119 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown
119 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown
# REPORT — Security review, round 2 (2026-11-19)
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A second, independent reader of our own code. It looked and wrote down; it changed no product code, no box, no hub,
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no key.
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## In plain language
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- **What I found: 29 findings.** 1 critical, 10 high, 14 medium, 3 groups of small ones (about 32 small items), and
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one entry that repeats two open October rows.
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- **New, known, came back:** 26 are new. 3 were known (one of them was ranked too low). **None came back after a fix.**
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All of October's fixes that I could test still hold, and their tests pass.
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- **P1 (usable by a stranger today): none confirmed. One is open as a question.** The scrambled form of the hub's first
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password has been public since February. If that password is still the live one, it is a P1. I could not read which
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password is live. **You answer this (D91).**
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- **The critical one:** a controller that someone has taken over can very likely become root on the host machine. It
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needs the controller first, so a stranger cannot use it alone.
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- **The pattern in the highs:** the check that stops a bad app definition (built after October) can be passed in six
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ways — by an imported app bundle, and by a catalog change alone.
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- **October findings this pass missed:** 3 small items of one October row; and 1 October finding I did not re-read.
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Details: `documentation/audits/security-review-2-2026-11-19/COMPARISON.md` §4.
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- **You decide two things** (`STATUS.md`, top of the decide table): **D91** — change the hub password now (my pick:
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yes); **D90** — close or accept that a taken-over hub can take over dashboards (my pick: close).
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- **Not reached:** most of the controller's backup code; the large root helper for OS updates beyond its entry checks;
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the hub's live settings (ingress, who may push to Gitea); the public sites beyond their headers. The full list is in
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`COVERAGE.md`, last column.
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- **Rows:** 254 before, 272 after, 18 opened, 0 closed. Noted: R-984 (re-ranked P4 → P2), R-979, R-980, R-974, R-955,
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R-1054.
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## What happens next
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Project Claude checks the findings and writes the fix tasks. Nothing was fixed here, on purpose.
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## Baselines
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| repo | reviewed commit | October's commit |
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|---|---|---|
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| `felhom.eu` (hub 0.182.0 deployed) | `b7d8f75b` | `0d463a85` (October's own page says `c9b94329`; the fix was `b67b8cea`) |
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| `felhom-controller` (0.353.0 on demo-hp) | `10df99b8` | `dcd89364` |
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| `felhom-agent` (0.175.1 on demo-hp) | `3411592b` | `86adbcaf` |
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| `app-catalog-felhom.eu` | `b6058150` | `1a642b43` |
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| `homelab-manifests` (clone at `~/git/homelab-manifests`) | `1908bc68` | — |
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**Correction to this report's first version:** the agent commit was written `34115920`; the right short hash is
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`3411592b`. The review read a `git archive` export of each commit, not the working tree (another session worked in
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the same clone all morning).
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## Repository visibility (anonymous GET from DooPlex, 2026-11-19 08:40 CET)
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`felhom.eu`, `felhom-controller`, `felhom-agent`, `app-catalog-felhom.eu`: page 200, clone 200.
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`homelab-manifests`: 404. Registry: 401 on `/v2/`, the catalog and a hub image manifest. So the attacker has read all
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product source (accepted, R-925). Limit: the request left DooPlex; no request was made from outside the LAN.
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## Method, and what was measured
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- Seven read-only helpers, one area each, with the brief's fences in full; each returned leads. Six fresh second
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readers re-traced every Critical and High without seeing the reasoning: **all hold, none disputed.**
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- Live, only on `demo-hp` and scratch guest 9202 (endpoint and shell reads; no browser): listeners, a full TCP connect
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scan of the host's LAN address (`nmap` is not on DooPlex; a plain connect loop), sshd, sudoers, file permissions,
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guest settings; three facts behind S2-01 (read-only, one of them in a private mount namespace that left nothing);
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three compose and Docker behaviours behind S2-06, S2-08, S2-09 with throwaway containers.
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- **Teardown, three layers:** machine — the throwaway containers and temp folders on 9202 were removed in the same
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command (0 left, checked); host — nothing left (0 mounts, 0 temp folders, checked); hub — provisioned nothing.
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- **One act was refused to CC and not done:** a read of the running hub (`kubectl exec`) to see which operator
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password is live. Tried: that one command. So S2-10 is „static, live state not measured".
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- **One secret-derived value appeared on a helper's screen by accident:** the operator password's bcrypt hash, when a
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search printed line 74 of the public hub manifest. It was not copied anywhere.
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- Evidence (never committed): `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/security-review-2-2026-11-19-PRIVATE/` (0700):
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`leads/`, `second-read/`, `live/`, `INDEX.md`, and the source exports.
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## Commits (felhom.eu `main`, documents only)
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`5f8412a8` Phase 0 · `3e7c0502` (rebased) five rows + R-984 · this commit: findings, coverage, comparison, 13 rows,
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STATUS, REPORT.
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## Instruction files and stale facts
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No `CLAUDE.md` or rule file was edited. Stale facts seen, **not** corrected here (they sit in files the release
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session is editing today or in architecture documents — for the fix tasks):
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- `13-threat-model.md` §5 „guest ↔ Proxmox host: holds" and „agent ↔ root on the host: holds by the sudoers" — S2-01, S2-23.
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- `13` §4 „+8 in setup mode" — setup mode is gone. `13` §4 „felhom-sshd (tunnel only)" — true, measured.
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- `OPEN-ITEMS.md` section headings: five carried a wrong row count before this session (for example „Backup &
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restore — 49 rows", 52 by count). **Corrected** by a recount of every heading (file `OPEN-ITEMS.md`, the `## …`
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lines; no gate reads them).
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## System poster
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No fact of `felhom-system-poster.facts.md` changed (no machine, role, path, tier, time, retention or key). Nothing done
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on the three.
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## Observations
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1. The allow-list is asked on every catalog path but not on the import path, and it judges one file. FILED: R-1407, R-1409, R-1420.
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2. A controller-to-agent route trusts a caller-named path as root. FILED: R-1406; backup target: R-984 (note, re-ranked).
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3. Page scripts insert server text unescaped in about 20 places; four are proven reachable. FILED: R-1408.
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4. A bind is judged at write time only. FILED: R-1421.
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5. Hub sign-in: public start hash, no try limit, no sign-out. FILED: R-1410 (D91).
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6. The hub's unsigned channels to the controller. FILED: R-1422 (D90).
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7. An unsigned job crashes the agent. FILED: R-1423.
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8. The hub and the box relay as open mailers for a box. FILED: R-1424.
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9. Hub hand-over doors (re-enroll, appliance register, escrow replace). FILED: R-1425.
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10. No per-box limits on the hub; ingress settings unknown; ring 0 by one box. FILED: R-1426.
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11. Samba path, storage path, claim page lock. FILED: R-1427.
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12. Root helpers and the format confirmation. FILED: R-1428.
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13. One CI runner for four repositories. FILED: R-1429.
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14. Low items, three groups. FILED: R-1430, R-1431, R-1432.
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15. Controller image by tag; installer by a movable tag. FILED: R-979 (a dated note there, and one on R-980).
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16. `settings.json` and the debug ring are world-readable inside the guest. NOT-A-FINDING: only root exists in the guest; the file holds bcrypt hashes and one encrypted value (measured). October listed it (R-984).
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17. traefik holds the Docker socket read-only-mounted. NOT-A-FINDING: needed by its provider; known design; it is why S2-08 matters.
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18. `cf_tunnel_token` appears 215 times in a week of controller log. NOT-A-FINDING: it is the key's name in a „no token" line; no value (measured).
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19. Host root filesystem's id is mountable through the assign route too. NOT-A-FINDING: it is the same missing check as R-1406, and it is in that row's private notes.
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20. A host with a scratch guest beside the customer's gives each guest's token every host-wide route. NOT-A-FINDING: test boxes only; the design is one customer per host.
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21. Vulnerable dependencies seen on the way. NOT-A-FINDING: none was seen (FileBrowser 1.5.8 on demo-hp is above the fix version of R-1305).
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22. The controller's `docker-compose.yml` in the repository still shows `privileged` and port 8080; demo-hp's running controller is not privileged and publishes no port (measured). FILED: R-1431
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## Minutes per phase
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Phase 0: about 10. Phases 1–3 (areas read in parallel by helpers, second reads, live measurements): about 30.
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Phase 4 (comparison, rows, pages): about 15.
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