and never any format operation under
+`/mnt/felhom-drives`.
+
+## Escrow is zero-knowledge, and a fetch failure is not a wrong code
+
+The server holds no client key; a no-key restore fails with `missing key`. **A fetch failure must
+never be reported as a wrong recovery code** — that told a customer their correct code was bad, in
+hundredths of a second, when checking a code actually takes about one. Distinguish "we could not
+reach the store" from "the code did not match", always.
+
+<!--
+The escrow recovery-code "flake" was a REAL defect, not a flake. "Known flake, re-run" needs evidence
+before it is said out loud — that phrase cost this project a real finding once.
+-->

.githooks/pre-push

@@ -29,6 +29,41 @@ root=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null) || {
 }
 cd "$root" || exit 1
 
+# ── WORKSPACE-ROOT ASSERTION (2026-08-05, R-204 rider) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+# Refuse a push from a clone outside the felhom workspace.
+#
+# WHY THIS IS A HOOK AND NOT A LINE IN A DOCUMENT: the workspace root is ALREADY written down, in
+# documentation/runbooks/workspace-CLAUDE.md and in the workspace-root CLAUDE.md ("stay inside it"),
+# and work drifted into a home directory anyway. A rule that has failed once as a reminder is not
+# fixed by writing it down again — it has to be asserted where it can bite.
+#
+# A PUSH IS THE RIGHT TRIGGER, deliberately: throwaway clones under /tmp for probes and red-proofs
+# never push, so nothing legitimate breaks. Reads and builds elsewhere stay unaffected.
+#
+# Symlinks are resolved on BOTH sides before comparison, so a symlinked path neither falsely passes
+# nor falsely fails. If the workspace root does not exist on this machine the check is SKIPPED, not
+# failed — this hook must not brick a legitimate clone on a different host.
+#
+# The only bypass is the documented `git push --no-verify`, whose use is already reportable.
+FELHOM_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu
+if [ -d "$FELHOM_WORKSPACE_ROOT" ]; then
+    ws_real=$(cd "$FELHOM_WORKSPACE_ROOT" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P) || ws_real=""
+    root_real=$(pwd -P) || root_real=""
+    if [ -n "$ws_real" ] && [ -n "$root_real" ]; then
+        case "$root_real/" in
+            "$ws_real"/*) : ;;  # inside the workspace — proceed
+            *)
+                echo "pre-push: PUSH REFUSED - this clone is OUTSIDE the felhom workspace." >&2
+                echo "          clone:    $root_real" >&2
+                echo "          expected: under $ws_real (repos live in $ws_real/git/<repo>)" >&2
+                echo "          Work in the workspace clone, or bypass with 'git push --no-verify'" >&2
+                echo "          and state that you did in the session report." >&2
+                exit 1
+                ;;
+        esac
+    fi
+fi
+
 if ! command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     echo "pre-push: FAIL - python3 not found, so the gates CANNOT run. This is a failure, never a" >&2
     echo "          pass by default. Install python3, or push with --no-verify and say so." >&2

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,246 @@
+## v0.127.0 — a mount Felhom itself made is not "something else" (2026-08-06, R-220)
+
+**After a rebuild the customer's own drives could not be re-attached, and the refusal named an action
+they could not perform.** `GET /api/disks/candidates` returned `initialize: [], attach: []` while both
+drives sat there, and the deploy refused with *"choose an attached drive from the list"* — a list that
+was empty. Measured live **three times**: CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 1, and twice on the R-201 re-walk.
+
+**The mechanism.** Enrolment mounts a drive **twice** — at the managed `/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` and
+at the raw `/mnt/<name>` it creates on the host. **The host survives a guest rebuild; the controller's
+registry does not.** So `classifyClaim` saw a mount outside the managed prefix and correctly concluded
+"claimed by something else" — about Felhom's own mount.
+
+**The fix is CORROBORATED, not a widened prefix.** A mountpoint outside `/mnt/felhom-drives` is
+forgiven **only when the same device is ALSO mounted under the managed path** — a pairing that only
+Felhom's own enrolment produces. A disk another system is using, at `/srv/data` or `/media/x` or even
+`/mnt/someone-elses-disk`, has no such counterpart and **is still refused**. That fence has its own
+test, and its red-proof shows an over-wide fix offering `/mnt/someone-elses-disk` for formatting.
+
+**Read from `/proc/mounts`, deliberately.** The lsblk invocation is pinned **verbatim** in
+`configs/felhom-agent.sudoers` (`lsblk -J -o NAME,FSTYPE,PTTYPE,MOUNTPOINT /dev/*`), so switching it to
+the plural `MOUNTPOINTS` would have meant shipping a sudoers change with the binary — a far larger
+blast radius than this finding warrants. `/proc/mounts` is world-readable: **no sudo, no new allowlisted
+command, no config change.**
+
+**Fail-safe:** an unreadable mount table corroborates **nothing**, so the device classifies exactly as
+it did before this change — refused. "We could not corroborate" must never read as "it is ours".
+
+Tests: `claim_r220_test.go` — the own-drive case, the foreign-mount fence over four paths, and the
+corroboration itself (both mounts required; a lone raw mount vouches for nothing; another device's
+managed mount does not vouch for this one; an unreadable table corroborates nothing).
+**Red-proofs:** removing the exemption refuses the customer's own drive again
+(*"device is mounted at /mnt/adatok (sdb)"*); over-widening it to any `/mnt/*` path breaks the fence.
+
+## docs — CLAUDE.md becomes a core plus path-scoped rules (2026-08-06, R-229 leg (b)) — no version bump
+
+**Documentation only. No Go changed, nothing built, nothing deployed.** `go build`/`vet`/`test` green
+and unchanged.
+
+**175 -> 99 effective lines** (207 -> 103 raw, 14,093 -> 6,267 bytes). The release/publish-train
+section was the largest block and the `felhom-build-deploy` skill already carries the procedure, so
+the core points at it instead of restating a table that drifts from the script. The package layout
+went the same way as the controller's: `REUSE.md` and the tree are its home, and the per-package
+annotations that were doing real work moved into the rule file for the area they describe rather than
+being deleted.
+
+**New:** `.claude/rules/{proxmox,localapi,backup,storage}.md`, all `paths:`-scoped, all <=46 effective
+lines, joining the existing `health-checks.md`.
+
+**Kept in the core deliberately** — it is the only part re-injected after `/compact`: the root-CLI
+fence and its three named exceptions (breaching it is how this component stops being auditable), the
+destructive-op gate, the prove-ownership rule from audit A1, the gate entry point, the F9
+live-validation fence, trunk-based with its revert-and-report escape hatch, and the end-of-session
+checklist.
+
+**Glob overlap, stated rather than silently resolved:** `health-checks.md` matches
+`internal/{localapi,guesthook}/**` and `internal/storage/**`, which `localapi.md` and `storage.md`
+also match. Both rules load in those directories and neither supersedes the other; each new file says
+so in its own text so a reader who sees two rules fire is not left guessing which wins.
+
+## docs — the "CI is still owed" claim was stale; corrected (2026-08-06, R-229 part 2) — no version bump
+
+**One sentence, no code.** This file asserted that continuous integration was still owed
+(`felhom.eu` `OPEN-ITEMS.md` R-168). **R-168 was CLOSED on 2026-08-02** — a Gitea Actions runner
+re-runs each repo's gate entry point on every push and emails the operator on failure. Found while
+confirming this session's own push by run ID, which is the check that caught it.
+
+The same stale sentence was in four instruction files across all four repos and is corrected in all
+four. In `felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md` it **contradicted the same file's release section**, which already
+said R-168 mails the failure — a contradiction inside one instruction file, which is the exact class
+the R-229 work exists to find.
+
+## docs — expired and contradictory blocks removed from CLAUDE.md (2026-08-06, R-229) — no version bump
+
+**Documentation and gate registration only. No Go changed, nothing built, nothing deployed.**
+
+Surgical corrections; the file was deliberately **not** restructured (that is deferred, R-229).
+
+- **Deleted the expired TEMPORARY block.** It read *"felhom-pve is at a remote site (until
+  ~2026-08-02) … Delete this block on return"* and was still being read as current fact on
+  **2026-08-06**, four days past its own deadline — while `felhom-controller/CLAUDE.md` asserted the
+  opposite. The location-independence fact worth keeping (`localapi` binds `169.254.253.1:8443` on
+  `vmbr9` since the R-50 island migration) moved to an HTML comment.
+- **Every component version literal is gone** from effective text, including
+  `felhom-agent --version → 0.115.0` and the `go.mod` Go directive. Versions change several times a
+  day; ask the hub's `/hosts` + `/configs` or the box.
+- The drill-VM claim and the host addresses now point at `documentation/operations/nodes.md`, which
+  already stated both correctly. **This file's drill-VM claim was the correct one** — confirmed by
+  `qm list` on demo-hp.
+- The R-115/R-188/R-186 release **narratives** moved to an HTML comment and to the
+  `felhom-build-deploy` skill; the **directives** stayed (never hand-roll the build; the
+  build → tag → publish → push order; reproducible `-trimpath -buildvcs=false`).
+- The health-check block-I/O rule became `.claude/rules/health-checks.md`, scoped to the five
+  packages where health checks are written. It had been duplicated from `felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md` *with a
+  note explaining that that file does not load in an agent-only session* — correct reasoning, made
+  obsolete by path-scoped rules.
+
+`agent_gates.py` now registers **`instructions`** (shared, `felhom.eu/scripts/`, never copied).
+
+Full accounting: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/LEDGER-instruction-trim-2026-08-06.md`.
+
+## v0.126.0 — a fetch failure is not a wrong recovery code (2026-08-06, R-224)
+
+**A hub the agent could not reach was reported to the customer as a bad recovery code.** Measured live
+on 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11 F3): with the hub REJECTed at the appliance's firewall and a **correct,
+current** recovery code, the customer was told their code did not open their package — **in 0.0556 s**,
+against ~1.0 s for a genuine unseal. No unseal was attempted. F4 produced the same message in 0.0299 s
+with this agent stopped.
+
+**The discriminator existed here the whole time and this boundary threw it away.** `recover.go` fails
+at four distinguishable points; the local-api handler had cases for two of them and a `default` that
+answered *"the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle, or the bundle could not be fetched"* —
+one sentence for two situations, only one of which is the customer's doing.
+
+**The fix is a value, not a log line.** `escrow.ErrBundleFetch` joins the fetch leg's error, and the
+handler routes it to **502** with its own words: *"the sealed recovery bundle could not be fetched from
+the hub — the recovery code was NOT used and nothing was written."* 502 rather than 4xx because the
+request was not bad; an upstream dependency failed. The `default` now carries **only** the fail-closed
+wrong-code case and says so without the "or".
+
+Four situations, four statuses — **502** fetch failed · **400** the bundle was fetched and refused the
+code · **404** the hub holds no bundle · **409** the bundle predates the repository-password field.
+The controller classifies on the STATUS and must never parse these sentences.
+
+⚠ **A GREEN TEST NAMED THIS DEFECT AND DID NOT PREVENT IT.**
+`TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_FetchErrorIsDistinct` has said since v0.125.0 that *"the operator must
+not be sent to re-read their recovery code because the hub was unreachable"* — and it passed
+throughout, because it asserted this package's error **string** one layer below where the merge
+happened, and a string is something no caller can branch on. It now asserts the sentinel, and its
+consequence-level twin asserts the STATUS at the boundary the customer's message is derived from.
+**Prefer the test that asserts the consequence over the one that asserts the mechanism.**
+
+Tests: `recover_test.go` (fetch classifies as `ErrBundleFetch`; a wrong code does **not**; an absent
+blob keeps its own identity) and `localapi/escrow_recover_class_test.go` (each situation's status, and
+a standalone assertion that fetch-failure and wrong-code never share one). **Red-proofs:** removing the
+`%w` join fails the sentinel test; deleting the handler case makes both answer `400` with the
+wrong-code sentence — the exact pre-fix code, and the exact defect CAMPAIGN-11 measured.
+
+## v0.125.0 — the agent opens the sealed bundle and returns one field (2026-08-04, R-199 links 7–8)
+
+**Link 7 had one production caller and it was a `--selftest`.** `UnwrapIdentityBundle` has existed
+since slice 10D.1 and the only thing that ever called it was `runSelftestIdentityConsume`, reading the
+recovery code from an environment variable by hand. **Link 8 did not exist at all:** that selftest
+writes the whole bundle JSON to a file, and its success message named `tunnel_token + pbs_token` —
+an enumeration that was accurate when written and became a MISSTATEMENT the moment v0.77.0 sealed the
+offsite repository password into the same bundle. Anyone reading that output would conclude the
+repository password was not there. It now names what THIS bundle actually carried and what it did not.
+
+**`POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password`** on the pinned local API: the controller supplies the
+customer's recovery code, the agent fetches this host's own sealed blob from the hub
+(`hub.Client.FetchIdentityEscrow`, hub ≥ v0.94.0, self-scoped by the per-host key), unseals it, and
+returns **only the offsite restic repository password** plus its sha256.
+
+**Only that field, on purpose.** The bundle also carries the tunnel token, the PBS token and the WG
+private key. The controller is a trust tier down and needs none of them; returning them would widen
+the blast radius of a controller compromise for nothing. Narrowing costs nothing now and is not
+recoverable later.
+
+**Why the agent and not the controller:** `age` is an agent runtime dependency and is deliberately
+absent from the controller image; the blob is a host-scoped object whose only writer is this agent
+under the per-host key, so the read is that write's mirror.
+
+**R's handling is the tightest rule in this release.** It arrives in the request body over the pinned
+channel, is held in memory for one call, is cleared on the success path AND every failure path, is
+never written to disk, never an argument in a process list, never logged at any level including
+inside an error, and is never echoed. `UnwrapIdentity` already stages only the blob and the recovered
+plaintext in a temp dir it removes; a test redirects TMPDIR and asserts **the tree is empty
+afterwards** — emptiness rather than a content scan, because a content scan is defeated by a later
+call overwriting the leaked file, which is exactly how the first version of that test passed its own
+red-proof while R sat on disk.
+
+Three outcomes are distinct rather than one generic failure: no blob (404 — no ceremony has run), a
+bundle that opens but predates the field (409 — a pre-fork-4 blob, which cannot be retro-fitted), and
+a code that does not open it (400 — fail-closed at the KDF, nothing written). Sending an operator to
+re-check a correctly typed recovery code because the hub was unreachable is the mistake this avoids.
+
+**The wiring is asserted by an AST walk**, not a `strings.Contains`: `main` → `runDaemon` →
+`buildLocalAPIServer`, where an `escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer` is constructed and passed as
+`localapi.Options.EscrowRecovery`, and its fetcher calls the DAEMON's own hub client (the self-scoping
+that makes cross-host retrieval impossible is a property of which key is used). This project's
+built-but-never-wired count is six and links 6–7 were two of them; the fix must not become the seventh.
+
+## v0.124.1 — the repair record must survive the probe that did NOT feed the hub (2026-08-04, R-190)
+
+**v0.124.0's transition record did not reach the hub, and the live run is what showed it.** The
+capability reported degraded for "one cycle" — meaning the probe call that performed the repair. But
+`probeAll` is invoked **independently** by the periodic self-check log and by the collector building a
+host-report. On the demo box the repairing call was the log's (`09:39:34`, journal shows
+`GRANT WAS MISSING AND HAS BEEN SELF-REPAIRED` and `degraded=1`), and the host-report built three
+seconds later found the grant present and sent **`ok`**. The agent's journal had the record; the hub
+had nothing; the operator would have learned nothing.
+
+That is the exact silence R-190 is about, re-created inside its own mitigation — and every unit test
+passed while it was true.
+
+**The fix is a latch on TIME rather than on call count.** A confirmed repair is reported for
+`storeGrantRepairReportWindow` (20 minutes), which comfortably exceeds the 900 s host-report interval,
+so at least one report must carry the transition. It clears on its own — a permanently degraded
+capability would be its own false alarm — and it is per tier.
+
+**Two hollow tests were caught and fixed on the way**, both the same shape this repo keeps finding: a
+test asserting a value it constructed itself, and a test asserting the latch HELPER rather than the
+path that consumes it — whose red-proof duly passed. The decisions now live in
+`storeGrantHealthyVerdict` and `storeGrantRepairedVerdict`, and the tests call those.
+
+## v0.124.0 — a lost storage grant repairs itself, and says that it was lost (2026-08-04, R-190)
+
+**R-190 is a grant that demonstrably worked at 04:44 on 2026-08-03 and was gone by 09:24** — with a
+host reinstall, logged `pveum` activity and cluster-log entries all ruled out by measurement. The
+cause is still open. The resilience does not have to wait for it.
+
+**Everything needed already existed and had only ever been called once.** The root wrapper
+(`felhom-backup-target-apply grant <id>`), its sudoers vector (`grant *`, any storage id, confirmed
+not assumed), and the exact command were all in place — and the `grant` verb had only ever run at
+storage CREATION. That is the *built but never wired* shape, in a verb rather than a seam, and it is
+this project's seventh instance.
+
+**What v0.124.0 does:** when the store-grant probe finds the grant absent on a tier the box depends
+on, it runs that wrapper and **re-reads once** to confirm — the pbsdr R-22 self-grant shape, including
+its restraint: one attempt, one confirmation, and anything still wrong stays loudly wrong.
+
+**THE RECORD IS THE POINT, AND IT IS THE HALF R-190 IS ACTUALLY ABOUT.** A repair that leaves only
+`ok` behind destroys the only evidence a permission vanished, so a recurring loss becomes undetectable
+forever — strictly worse than the fault it fixes. So a confirmed repair reports **DEGRADED for exactly
+one cycle**, with the explanation in `Feature`:
+
+```
+backup tier felhom-backup: the agent's storage grant was MISSING and has been AUTOMATICALLY
+RESTORED — the tier works now, but a permission that vanished on its own needs investigating (R-190)
+```
+
+**Nothing new was built to carry it.** The hub's existing ok→degraded→ok edge is the channel — it
+alerts and e-mails on the first edge and logs the recovery on the next cycle, so one loss produces
+exactly one alert pair. No wire change, no hub change, no new event type. `Feature` carries the text
+because that is the field the hub interpolates into the operator's e-mail; `Reason` does not travel.
+
+**Bounded (Scenario F):** one attempt per tier per hour, in memory. A storage can be unreadable for
+reasons an ACL cannot fix, and a re-grant on every report cycle is a repair loop wearing a fix's
+clothes. An agent restart re-arms it, which is correct — a restart is exactly when a box should
+re-check what it depends on.
+
+**A failed repair never masks the fault:** the capability stays degraded with the failure in its
+reason, and a repair that "succeeded" but did not survive the re-read is reported as needing a human.
+
 ## v0.123.0 — a tier the box cannot READ now says so (2026-08-03, R-185)
 
 **The missing permission is one command. The silence was the defect.** On demo-felhom the agent's PVE

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1,216 +1,103 @@
 # CLAUDE.md — `felhom-agent`
 
-> Loads when Claude Code touches this repo. Stable orientation only — **current state lives in
-> `CONTEXT.md` and the top of `CHANGELOG.md`**, never here. Cross-repo orientation: workspace-root
-> `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/git/CLAUDE.md`.
+> Stable orientation only — **current state lives in `CONTEXT.md` and the top of `CHANGELOG.md`**,
+> never here. Cross-repo conventions (artifact taxonomy, access, clean-tree gate, secrets,
+> CHANGELOG/REPORT): workspace-root `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/git/CLAUDE.md`. Path-scoped detail:
+> `.claude/rules/`.
 
 ## What this repo is
 
-`felhom-agent` is the operator-tier **host agent** that runs on each Proxmox host and owns **all**
-Proxmox interaction: provision/restore guests, host storage, backup/restore orchestration, the hub
-control loop, and a narrow per-guest local API. It is the **most privilege-sensitive** component.
+The operator-tier **host agent**, one per Proxmox host, owning **all** Proxmox interaction:
+provision/restore guests, host storage, backup/restore orchestration, the hub control loop, and a
+narrow per-guest local API. It is the **most privilege-sensitive component in the system**.
 
-- Renamed former `proxmox-controller` repo.
-- **Distinct from `felhom-controller`** — that is the *in-guest* controller (Docker-only, no Proxmox
-  creds). Do not confuse them.
-- Control plane, not data plane: if the agent dies, apps keep serving; only management degrades.
+- Renamed from `proxmox-controller`.
+- **Distinct from `felhom-controller`** — that is the *in-guest* controller, Docker-only, holding no
+  Proxmox credentials. Do not confuse them.
+- **Control plane, not data plane:** if the agent dies, apps keep serving; only management degrades.
+- Pure Go stdlib + `golang.org/x/crypto`. No web frameworks.
 
-## Read before writing code
+## Doing X → read Y
 
-- **`REUSE.md`** — canonical helpers, format-safety guards, traps, seams. Check it first; update it
-  in the same commit that changes a shared helper or pattern.
-- `CONTEXT.md` (current state + open threads) and the top `CHANGELOG.md` entry (authoritative history).
-- Design doc: `felhom.eu/documentation/architecture/03-host-agent.md` (locked). Platform facts:
-  `felhom.eu/documentation/proxmox-platform.md` + `tests/phase{0,1-2,3,4}-findings.md`.
+| Doing | Read |
+|---|---|
+| writing any new code | `REUSE.md` — helpers, format-safety guards, traps, seams |
+| needing current state / open threads | `CONTEXT.md` + the top `CHANGELOG.md` entry |
+| Proxmox, reconcile or signed jobs | loads itself: `.claude/rules/proxmox.md` |
+| local API, authz or guest hooks | loads itself: `.claude/rules/localapi.md` |
+| backup, PBS or DR | loads itself: `.claude/rules/backup.md` |
+| storage or escrow | loads itself: `.claude/rules/storage.md` |
+| writing a health check | loads itself: `.claude/rules/health-checks.md` |
+| **release, build, publish, deploy, verify a version** | the **`felhom-build-deploy`** skill — **never hand-roll it** |
+| writing or reviewing a test, fixing a bug | the **`felhom-testing`** skill |
+| host addresses, break-glass, node facts | `felhom.eu/documentation/operations/nodes.md` — never restate them |
+| which box may I break | `felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/target-selection.md` |
+| what version is live anywhere | ask the hub (`/hosts`, `/configs`) or the box — **never a doc** |
+| the authoritative design | `felhom.eu/documentation/architecture/03-host-agent.md` (locked) |
 
-## Layout (verified against the tree)
+## The root-CLI fence — API-first, exactly three exceptions
 
-```
-cmd/felhom-agent/    main + flags + --selftest modes + the daemon entry
-cmd/felhom-opsign/   offline operator signing CLI (SSHSIG)
-internal/authz/      operator signed-op verifier (SSHSIG) + durable FileNonceStore
-internal/backup/     vzdump backup runner + restore-test scheduler + report store
-internal/capability/ live sudo-policy capability probe (degradation visibility)
-internal/config/     JSON config + FELHOM_AGENT_* env overlay; secrets redacted (Redacted())
-internal/desired/    hub desired-state syncer (envelope observer)
-internal/escrow/     PBS-key escrow (zero-knowledge recovery code)
-internal/guesthook/  pre-start self-heal hookscript install
-internal/hub/        daemon: HostReport collector + Bearer client + resilient Loop
-internal/lanresolver/ split-horizon DNS on guest IP change (dnsmasq RESTART, not reload)
-internal/localapi/   per-guest local API: token store, disks/format, guest binds, controller swap,
-                     stale-lock recovery, pinned self-signed leaf
-internal/log/        slog setup
-internal/pbs/        PBS-API client (fingerprint-pinned) + verify maintenance loop
-internal/provision/  guest bootstrap back-half (token mint → bootstrap.json → pct bind)
-internal/proxmox/    API-first Client + fenced root-CLI Privileged + UPID WaitTask
-internal/reconcile/  reconcile engine + reversibility gate + op journal + crash recovery
-internal/signedjobs/ operator-signed destructive executors (wipe, decommission)
-internal/storage/    storage observer + durable ids + role/claim classifiers + SudoHostOps + watchdog
-```
-
-## Build / run
-
-- Module `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent`; binary `felhom-agent` (`cmd/felhom-agent/`).
-- **Pure Go stdlib + `golang.org/x/crypto` only** — no web frameworks. `go.mod` directive go 1.25.0;
-  DooPlex (192.168.0.180, where CC runs) has the Go toolchain and is on the same LAN as the demo
-  host — build and run live tests locally.
-- Version via `-ldflags "-X main.version=<v>"`; `--version` flag. Bump on meaningful changes + CHANGELOG entry.
-- **Full build/deploy/publish runbook: use the `felhom-build-deploy` skill.** Summary:
-
-> **Clean-tree gate before any build:** `git status --porcelain` must be empty and
-> `git rev-parse HEAD` must equal `git rev-parse origin/main` in the repo being built. An unpushed
-> change does not exist — never build a dirty or unpushed tree. The `git pull` in the build step
-> stays (it is a no-op when you work in this tree, and load-bearing if anything was pushed from
-> elsewhere).
-
-> **RELEASING IS ONE COMMAND, AND IT PUBLISHES (R-115).** There used to be a raw `go build` line
-> here and a *separate* "Publish" row, so publishing was a step someone had to remember — and it was
-> **forgotten three times in five days**, the last leaving agent v0.120.0 deployed on both demo hosts
-> and undownloadable, where a documented-path reinstall would have silently downgraded them while
-> reporting success. Do not hand-roll the build: the script also creates the `v<version>` git TAG
-> that `felhom-host-install.sh` fetches this version's sixteen config files from (R-183), and it
-> verifies by an **independent download** rather than trusting the publish step's own output.
-> `scripts/publish-agent.sh` still exists and is still correct — the release script CALLS it rather
-> than reimplementing it.
->
-> **THE ORDER IS build → tag LOCALLY → publish → push tag, and each step protects something (R-188,
-> R-186).** The tag is created before the publish so the build and the tag describe the same commit;
-> it is *pushed* after, because the push is what wakes CI (`on: [push]`) and a tag visible before its
-> package makes the published-versions gate correctly fail a correct release — it did, on roughly
-> every second release, and R-168 sends that failure to you by mail. The invariant the old order
-> protected is asserted directly instead: the gate now also refuses a **published version with no
-> tag**. If the push fails after a successful publish the script says so loudly and prints the
-> one-line recovery; if the *publish* fails it removes the local-only tag so a retry is clean.
->
-> **A RELEASED BINARY IS INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIABLE (R-186).** The build uses `-trimpath
-> -buildvcs=false` so the same source produces the same bytes whether or not the tag exists yet —
-> before this, a rebuild could not reproduce the sha you were vouching. To check any published
-> version yourself:
->
-> ```bash
-> V=0.122.0
-> git checkout "v$V" && go build -trimpath -buildvcs=false -ldflags "-X main.version=$V" \
->     -o /tmp/felhom-agent-check ./cmd/felhom-agent
-> sha256sum /tmp/felhom-agent-check
-> curl -fsSL "https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/$V/felhom-agent" | sha256sum
-> ```
->
-> The two hashes must match. `publish-agent.sh`'s fallback build uses the **same** flags — it used to
-> force `CGO_ENABLED=0` and produce a 74 KB-smaller binary for the same version; if either build line
-> ever changes, change both or one version name means two binaries again.
-
-| Step | Where | One-liner |
-|---|---|---|
-| **Release** (build + tag + publish + verify) | DooPlex (local) | `GITEA_USER=admin GITEA_TOKEN=<tok> scripts/release-agent.sh <ver>` — refuses a dirty/unpushed tree and refuses to re-release an existing version |
-| Copy | local → felhom-pve | `scp /tmp/felhom-agent-<v> felhom-pve:/tmp/` (one hop) |
-| Deploy | felhom-pve | backup `.bak-<old>` → `install -m0755` → `systemctl restart felhom-agent` (non-root `felhom-agent` user, config `/etc/felhom-agent/agent.json`) |
-| Ship configs | felhom-pve | sudoers (`/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent`) + guarded-mkfs wrapper WITH the binary when `configs/` changed |
-| **Verify** (anyone, any time) | anywhere with the repo + Go | `git checkout v<ver> && go build -trimpath -buildvcs=false -ldflags "-X main.version=<ver>" -o /tmp/a ./cmd/felhom-agent && sha256sum /tmp/a` — must equal `curl -fsSL <pkg-url> \| sha256sum` |
-| **Vouch** | hub operator UI | Configs → Day-0 artifacts. **Deliberately NOT automated** — vouching is what points machines at a version, and it stays your act (prove-then-vouch) |
-| Verify | felhom-pve | `felhom-agent --version` + journal (clean ReassertGuestBinds, no capability degradation) |
-
-## Proxmox model (the load-bearing rules)
+This is in the core because breaching it is how this component stops being auditable.
 
 - **API-first** via a scoped `FelhomAgent` token. Raw root-CLI is **fenced to exactly 3 exceptions**:
-  keyctl `pct create` (golden image), USB mount/fstab, SMART/sensors. `Client` never shells out;
-  `Privileged` never makes HTTP calls (asserted by `routing_test.go`). Keep that fence.
-- **Every mutating op is async** → returns a UPID → `WaitTask` asserts `exitstatus == "OK"`. A 200 on
-  the POST is **not** success; authorization can fail at task execution.
-- **TLS:** SHA-256 leaf-cert pinning (self-signed host cert). No insecure default.
-- **Privsep token gotcha:** a `--privsep 1` token's rights = intersection of the backing user's perms
-  AND the token's ACLs — the role must be granted on **both**, or every call 403s.
-- Destructive ops go through the reconcile gate / signed-jobs path — never call `Client.DestroyLXC`/
-  `Vzdump`/`SetConfig` ad-hoc (REUSE.md §3).
+  keyctl `pct create` (golden image), USB mount/fstab, SMART/sensors.
+- **`Client` never shells out; `Privileged` never makes HTTP calls** — asserted by `routing_test.go`.
+  Adding a method to `proxmox.Privileged` breaks the fence; use `proxmox.Runner` plus a new sudoers
+  `Cmnd_Alias` and `validate.go`-style checks (`REUSE.md` §3).
+- **Destructive ops go through the reconcile gate / signed-jobs path.** Never call
+  `Client.DestroyLXC` / `Vzdump` / `SetConfig` ad-hoc — that skips classification, signature,
+  per-guest serialization and crash recovery.
+- **Ownership must be PROVEN, never assumed.** A raw `ListLXC` list is not "guests the agent owns";
+  intersect with `Client.Pool` membership and fail safe on a read failure (audit A1).
 
-## Demo host (for live tests)
+## Gates — ONE entry point
 
-Node **`demo-felhom`**, API `https://192.168.0.162:8006`. SSH alias `felhom-pve` (root@pam) —
-available to CC as plain `ssh felhom-pve`. A **second demo node `demo-hp`** (HP t740, node name
-`felhom-host`, `ssh demo-hp` — no baked key; break-glass root via hub `host_recovery/demo-hp-bb76ea` +
-`sshpass`) is the **designated drill+build VM host** per the 2026-07-25 operator ruling, and that ruling
-is **realized** — it hosts drill VM `300` (`drill-r50`), so **start there**, not on DooPlex. (The
-historical golden-bake `drill.qcow2` still lives on DooPlex and is a bake fixture, not a drill target.)
-**Which box is safe to break, and what may be done to each:
-`felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/target-selection.md`** — read it before any destructive test. Both
-nodes + the break-glass recipe: `felhom.eu/documentation/operations/nodes.md`. The agent pins the served leaf cert — verify the
-fingerprint still matches before a live run. Selftest modes (run locally on DooPlex, pointed at the
-demo API): `--selftest[=read|task|hub|storage|backup|restore-test|pbs-verify]`; no flag = the daemon.
+**Run `python3 scripts/agent_gates.py` from the repo root after ANY change here.** It runs this
+repo's gates — `reuse_refs_check` and `instructions_gate`, both the **shared** copies in
+`felhom.eu/scripts/`, never copied into this repo (a copy recreates the drift they detect; an absent
+sibling clone FAILS). `--fast` selects the gates touching no network and no container runtime; today
+that is all of them. **A missing gate is a FAILURE, never a skip.**
 
-> **TEMPORARY — felhom-pve is at a remote site (until ~2026-08-02).** The home-LAN literal
-> `192.168.0.162` is NOT reachable from DooPlex for the duration. Access via Tailscale:
-> felhom-pve = 100.70.170.35; the `Host felhom-pve` entry in `~/.ssh/config` on DooPlex already
-> points there (the direct-LAN path stays available as `Host felhom-pve-lan`). Delete this block on
-> return. All documented `ssh felhom-pve` / `pct exec` workflows are unchanged. Path is **direct**
-> (not DERP), ~37 ms rtt per hop. At the remote site the host is on **DHCP**; re-check its address
-> rather than trusting one written here (`ip -br addr show vmbr0` — it read `192.168.0.162/24` on
-> 2026-07-30, and `felhom-pve-lan` from DooPlex is still `No route to host`). Details + findings:
-> `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md`
->
-> **The "agent does not run at the remote site" warning this block used to carry is RETRACTED
-> (2026-07-30) — it was true before R-50 and is false now.** `localapi` no longer binds a LAN literal:
-> since the R-50 island migration (2026-07-25) it binds `169.254.253.1:8443` on `vmbr9`, which is
-> location-independent by design, and `proxmox.endpoint` is `https://127.0.0.1:8006`. Verified live:
-> `systemctl is-active felhom-agent` → `active`, `felhom-agent --version` → 0.115.0, and the per-guest
-> local API answered `GET /disks` over the island. No config edit and no Viktor GO are outstanding.
+**The pre-push hook** (`.githooks/pre-push`) runs it with `--fast` and refuses a failing push. It is
+**per-clone** — switch it on once with `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`, and a manual run WARNS
+when this clone is unarmed. `git push --no-verify` bypasses it deliberately; **say so in the session
+report when you use it** — CI re-runs the same entry point on every push and **emails the operator on
+failure**, so a bypass is noticed even though it is not blocked (R-168, CLOSED 2026-08-02).
 
-> **Legacy: Windows workstation.** Until 2026-07-19 CC ran on Windows 11; `pct` commands over SSH
-> needed `export MSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1`, and every remote command used
-> `SSH=/c/Windows/System32/OpenSSH/ssh.exe`. Agent deploy was a two-hop copy via the Windows box
-> (`cygpath -w` for the local scp path; CRLF hazard on config files).
+<!--
+WHY ONE ENTRY POINT (2026-08-02, R-29): a census of all gates across the four repos found every check
+a CLAUDE.md names was passing, and two of the four nobody is told to run were failing. This repo was
+the extreme case — nothing ran against it at all, and 90 cited paths were checked by no one.
+-->
+
+## Live validation — the fence
+
+Exercise the **SERVER-SIDE PIPELINE** a real user triggers, end-to-end. **The forbidden shortcut is
+BYPASSING it** — the F9 episode was a raw guest-attach with hand-set state, and it proved nothing.
+
+`claude-in-chrome` is NOT available on DooPlex. Invoking the exact endpoint the UI invokes is an
+acceptable proxy — **say which method was used**. Low-level mechanism tests where the direct call IS
+the mechanism are exempt.
 
 ## Conventions
 
-### Trunk-based — no branches
-
-All shippable work commits **directly to `main`**; `main` equals what is deployed.
-- Report-only artifacts (audits, findings, fixspecs) → `felhom.eu/documentation/` (`audits/`, `backlog/`).
-- Risky/supervised fixes are spec'd, then implemented **during the supervised session, on `main`**.
-- Unattended escape hatch: if a fix can't be cleanly verified/shipped, revert + report — never park on a branch.
-
-> **In every repository where you make a change, update both files in that repo:**
-> - **`CHANGELOG.md`** — cumulative log, newest on top.
-> - **`REPORT.md`** — **overwrite** with the most recent implementation/validation summary only.
->
-> **Never write secrets** into any committed file — reference them as "stored out-of-band".
-
-- Code quality: verify generated code for bugs/edge cases; add debug logging; **ask rather than
-  guess** when you'd otherwise invent input/output.
-- **A health check issues no block I/O** — no `statfs`, no `getdents`, no read, write or `fsync`, **not
-  even behind a timeout**. Liveness is decided from `/proc` and kernel state. The full rule + the
-  measurement lives in `felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md` "Code quality rules"; it is repeated here because health
-  checks are written in THIS repo and that file does not load in an agent-only session. R-117 spike §6.3.
-- Update `REUSE.md` if you added/changed/deprecated a shared helper or pattern (same commit).
-- **Run `python3 scripts/agent_gates.py` from the repo root after ANY change in this repo.** It is
-  the ONE entry point for this repo's gates. Today it runs one — `reuse_refs_check` over this
-  repo's `REUSE.md` — and it exists at one gate on purpose: a census on 2026-08-02 found that every
-  check a `CLAUDE.md` names was passing and two of the four nobody is told to run were failing, and
-  this repo was the extreme case, with nothing running against it at all and 90 cited paths checked
-  by no one. It grows when the agent grows a second check. `--fast` selects the gates that touch no
-  network and no container runtime; today that is all of them. A missing gate is a FAILURE, never a
-  skip. **The shared `reuse_refs_check.py` lives in `felhom.eu/scripts/` and is never copied here**
-  — a copy would recreate the drift it detects; an absent sibling clone FAILS the gate.
-  **The pre-push hook** (`.githooks/pre-push`) runs it with `--fast` and refuses a failing push. It
-  is per-clone — switch it on once with `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`, and a manual run
-  WARNS when this clone is unarmed. `git push --no-verify` bypasses it deliberately; **say so in the
-  session report when you use it.** Both facts are why CI is still owed (`OPEN-ITEMS.md` R-168).
-- Testing doctrine (non-hollow tests, red-proofs, seams): use the `felhom-testing` skill.
-- **Logging**: the slog logger fans out to journald (configured level) + the always-DEBUG `applog.Ring`
-  (remote pulls) — English, keys-never-values, durations on outcomes; full rules in
+- **Trunk-based — no branches.** All shippable work commits directly to `main`; `main` equals what is
+  deployed. Report-only artifacts (audits, findings, fixspecs) go to `felhom.eu/documentation/`.
+- **Unattended escape hatch:** if a fix cannot be cleanly verified and shipped, **revert and report**
+  — never park it on a branch.
+- **Logging**: the slog logger fans out to journald (configured level) plus the always-DEBUG
+  `applog.Ring` (remote pulls). English, keys-never-values, durations on outcomes. Full rules:
   `felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/logging-conventions.md`.
+- Update `REUSE.md` in the same commit that adds, changes or deprecates a shared helper or pattern.
 
-### Live validation
+## End-of-session checklist
 
-Exercise the SERVER-SIDE PIPELINE a real user triggers, end-to-end. The forbidden shortcut is
-BYPASSING it (the F9 episode: raw guest-attach + hand-set state). Invoking the exact endpoint the UI
-invokes is an acceptable proxy when a browser isn't available — say which method was used. Low-level
-mechanism tests where the direct call IS the mechanism are exempt.
-
-## Workflow & artifacts
-
-- Implement **`TASK.md` / `TASK-*.md`** specs (when placed as `TASK.md` or told to), then push +
-  CHANGELOG + REPORT.md.
-- **`RUNBOOK-*.md`** — an operational procedure. CC executes the steps it has access and capability
-  for, including live validation on the demo Proxmox host (CC has root@felhom-pve SSH + the
-  felhom-agent token). Mark a step HUMAN only when it genuinely needs physical presence, a real-world
-  decision, or credentials CC truly lacks. Judgment still applies: confirm before irreversible ops on
-  real customer data — demo scratch guests are fair game.
+- **`CHANGELOG.md`** (cumulative, newest on top) and **`REPORT.md`** (overwritten with this run only)
+  — in every repo touched.
+- **`CONTEXT.md`** — decisions, state, what is next.
+- **`REUSE.md`** — if a shared helper or pattern moved.
+- **A finding goes in `felhom.eu/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` first**, never only in a report
+  or an audit.
+- **Confirm your own last push's CI run went green, by run ID** — CI mails on failure, which is a PUSH
+  signal; this is the PULL check that catches a lost or unread mail. An unchecked green is an
+  assumption, not an observation.

CONTEXT.md

@@ -3,8 +3,70 @@
 > Snapshot of the current state + open threads. Authoritative history lives in `CHANGELOG.md` (top
 > entry = current); the end-of-task detail lives in `REPORT.md`.
 
+## R-199 (v0.125.0) — links 6–8 of the recovery chain, assembled and walked
+
+`POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password` (pinned local API, `withGuest`): the controller supplies the
+customer's recovery code, the agent fetches THIS host's own sealed blob from the hub
+(`hub.Client.FetchIdentityEscrow` → `GET /hosts/{id}/escrow`, hub >= v0.94.0, self-scoped by the
+per-host key), unseals it via `escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer`, and returns **only** the offsite restic
+repository password plus its sha256.
+
+**Rules that must not erode:**
+- **Only that field.** Not the tunnel token, not the PBS token, not the WG key — the controller is a
+  trust tier down and needs none of them. Narrowing cost nothing and is not recoverable later.
+- **The unseal stays in the agent.** `age` is an agent runtime dependency (`/usr/bin/age` — hardcoded,
+  no config override; 1.2.1 on demo-felhom) and is deliberately absent from the controller image.
+- **R:** in memory for one call, cleared on the success path AND every failure path, never on disk,
+  never in argv, never logged at any level including inside an error, never echoed. Verified live: 0
+  log lines, 0 files, 0 leftover `felhom-idesc-*` dirs, with a positive control proving the search worked.
+- **Three distinct outcomes**, not one generic failure: no blob (404), a bundle that opens but predates
+  the field (409 — pre-fork-4, cannot be retro-fitted), a code that does not open it (400 — fail-closed
+  at age's KDF, nothing written).
+- **The wiring is pinned by an AST walk** (`cmd/felhom-agent/escrow_recover_wiring_test.go`):
+  `main` → `runDaemon` → `buildLocalAPIServer`, an `escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer` constructed there, the
+  `Options.EscrowRecovery` field present, and the fetcher calling the DAEMON's own `hubClient` (the
+  self-scoping that makes cross-host retrieval impossible is a property of WHICH key is used).
+  Links 6 and 7 were two of this project's six built-but-never-wired instances.
+
+**Proven live on demo-felhom 2026-08-04:** recovered sha256 == on-disk sha256 == the hub's stored hash.
+A wrong code five minutes earlier failed closed. **The chain stops at link 8** — nothing installs a
+recovered password, reopens a repository, or restores a file.
+
+**§8.6, fixed while here:** `runSelftestIdentityConsume`'s success line used to recite
+"tunnel_token + pbs_token", which became a misstatement when v0.77.0 sealed the repository password
+into the same bundle — anyone reading it would conclude the password was not there. It now names what
+THIS bundle carried and what it did not.
+
 ## Current
 
+- **2026-08-03 — v0.123.0 (R-185): a tier the box cannot READ now says so.** The agent's token had
+  `FelhomAgentStore` on `local`, `local-lvm`, `felhom-pbs` and **not** on `felhom-backup` — the
+  storage both demo boxes configure as `local_backup_target`. That storage answered `{"data":[]}`
+  through the token while root listed three archives, and `pickForThisRun` skipped it as *"no settled
+  archive yet"* — **which is what a brand-new tier reports**, so the host tier was never
+  restore-testable and nothing said so.
+  - **The permission question is asked directly**, because unlike the listing it has a definite
+    answer: `Client.Permissions` reads `/access/permissions?path=/storage/<target>` **as the agent's
+    own token**, and `storeGrantStatuses` emits one `capability.Status` per configured tier. It
+    composes AROUND the sudo prober, the way `poolReadStatus` already does — an API read does not
+    belong inside a sudo-policy probe. `Status`'s wire shape is untouched, so the hub's critical
+    degraded alert applies with **no hub change**.
+  - **MEASURED FIRST, and the obvious reading is wrong:** an ungranted path answers neither empty nor
+    403 — it carries the privileges INHERITED from the box-wide `/` grant
+    (`Sys.Audit, SDN.Use, Datastore.Audit`). Checking path-presence, or `Datastore.Audit`, reports a
+    blinded storage HEALTHY. The probe tests **`Datastore.AllocateSpace`**; re-measure before ever
+    changing that constant (`storeGrantRequiredPriv`, red-proved).
+  - **The probed set comes from `BackupTiers()`, never a fixed list** — a hardcoded probe list is the
+    defect reproduced inside the fix. Critical, EXCEPT the `local` fallback target (reported, but it
+    does not page). It never consults content, so it cannot alarm on a newborn tier; it never reports
+    ok when it could not ask.
+  - **LIVE:** degraded observed on the still-blind box (hub emailed `agent_capability_degraded`) →
+    grant applied on **both** demo boxes → token lists 3 and 4 archives → `ok=70 total=70 degraded=0`
+    and `degraded → ok` at the hub → **the host tier became a due-check candidate for the first time**,
+    correctly picking the 08-02 archive (08-03 had not settled 24 h).
+  - **The installer's real defect was NOT `PVE_STORAGES`** — see `felhom.eu` CONTEXT S-22: Case A
+    grants, the Scenario-F reuse arm did not. Fixed in installer **1.24.0** with a gate.
+
 - **2026-08-03 — v0.122.0 (R-189 · R-188 · R-186): three signals that lied about their own work.**
   None touches data; all three cost attention, which every other signal depends on.
   - **R-189 — a passing restore-test no longer vanishes on a restart.** `restore_tests[]` came only

REPORT.md

@@ -1,281 +1,41 @@
-# REPORT — R-189 · R-188 · R-186: three ways the signals lied about themselves
+# REPORT — felhom-agent v0.127.0: a mount Felhom made is not foreign (R-220)
 
-**Date:** 2026-08-03 · **Repo:** `felhom-agent` **v0.121.1 → v0.122.0** (`7581f81`) · released,
-published, verified by an independent download **and by rebuilding it**, deployed to demo-felhom.
-`felhom.eu`: register + docs only, **no hub change and no hub bump** — the hub already reads
-`restore_tests[]`; the defect was that the agent stopped sending them.
+**Scope: the host half of R-220.** The customer-facing refusal message is the controller's half and
+ships as felhom-controller v0.203.0.
 
----
+## What changed
 
-## 1. Baselines, re-read on arrival
+| File | Change |
+|---|---|
+| `internal/storage/claim.go` | `claimFacts.felhomOwnedMounts`; `classifyClaim` forgives a non-managed mountpoint **only when corroborated**; `felhomOwnedMounts()` + `procMounts()` |
+| `internal/storage/hostops.go` | `mountTable` seam (nil ⇒ real `/proc/mounts`) |
+| `internal/storage/claim_r220_test.go` | new — the own-drive case, the fence, and the corroboration's four edges |
 
-| Repo | `main` @ commit | Version | Matched §1? |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `felhom-agent` | `3d0a1d615d11` | `v0.121.1` | **yes** |
-| `felhom.eu` | `c9a3e48b2106` | hub `v0.91.1` | **yes** |
+## The shape chosen, and why (§7.3)
 
-Highest register ID in use was **R-189**; no new IDs were needed — all three rows already existed.
-(Grep confirmed R-190+ free, in case one had been.)
+**Candidate (b): the claimed check distinguishes a mount Felhom made from a foreign one** — the task
+called it "nearer the truth" and it is, because the host and its knowledge survive the rebuild while
+the guest's registry does not. Candidate (a) — having the rebuild path clear the raw mounts — would
+have made correctness depend on a cleanup step running, and a cleanup that does not run leaves exactly
+today's defect.
 
-## 2. Scenario H — the reproducibility measurement (Part 3, done first on purpose)
+**The discriminator is corroboration, not a path prefix**: the same device must ALSO be mounted under
+`/mnt/felhom-drives`. Only enrolment produces that pairing.
 
-**Before**, one commit, same source, same toolchain, same ldflags — the only difference is whether the
-tag existed when the build ran:
+**`/proc/mounts` rather than `lsblk MOUNTPOINTS`**, because the lsblk invocation is pinned verbatim in
+the sudoers file; changing it would have coupled this fix to a config rollout. `/proc/mounts` is
+world-readable and needs neither.
 
-| build | sha256 | size | embedded module version |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| default flags, **no tag yet** | `18f4a495…` | 14 085 464 B | `v0.121.2-0.20260803133646-3d0a1d61` |
-| default flags, **tagged** | `4a38f394…` | 14 085 440 B | `v0.121.99` |
-| `-trimpath -buildvcs=false`, either way | `7ffcdf1d…` | 14 064 574 B | *(none)* |
+## Green gate
 
-**After, on the real release (v0.122.0) — the three values §15.2 asks for:**
+`go build` · `go vet` clean · `go test ./...` → **29 packages ok** · `agent_gates.py --fast` → all OK.
 
-| artifact | sha256 | size |
-|---|---|---|
-| published, downloaded from Gitea | `d5f294e56c1ef59055e8e87fb9135aa477632dbbc56a5d4bff46bbd0466c1edf` | 14 076 649 B |
-| rebuild at the tag, #1 | `d5f294e56c1ef59055e8e87fb9135aa477632dbbc56a5d4bff46bbd0466c1edf` | 14 076 649 B |
-| rebuild at the tag, #2 | `d5f294e56c1ef59055e8e87fb9135aa477632dbbc56a5d4bff46bbd0466c1edf` | 14 076 649 B |
+| Red-proof | Result |
+|---|---|
+| remove the `felhomOwnedMounts` exemption | **FAILS** — "device is mounted at /mnt/adatok (sdb)", the pre-fix refusal |
+| over-widen the exemption to any `/mnt/*` | **FAILS** — "/mnt/someone-elses-disk was offered for formatting" |
 
-**All three identical.** The property is removed-cause, not sequenced-around: `-buildvcs=false` drops
-a stamp nothing reads (no `ReadBuildInfo` caller, verified by grep), and the version still comes from
-the explicit `-X main.version` ldflag. `-trimpath` additionally makes a rebuild from a different
-checkout directory match.
+## Not changed
 
-**A second discrepancy fell out of the measurement and is fixed with it:** `publish-agent.sh`'s
-fallback build forced `CGO_ENABLED=0` and produced **13 990 236 B** against the release path's
-**14 064 574 B** — a 74 KB difference, i.e. one version name meaning two binaries depending on which
-entry point ran. Both paths now use identical flags, each commented with a pointer to the other.
-
-## 3. Scenario E — a correct release no longer emails a failure (Part 2)
-
-**Only the tag PUSH moved.** The order is now build → tag **locally** → publish → push tag. The tag is
-still created before anything is published, so the build and the tag describe the same commit; it
-becomes *visible* — to CI (`on: [push]`) and to any `raw/tag/…` fetch — only once the package is
-downloadable.
-
-**The old ordering's invariant is asserted directly rather than arranged for.**
-`check-published-versions.py` now carries two invariants: every tag has an installable package (as
-before) **and no published version is missing its tag** (new). The second is a **bounded probe** —
-the frontier past the newest tag, where a failed tag push leaves an orphan, plus patch gaps — and it
-**prints its probe set on every run**, because a check whose coverage is invisible reads as a
-guarantee it is not making. The package listing api was **re-measured**, not assumed: `401` without a
-token, so absence still cannot be enumerated, and the script says so in its own output.
-
-**Live result — this release is the test:**
-
-| release | CI runs on the release commit | outcome |
-|---|---|---|
-| v0.121.0 (yesterday) | #12 / #13 | one **green**, one **red** |
-| v0.121.1 (yesterday) | #17 / #18 | one **red**, one **green** |
-| **v0.122.0 (this one)** | **#21 (task id 96) / #22 (task id 97)** | **both green** |
-
-**Failure modes made loud rather than tidy:** a publish that succeeds followed by a tag push that
-fails now dies printing `git push origin v<ver>` — the local tag is already there, so recovery is one
-line — and a publish that *fails* deletes the local-only tag so a retry is clean instead of colliding
-with step 2's re-release guard.
-
-## 4. Scenarios F and G — both directions demonstrated, then cleaned up
-
-**G — a published version with no tag must FAIL.** A real fixture: version **0.121.2** (the frontier,
-exactly where a failed tag push lands) published to the live registry with no tag.
-
-```
-0.121.2    next patch after the newest tag            PUBLISHED — NO TAG
-check-published-versions: 1 PUBLISHED VERSION(S) WITH NO TAG
-  v0.121.2 is downloadable at … but has no git tag.
-      git push origin v0.121.2
-EXIT=1
-```
-
-**Red-proof (observed):** with the fixture still live, replacing the probe set with `[]` produced
-`ALL RELEASED VERSIONS INSTALLABLE, AND NONE UNTAGGED`, **exit 0** — a green run over a published
-orphan. Restored.
-
-**Teardown:** fixture deleted (HTTP 204), absence independently re-verified (`GET → 404`), gate green
-again (exit 0). No scratch tag was ever pushed.
-
-**F — a tag with no package must still FAIL.** Demonstrated against a local stand-in serving two tags
-where only one has a package:
-
-```
-  ok   v0.120.0: binary downloadable + tag serves its configs
-  FAIL v0.199.0:
-        - binary NOT downloadable (HTTP 404 …)
-        - tag does not serve configs/felhom-agent.service (HTTP 404) — a box would 404 mid-install
-EXIT=1
-```
-
-**Why not a real pushed tag:** pushing one wakes CI and would have emailed the operator a **true**
-alarm about a fixture — the same attention cost R-188 exists to remove. F is also already
-demonstrated in the wild: CI runs **#13** and **#17** failed for exactly this reason yesterday.
-
-## 5. R-189 — a proof that survives a restart reaches the hub (Part 1)
-
-`restore_tests[]` came only from the in-memory `backup.Store`, whose comment read *"lost on restart;
-the cadence re-populates"*. True under a timer; false since R-86, because the agent refuses to re-test
-an archive it has already proven — so a lost proof is not repeated for a whole archive generation.
-
-**What changed**
-
-- `RestoreTestState` stores the **tier** and what was **verified** beside the archive (v3 shape).
-  Both are recorded **at proof time from the run's own result** — deriving them later would need a
-  storage-type lookup at report-building time, a network call that can fail on the one path where
-  failing means mislabelling a proof.
-- `ProvenRestoreTests` renders the stored proofs as report entries; `Collector.SetProvenRestoreTests`
-  merges them with the in-memory result.
-- **Merge rule: one entry per tier, newest by `TestedAt` wins.** It falls out of what each source
-  means rather than from a preference: a fresh failure beats a stored success (the failure is the
-  news and lives nowhere else), a stored success beats a stale in-memory entry after a restart, and a
-  tier never appears twice — the hub would read that as two tests. An unparseable timestamp counts as
-  **older**, so a malformed entry cannot displace a good one.
-- **It refuses to lie.** A record missing the archive **or** the tier produces no entry, and run
-  mechanics (scratch VMID, duration) are not re-invented: an absent duration is not a claim, a
-  fabricated one would be.
-- **The asymmetry is now in the code** (§8.1): a success *suppresses* future work so it must be
-  durable; a failure *causes* future work and heals itself, and persisting one would make a healed
-  tier keep reporting a fault.
-- **`Store`'s comment is corrected in place** — leaving it is how the next reader concludes this is
-  handled.
-
-**Migration, and it is visible on the live box:** a pre-R-189 record has an archive but no tier, so it
-is **not** reportable. Upgrading does not retroactively make an old proof visible; the tier's next
-real proof fills it in. Confirmed immediately after the deploy — still `0 restore-tests`, with the
-v2 record sitting on disk.
-
-## 6. Scenario A, live on demo-felhom — against the observation that filed R-189
-
-**The observation being replaced (2026-08-03, 15:25):** a real offsite restore-test PASSED, the agent
-was restarted 2 m 43 s later, and the hub logged `0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports.
-
-**The same sequence, on v0.122.0:**
-
-```
-16:44:06  restore-test tier is DUE   target=felhom-pbs
-          archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-27T19:55:41Z
-          reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven (last proven archive was a different one)"
-16:55:21  restore-test: scratch guest torn down  vmid=990000
-16:55:21  backup: scheduled restore-test PASSED  archive=felhom-pbs:…2026-07-27T19:55:41Z  duration_s=675.1
-16:55:32  systemctl restart felhom-agent        ← INSIDE the 15-minute reporting window
-16:55:36  hub: host-report from demo-felhom-8363b5 (… 1 restore-tests …)      ← was 0
-```
-
-**The proof on disk (v3 — the tier is what the old shape lacked):**
-
-```json
-{"felhom-pbs": {"archive": "felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-27T19:55:41Z",
-                "tier": "pbs", "verified": "boot+running", "proven_at": "2026-08-03T14:55:21Z"}}
-```
-
-**What the HUB stored** — read from its own database (copied with its `-wal`, freshness confirmed by
-the newest row's `received_at` = `2026-08-03 14:55:36` UTC, matching the ingest line):
-
-```json
-{ "source_archive": "felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-27T19:55:41Z",
-  "source_tier": "pbs", "pass": true, "verified": "boot+running",
-  "tested_at": "2026-08-03T14:55:21Z", "scratch_vmid": 0, "duration_seconds": 0 }
-```
-
-That report was built **after** the restart, when the in-memory store was empty — so the entry can
-only have come from the persisted state. The archive, the tier, and the **original** test time
-survived; the run mechanics are zero because they are deliberately not re-invented.
-
-**A 14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in **675 s** — and
-this time the proof outlived the process that produced it.
-
-**Teardown, all three layers:** scratch guest absent from `pct list` (0), its volumes gone from `lvs`
-(0), the validation drop-in removed and the daemon back on its defaults
-(`eval_interval=6h0m0s settle=24h0m0s`). The hub-side `restore_tests[]` record is **retained
-deliberately** — it is the proof the staleness check reads, so deleting it would delete the result.
-No `restore_test_*` event was raised, because nothing failed and nothing is stale.
-
-
-## 7. Tests and red-proofs
-
-Green gate: `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` — **29 packages ok, rc=0**, plus
-`python3 scripts/agent_gates.py` (reuse-refs + published-versions) all OK. The test run and the commit
-were always separate commands.
-
-| # | Test | Asserts | Mutation | Observed |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
-| A | `TestMerge_ProofSurvivesARestart` | an empty in-memory store + a persisted proof → the proof is reported, with its archive and its original time | the persisted merge deleted (the pre-R-189 body) | **FAIL** — `after a restart the persisted proof must be reported; got 0 entr(ies): []` — the live observation exactly |
-| B | `TestMerge_NeverInventsAPassForAnUnprovenTier` | no proof → no entry; a tier-less record → no entry | — (its state-layer twin below carries the mutation) | pass |
-| B′ | `TestProvenRestoreTests_RefusesToReportWhatItCannotDescribe` | v1 + v2 + v3 records side by side → only the describable one is reported | the `reportable()` filter dropped | **FAIL** — `got 3` entries, two with an empty `SourceTier`/`SourceArchive` |
-| C | `TestMerge_NewerWinsAndNeverDuplicatesATier` | one entry per tier, newest wins, in both directions | de-duplication removed | **FAIL** — `one entry per tier; got 2 for "pbs" — the hub would read two tests` |
-| D | `TestMerge_AFailureIsStillReported` | a fresh failure beats an older stored success | (same mutation) | **FAIL** — 2 entries, i.e. the failure no longer the single answer for that tier |
-| — | `TestMerge_MalformedTimestampNeverWins` | unparseable ≠ newest | — | pass |
-| — | `TestMerge_NilProvenSourceIsANoOp` | pre-R-189 behaviour unchanged when unwired | — | pass |
-| — | `TestScheduler_ProofIsRecordedReportably` | a pass **through the scheduler** leaves a reportable proof | — | pass |
-| — | `TestScheduler_AFailureLeavesNoPersistedProof` | §8.1's asymmetry, asserted not assumed | — | pass |
-| G | the gate's converse assertion | a published version with no tag fails | probe set → `[]` | **FAIL** (green over a live orphan) |
-| I | `TestMainWiresTheDurableRestoreTestProof` | **AST**: `SetProvenRestoreTests` is called **and fed `rtState`** | the call commented out | **FAIL** — `main.go never calls collector.SetProvenRestoreTests` (a `strings.Contains` check would have passed — the string is still there) |
-| H | reproducibility | three identical sha256 | — (measurement, §2) | pass |
-
-**Jitter, per §10:** every timestamp fixture uses odd minutes and seconds (`13:25:14`, `19:55:41`,
-`13:41:07`, `04:41:58`) — several taken from the real box — rather than round hours. Yesterday a test
-was hollow because a perfectly regular series landed exactly on a threshold and survived its own
-mutation.
-
-## 8. Files changed
-
-`internal/backup/restoretest_state.go` (v3 record + `ProvenRestoreTests`), `internal/backup/store.go`
-(the comment that had become false), `internal/backup/schedule.go` (record tier + verified),
-`internal/hub/collect.go` (the seam + the merge), `cmd/felhom-agent/main.go` (wiring),
-`scripts/release-agent.sh` (ordering, reproducible build, loud half-done release),
-`scripts/publish-agent.sh` (identical build flags), `scripts/check-published-versions.py` (the
-converse invariant), plus `REUSE.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`, `CONTEXT.md`, `CLAUDE.md` and three test files.
-
-**Commits** — `felhom-agent`: `7581f81` (v0.122.0). `felhom.eu`: see §10.
-
-## 9. The independent-verification command (Part 3, recorded in `CLAUDE.md`)
-
-```bash
-V=0.122.0
-git checkout "v$V" && go build -trimpath -buildvcs=false -ldflags "-X main.version=$V" \
-    -o /tmp/felhom-agent-check ./cmd/felhom-agent
-sha256sum /tmp/felhom-agent-check
-curl -fsSL "https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/$V/felhom-agent" | sha256sum
-```
-
-Both print `d5f294e56c1ef59055e8e87fb9135aa477632dbbc56a5d4bff46bbd0466c1edf` (§2).
-
-## 10. Registers
-
-- **R-189 → CLOSED** (shipped + proven live), **R-188 → CLOSED** (shipped), **R-186 → CLOSED**
-  (shipped + measured).
-- **R-185 remains OPEN and untouched** — it is a missing `/storage/felhom-backup` ACL on demo-felhom,
-  a permission defect, not a reporting one. Nothing in this session changed it, and the priority list
-  says so explicitly.
-- No new IDs minted. `ROADMAP.md` contains none of these three rows, so there was nothing to collapse.
-- `00-capability-map.md`'s restore-proof row now records that the evidence path itself had a gap and
-  what closed it; `CONTEXT.md` gains **S-19** (the proof/failure asymmetry and the merge rule) and
-  **S-20** (the release ordering and what each step protects); `STATUS.md` rewritten for the operator
-  and trimmed to 83 lines.
-
-## 11. Observations — noticed, recorded, NOT acted on
-
-- **The proof state holds ONE record per tier, so proving an OLDER archive re-arms a newer one —
-  CONFIRMED after the validation, not merely predicted.** With the defaults restored, the due-check
-  reads: `tier=felhom-pbs due=true archive="…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z" proven="…2026-07-27T19:55:41Z" —
-  newest settled archive has not been proven (last proven archive was a different one)`.
-  Surfaced by this session's own validation method: to get a fresh proof without waiting a week, the
-  settle lag was widened so the older, unproven offsite archive became the candidate. That overwrote
-  the record for the newer archive, so once the default 24 h settle returns, the newest settled
-  archive is no longer the recorded proof and the tier becomes due once more. **Consequence, stated
-  rather than left to surprise: demo-felhom will run one further unattended offsite restore-test
-  within 6 h, after which the newest archive is the recorded proof** — the correct steady state. In
-  normal operation this cannot arise, because the candidate only ever moves forward.
-- **`RestoreTestState.Snapshot()` has no caller again.** The host report is now fed by
-  `ProvenRestoreTests`, which carries what a bare timestamp cannot. The method's doc comment says in
-  as many words that it should be deleted if it does not acquire one — deliberately not deleted in
-  this session, because removing an exported method is a change with no bearing on the three rows.
-- **Ten files in this repo are not `gofmt`-clean and were already so on arrival**
-  (`internal/capability/probe.go`, `internal/escrow/consume.go`, `internal/mgmtplane/mgmtplane.go`,
-  `internal/reconcile/bringup.go`, `internal/signedjobs/runner.go`, `internal/storage/{candidates,
-  intent}.go` and three test files). Every file this session touched is clean; the others are
-  untouched, and no gate checks formatting.
-- **The hub sweeps every 60 s and re-reads 14 days of host-reports per customer** for the restore-test
-  staleness check. Unchanged here and not a defect at this fleet size; it is the cost centre if the
-  fleet grows, and it is the reason the window read was deliberately left at 14 days yesterday.
-- **`felhom.eu/CONTEXT.md` still carries duplicate standing-ruling IDs** (three `S-14`s, two `S-15`s)
-  from before yesterday. New rulings continue to be numbered above the collision (S-19, S-20) rather
-  than adding to it; renumbering the existing ones is a separate, purely editorial change.
+No sudoers, no allowlisted command, no PVE surface, no format path. Every other claim signal
+(system disk, read-only, LVM PV, ZFS member, member FSTYPEs, empty-topology backstop) is untouched.

REUSE.md

@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
 | `localapi.DiskOps` / `StorageGate` / `GuestAttacher` / `GuestLister` | internal/localapi/disks.go | `*storage.SudoHostOps`; `storageGateAdapter` (cmd/felhom-agent/main.go); `*GuestBinder`; `*proxmox.Client` | `fakeDiskOps`/`fakeGate`/`fakeGuestAttacher`/`fakeGuestList` internal/localapi/disks_test.go |
 | `localapi.GuestAPI` / `BackupService` / `BackupStore` / `TokenAuthority` | internal/localapi/server.go | `*proxmox.Client`, `*backup.BackupRunner`, `*backup.Store`, `*TokenStore` | `fakeGuests`/`fakeBackups`/`fakeStore` internal/localapi/server_test.go |
 | `backup.InFlight` | internal/backup/inflight.go | `TryAcquire(what) (release, busy, ok)` / `Busy()` | THE host-wide "one heavy guest operation at a time" gate — shared by the local-API backup path and the restore-test scheduler (R-85) | A **LINK** guard, not a lock one: the scratch VMID never touches the live guest's vzdump lock, but an offsite restore PULLS multi-GB over the tunnel a backup PUSHES one. Callers **DEFER, never cancel** — a deferred restore-test costs coverage, a cancelled backup costs the backup. A nil gate is ungated (pre-R-85 callers). |
+| `capability` store-grant probe (`storeGrantStatuses` / `storeGrantVerdict` / `Client.Permissions`) | cmd/felhom-agent/main.go, internal/proxmox/query.go | *"may the agent READ this backup tier?"*, one `capability.Status` per configured tier | R-185. **Never infer permission from an empty content listing** — `{"data":[]}` is what a FORBIDDEN tier and a NEWBORN tier both return, and that ambiguity hid an unreadable host tier on both demo boxes. Ask `/access/permissions` **as the agent's own token** (root always says yes). **The ungranted answer is not empty and not a 403** — it carries the privileges inherited from the box-wide `/` grant, so test for **`Datastore.AllocateSpace`** specifically; path-presence or `Datastore.Audit` reports a blinded storage healthy. Probed set comes from `BackupTiers()`, never a fixed list. Critical except the `local` fallback. Composes AROUND the sudo prober (the `poolReadStatus` precedent); `Status`'s wire shape is untouched so the hub alert is free. Unreachable PVE ⇒ degraded, never ok. |
 | `backup.RestoreTestState` | internal/backup/restoretest_state.go | `RecordSuccess(target,archive,tier,verified,t)` / `ProvenArchive(target)` / `ProvenRestoreTests(ctx)` / `LastSuccess(target)` / `OldestFirst(targets)` | Per-tier restore-test PROOF state, persisted (atomic tmp+rename) — **which archive** was proven, and when (R-86) | **Credit ONLY on success** — a permanently failing tier must keep sorting first, or it looks freshly proven and stops being retried. Ties break on target id: without it, two tiers proven in the same second rotate by Go's randomised map order. **This one NEEDS persistence unlike R-84** — R-84 had ground truth to consult (the archive is still on the storage); a restore-test destroys its scratch and leaves no artifact. **R-86: the ARCHIVE is the state, the time is metadata** — a time alone cannot answer "have we proven THIS archive", which is the due-check's whole question. A pre-R-86 file (bare RFC3339 per target) keeps its time and yields NO proven archive, so each tier is due once after the upgrade; reading a legacy time as proof of the current archive would invent a guarantee. **R-189: it is also the REPORTABLE half of the restore-test signal.** The in-memory `backup.Store` holds only this process's latest run, and under per-archive due-ness the agent will not re-test a proven archive — so a proof lost to a restart is not repeated for a whole archive generation (observed live: a passing 14.5 GB offsite restore reached no host-report). `ProvenRestoreTests` renders the stored proofs as `hub.RestoreTest` entries and the collector merges them; a record missing the archive or the tier is NOT emitted, because an unproven tier reading as proven is worse than the defect. **Only successes are stored, deliberately:** a success suppresses future work, a failure causes it. |
 | `hub.ProvenRestoreTestReporter` + `Collector.SetProvenRestoreTests` | internal/hub/collect.go | the DURABLE restore-test source, merged with the in-memory one | R-189. Merge rule: **one entry per tier, newest by `TestedAt` wins** — a fresh failure beats a stored success (the failure is the news, and it lives nowhere else), a stored success beats a stale in-memory entry after a restart, and a tier never appears twice (the hub would read two tests). An unparseable timestamp counts as OLDER, so a malformed entry cannot displace a good one. **The wiring is pinned by an AST test** — the method this replaced (`RestoreTestState.Snapshot`) carried a doc comment naming a host-report gauge and had no caller for weeks. |
 | `backup.SpecBuilder` / `backup.TierPicker` / `(*BackupRunner).PickSettledRestoreCandidateOn` | internal/backup/schedule.go, runner.go | `func(ctx,archive) RestoreTestSpec`; `func(ctx,target,notAfter) (archive,landed,error)` | The per-run restore-test spec + per-tier **settled** candidate lookup (R-85, widened by R-86) | The spec is built **PER RUN**, never frozen at construction — the pre-R-85 immediately-invoked value made the offsite tier unschedulable AND went stale on any config change. `SourceTier` comes from **the archive**, never the configured target (the v0.100.0 rule). A tier with no archive returns `("", zero, nil)` — **`""` is NOT an error**, or every fresh box looks broken for its first week. **R-86: `notAfter` is the settle cutoff** (zero = no cutoff, which is what keeps `PickRestoreCandidateOn` a one-line call into it), and the picker now skips entries failing `archivePlausiblyComplete` — under per-archive due-ness an incomplete phantom would be picked forever, fail forever, never earn proof, and make the tier due at EVERY evaluation. |

cmd/felhom-agent/escrow_recover_wiring_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"go/ast"
+	"go/parser"
+	"go/token"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Scenario H — THE SEAM IS WIRED IN THE PRODUCTION PATH, proven by walking the AST rather than by
+// grepping for a string.
+//
+// WHY THIS TEST EXISTS AND WHY IT IS AN AST WALK. This project's built-but-never-wired count is six,
+// and links 6 and 7 of the recovery chain were TWO of them: `UnwrapIdentityBundle` sat in the tree
+// for two months with no caller but a `--selftest`, and the hub's blob-serving endpoints have no
+// client to this day. The fix must not become the seventh. `strings.Contains` on the file would pass
+// against a commented-out line, a line inside a test helper, or a line in dead code behind a flag
+// nobody sets — so this resolves the call graph instead: `Options{EscrowRecovery: …}` must be
+// constructed inside a function that `runDaemon` reaches, and `runDaemon` must be reached by `main`.
+
+func parseMain(t *testing.T) (*token.FileSet, *ast.File) {
+	t.Helper()
+	fset := token.NewFileSet()
+	f, err := parser.ParseFile(fset, "main.go", nil, parser.ParseComments)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parsing main.go: %v", err)
+	}
+	return fset, f
+}
+
+// callsWithin returns the set of function names called (directly, by identifier or selector) inside
+// the named top-level function.
+func callsWithin(f *ast.File, fnName string) map[string]bool {
+	out := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, d := range f.Decls {
+		fd, ok := d.(*ast.FuncDecl)
+		if !ok || fd.Name == nil || fd.Name.Name != fnName || fd.Body == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		ast.Inspect(fd.Body, func(n ast.Node) bool {
+			ce, ok := n.(*ast.CallExpr)
+			if !ok {
+				return true
+			}
+			switch fn := ce.Fun.(type) {
+			case *ast.Ident:
+				out[fn.Name] = true
+			case *ast.SelectorExpr:
+				if x, ok := fn.X.(*ast.Ident); ok {
+					out[x.Name+"."+fn.Sel.Name] = true
+				}
+				out[fn.Sel.Name] = true
+			}
+			return true
+		})
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// TestEscrowRecoveryIsWiredIntoTheDaemon asserts the whole chain from func main() to the field.
+func TestEscrowRecoveryIsWiredIntoTheDaemon(t *testing.T) {
+	_, f := parseMain(t)
+
+	// 1. main() reaches runDaemon.
+	if !callsWithin(f, "main")["runDaemon"] {
+		t.Fatal("func main() does not call runDaemon — the daemon path this test asserts is not the live one")
+	}
+	// 2. runDaemon reaches buildLocalAPIServer.
+	if !callsWithin(f, "runDaemon")["buildLocalAPIServer"] {
+		t.Fatal("runDaemon does not call buildLocalAPIServer — the local API is not built on the daemon path")
+	}
+
+	// 3. Inside buildLocalAPIServer, a localapi.Options composite literal carries EscrowRecovery, and
+	//    an escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer is constructed there.
+	var optionsHasField, recovererConstructed bool
+	for _, d := range f.Decls {
+		fd, ok := d.(*ast.FuncDecl)
+		if !ok || fd.Name == nil || fd.Name.Name != "buildLocalAPIServer" || fd.Body == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		ast.Inspect(fd.Body, func(n ast.Node) bool {
+			cl, ok := n.(*ast.CompositeLit)
+			if !ok {
+				return true
+			}
+			sel, ok := cl.Type.(*ast.SelectorExpr)
+			if !ok {
+				return true
+			}
+			pkg, _ := sel.X.(*ast.Ident)
+			if pkg == nil {
+				return true
+			}
+			switch pkg.Name + "." + sel.Sel.Name {
+			case "localapi.Options":
+				for _, el := range cl.Elts {
+					kv, ok := el.(*ast.KeyValueExpr)
+					if !ok {
+						continue
+					}
+					if k, ok := kv.Key.(*ast.Ident); ok && k.Name == "EscrowRecovery" {
+						optionsHasField = true
+					}
+				}
+			case "escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer":
+				recovererConstructed = true
+			}
+			return true
+		})
+	}
+	if !recovererConstructed {
+		t.Error("no escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer is constructed in buildLocalAPIServer — links 6→8 have no " +
+			"production assembly point (the built-but-never-wired shape, seventh instance)")
+	}
+	if !optionsHasField {
+		t.Error("localapi.Options in buildLocalAPIServer carries no EscrowRecovery field — the recoverer " +
+			"exists and the route would answer 503 forever")
+	}
+}
+
+// The hub fetch must be the DAEMON's own hub client, not a freshly constructed one with different
+// credentials — the self-scoping that makes cross-host retrieval impossible is a property of WHICH
+// key is used.
+func TestEscrowRecoveryUsesTheDaemonHubClient(t *testing.T) {
+	fset, f := parseMain(t)
+	var fetchUsesHubClient bool
+	for _, d := range f.Decls {
+		fd, ok := d.(*ast.FuncDecl)
+		if !ok || fd.Name == nil || fd.Name.Name != "buildLocalAPIServer" || fd.Body == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		ast.Inspect(fd.Body, func(n ast.Node) bool {
+			ce, ok := n.(*ast.CallExpr)
+			if !ok {
+				return true
+			}
+			sel, ok := ce.Fun.(*ast.SelectorExpr)
+			if !ok || sel.Sel.Name != "FetchIdentityEscrow" {
+				return true
+			}
+			if x, ok := sel.X.(*ast.Ident); ok && x.Name == "hubClient" {
+				fetchUsesHubClient = true
+			} else {
+				t.Errorf("FetchIdentityEscrow at %s is called on something other than the injected hub client",
+					fset.Position(ce.Pos()))
+			}
+			return true
+		})
+	}
+	if !fetchUsesHubClient {
+		t.Fatal("the recoverer's fetcher does not call hubClient.FetchIdentityEscrow — either the fetch is " +
+			"not wired, or it uses a client whose credentials are not this host's")
+	}
+}
+
+// The route itself must be registered on the local API. A handler with no route is the same defect
+// one layer down, and it has shipped here before.
+func TestRecoverRouteIsRegistered(t *testing.T) {
+	fset := token.NewFileSet()
+	f, err := parser.ParseFile(fset, "../../internal/localapi/server.go", nil, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parsing localapi/server.go: %v", err)
+	}
+	var registered bool
+	ast.Inspect(f, func(n ast.Node) bool {
+		ce, ok := n.(*ast.CallExpr)
+		if !ok || len(ce.Args) < 2 {
+			return true
+		}
+		sel, ok := ce.Fun.(*ast.SelectorExpr)
+		if !ok || sel.Sel.Name != "HandleFunc" {
+			return true
+		}
+		lit, ok := ce.Args[0].(*ast.BasicLit)
+		if !ok {
+			return true
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(lit.Value, "/escrow/recover-offsite-password") {
+			registered = true
+		}
+		return true
+	})
+	if !registered {
+		t.Fatal("POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password is not registered on the local API mux — the handler " +
+			"exists and nothing can reach it")
+	}
+}

cmd/felhom-agent/main.go

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
 
@@ -441,15 +442,113 @@ func poolReadStatus(ctx context.Context, px *proxmox.Client) capability.Status {
 // One exception, so an ordinary configuration is not turned into an alarm: a box with no dedicated
 // target (`local_backup_target: "local"`, which host-install's own comment calls the DEGRADED
 // fallback) is not treated as critical for that tier — see storeGrantCritical.
-func storeGrantStatuses(ctx context.Context, px *proxmox.Client, cfg config.Config) []capability.Status {
+func storeGrantStatuses(ctx context.Context, px *proxmox.Client, cfg config.Config, repair *storeGrantRepairer) []capability.Status {
 	tiers, _ := cfg.Backup.BackupTiers() // warnings are logged where the tiers are armed
 	out := make([]capability.Status, 0, len(tiers))
 	for _, t := range tiers {
-		out = append(out, storeGrantStatus(ctx, px, t.TargetID, storeGrantCritical(t.TargetID)))
+		out = append(out, storeGrantStatus(ctx, px, t.TargetID, storeGrantCritical(t.TargetID), repair))
 	}
 	return out
 }
 
+// storeGrantRepairReportWindow is how long after a repair the capability keeps reporting the
+// transition. It MUST exceed the hub report interval, or the record never reaches the operator.
+//
+// FOUND BY THE LIVE RUN, NOT BY THE TESTS (2026-08-04). The first implementation reported degraded
+// for exactly "one cycle" — the probe call that did the repair. But `probeAll` is invoked
+// INDEPENDENTLY by the startup/periodic self-check log and by the collector building a host report,
+// so the repairing call was the LOG's, and the report built three seconds later found the grant
+// present and reported `ok`. The agent's journal had the record; the hub had nothing; the operator
+// would have learned nothing. That is precisely the silence R-190 is about, re-created inside its own
+// mitigation.
+//
+// A latch on TIME rather than on call count fixes it: 20 minutes comfortably exceeds the 900 s report
+// interval, so at least one host-report must carry the transition, and it still clears on its own.
+const storeGrantRepairReportWindow = 20 * time.Minute
+
+// storeGrantRepairMinInterval bounds how often a single tier's grant may be re-granted (Scenario F).
+//
+// A storage can be unreadable for reasons an ACL cannot fix — the storage is gone, PVE is wedged,
+// the wrapper is missing. Without a bound the probe would re-grant on every report cycle forever: a
+// repair loop is a new defect wearing a fix's clothes. One attempt per tier per hour is frequent
+// enough that a real loss is repaired within one backup window, and rare enough that a permanent
+// fault produces attempts you can count on one hand per day.
+const storeGrantRepairMinInterval = time.Hour
+
+// storeGrantRepairer bounds and records the self-repair. It is deliberately in-memory: an agent
+// restart re-arms the repair, which is correct — a restart is exactly when a box should re-check
+// everything it depends on.
+type storeGrantRepairer struct {
+	run      func(ctx context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error)
+	log      *slog.Logger
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	last     map[string]time.Time // target id → last ATTEMPT (success or failure)
+	repaired map[string]time.Time // target id → last CONFIRMED repair (drives the report latch)
+}
+
+// noteRepaired latches a confirmed repair so it is reported for storeGrantRepairReportWindow.
+func (r *storeGrantRepairer) noteRepaired(target string, now time.Time) {
+	if r == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	if r.repaired == nil {
+		r.repaired = map[string]time.Time{}
+	}
+	r.repaired[target] = now
+}
+
+// recentlyRepaired reports whether a confirmed repair is still inside its report window — the latch
+// that guarantees a host-report carries the transition even though the probe that repaired may have
+// been a log-only one.
+func (r *storeGrantRepairer) recentlyRepaired(target string, now time.Time) bool {
+	if r == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	t, ok := r.repaired[target]
+	return ok && now.Sub(t) < storeGrantRepairReportWindow
+}
+
+// mayAttempt reports whether a repair may run now for this target, and records the attempt if so.
+func (r *storeGrantRepairer) mayAttempt(target string, now time.Time) bool {
+	if r == nil || r.run == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	if r.last == nil {
+		r.last = map[string]time.Time{}
+	}
+	if t, ok := r.last[target]; ok && now.Sub(t) < storeGrantRepairMinInterval {
+		return false
+	}
+	r.last[target] = now
+	return true
+}
+
+// repair runs the EXISTING root wrapper's `grant` verb for this storage. It adds no privileged
+// surface: `felhom-backup-target-apply grant *` is already in the sudoers allowlist for any storage
+// id (configs/felhom-agent.sudoers), and the verb already grants BOTH the user and the token — a
+// privsep token's rights are the intersection, so granting one of the two grants nothing usable.
+//
+// This is the pbsdr shape (internal/pbsdr/manager.go, the R-22 self-grant): on a refusal, run the
+// root wrapper and RE-READ ONCE rather than dead-locking. Its restraint is copied too — one attempt,
+// one confirmation, and anything still wrong stays loudly wrong.
+func (r *storeGrantRepairer) repair(ctx context.Context, target string) error {
+	rctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	_, errOut, err := r.run(rctx, localapi.BackupTargetWrapperPath, "grant", target)
+	if err != nil {
+		r.log.Error("store-grant: SELF-REPAIR FAILED — the tier stays unreadable",
+			"target", target, "err", err, "stderr", strings.TrimSpace(string(errOut)))
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // storeGrantRequiredPriv is the privilege whose ABSENCE was measured to blind the content listing.
 //
 // Measured on demo-felhom 2026-08-03: the two storages that list through the token hold
@@ -468,7 +567,7 @@ func storeGrantCritical(targetID string) bool { return targetID != "local" }
 
 // storeGrantStatus is one tier's grant probe. It NEVER reports ok when it could not ask: a
 // self-check that fails open is worse than none, because it converts "I do not know" into "fine".
-func storeGrantStatus(ctx context.Context, px *proxmox.Client, targetID string, critical bool) capability.Status {
+func storeGrantStatus(ctx context.Context, px *proxmox.Client, targetID string, critical bool, repair *storeGrantRepairer) capability.Status {
 	s := capability.Status{
 		Name:     "pve:store-grant:" + targetID,
 		Feature:  "backup tier " + targetID + " readable by the agent (archive listing, restore-test candidacy)",
@@ -486,7 +585,117 @@ func storeGrantStatus(ctx context.Context, px *proxmox.Client, targetID string,
 	pctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
 	defer cancel()
 	privs, err := px.Permissions(pctx, "/storage/"+targetID)
-	return storeGrantVerdict(targetID, critical, privs, err)
+	s = storeGrantVerdict(targetID, critical, privs, err)
+	if err != nil {
+		return s
+	}
+	if s.Status != capability.StatusDegraded {
+		// Healthy — but if this tier was repaired moments ago, keep REPORTING the transition until a
+		// host-report has certainly carried it. Without this latch the repairing probe may be a
+		// log-only one and the hub never learns anything happened (measured live, see the window's
+		// comment).
+		return storeGrantHealthyVerdict(targetID, critical, s, repair.recentlyRepaired(targetID, time.Now()))
+	}
+
+	// ── R-190 mitigation: the grant is missing — repair it, and SAY that it was missing ──────────
+	//
+	// R-190 is a grant that demonstrably worked at 04:44 and was gone by 09:24, with a reinstall,
+	// logged pveum activity and cluster-log entries all ruled out. The cause is still open; the
+	// resilience does not have to wait for it. Everything needed already exists — the root wrapper,
+	// its sudoers vector for any storage id, and the exact command — and until now the `grant` verb
+	// had only ever been called at CREATION. That is the "built but never wired" shape, in a verb
+	// rather than a seam.
+	if !repair.mayAttempt(targetID, time.Now()) {
+		// Bounded (Scenario F): an earlier attempt did not hold and it is too soon to try again. Stay
+		// degraded and say why — a quiet "we already tried" is how a permanent fault becomes silence.
+		s.Reason = "the agent token lacks " + storeGrantRequiredPriv + " on /storage/" + targetID +
+			" and a self-repair was attempted within the last " + storeGrantRepairMinInterval.String() +
+			" without holding — NOT retrying yet; this needs a human"
+		return s
+	}
+	if rerr := repair.repair(ctx, targetID); rerr != nil {
+		s.Reason = "the agent token lacks " + storeGrantRequiredPriv + " on /storage/" + targetID +
+			" and the self-repair FAILED (" + rerr.Error() + ") — this tier's archives are INVISIBLE to the agent"
+		return s // Scenario E: a failed repair must never mask the degraded state.
+	}
+	// Re-read ONCE to confirm, exactly as pbsdr does — the wrapper reporting success is a claim about
+	// its own write; the grant being readable is a different claim, and it is the one that matters.
+	cctx, ccancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
+	defer ccancel()
+	privs2, err2 := px.Permissions(cctx, "/storage/"+targetID)
+	if err2 != nil || privs2[storeGrantRequiredPriv] != 1 {
+		s.Reason = "the agent token lacks " + storeGrantRequiredPriv + " on /storage/" + targetID +
+			" and the self-repair did not take (re-read says it is still missing) — this needs a human"
+		return s
+	}
+
+	// REPAIRED — and reported as DEGRADED for exactly this one cycle, deliberately.
+	//
+	// The tier works again, so "ok" would be true of this instant and would throw away the only
+	// evidence that anything happened. R-190's own words: the probe sees the STATE, nothing sees the
+	// TRANSITION. A silent self-repair makes a recurring loss undetectable forever, which is strictly
+	// worse than the fault it fixes.
+	//
+	// §8.5 asked whether the hub's existing degraded↔ok edge suffices before building anything new.
+	// It does — as a CHANNEL — but only if the agent deliberately reports one degraded cycle: the hub
+	// alerts and e-mails on the ok→degraded edge and logs the degraded→ok recovery, so one loss
+	// produces exactly one alert pair and the operator learns of it. NOTHING NEW WAS BUILT: no wire
+	// change, no hub change, no new event type. The `Feature` text carries the explanation because
+	// that is the field the hub puts in the operator's e-mail (the Reason does not travel).
+	repair.noteRepaired(targetID, time.Now())
+	s = storeGrantRepairedVerdict(targetID, critical)
+	repairLogger(repair).Error("store-grant: GRANT WAS MISSING AND HAS BEEN SELF-REPAIRED — investigate the loss (R-190)",
+		"target", targetID, "privilege", storeGrantRequiredPriv,
+		"action", "felhom-backup-target-apply grant "+targetID, "confirmed_by", "re-read")
+	return s
+}
+
+// storeGrantHealthyVerdict decides what a HEALTHY probe reports — which is not always "ok".
+//
+// Split out so the tests exercise this decision rather than a copy of it. An earlier version of this
+// guard lived inline and its red-proof PASSED, because the test asserted the latch helper instead of
+// the path that consumes it — the same hollow shape this file has now caught twice.
+//
+// If the tier was repaired inside the report window, the transition is reported even though the grant
+// is present: the probe that repaired may have been a log-only one, and without this the host-report
+// carries `ok` and the operator never learns the permission vanished (measured live 2026-08-04).
+func storeGrantHealthyVerdict(targetID string, critical bool, healthy capability.Status, repairedRecently bool) capability.Status {
+	if repairedRecently {
+		return storeGrantRepairedVerdict(targetID, critical)
+	}
+	return healthy
+}
+
+// storeGrantRepairedVerdict is the post-repair verdict — the RECORD half of R-190, split out so the
+// tests exercise the real thing rather than a copy of it (yesterday's hollow-test lesson).
+//
+// It reports DEGRADED although the tier now works, and that is the whole point: "ok" would be true of
+// this instant and would throw away the only evidence that a permission vanished. The hub raises its
+// ok→degraded edge (an operator e-mail) and logs the degraded→ok recovery on the next cycle, so one
+// loss produces exactly one alert pair. Nothing new was built for this — no wire change, no hub
+// change, no new event type.
+//
+// The explanation lives in FEATURE because that is the field the hub interpolates into the operator's
+// e-mail (`monitor/host_capability.go` emitTransition builds its message from the capability names
+// and features; Reason does not travel). Putting it in Reason alone would be a record nobody reads.
+func storeGrantRepairedVerdict(targetID string, critical bool) capability.Status {
+	return capability.Status{
+		Name:     "pve:store-grant:" + targetID,
+		Critical: critical,
+		Status:   capability.StatusDegraded,
+		Feature: "backup tier " + targetID + ": the agent's storage grant was MISSING and has been " +
+			"AUTOMATICALLY RESTORED — the tier works now, but a permission that vanished on its own needs investigating (R-190)",
+		Reason: "grant absent at probe time; `felhom-backup-target-apply grant " + targetID +
+			"` re-applied it and a re-read confirms " + storeGrantRequiredPriv + " is present again",
+	}
+}
+
+// repairLogger returns the repairer's logger, or the default — the record must survive a nil.
+func repairLogger(r *storeGrantRepairer) *slog.Logger {
+	if r != nil && r.log != nil {
+		return r.log
+	}
+	return slog.Default()
 }
 
 // storeGrantVerdict is the DECISION, split out from the API call so the tests exercise the real
@@ -598,9 +807,17 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 	// reaper fail-safes (locks stay uncleared) — visible on the hub report, no operator page.
 	// R-185: the store-grant probes compose around the sudo prober the same way the pool read does
 	// (an API read does not belong inside the sudo-policy probe — the v0.62.0 A1 precedent).
+	// R-190: the store-grant probe also REPAIRS a missing grant, through the root wrapper that
+	// already exists and is already sudoers-permitted for any storage id — and reports the loss.
+	// The runner is the DIRECT one for the same reason the sudo prober uses it: the wrapper is
+	// invoked through the privileged path, which prepends sudo itself.
+	grantRepairer := &storeGrantRepairer{
+		run: (&proxmox.ExecRunner{Mode: proxmox.RunnerMode(cfg.Privileged.Mode)}).Run,
+		log: logger,
+	}
 	probeAll := func(ctx context.Context) []capability.Status {
 		out := append(capProber.Probe(ctx), poolReadStatus(ctx, px))
-		return append(out, storeGrantStatuses(ctx, px, cfg)...)
+		return append(out, storeGrantStatuses(ctx, px, cfg, grantRepairer)...)
 	}
 	// (The startup self-check log runs AFTER the pbsdr manager is wired below, so its snapshot
 	// already carries the gated view — v0.86.0.)
@@ -882,7 +1099,7 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 			return false
 		},
 	}
-	localSrv := buildLocalAPIServer(cfg, px, backupStore, heavyOps, observer, driveKnown, hostOps, gate, collector, intentRec, guestBindStore, formatJobStore, logRing, escrowCeremonyCfg, logger, &localTokens)
+	localSrv := buildLocalAPIServer(cfg, px, backupStore, heavyOps, observer, driveKnown, hostOps, gate, collector, client, intentRec, guestBindStore, formatJobStore, logRing, escrowCeremonyCfg, logger, &localTokens)
 	if localTokens != nil {
 		defer localTokens.Close()
 	}
@@ -1460,7 +1677,7 @@ func buildRestoreTestScheduler(cfg config.Config, px *proxmox.Client, engine *re
 // leaf (stable fingerprint). Any failure DISABLES the server (returns nil) WITHOUT crashing the
 // daemon — the host still reports/reconciles; only the controller channel is unavailable until
 // fixed. The opened token store is returned via outTokens so the caller can Close it.
-func buildLocalAPIServer(cfg config.Config, px *proxmox.Client, store *backup.Store, inFlight *backup.InFlight, observer *storage.Observer, driveTargets storage.KnownTargets, hostOps *storage.SudoHostOps, gate *reconcile.Gate, collector *hub.Collector, intent localapi.IntentRecorder, guestBinds *localapi.GuestBindStore, formatJobs *localapi.FormatJobStore, logRing *applog.Ring, escrowCeremony *localapi.EscrowCeremonyConfig, logger *slog.Logger, outTokens **localapi.TokenStore) *localapi.Server {
+func buildLocalAPIServer(cfg config.Config, px *proxmox.Client, store *backup.Store, inFlight *backup.InFlight, observer *storage.Observer, driveTargets storage.KnownTargets, hostOps *storage.SudoHostOps, gate *reconcile.Gate, collector *hub.Collector, hubClient *hub.Client, intent localapi.IntentRecorder, guestBinds *localapi.GuestBindStore, formatJobs *localapi.FormatJobStore, logRing *applog.Ring, escrowCeremony *localapi.EscrowCeremonyConfig, logger *slog.Logger, outTokens **localapi.TokenStore) *localapi.Server {
 	if !cfg.LocalAPI.Enabled() {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -1532,7 +1749,29 @@ func buildLocalAPIServer(cfg config.Config, px *proxmox.Client, store *backup.St
 		gaMode = proxmox.RunnerSudo
 	}
 	guestBinder := localapi.NewGuestBinder(&proxmox.ExecRunner{Mode: gaMode, SudoPath: cfg.Privileged.SudoPath}, logger)
+	// R-199 (v0.125.0) — chain links 6->8, assembled here and ONLY here. The fetcher is this daemon's
+	// own hub client (per-host key, self-scoped server-side), so the recoverer can never read another
+	// host's blob even if asked to. `client` is the same one the report loop uses; a nil hub config
+	// cannot reach this line (the daemon exits above), so the seam is always live in production —
+	// which is the point: links 6 and 7 spent months existing without a caller.
+	escrowRecoverer := escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer{
+		Fetch: func(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) {
+			resp, ferr := hubClient.FetchIdentityEscrow(ctx)
+			if ferr != nil {
+				return nil, false, ferr
+			}
+			if !resp.Present || resp.IdentityEscrowB64 == "" {
+				return nil, false, nil
+			}
+			blob, derr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(resp.IdentityEscrowB64)
+			if derr != nil {
+				return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("hub served a malformed escrow blob (not base64)")
+			}
+			return blob, true, nil
+		},
+	}
 	srv, err := localapi.NewServer(localapi.Options{
+		EscrowRecovery: escrowRecoverer,
 		ListenAddr:    cfg.LocalAPI.ListenAddr,
 		Cert:          cert,
 		AgentVersion:  version, // v0.82.0: the X-Felhom-Agent-Version capability channel
@@ -2654,7 +2893,28 @@ func runSelftestIdentityConsume(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "  [FAIL] writing recovered bundle:", err)
 		return 1
 	}
-	fmt.Printf("  [OK] identity recovered (tunnel_token + pbs_token) → %s (0600) — never printed\n", keyDest)
+	// R-199 / §8.6: this line used to read "(tunnel_token + pbs_token)" — an enumeration that was
+	// accurate when it was written (pre-fork-4) and became a MISSTATEMENT the moment v0.77.0 sealed the
+	// offsite repository password into the same bundle. Anyone reading the old output would conclude the
+	// repository password was not there, and that is part of how the chain's extraction link came to be
+	// described as missing for a month. Name what was recovered from THIS bundle, and name what is
+	// absent, rather than reciting a fixed list.
+	recovered := []string{"tunnel_token", "pbs_token"}
+	var absent []string
+	if bundle.WGPrivateKey != "" {
+		recovered = append(recovered, "wg_private_key")
+	} else {
+		absent = append(absent, "wg_private_key")
+	}
+	if bundle.ResticRepoPassword != "" {
+		recovered = append(recovered, "restic_repo_password")
+	} else {
+		absent = append(absent, "restic_repo_password (pre-fork-4 blob — the field did not exist when this was sealed)")
+	}
+	fmt.Printf("  [OK] identity recovered (%s) → %s (0600) — values never printed\n", strings.Join(recovered, " + "), keyDest)
+	if len(absent) > 0 {
+		fmt.Printf("  [NOTE] fields ABSENT from this bundle: %s\n", strings.Join(absent, "; "))
+	}
 
 	// S5 DR: install the recovered WG private key so the tunnel re-establishes with the SAME
 	// identity/pubkey (→ the same hub /32), no fresh keygen. Create-only (refuses to overwrite a

cmd/felhom-agent/storegrant_test.go

@@ -2,9 +2,13 @@ package main
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"go/ast"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/capability"
 )
@@ -132,7 +136,7 @@ func TestStoreGrant_TheFallbackTargetIsNotCritical(t *testing.T) {
 // A probe that cannot ask must never answer "ok" — unknown reported as healthy is worse than no
 // probe, because it looks like coverage.
 func TestStoreGrant_UnreachablePVEIsDegradedNotOK(t *testing.T) {
-	s := storeGrantStatus(context.Background(), nil, "felhom-backup", true)
+	s := storeGrantStatus(context.Background(), nil, "felhom-backup", true, nil)
 	if s.Status != capability.StatusDegraded {
 		t.Fatalf("an unaskable probe must be DEGRADED, never ok; got %q", s.Status)
 	}
@@ -164,3 +168,250 @@ func TestMainWiresTheStoreGrantProbe(t *testing.T) {
 			"which is precisely the silence R-185 is about")
 	}
 }
+
+// ── R-190 — the grant repairs itself, and the repair is VISIBLE ──────────────────────────────
+//
+// R-190 is a storage grant that demonstrably worked at 04:44 on 2026-08-03 and was gone by 09:24,
+// with a host reinstall, logged `pveum` activity and cluster-log entries all ruled out. The cause is
+// open; the resilience is not conditional on it.
+//
+// The half that matters is the RECORD. R-190's own words: the probe sees the state, nothing sees the
+// transition. A self-repair that leaves only "ok" behind destroys the only evidence a loss happened,
+// so a recurring loss becomes undetectable forever — strictly worse than the fault it fixes.
+
+// fakeRepairRunner records wrapper invocations and can be made to fail.
+type fakeRepairRunner struct {
+	calls [][]string
+	fail  bool
+}
+
+func (f *fakeRepairRunner) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	f.calls = append(f.calls, append([]string{name}, args...))
+	if f.fail {
+		return nil, []byte("pveum: refused"), errors.New("exit status 2")
+	}
+	return nil, nil, nil
+}
+
+func newRepairer(f *fakeRepairRunner) *storeGrantRepairer {
+	return &storeGrantRepairer{run: f.Run, log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))}
+}
+
+// ── SCENARIO F — the repair is BOUNDED ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF (observed 2026-08-04): make mayAttempt always return true (drop the
+// storeGrantRepairMinInterval check) →
+//
+//	--- FAIL: TestGrantRepair_IsBounded
+//	    storegrant_test.go: a repair must not run on every cycle; 5 cycles produced 5 attempt(s)
+//
+// which is a re-grant every report cycle, forever, against a fault an ACL cannot fix. Restored.
+func TestGrantRepair_IsBounded(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeRepairRunner{}
+	r := newRepairer(f)
+	// Jittered, so the series never lands exactly on the interval boundary — a perfectly regular
+	// series is how a threshold test passes its own mutation, which has happened here before.
+	base := time.Date(2026, 8, 4, 9, 17, 43, 0, time.UTC)
+	offsets := []time.Duration{0, 13*time.Minute + 7*time.Second, 27*time.Minute + 51*time.Second,
+		41*time.Minute + 19*time.Second, 55*time.Minute + 3*time.Second}
+	attempts := 0
+	for _, off := range offsets {
+		if r.mayAttempt("felhom-backup", base.Add(off)) {
+			attempts++
+		}
+	}
+	if attempts != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("a repair must not run on every cycle; %d cycles produced %d attempt(s) within %s",
+			len(offsets), attempts, storeGrantRepairMinInterval)
+	}
+	// ...and once the interval has genuinely passed, it may try again — a bound is not a ban.
+	if !r.mayAttempt("felhom-backup", base.Add(storeGrantRepairMinInterval+2*time.Minute+11*time.Second)) {
+		t.Fatal("after the interval a repair must be allowed again — otherwise one failure disables the repair forever")
+	}
+	// A DIFFERENT tier is not throttled by this one's attempt.
+	if !r.mayAttempt("felhom-pbs", base.Add(time.Minute)) {
+		t.Fatal("the bound must be per tier — one tier's attempt must not suppress another's")
+	}
+}
+
+// A nil repairer (or one with no runner) never attempts, and never panics.
+func TestGrantRepair_NilIsSafe(t *testing.T) {
+	var r *storeGrantRepairer
+	if r.mayAttempt("felhom-backup", time.Now()) {
+		t.Fatal("a nil repairer must never claim an attempt")
+	}
+	if (&storeGrantRepairer{}).mayAttempt("felhom-backup", time.Now()) {
+		t.Fatal("a repairer with no runner must never claim an attempt")
+	}
+}
+
+// The repair calls the EXISTING wrapper verb, with the storage id — no new privileged surface.
+func TestGrantRepair_CallsTheExistingWrapperVerb(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeRepairRunner{}
+	r := newRepairer(f)
+	if err := r.repair(context.Background(), "felhom-backup"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("repair should succeed with a healthy runner: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(f.calls) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("exactly one wrapper invocation expected; got %d", len(f.calls))
+	}
+	got := f.calls[0]
+	want := []string{"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-backup-target-apply", "grant", "felhom-backup"}
+	if len(got) != len(want) {
+		t.Fatalf("wrapper argv = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	for i := range want {
+		if got[i] != want[i] {
+			t.Fatalf("wrapper argv = %v, want %v — the sudoers vector is `grant *`; anything else is a policy change", got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A repair that FAILS must surface the failure, not swallow it (Scenario E's precondition).
+func TestGrantRepair_FailureIsReturned(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeRepairRunner{fail: true}
+	if err := newRepairer(f).repair(context.Background(), "felhom-backup"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a failed wrapper run must return its error — a repair that cannot run must never read as done")
+	}
+}
+
+// ── SCENARIO D (the half that matters) — the REPAIR MUST BE VISIBLE ──────────────────────────
+//
+// A repair that leaves only "ok" behind is worse than the fault: the tier works, and the fact that a
+// permission vanished is gone with it. R-190 exists because nothing saw the transition.
+//
+// The channel is the hub's EXISTING ok→degraded→ok edge (§8.5) — nothing new was built. That only
+// works if the agent deliberately reports ONE degraded cycle after repairing, and if the explanation
+// rides the field the hub actually puts in the operator's e-mail. The hub's message is built from the
+// capability NAME and FEATURE (`internal/monitor/host_capability.go` emitTransition) — **not** from
+// Reason — so the Feature must carry it.
+//
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF (observed 2026-08-04): after a successful repair, report ok instead —
+//
+//	s.Status = capability.StatusOK; s.Feature unchanged
+//
+// →	--- FAIL: TestGrantRepair_ARepairedGrantIsReportedAsATransition
+//
+//	storegrant_test.go: a self-repair must still report DEGRADED for one cycle so the hub raises
+//	its edge; got "ok" — the loss would be invisible
+//
+// i.e. exactly the silence R-190 is about. Restored.
+func TestGrantRepair_ARepairedGrantIsReportedAsATransition(t *testing.T) {
+	// THE PRODUCTION verdict, not a copy of it. An earlier draft of this test built the Status
+	// itself and asserted its own construction — it would have passed while production reported ok,
+	// which is precisely the silence being guarded against.
+	if pre := probeWith(permUngranted, "felhom-backup", true); pre.Status != capability.StatusDegraded {
+		t.Fatalf("precondition: a missing grant is degraded; got %q", pre.Status)
+	}
+	s := storeGrantRepairedVerdict("felhom-backup", true)
+
+	if s.Status != capability.StatusDegraded {
+		t.Fatalf("a self-repair must still report DEGRADED for one cycle so the hub raises its edge; "+
+			"got %q — the loss would be invisible", s.Status)
+	}
+	// The hub e-mails the FEATURE text. If the explanation is not there, the operator is told a
+	// capability was degraded and never learns it repaired itself or that anything vanished.
+	for _, want := range []string{"MISSING", "RESTORED", "felhom-backup", "R-190"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(s.Feature, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("the Feature text is what the hub puts in the operator's e-mail; it must contain %q. Got: %s", want, s.Feature)
+		}
+	}
+	if !s.Critical {
+		t.Fatal("the transition must be CRITICAL or the hub does not alert on it at all")
+	}
+}
+
+// ── SCENARIO H — the seam ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The wrapper's `grant` verb is itself a "built but never wired" example: it exists, is
+// sudoers-permitted for any id, and had only ever been called at storage CREATION. The repair must
+// not become the seventh instance. AST, not grep — a commented-out call still contains the string.
+func TestMainWiresTheGrantRepair(t *testing.T) {
+	f := parseMainForWiring(t)
+
+	var built, passed bool
+	ast.Inspect(f, func(n ast.Node) bool {
+		switch node := n.(type) {
+		case *ast.CompositeLit:
+			if id, ok := node.Type.(*ast.Ident); ok && id.Name == "storeGrantRepairer" {
+				built = true
+			}
+		case *ast.CallExpr:
+			if id, ok := node.Fun.(*ast.Ident); ok && id.Name == "storeGrantStatuses" && len(node.Args) == 4 {
+				if a, ok := node.Args[3].(*ast.Ident); ok && a.Name == "grantRepairer" {
+					passed = true
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return true
+	})
+	if !built {
+		t.Error("main.go never constructs a storeGrantRepairer — nothing would ever repair a lost grant")
+	}
+	if !passed {
+		t.Error("storeGrantStatuses is not passed the repairer — the probe would detect the loss and " +
+			"leave it, which is v0.123.0's behaviour and not R-190's mitigation")
+	}
+}
+
+// The transition must survive a probe that is NOT the one feeding the hub.
+//
+// MEASURED LIVE 2026-08-04, and this test exists because the first implementation failed it in
+// production while every unit test passed: `probeAll` is called independently by the self-check LOG
+// and by the collector building a host-report. The repairing call was the log's; the report three
+// seconds later found the grant present and reported `ok`. The agent's journal had the record and the
+// hub had nothing — the exact silence R-190 is about, re-created inside its own mitigation.
+//
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF (observed): delete the `recentlyRepaired` branch from the healthy path →
+//
+//	--- FAIL: TestGrantRepair_TransitionSurvivesALaterProbe
+//	    storegrant_test.go: a probe AFTER the repair must still report the transition; got "ok" —
+//	    the host-report would carry ok and the operator would never learn the grant vanished
+//
+// Restored.
+func TestGrantRepair_TransitionSurvivesALaterProbe(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRepairer(&fakeRepairRunner{})
+	// Jittered, never landing on the window boundary.
+	repairedAt := time.Date(2026, 8, 4, 9, 39, 34, 0, time.UTC)
+	r.noteRepaired("felhom-backup", repairedAt)
+
+	// The DECISION a later probe makes — the production function, not the helper it calls. An
+	// earlier draft asserted `recentlyRepaired` directly and its red-proof PASSED, because removing
+	// the latch's USE left the helper untouched.
+	healthy := probeWith(permGranted, "felhom-backup", true)
+	if healthy.Status != capability.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("precondition: a granted tier is ok; got %q", healthy.Status)
+	}
+	got := storeGrantHealthyVerdict("felhom-backup", true,
+		healthy, r.recentlyRepaired("felhom-backup", repairedAt.Add(3*time.Second)))
+	if got.Status != capability.StatusDegraded {
+		t.Fatalf("a probe AFTER the repair must still report the transition; got %q — the host-report "+
+			"would carry ok and the operator would never learn the grant vanished", got.Status)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(got.Feature, "RESTORED") {
+		t.Fatalf("the later probe must carry the explanation into the hub's e-mail; got: %s", got.Feature)
+	}
+	// Outside the window it reports plain ok again.
+	late := storeGrantHealthyVerdict("felhom-backup", true,
+		healthy, r.recentlyRepaired("felhom-backup", repairedAt.Add(storeGrantRepairReportWindow+time.Minute)))
+	if late.Status != capability.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("outside the window a healthy tier reports ok; got %q — a permanent degraded state "+
+			"would be its own false alarm", late.Status)
+	}
+	if !r.recentlyRepaired("felhom-backup", repairedAt.Add(14*time.Minute+37*time.Second)) {
+		t.Fatal("the latch must outlast the 900s hub report interval, or the record never reaches the hub")
+	}
+	// ...and it clears on its own rather than latching a box degraded forever.
+	if r.recentlyRepaired("felhom-backup", repairedAt.Add(storeGrantRepairReportWindow+time.Minute+7*time.Second)) {
+		t.Fatal("the latch must clear — a permanent degraded state would be its own false alarm")
+	}
+	// It is per tier.
+	if r.recentlyRepaired("felhom-pbs", repairedAt.Add(time.Second)) {
+		t.Fatal("one tier's repair must not latch another tier's status")
+	}
+	// The window MUST exceed the report interval — the property, asserted rather than assumed.
+	if storeGrantRepairReportWindow <= 15*time.Minute {
+		t.Fatalf("the report window (%s) must exceed the 900s hub report interval, or a transition can "+
+			"be missed entirely", storeGrantRepairReportWindow)
+	}
+}

internal/escrow/recover.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+package escrow
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+)
+
+// R-199 links 6→8 — fetch this host's own sealed identity blob, open it with the customer's recovery
+// code R, and hand back EXACTLY ONE field: the offsite restic repository password.
+//
+// WHY ONLY ONE FIELD. The bundle also carries the Cloudflare tunnel token, the PBS access token and
+// the WG private key (see IdentityBundle). The caller in this flow — the in-guest controller, one
+// trust tier down — needs none of them, and returning them would widen the blast radius of a
+// controller compromise for no gain. Narrowing costs nothing here and is not recoverable later.
+//
+// WHY R NEVER TOUCHES DISK. `UnwrapIdentity` stages the BLOB and the recovered plaintext in a
+// `MkdirTemp` that it removes, and feeds R through the pty; R itself is never written. This wrapper
+// keeps that property: it takes R as an argument, passes it straight through, and holds no copy.
+// Callers must clear their own reference (the `R = ""` discipline in cmd/felhom-agent).
+//
+// The errors below are DISTINCT on purpose. "could not fetch", "no blob", "wrong code" and "the blob
+// predates the field" are FOUR different situations for the operator and only one of them is a fault.
+//
+// ⚠ THERE WERE THREE, AND THE FOURTH WAS THE DEFECT (R-224, 2026-08-06). This comment said "three"
+// and named "no blob", "wrong code" and "predates the field" — while a FAILED FETCH was wrapped as an
+// anonymous error and fell through the caller's `default` branch into the wrong-code message. So a
+// hub that could not be reached was reported to the customer as a bad recovery code.
+//
+// Measured live on 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11 F3): with the hub REJECTed at the appliance's firewall and
+// a CORRECT current recovery code, the customer was told the code did not open their package — in
+// 0.0556 s, when a real unseal costs ~1 s of scrypt. The agent's own log carried the truth the whole
+// time (`escrow: fetching the sealed bundle: hub: transport error: … no route to host`) and the HTTP
+// boundary threw it away.
+//
+// The discriminator therefore has to be a VALUE, not a log line — that is what ErrBundleFetch is.
+
+var (
+	// ErrBundleFetch — the sealed bundle could not be FETCHED (the hub refused, was unreachable, or
+	// the transport failed). **The recovery code was never used**, so nothing about it is known and
+	// nothing may be said about it. Wraps the underlying cause for the operator log; carries no secret.
+	ErrBundleFetch = errors.New("escrow: the sealed bundle could not be fetched")
+	// ErrNoEscrowBlob — the hub holds no sealed bundle for this host. Not a fault: no ceremony has run.
+	ErrNoEscrowBlob = errors.New("escrow: the hub holds no sealed identity bundle for this host (no ceremony has run)")
+	// ErrNoResticPassword — the bundle opened, but carries no repository password. Real and expected
+	// for a pre-fork-4 blob (agent < v0.77.0, 2026-07-09): the field did not exist and CANNOT be
+	// retro-fitted, because R is never retained. Distinguished from a wrong code so the operator is
+	// not sent hunting for a mistyped recovery code that was typed correctly.
+	ErrNoResticPassword = errors.New("escrow: the recovered bundle carries NO offsite repository password (a pre-fork-4 blob — the field did not exist when it was sealed and cannot be retro-fitted)")
+)
+
+// BlobFetcher yields this host's own opaque identity-escrow blob. present=false is a clean "none".
+// An interface-free func field keeps this package free of any dependency on the hub client.
+type BlobFetcher func(ctx context.Context) (blob []byte, present bool, err error)
+
+// OffsiteKeyRecoverer is the assembled links 6→8. Construct it with a fetcher; call it with R.
+type OffsiteKeyRecoverer struct {
+	Fetch BlobFetcher
+}
+
+// RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword fetches, unseals and extracts. It returns ONLY the repository password.
+//
+// A WRONG RECOVERY CODE FAILS CLOSED at the scrypt KDF inside UnwrapIdentity — `age -d` exits
+// non-zero and emits no plaintext, so there is no partial result and nothing is written anywhere.
+// That property is the crypto's, not a check here, which is why this function has no "validate R"
+// step to get wrong.
+//
+// NOTHING IS LOGGED BY THIS FUNCTION and no error it returns contains R, the password, or blob bytes.
+func (r OffsiteKeyRecoverer) RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(ctx context.Context, recoveryCode string) (string, error) {
+	if r.Fetch == nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("escrow: recoverer has no blob fetcher configured")
+	}
+	if recoveryCode == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("escrow: the recovery code is required")
+	}
+	blob, present, err := r.Fetch(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		// R-224: joined with ErrBundleFetch so the caller can classify by VALUE. The cause stays
+		// wrapped for the operator log; neither carries a secret. Before this, the fetch failure was
+		// an anonymous error and the local-api handler's `default` branch reported it to the customer
+		// as a wrong recovery code.
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrBundleFetch, err)
+	}
+	if !present || len(blob) == 0 {
+		return "", ErrNoEscrowBlob
+	}
+	bundle, err := UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx, blob, recoveryCode)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err // already the fail-closed "the recovery code did not unwrap…" message; no secret in it
+	}
+	if bundle.ResticRepoPassword == "" {
+		return "", ErrNoResticPassword
+	}
+	return bundle.ResticRepoPassword, nil
+}

internal/escrow/recover_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+package escrow
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// R-199 links 6→8, with REAL crypto (age is present on the build/demo host; ensureAge skips
+// elsewhere). These are the unit half of the session's question — "is the repository password
+// actually recoverable from the sealed bundle" — and the live half is the same equality on hardware.
+
+const testR = "correct horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel"
+
+func sealBundle(t *testing.T, b IdentityBundle, r string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	blob, err := WrapIdentityBundle(context.Background(), b, r)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("WrapIdentityBundle: %v", err)
+	}
+	return blob
+}
+
+func fetcherFor(blob []byte) BlobFetcher {
+	return func(context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) { return blob, true, nil }
+}
+
+// Scenario A (unit) — the recovered repository password is BYTE-IDENTICAL to the sealed one, and it
+// is the REPOSITORY password rather than some other field of a bundle that also parses.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: return bundle.PBSToken (or TunnelToken, or WGPrivateKey) instead of
+// bundle.ResticRepoPassword → a plausible-looking bundle yields a non-matching key → this FAILS.
+// That mutation is the shape of the bug that would otherwise ship silently, because every one of
+// those fields is a non-empty string that looks like a secret.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_ReturnsTheRepositoryPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	ensureAge(t)
+	const repoPW = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+	blob := sealBundle(t, IdentityBundle{
+		TunnelToken:        "TUNNEL-TOKEN-NOT-THE-ANSWER",
+		PBSToken:           "PBS-TOKEN-NOT-THE-ANSWER",
+		WGPrivateKey:       "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=",
+		ResticRepoPassword: repoPW,
+	}, testR)
+
+	got, err := (OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: fetcherFor(blob)}).RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("recover: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != repoPW {
+		t.Fatalf("the recovered key is not the sealed repository password (len %d vs %d) — a different "+
+			"field of the bundle was returned", len(got), len(repoPW))
+	}
+	// Belt: it must not be any of the OTHER fields, so a future refactor cannot satisfy the check
+	// above by coincidence.
+	for _, other := range []string{"TUNNEL-TOKEN-NOT-THE-ANSWER", "PBS-TOKEN-NOT-THE-ANSWER", "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA="} {
+		if got == other {
+			t.Fatalf("the recoverer returned the wrong bundle field")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Scenario B — a WRONG recovery code fails closed, the failure names no secret, and nothing is
+// written. The fail-closed property is the crypto's (age's scrypt KDF), which is why there is no
+// validation step here to get wrong — the test pins that it stays that way.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_WrongCodeFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	ensureAge(t)
+	const repoPW = "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
+	blob := sealBundle(t, IdentityBundle{TunnelToken: "t", PBSToken: "p", ResticRepoPassword: repoPW}, testR)
+
+	got, err := (OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: fetcherFor(blob)}).RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), "not the recovery code at all")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a wrong recovery code MUST fail — a plausible-but-wrong bundle is the one outcome the design forbids")
+	}
+	if got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("a failed unseal returned %d bytes — there must be no partial result", len(got))
+	}
+	// The error may name the step; it may never name a secret.
+	for _, secret := range []string{repoPW, testR, "not the recovery code at all"} {
+		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), secret) {
+			t.Fatalf("the failure message leaked a secret: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A bundle with no repository password is its OWN answer, not a wrong-code error. Sealed before
+// fork-4 (agent < v0.77.0) the field did not exist; sending the operator to re-check a correctly
+// typed recovery code would be the wrong instruction.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_PreForkFourBundle(t *testing.T) {
+	ensureAge(t)
+	blob := sealBundle(t, IdentityBundle{TunnelToken: "t", PBSToken: "p"}, testR)
+
+	_, err := (OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: fetcherFor(blob)}).RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoResticPassword) {
+		t.Fatalf("a pre-fork-4 bundle must report its own error, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// Scenario D at this layer — no blob is a clean, distinguishable answer.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_NoBlob(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: func(context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) { return nil, false, nil }}
+	_, err := rec.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoEscrowBlob) {
+		t.Fatalf("absent blob must yield ErrNoEscrowBlob, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// Scenario F — R persists NOWHERE. TMPDIR is redirected into the test's own directory, the unseal is
+// run for real, and the whole tree is then walked: no file may contain R (or the recovered password),
+// and the staging directory the unseal creates must be gone.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: write R to a temp file anywhere in the flow (e.g. add
+// `os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(work,"r"), []byte(recoveryCode), 0o600)` inside UnwrapIdentity before
+// its defer removes the dir — or simply drop that defer and let the plaintext staging survive) → the
+// walk finds it → this FAILS.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_RLeavesNoTrace(t *testing.T) {
+	ensureAge(t)
+	const repoPW = "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111"
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("TMPDIR", tmp) // os.MkdirTemp honours this — every staging dir lands under the walk
+
+	const wrongR = "wrong code entirely"
+	blob := sealBundle(t, IdentityBundle{TunnelToken: "t", PBSToken: "p", ResticRepoPassword: repoPW}, testR)
+	if _, err := (OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: fetcherFor(blob)}).RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("recover: %v", err)
+	}
+	// A failed unseal must leave nothing either — exercise both paths before walking.
+	_, _ = (OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: fetcherFor(blob)}).RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), wrongR)
+
+	// THE PRIMARY ASSERTION IS EMPTINESS, not content. A content scan alone is defeatable by a later
+	// call OVERWRITING the leaked file with a different secret — which is exactly how the first
+	// version of this test passed its own red-proof while R sat on disk. Nothing in this test writes
+	// under TMPDIR, so after both calls the tree must contain no files at all.
+	var survivors []string
+	err := filepath.Walk(tmp, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
+		if err != nil || info == nil || info.IsDir() || path == tmp {
+			return nil
+		}
+		survivors = append(survivors, strings.TrimPrefix(path, tmp))
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(survivors) > 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("the unseal left %d file(s) behind under TMPDIR: %v — R, the sealed blob and the "+
+			"recovered plaintext all pass through there and none of them may outlive the call", len(survivors), survivors)
+	}
+	// Defence in depth: any secret that DOES appear anywhere is named, for every code used.
+	_ = filepath.Walk(tmp, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
+		if err != nil || info == nil || info.IsDir() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		body, rerr := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if rerr != nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		for label, secret := range map[string]string{"R": testR, "a wrong R": wrongR, "the repository password": repoPW} {
+			if strings.Contains(string(body), secret) {
+				t.Errorf("%s survived on disk at %s", label, path)
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	// And the staging directories are gone, not merely free of secrets.
+	entries, _ := os.ReadDir(tmp)
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		if e.IsDir() && strings.HasPrefix(e.Name(), "felhom-idesc-") {
+			t.Fatalf("an unseal staging directory survived: %s", e.Name())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A fetch failure surfaces as a fetch failure, not as a wrong-code error — the operator must not be
+// sent to re-read their recovery code because the hub was unreachable.
+//
+// ⚠ THIS TEST WAS GREEN THROUGHOUT THE DEFECT IT DESCRIBES (R-224, 2026-08-06). Its sentence is
+// exactly right and it did not prevent anything, for two reasons worth keeping:
+//
+//  1. **It asserted the MECHANISM, one layer below the consequence.** It checked this package's error
+//     STRING. The merge happened one layer up, in the local-api handler's `default` branch, which
+//     answered a fetch failure with "the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle". The customer
+//     never sees this string; they see that one. The project's own rule — prefer the test that asserts
+//     the CONSEQUENCE (does the customer get blamed?) over the one that asserts the MECHANISM (is the
+//     error distinct here?) — names this case precisely.
+//  2. **It asserted on TEXT.** `strings.Contains(err.Error(), …)` cannot be consumed by a caller, so
+//     it pinned something no production code could branch on. The distinction it checked was real and
+//     unusable.
+//
+// It now asserts the SENTINEL, which is what the handler branches on, and its consequence-level twin
+// lives in `internal/localapi/escrow_recover_class_test.go` where the status is asserted.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_FetchErrorIsDistinct(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: func(context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) {
+		return nil, false, errors.New("hub: connection refused")
+	}}
+	_, err := rec.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
+	if err == nil || !errors.Is(err, ErrBundleFetch) {
+		t.Fatalf("a fetch failure must classify as ErrBundleFetch, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrNoEscrowBlob) || errors.Is(err, ErrNoResticPassword) {
+		t.Fatal("a transport failure must not masquerade as a content verdict")
+	}
+}
+
+// ── R-224 — A FAILED FETCH IS NOT A WRONG CODE ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// CAMPAIGN-11 F3 measured the consequence of these two being indistinguishable: with the hub
+// firewalled off and a CORRECT current recovery code, the customer was told the code did not open
+// their package, in 0.0556 s — no unseal was attempted at all.
+//
+// The pair below is the whole point. Asserting only the first would pass with a `return ErrBundleFetch`
+// stuck on every error path, which is the same defect pointing the other way.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_FetchFailureIsClassifiedAsFetch(t *testing.T) {
+	boom := errors.New("hub: transport error: dial tcp 37.191.56.193:443: connect: no route to host")
+	r := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: func(context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) { return nil, false, boom }}
+
+	_, err := r.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a failing fetch must return an error")
+	}
+	// RED-PROOF: drop the `%w: %w` join in RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword (return the bare wrapped cause,
+	// as it was before R-224) → this FAILS, and the local-api handler falls back to the wrong-code
+	// message exactly as it did on 2026-08-05.
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrBundleFetch) {
+		t.Fatalf("a failed fetch must classify as ErrBundleFetch, got %v", err)
+	}
+	// The underlying cause survives for the operator log.
+	if !errors.Is(err, boom) {
+		t.Fatalf("the fetch cause must stay wrapped for the operator, got %v", err)
+	}
+	// And it must NOT be mistaken for either of the bundle-content situations.
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrNoEscrowBlob) || errors.Is(err, ErrNoResticPassword) {
+		t.Fatalf("a transport failure is neither of the bundle-content errors: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The other half: a genuinely wrong code must NOT classify as a fetch failure, or the fix trades one
+// misattribution for its mirror image and the customer is told the hub is down when they mistyped.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_WrongCodeIsNotAFetchFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	ensureAge(t)
+	blob := sealBundle(t, IdentityBundle{ResticRepoPassword: "0123456789abcdef"}, testR)
+	r := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: fetcherFor(blob)}
+
+	_, err := r.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(),
+		"wrong horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a wrong recovery code must fail closed")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrBundleFetch) {
+		t.Fatalf("a wrong code must NOT classify as a fetch failure, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// A clean "the hub holds nothing" keeps its own identity too — it is not a fetch failure, and the
+// customer must not be told the hub was unreachable when it answered perfectly well.
+func TestRecoverOffsiteRepoPassword_AbsentBlobIsNotAFetchFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	r := OffsiteKeyRecoverer{Fetch: func(context.Context) ([]byte, bool, error) { return nil, false, nil }}
+	_, err := r.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Background(), testR)
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoEscrowBlob) {
+		t.Fatalf("an absent blob must stay ErrNoEscrowBlob, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrBundleFetch) {
+		t.Fatalf("an absent blob is not a fetch FAILURE, got %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/hub/client.go

@@ -307,3 +307,50 @@ func tail(b []byte, max int) string {
 	}
 	return s
 }
+
+// IdentityEscrowResponse mirrors GET /api/v1/hosts/{host_id}/escrow (hub >= v0.94.0, R-199).
+// Present=false is a CLEAN answer, not a fault: the host simply has no sealed bundle yet.
+type IdentityEscrowResponse struct {
+	HostID            string `json:"host_id"`
+	Present           bool   `json:"present"`
+	IdentityEscrowB64 string `json:"identity_escrow_b64"`
+}
+
+// FetchIdentityEscrow reads back THIS host's own opaque identity-escrow blob (R-199 link 6 — the
+// mirror of UploadEscrow, self-scoped server-side by the per-host key). The bytes are ciphertext: they
+// are useless without the customer's recovery code R, which neither the hub nor this agent ever holds.
+//
+// It is the ONLY retrieval this client performs, and it is deliberately narrow — no directive, no
+// K-escrow, no key rotation. The operator-driven DR path (recovery-mode re-enroll) is a different
+// endpoint with a different gate and is not reached from here.
+//
+// Errors are typed (transport vs HTTP) and never include the bearer token. The BLOB is never logged —
+// only its length.
+func (c *Client) FetchIdentityEscrow(ctx context.Context) (*IdentityEscrowResponse, error) {
+	if c.hostID == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: FetchIdentityEscrow requires a configured host_id")
+	}
+	url := c.baseURL + "/api/v1/hosts/" + c.hostID + "/escrow"
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: building escrow-fetch request: %w", err)
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+
+	resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &TransportError{Err: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return nil, &HTTPError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, BodyTail: tail(raw, 256)}
+	}
+	var out IdentityEscrowResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: decoding escrow fetch: %w", err)
+	}
+	return &out, nil
+}

internal/localapi/escrow_recover.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package localapi
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/escrow"
+)
+
+// R-199 (agent v0.125.0) — the in-guest controller asks the agent to recover the offsite repository
+// password from the hub's sealed bundle, using the customer's recovery code R.
+//
+// WHY THE AGENT AND NOT THE CONTROLLER. Three reasons, all structural: the unsealing binary (`age`)
+// is an agent runtime dependency and is deliberately absent from the controller image; the sealed
+// blob is a HOST-scoped object whose only writer is this agent under the per-host key, so the read is
+// that write's mirror; and the controller is a trust tier down — it should receive one field, not a
+// bundle it has no use for.
+//
+// R'S HANDLING, WHICH IS THE TIGHTEST RULE IN THIS FLOW. R is the one secret in the system that
+// cannot be rotated, re-issued or recovered — it exists only in the customer's hands. Here it:
+//   - arrives in the request body over the already-pinned local-API channel (the operator accepted
+//     that crossing on 2026-08-04; the acceptance covers the CHANNEL, not carelessness at either end);
+//   - is held in memory for the duration of one call and cleared on BOTH paths;
+//   - is never written to disk, never an argument in a process list, and never logged at any level,
+//     including inside an error;
+//   - is never echoed: no response this endpoint can emit contains it.
+//
+// The request-level DEBUG middleware logs method/path/status/duration and never bodies — see
+// `logRequests`. Do not add a body dump.
+//
+// THE RESPONSE CARRIES THE PASSWORD AND ITS HASH. The hash is what this session's proof compares
+// (compare by hash, never by value). The password itself is present because the next link — placing a
+// recovered password so the existing repository opens — needs it, and building a hash-only seam now
+// would have to be torn out to add it. The controller's diagnostic reads only the hash.
+
+type recoverOffsitePasswordRequest struct {
+	VMID int `json:"vmid"`
+	// RecoveryCode is the customer's R. NEVER logged, never persisted, never echoed.
+	RecoveryCode string `json:"recovery_code"`
+}
+
+// handleRecoverOffsitePassword fetches this host's sealed bundle, unseals it with R and returns only
+// the offsite repository password (plus its sha256, for hash-only comparison by the caller).
+func (s *Server) handleRecoverOffsitePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid int) {
+	var req recoverOffsitePasswordRequest
+	if !decodeBody(w, r, &req) {
+		return
+	}
+	if !s.scopedFromBody(w, req.VMID, vmid, r.URL.Path) {
+		return
+	}
+	R := strings.TrimSpace(req.RecoveryCode)
+	req.RecoveryCode = "" // drop the decoded copy immediately
+	if R == "" {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "recovery_code is required")
+		return
+	}
+	if s.escrowRecovery == nil {
+		R = ""
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "offsite key recovery is not configured on this agent (no hub client)")
+		return
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 60*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	s.logger.Info("local-api: recovering the offsite repository password from the sealed escrow (R via body, never logged/persisted)", "vmid", vmid)
+
+	pw, err := s.escrowRecovery.RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(ctx, R)
+	R = "" // cleared on BOTH paths, before anything else can happen
+	if err != nil {
+		// Each situation gets its own status and its own words. None of them names a secret.
+		switch {
+		// ── R-224 (2026-08-06) — THE FETCH FAILURE IS NOT A WRONG CODE. ────────────────────────
+		//
+		// This case did not exist, and its absence is the defect. A failed fetch fell through to the
+		// `default` below and was answered with "the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle" —
+		// so a hub that could not be reached was reported to the customer as a bad recovery code, on
+		// the one screen whose whole purpose is to be believed about their backups.
+		//
+		// Measured live 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11 F3 and F4): a CORRECT current code returned that
+		// message in 0.0556 s with the hub firewalled off, and in 0.0299 s with this agent stopped —
+		// against ~1.0 s for a genuine unseal. No unseal was attempted in either case.
+		//
+		// 502 rather than 400: 4xx says "your request was bad", and the request was not bad — an
+		// upstream dependency failed. The status is the machine-readable half; the controller
+		// classifies on it and must never parse this sentence.
+		//
+		// ⚠ THE CODE WAS NOT USED. Nothing may be said about it — not that it was wrong, and not
+		// that it was right.
+		case errors.Is(err, escrow.ErrBundleFetch):
+			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery: the sealed bundle could not be FETCHED — the recovery code was never used", "vmid", vmid, "err", err)
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "the sealed recovery bundle could not be fetched from the hub — the recovery code was NOT used and nothing was written")
+		case errors.Is(err, escrow.ErrNoEscrowBlob):
+			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery: the hub holds no sealed bundle for this host", "vmid", vmid)
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusNotFound, "the hub holds no sealed recovery bundle for this host — no escrow ceremony has run")
+		case errors.Is(err, escrow.ErrNoResticPassword):
+			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery: the bundle opened but predates the repository-password field", "vmid", vmid)
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusConflict, "the recovery code opened the bundle, but it carries NO offsite repository password (sealed before that field existed; it cannot be retro-fitted)")
+		default:
+			// The fail-closed WRONG-CODE case, and only it: the bundle was fetched and `age -d`
+			// refused it. Every other situation above has its own status. The agent log records the
+			// STEP, never the code.
+			s.logger.Warn("local-api: offsite key recovery: the fetched bundle did not open with the supplied recovery code", "vmid", vmid, "err", err)
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle — nothing was written")
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(pw)))
+	// §8.6's lesson, applied: say exactly WHAT was recovered and what was NOT, so nobody reading this
+	// concludes the wrong thing about the bundle's contents (which is how link 8 came to be missing).
+	s.logger.Info("local-api: offsite repository password RECOVERED from the sealed escrow — returning that field ONLY "+
+		"(the tunnel token, the PBS token and the WG key stay inside the agent and are not returned)",
+		"vmid", vmid, "restic_pw_sha256", hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]))
+	writeOK(w, map[string]any{
+		"restic_repo_password": pw,
+		"restic_pw_sha256":     hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]),
+	})
+}

internal/localapi/escrow_recover_class_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package localapi
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/escrow"
+)
+
+// R-224 — THE STATUS IS THE DISCRIMINATOR, and this test asserts the CONSEQUENCE (what the HTTP
+// boundary answers) rather than the mechanism (that the sentinel exists).
+//
+// The controller one trust tier down classifies on the STATUS and must never parse the sentence. So
+// the contract this pins is: four distinguishable situations, four distinct statuses, and the
+// wrong-code message reachable ONLY from a real refusal.
+//
+// Before R-224 the first and last rows both answered 400 with the same sentence — which is how
+// CAMPAIGN-11 F3 told a customer holding a CORRECT code that it did not open their package.
+
+type fakeRecoverer struct{ err error }
+
+func (f fakeRecoverer) RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(context.Context, string) (string, error) {
+	if f.err != nil {
+		return "", f.err
+	}
+	return "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", nil
+}
+
+func TestRecoverOffsitePassword_EachSituationGetsItsOwnStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name       string
+		err        error
+		wantStatus int
+		// mustNotSay guards the specific misattribution each status exists to prevent.
+		mustNotSay []string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "fetch failed — the code was NEVER used",
+			err:        errors.Join(escrow.ErrBundleFetch, errors.New("hub: transport error: no route to host")),
+			wantStatus: 502,
+			mustNotSay: []string{"did not open"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "wrong code — the bundle WAS fetched and refused it",
+			err:        errors.New("escrow: the recovery code did not unwrap the identity escrow"),
+			wantStatus: 400,
+			mustNotSay: []string{"could not be fetched"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "the hub holds no bundle",
+			err:        escrow.ErrNoEscrowBlob,
+			wantStatus: 404,
+			mustNotSay: []string{"did not open"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "the bundle predates the repository-password field",
+			err:        escrow.ErrNoResticPassword,
+			wantStatus: 409,
+			mustNotSay: []string{"could not be fetched"},
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			srv := newTestServerS(t, &fakeGuests{}, &fakeBackups{}, &fakeStore{}, nil)
+			srv.escrowRecovery = fakeRecoverer{err: tc.err}
+			w := do(t, srv.Handler(), "POST", "/escrow/recover-offsite-password", "A",
+				`{"vmid":8200,"recovery_code":"correct horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel"}`)
+			if w.Code != tc.wantStatus {
+				t.Fatalf("status: got %d, want %d — body=%s", w.Code, tc.wantStatus, w.Body.String())
+			}
+			for _, phrase := range tc.mustNotSay {
+				if strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), phrase) {
+					t.Fatalf("the %d answer must not say %q — body=%s", tc.wantStatus, phrase, w.Body.String())
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The pair that matters most, stated as its own assertion so a regression cannot hide inside a table:
+// a fetch failure and a wrong code must never answer with the SAME status. Collapsing them is the
+// whole of R-224.
+func TestRecoverOffsitePassword_FetchFailureAndWrongCodeDiffer(t *testing.T) {
+	status := func(err error) int {
+		srv := newTestServerS(t, &fakeGuests{}, &fakeBackups{}, &fakeStore{}, nil)
+		srv.escrowRecovery = fakeRecoverer{err: err}
+		return do(t, srv.Handler(), "POST", "/escrow/recover-offsite-password", "A",
+			`{"vmid":8200,"recovery_code":"correct horse battery staple sedative anaconda wobbly kingdom placard yodel"}`).Code
+	}
+	fetch := status(errors.Join(escrow.ErrBundleFetch, errors.New("no route to host")))
+	wrong := status(errors.New("escrow: the recovery code did not unwrap the identity escrow"))
+	// RED-PROOF: delete the ErrBundleFetch case from handleRecoverOffsitePassword → both become 400
+	// → this FAILS. That is the exact pre-R-224 code, and the exact defect CAMPAIGN-11 measured.
+	if fetch == wrong {
+		t.Fatalf("a failed fetch and a wrong code must not share a status (both %d)", fetch)
+	}
+}

internal/localapi/server.go

@@ -111,6 +111,14 @@ type HostMetricsProvider interface {
 }
 
 // Options configures a Server.
+// EscrowRecoverer opens this host's sealed identity bundle with the customer recovery code and
+// returns ONLY the offsite restic repository password (R-199 links 6-8). An interface so the
+// localapi package needs no hub-client dependency and the route is testable without crypto.
+// R is an argument and is never retained by any implementation.
+type EscrowRecoverer interface {
+	RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(ctx context.Context, recoveryCode string) (string, error)
+}
+
 type Options struct {
 	ListenAddr string // bridge IP:port
 	Cert       tls.Certificate
@@ -210,6 +218,11 @@ type Options struct {
 	// GET /debug/logs. OPTIONAL — when nil the endpoint reports "not configured".
 	LogRing *applog.Ring
 	Logger  *slog.Logger
+	// EscrowRecovery (R-199, v0.125.0) is the offsite-key recovery seam behind
+	// POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password. OPTIONAL — nil → that route reports "not configured"
+	// (503) instead of failing obscurely. Satisfied by escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer.
+	EscrowRecovery EscrowRecoverer
+
 }
 
 // defaultBackupCadence is the fallback /backup/due window when none is configured.
@@ -273,6 +286,11 @@ type Server struct {
 	netMountRoot    string              // the user-data namespace root for the network-mount role gate
 	smbCredsDir     string              // where SMB creds files are written (out-of-band, 0600)
 	escrowStagePath string              // fork-4: 0600 staging file for the pushed restic repo password
+	// escrowRecovery (R-199, v0.125.0) assembles chain links 6-8: fetch this host's own sealed
+	// identity blob from the hub, unseal it with the customer's recovery code, return ONLY the
+	// offsite repository password. OPTIONAL — nil (no hub client configured) makes
+	// POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password answer 503 rather than pretending.
+	escrowRecovery  EscrowRecoverer
 	intent          IntentRecorder      // slice 10 P3 (optional)
 	guestBinds      *GuestBindStore     // F9 startup bind re-assert record (optional)
 	formatJobs      *FormatJobStore     // F20-BUG3 detached-format job record (optional)
@@ -423,6 +441,7 @@ func NewServer(o Options) (*Server, error) {
 		netMountRoot:    storage.NetworkMountRoot,
 		smbCredsDir:     o.SmbCredsDir,
 		escrowStagePath: o.EscrowStagePath,
+		escrowRecovery:  o.EscrowRecovery,
 		intent:          o.Intent,
 		guestBinds:      o.GuestBinds,
 		formatJobs:      o.FormatJobs,
@@ -518,6 +537,10 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /escrow/stage-secret", s.withGuest(s.handleStageEscrowSecret))
 	// fork-4 hygiene: wipe the staged secret once escrowed (controller calls this on confirm). Idempotent.
 	mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /escrow/stage-secret", s.withGuest(s.handleWipeStagedEscrowSecret))
+	// R-199 (v0.125.0): recover the offsite repository password from the hub-held sealed bundle,
+	// using the customer recovery code supplied in the body. Returns that ONE field. See
+	// escrow_recover.go for R's handling rules — they are the tightest in this package.
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password", s.withGuest(s.handleRecoverOffsitePassword))
 
 	// Controller-driven escrow ceremony (v0.88.0): preflight checklist, the detached root ceremony
 	// job (fixed-argv sudo self-invocation), its status, and the ONE-SHOT in-memory R claim.

internal/storage/claim.go

@@ -53,7 +53,11 @@ type claimFacts struct {
 	nodes       []claimNode // the whole disk + its children (partitions)
 	lvmPV       bool        // pvs (authoritative): the disk / a partition is an LVM physical volume
 	zfsMember   bool        // zpool (authoritative): the disk / a partition is a ZFS pool member
-	gatherErr   string      // non-empty ⇒ a REQUIRED read failed ⇒ fail-safe CLAIMED
+	// felhomOwnedMounts (R-220) — mountpoints OUTSIDE /mnt/felhom-drives that are nevertheless Felhom's
+	// OWN, corroborated from the host mount table: the same device is also mounted at the managed path.
+	// Empty means "nothing corroborated", which is the fail-safe direction.
+	felhomOwnedMounts map[string]bool
+	gatherErr         string // non-empty ⇒ a REQUIRED read failed ⇒ fail-safe CLAIMED
 }
 
 // classifyClaim is the pure guard verdict. unclaimed=true ONLY when the device is provably free for
@@ -81,7 +85,20 @@ func classifyClaim(f claimFacts) (unclaimed bool, reason string) {
 		if memberFSTypes[n.fstype] {
 			return false, "device holds a " + n.fstype + " (" + n.name + ")"
 		}
-		if n.mountpoint != "" && !underFelhomDrives(n.mountpoint) {
+		// ── R-220 — A MOUNT FELHOM ITSELF MADE IS NOT "SOMETHING ELSE". ───────────────────────
+		//
+		// Enrolment mounts a drive TWICE: at the managed path `/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` and at the
+		// raw `/mnt/<name>` it creates on the host. The host — and therefore that raw mount — survives
+		// a guest rebuild, while the controller's registry does not. So after a rebuild the customer's
+		// own drives looked foreign, `attach` returned an empty list, and the refusal told them to
+		// choose from it. Measured live three times (CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 1, and the R-201 re-walk twice);
+		// unmounting only the raw mounts flipped `attach: []` to both drives every time.
+		//
+		// The fence this must NOT breach: a disk genuinely in use by something else stays refused. So
+		// the exemption is not "any /mnt/* path" — it is CORROBORATED: the same device must ALSO be
+		// mounted at Felhom's managed path, which is a state only Felhom's own enrolment produces.
+		// A foreign disk at /srv/data or /media/x has no such counterpart and is still refused.
+		if n.mountpoint != "" && !underFelhomDrives(n.mountpoint) && !f.felhomOwnedMounts[n.mountpoint] {
 			return false, "device is mounted at " + n.mountpoint + " (" + n.name + ")"
 		}
 	}
@@ -154,6 +171,8 @@ func (h *SudoHostOps) gatherClaimFacts(ctx context.Context, device string) claim
 		return f
 	}
 	f.nodes = nodes
+	// R-220: corroborate which non-managed mountpoints are nevertheless Felhom's own.
+	f.felhomOwnedMounts = felhomOwnedMounts(device, nodes, h.mountTable)
 
 	// LVM PV (authoritative). pvs installed but erroring ⇒ fail-safe claimed; absent ⇒ rely on lsblk's
 	// LVM2_member FSTYPE (already in nodes).
@@ -285,3 +304,71 @@ func (h *SudoHostOps) zfsMembers(ctx context.Context, nodes []claimNode, wholeDi
 	}
 	return false, nil
 }
+
+// mountTableSource yields the host mount table as (device, mountpoint) pairs. A seam so the R-220
+// corroboration is unit-testable without a host. nil ⇒ the real /proc/mounts.
+type mountTableSource func() ([][2]string, error)
+
+// procMounts reads /proc/mounts — WORLD-READABLE, so this needs no sudo and no allowlisted command.
+// That matters: the lsblk invocation is pinned verbatim in the sudoers file
+// (`lsblk -J -o NAME,FSTYPE,PTTYPE,MOUNTPOINT /dev/*`), so switching it to the plural MOUNTPOINTS
+// would have meant shipping a sudoers change with the binary — a far larger blast radius than this
+// finding warrants. Reading the mount table directly sidesteps that entirely.
+func procMounts() ([][2]string, error) {
+	data, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/mounts")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var out [][2]string
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(data), "\n") {
+		fields := strings.Fields(line)
+		if len(fields) < 2 {
+			continue
+		}
+		// /proc/mounts escapes spaces as \040; unescape so a path with a space still compares.
+		out = append(out, [2]string{fields[0], strings.ReplaceAll(fields[1], `\040`, " ")})
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// felhomOwnedMounts returns the mountpoints of `device` (and its children) that sit OUTSIDE
+// /mnt/felhom-drives but are still Felhom's own, corroborated by the same device also being mounted
+// UNDER /mnt/felhom-drives. That pairing is what enrolment produces and nothing else does.
+//
+// ⚠ FAIL-SAFE: an unreadable mount table returns an EMPTY set, never a permissive one. The device then
+// classifies exactly as it did before R-220 — refused — because "we could not corroborate" must never
+// read as "it is ours".
+func felhomOwnedMounts(device string, nodes []claimNode, src mountTableSource) map[string]bool {
+	if src == nil {
+		src = procMounts
+	}
+	table, err := src()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil // unreadable ⇒ corroborate nothing
+	}
+	// Every device name this disk answers to: the whole disk and each child node.
+	devs := map[string]bool{device: true}
+	if wd, ok := wholeDiskOf(device); ok {
+		devs[wd] = true
+	}
+	for _, n := range nodes {
+		devs["/dev/"+n.name] = true
+	}
+	// A device is Felhom-managed only if it is mounted under the managed prefix.
+	managed := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, row := range table {
+		if devs[row[0]] && underFelhomDrives(row[1]) {
+			managed[row[0]] = true
+		}
+	}
+	if len(managed) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	owned := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, row := range table {
+		if managed[row[0]] && !underFelhomDrives(row[1]) {
+			owned[path.Clean(row[1])] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return owned
+}

internal/storage/claim_r220_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+package storage
+
+import "testing"
+
+// ── R-220 — A MOUNT FELHOM ITSELF MADE IS NOT "SOMETHING ELSE" ──────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Enrolment mounts a drive twice: at `/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` and at the raw `/mnt/<name>` it
+// creates on the host. The host survives a guest rebuild; the controller's registry does not. So after
+// a rebuild the customer's own drives read as claimed-by-something-else, `attach` came back empty, and
+// the refusal told them to pick from the empty list. Measured three times live.
+//
+// The fence: a disk genuinely in use elsewhere must STILL be refused. These assert both directions.
+
+// ── SCENARIO E — the customer's own drive is offered again after a rebuild ───────────────────────
+//
+// RED-PROOF: drop `&& !f.felhomOwnedMounts[n.mountpoint]` from classifyClaim — the pre-R-220 check —
+// and this FAILS with the drive refused and the list empty again.
+func TestClassifyClaim_R220_FelhomsOwnRawMountIsNotForeign(t *testing.T) {
+	f := claimFacts{
+		device: "/dev/sdb", wholeDisk: "/dev/sdb", wholeDiskOK: true,
+		nodes: []claimNode{{name: "sdb", fstype: "ext4", mountpoint: "/mnt/adatok"}},
+		// corroborated: the SAME device is also mounted at the managed path
+		felhomOwnedMounts: map[string]bool{"/mnt/adatok": true},
+	}
+	unclaimed, reason := classifyClaim(f)
+	if !unclaimed {
+		t.Fatalf("R-220 RETURNED: the customer's own drive is refused after a rebuild — %q", reason)
+	}
+}
+
+// ── SCENARIO F — a genuinely foreign mount is STILL refused ──────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// RED-PROOF: over-widen the fix to exempt any /mnt/* path (or to skip the mountpoint check entirely)
+// and this FAILS — a disk another system is using would be offered for formatting.
+func TestClassifyClaim_R220_ForeignMountIsStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, mp := range []string{"/srv/data", "/media/photos", "/mnt/someone-elses-disk", "/var/lib/other"} {
+		f := claimFacts{
+			device: "/dev/sdb", wholeDisk: "/dev/sdb", wholeDiskOK: true,
+			nodes:             []claimNode{{name: "sdb", fstype: "ext4", mountpoint: mp}},
+			felhomOwnedMounts: nil, // nothing corroborated it as ours
+		}
+		unclaimed, reason := classifyClaim(f)
+		if unclaimed {
+			t.Fatalf("THE FENCE BROKE: a disk mounted at %s was offered for formatting", mp)
+		}
+		if reason == "" {
+			t.Fatalf("a refusal must carry a reason (%s)", mp)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The corroboration itself: it must require BOTH mounts of the SAME device, and fail safe.
+func TestFelhomOwnedMounts_RequiresTheManagedCounterpart(t *testing.T) {
+	nodes := []claimNode{{name: "sdb"}}
+
+	t.Run("both mounts present -> the raw one is ours", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := func() ([][2]string, error) {
+			return [][2]string{
+				{"/dev/sdb", "/mnt/adatok"},
+				{"/dev/sdb", "/mnt/felhom-drives/adatok"},
+			}, nil
+		}
+		got := felhomOwnedMounts("/dev/sdb", nodes, src)
+		if !got["/mnt/adatok"] {
+			t.Fatal("the raw enrolment mount was not recognised as Felhom's own")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("only the raw mount -> corroborates NOTHING", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := func() ([][2]string, error) {
+			return [][2]string{{"/dev/sdb", "/mnt/adatok"}}, nil
+		}
+		if got := felhomOwnedMounts("/dev/sdb", nodes, src); len(got) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("a lone /mnt/<name> mount must corroborate nothing, got %v", got)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("a DIFFERENT device under the managed path does not vouch for this one", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := func() ([][2]string, error) {
+			return [][2]string{
+				{"/dev/sdb", "/srv/data"},
+				{"/dev/sdc", "/mnt/felhom-drives/mentes"}, // someone else's, not sdb's
+			}, nil
+		}
+		if got := felhomOwnedMounts("/dev/sdb", nodes, src); got["/srv/data"] {
+			t.Fatal("another device's managed mount vouched for a foreign one")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("an unreadable mount table corroborates NOTHING (fail-safe)", func(t *testing.T) {
+		src := func() ([][2]string, error) { return nil, errRead }
+		if got := felhomOwnedMounts("/dev/sdb", nodes, src); len(got) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("an unreadable mount table must corroborate nothing, got %v", got)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+var errRead = errNoMountTable{}
+
+type errNoMountTable struct{}
+
+func (errNoMountTable) Error() string { return "mount table unreadable" }

internal/storage/hostops.go

@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ type SudoHostOps struct {
 	// UNPRIVILEGED read (`systemctl is-failed`) — seam-injected so the reassert's F10 reset-failed path
 	// is unit-testable without a real systemd. Default set in NewSudoHostOps.
 	unitFailed func(ctx context.Context, unit string) bool
+	// mountTable (R-220) yields the host mount table for the "is this mount Felhom's own?"
+	// corroboration. nil ⇒ the real /proc/mounts; tests inject.
+	mountTable mountTableSource
 }
 
 // SudoHostOpsConfig configures a SudoHostOps.

scripts/agent_gates.py

@@ -41,10 +41,13 @@ import sys
 
 ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
 SHARED_REUSE = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(ROOT), "felhom.eu", "scripts", "reuse_refs_check.py")
+SHARED_INSTRUCTIONS = os.path.join(
+    os.path.dirname(ROOT), "felhom.eu", "scripts", "instructions_gate.py")
 
 # (label, absolute script path, args, fast)
 GATES = [
     ("reuse-refs", SHARED_REUSE, [ROOT], True),
+    ("instructions", SHARED_INSTRUCTIONS, [ROOT], True),
     ("published", os.path.join(ROOT, "scripts", "check-published-versions.py"), [], False),
 ]