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ebdc04601d
gates / gates (push) Successful in 15s
The alarm ladder gains §6.2 - which events are per-app, per-run, per-tier or coarse, and why the default is coarse. CONTEXT records two rulings: the grain is allow-listed rather than inferred from the payload, with crossdrive_failed as the proof that a payload rule would have been wrong; and a finding recorded only in REPORT.md has a lifetime of one session. R-389 closed and compressed, keeping its rules and naming the commit whose git show returns the full text. R-390 and R-391 left open. REPORT.md is gate 11's first real subject and passes: six observations, two FILED, four NOT-A-FINDING with their reasons. Three of those declarations are things a tidier report would have omitted - the gate's own spec would have passed the item it was built to catch, the burst has no ceiling, and ArgoCD said "successfully rolled out" while still running the old image. STATUS carries forward the one thing outstanding: the controller floor still reads 0.222.0 while the golden reads 0.223.0.
126 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
126 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
# STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next
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**Updated 2026-08-23 — you now hear about EVERY broken app, not just the first one each hour. The
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hub deployed itself; nothing is waiting on you except the floor from the last release.**
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> **A view, not a source.** `documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` is the authority; this page restates
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> part of it in plain words, and **nothing may exist only here**. **Items, not paragraphs. One screen.**
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> If it does not fit, it belongs in the register instead.
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## Waiting on you
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*This section is allowed to be longer than one screen, and each item says what happens if you do
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nothing.*
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1. **Raise the controller floor to 0.223.0** — Hub → Configuration, the global floor box, on its own.
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You already vouched the golden (the hub reads `golden_version` 0.223.0), but the floor still reads
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**0.222.0**, so the last step of that release is outstanding.
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**If you do nothing:** boxes are offered 0.223.0 but nothing requires it, so a machine that misses
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the offer stays on 0.222.0 — where an app stopped from outside is reported as if you stopped it.
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2. **Nothing else.** This release changed only the hub, and the hub deploys itself through its
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manifest. No golden, no vouch, no controller.
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3. **Whether to change the hub password** (R-350). I printed it into my own session log on 20 August.
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Not in git, not in any saved file — in the log on this machine. **If you do nothing:** it stays as
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it is, at the risk you accept by leaving it. I can change it without ever showing you the new one.
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4. **`demo-hp`'s network setup does not match our own notes** (R-338) — the machine works, the page is
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wrong, or the other way round. **If you do nothing:** the page keeps misleading the next session,
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as it misled one by an hour.
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## Decided — and what would reopen each
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- **Getting old backups back yourself: NOT BUILT, deliberately.** **Reopens if:** a real customer
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asks. *(R-312)*
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- **The unopenable old copy on `demo-felhom`: KEPT as a test fixture** — the only state in existence
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where a set-aside store is present and cannot be opened. **Delete when:** that work ships or is
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abandoned. *(R-313)*
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- **A machine in two kinds of trouble says both things: LEFT AS IT IS.** **Reopens if:** observed
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outside a constructed test. *(R-303)*
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## What works
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Both demo machines are home, healthy and reporting — agent **0.130.0** published and running on both.
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`demo-hp` runs controller **0.219.0**; the fleet floor is still **0.218.0** (see item 2 above).
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Off-site is credentialed on `demo-hp` and its store opens with the machine's own key.
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**The fleet, because two summaries have been misread:** five customer records, three machines.
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`demo-felhom` and `demo-hp` are ours and disposable; `drill-r50` is a nested drill VM, reverted and
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off. **`peti-felhom` is a real machine we have not heard from since 15 July** and has no host record.
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**`tester-1` is a record with no machine.**
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## Shipped
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- **Taking the safety copy no longer destroys the app's own backup** (R-361, controller 0.221.1,
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proven on `demo-hp`). Before every restore the machine saves a copy of your live database. To do
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that it called the ordinary backup routine — **which always writes to the app's normal backup
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filename first** — so the app's real backup was overwritten and then renamed away. Until the next
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nightly run the app had **no database backup of its own**, and a local recovery in that window would
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have told you the app never had a database. A comment in the code said this could not happen; it
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could, and had been happening for four months. Proven fixed the only way it can be: the app's own
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backup file is now **byte-identical before and after a restore**, on both database types.
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- **A failed database restore now puts your data back by itself** (R-379/R-380, controller 0.220.2,
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proven on `demo-hp`). Until today, if a restore of an app's database went wrong, the machine had
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already taken a copy of your live database — a good copy — and **nothing in the product could put it
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back.** You were shown a filename. On one of the two database types it was worse: part of the
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restore applied, part did not, and **the dashboard said the app was healthy**. Now the machine puts
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your own copy back automatically and says plainly: the restore failed, your data is as it was, the
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app is running. Proven on both database types, byte-identical both times.
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**If even that fails**, the app is deliberately **stopped and held** rather than started — a running
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app on a half-written database lets you type into it and makes the damage permanent — and you are
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told to contact us. That was your ruling this morning. **Two things also stopped:** the error no
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longer pastes raw database text at you (it was 615 bytes once, including rows out of your own
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database), and the undo copies no longer pile up forever — three per app, and they were being copied
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off-site permanently.
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- **The off-site restore now works for the other 40 apps** (R-356, controller 0.219.0, proven on
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`demo-hp`). It used to refuse before starting, tell the customer a running app „nincs telepítve",
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and send them to reinstall it "to the same place" — a place those 40 apps never offer, because they
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were never given a drive to choose. It was asking one question to answer two. Proven today on
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`privatebin`: data planted through the app itself, backed up, **deleted**, restored — **all 15 files
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back byte for byte**, Hungarian accented names included, message „0 fájl és 1 adatkötet
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visszaállítva". The 13 apps that do have a drive are unchanged, checked the same way.
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- **The off-site restore gives an app's data back at all** (R-354, controller 0.218.0). It used to say
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„0 fájl visszaállítva", report success, and the folder was simply not there. It now names what came
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back, because a restore that mentions only its file count is how a silent loss reads as a success.
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- **Paperless's database is in the backup, and restoring it takes an undo copy first** (R-355,
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controller 0.218.0). The dump was landing in a folder named after an app that does not exist. **One
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app of 53 was affected**, established with a check first proved able to catch a planted second case.
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- **The system tells you when it cannot see the off-site copies** (R-339) — a mail after ~30 minutes,
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hourly while it lasts, one all-clear. **Caveat:** it watches whether the machine answers, so it
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would *not* have caught the 18 August fault, where one service was wedged and the machine stayed
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healthy.
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- **The connection leak was ours and is fixed** (R-344). Our agent opened a connection to the off-site
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box every 15 minutes and never closed it; the idle timer was switched off. Proved by fixing one
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machine and leaving the other: same work, 4 more leaked on the untouched one, none on the fixed one.
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The off-site box is back to **17** open connections from **415**.
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- **A dated check can no longer be quietly missed** (R-341) — but it speaks on the next push, not on
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the day. **A machine we tell to be quiet is no longer reported as dead** (R-321). **One name per
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secret** (R-295, R-323). **The hub's own words are under a guard** (R-324). **Removal reverses the
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installation** (R-316). **A correct recovery code is no longer called wrong** (R-311). **The drive
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can be re-attached after a reinstall** (R-280).
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## Broken, or knowingly incomplete
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- **Nothing ever checks that the off-site store is still readable** (R-359). Not the controller, not
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the agent. We find out at restore time. A deliberately corrupted copy was caught instantly by the
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standard tool — which we never run.
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- **A restore that returns nothing still reports success** (part of R-354's neighbourhood, not fixed
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today) and **verification copies have no delete guard**. Both deliberately left for their own rows.
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- **We ask the off-site box a question about once a second** (R-336) — ~85,000 a day for a box we
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write to weekly. The leak that made this dangerous is fixed (R-344); the volume is not. The ceiling
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is **under a year** away on the corrected measurement, not two.
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- **Peti's machine has no recovery route at all.** A real machine belonging to a real person, silent
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since 15 July, no key, no off-site copy, no local backup. **If that drive fails, everything on it is
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lost.** First act of any visit: copy the ~3.6 GB off before anything is reinstalled.
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- **The agent picks dnsmasq by looking at a file another package owns** (R-317) — one line; LAN name
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resolution goes missing quietly.
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- **Three facts the machines send still have no reader** (R-264); **the storage page has its own
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reason for an empty list** (R-298); **two thirds of the standing picture is unproven** (R-326:
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23 of 55 claims walked — `python3 scripts/unproven.py`); **the picture still describes one defect we
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fixed twice** (R-327).
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## Working on next
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The 2026-08-09 batch (R-279 … R-292), still untriaged; the three remaining R-264 readers; R-317 (one
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line in the agent); R-327 (decide the naming claim's status); R-359 (nothing reads the off-site store).
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