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f651b31a7a
gates / gates (push) Successful in 22s
Closes the delivery gap v0.207.0 opened this session. Until now the gate was correctly red and a machine installed today would have received 0.206.0 — the release written, tested and pushed, and not delivered. Round trip is the evidence, not the build log: the published bytes were downloaded back (656 879 192 B, sha256 20ec9602…22995, both identical to what the bake reported) and ./etc/felhom-controller-image read OUT of the downloaded archive says felhom-controller:0.207.0 — the delivered artifact naming the controller it will start. Acceptance markers were the ones R-233 re-captured from a real log: docker OK (overlay2…) x1, including mount point rootfs AND mp0 x2 (there is no mp1 since build-golden.sh v3.0.0), upload OK (HTTP 201) x1, excluding 0, FATAL 0. The 404 pre-gate ran WITH a control so a 404 could not mean 'wrong URL': 0.206.0 -> 200, 0.207.0 -> 404. The token never crossed a shell — copied file->file, read by a runner script inside the VM; systemctl show grep for the value returned 0. The token-leak grep on the COMMITTED log returned 0, and that 0 is evidence because a planted copy returned 1 before being shredded. Vouch was a three-field change with all three checked deliberately: MinAgent 0.127.0 read from the golden's controller CHANGELOG header, agent_version already >= it, min_agent not above agent_version (not the R-216 shape). Verified by re-reading the manifest rather than trusting the flash. The R-120 gate did not refuse. Drill VM restored to virgin; qemu confirmed exited with ps -eo comm, not a self-matching pgrep -f. R-242: the bake half is done and the --no-verify bypass declared earlier today is now historical. Its remaining half is UNCHANGED — nothing gates the VOUCH itself, so a baked-but-unvouched golden still passes the currency gate silently.
95 lines
5.8 KiB
Markdown
95 lines
5.8 KiB
Markdown
# STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next
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**Updated 2026-08-08.**
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> **A view, not a source.** `documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` is the authority; this page restates
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> part of it in plain words, and **nothing may exist only here**. Not `CONTEXT.md`, which is technical
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> state written for Claude Code. **Items, not paragraphs. One screen.** If it does not fit, something
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> belongs in the register instead.
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>
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> *Rebuilt from the register on 2026-08-07, from 258 lines. The old "what shipped recently" log is what
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> the per-repo `CHANGELOG.md` files and the register are for, and is not restated here.*
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## What works
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A blank machine boots the Felhom disc, installs itself unattended, and is claimed by the customer, who
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sets their own password. They install apps from a catalogue of fifty-three, share files over the home
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network, and open apps from a launcher or a shared link. Backups run on their own to three places — the
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machine's drive, a second drive, and an encrypted off-site copy.
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**The backup promise is proved, and so is getting the data back yourself.** A machine has been
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destroyed on purpose and its files came back byte for byte identical — four times now, including a
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filename with Hungarian accents. On **2026-08-07 the household's own journey passed for the first
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time**: someone with a browser and their recovery code got everything back with **no command line
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inside the machine at any point**. From logging in to seeing what is in the store took **72 seconds**.
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*(R-201 — closed.)*
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**And the two rough edges the walk found are gone.** After a rebuild the restore used to stop dead
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twice — once because the machine no longer recognised its own drives, once because it refused to
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restore an app that was not installed while promising, three lines above, that it would reinstall it.
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Both now say what has happened, say that nothing is lost, and link to the one screen that fixes it.
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*(R-252, R-253 — both closed 2026-08-08.)*
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## What's broken
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- **An app's own first-login password is still sitting in a page's HTML**, behind a Reveal button that
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only hides it visually — the same fault we just fixed for the configuration passphrase, in a
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different place, with a real per-install secret. Found by looking for it rather than by an incident.
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*(R-254)*
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- **The machine's own screen keeps telling an already-paired box to pair itself** — 25 minutes after it
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was paired, on a screen that promises it refreshes itself. *(R-214, R-235)*
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- **A rebuilt machine cannot create a new recovery code at all.** *(R-221)*
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- **A backup that covered nothing still calls itself „Sikeres".** The state is honest; the word is not.
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*(R-240)*
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- **A machine waiting for its recovery code can stop making off-site backups without alarming us.**
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Measured on 7 August: after a *rebuild* we ARE told, promptly and correctly. The gap is narrower than
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it read — it is a machine that reaches the state without a working tier behind it. *(R-243)*
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- **The card offering to reopen set-aside backups promises more than we can deliver** — we keep the old
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sealed package, but nothing can open it. *(R-202)*
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- **Deleting a customer leaves rows behind** on every test machine ever torn down, while reporting a
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clean teardown. No secrets involved, but it accumulates with each walk. *(R-244)*
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- **Putting restored files back where they belong is still a manual step.** *(R-213)*
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## Found today
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- **A password was living in the page source, and we went looking for others.** The configuration
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passphrase was written into the settings page on every load and merely hidden with styling — it is
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now fetched only when asked for, and the asking is recorded. *(R-249, fixed.)* The search that fix
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required turned up **two more places doing the same thing**, one of them a real per-install app
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password. *(R-254, not fixed — recommended next.)*
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- **The record was a day behind itself.** The recovery row still recorded only what was proven on
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4 August. Corrected, with both halves and both dates. A sweep of all 146 register rows found **no
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other** entry whose state disagrees with its own body.
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## What we're working on
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- **Getting the remaining two secrets out of page sources**, the same way. *(R-254)*
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- **Proving the hub really keeps the old sealed key** when a machine re-seals. Never run outside a
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test; needs a second deliberate wipe and its own session. *(R-198)*
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## Waiting on you
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- **Nothing.** The new base image was baked and approved the same day, so a machine installed now
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receives this week's fixes — including getting the password out of the page source. *(R-242 — the
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bake half done; what remains is ours, not yours.)*
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*R-245 — whether an undecided household is auto-abandoned after 30 days — was settled on 7 August: we
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do not build it, and the reasoning is recorded.*
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## DooPlex infrastructure — separate from the product
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*Kept under its own heading rather than dropped: these are real asks that need you, but they concern
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the machine all this is built on, not what a customer receives. Mixing them in is why the page stopped
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being readable.*
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- **DooPlex's own backup makes every copy inside the same box, and nothing says when it fails.**
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*(R-232)*
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- **193 old images exist only on this machine** and cannot be re-downloaded. About 27 GB against 199 GB
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free — clutter, not space. Nothing deleted. *(R-210)*
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- **The hub password needs rotating** — a diagnostic printed it into a session log; nothing suggests
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anyone else saw it. *(R-132)*
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- **One thing to read after DooPlex next restarts** — the second-SSD move has never survived a reboot;
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it writes PASS/FAIL to `/var/log/felhom-store-postboot-check.log`. On PASS, 34 GB comes back. *(R-209a)*
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- **Backup scripts on DooPlex are unversioned host state.** *(R-231)*
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- **Instruction-file follow-ups**, each needing a decision rather than an edit. *(R-229, R-230)*
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