Question A: YES, no code change. customer.domain is a trimmed string with no
UNIQUE, no CHECK, no format rule (store.go:114, configs.go:673), copied verbatim
into controller.yaml (configgen.go:48), and every one of its 30 consumers on the
box interpolates it without parsing. Zero hits for registrable/eTLD/publicsuffix
across both repos. Nothing creates DNS records (zero hits for dns_records) — the
two Cloudflare clients are WAF-only. And the zone-ownership assumption is a
SWITCH, not a requirement: traefik.yml.tmpl selects DNS-01 when cf_api_token is
set and HTTP-01 when it is empty.
The real blocker is Cloudflare, proven live: the edge certificate covers exactly
one wildcard level (SAN = demo-felhom.eu, *.demo-felhom.eu), so a two-label
hostname — which a per-tester subdomain forces — gets "tls alert handshake
failure" and no peer certificate at all. That makes Advanced Certificate Manager
a prerequisite of the separate-domain plan, not an optional extra. Whether ACM is
available on the account could not be established read-only: the only Cloudflare
tokens in reach are the Zone:DNS:Edit tokens on the demo boxes, which the fence
forbids using.
Question C, measured rather than reasoned: r.Cookie returns the FIRST match and
never tries the others (BOGUS+real = 302, real+BOGUS = 200), so a tossed cookie
wins outright — DoS and confusion, not takeover, since it fails closed on
mutations. CSRF is a single choke point (server.go:256) and the token carries the
whole load against a same-registrable-domain attacker. But it is SKIPPED entirely
when no session cookie is present, which with browser-cached Basic auth is
cross-origin CSRF on every mutating route (R-135).
Agreeing with the separate-domain recommendation, with the caveat the brief asked
for: it is necessary but not sufficient. It does not solve Question D, because
that is a shared-zone problem and the new domain is a shared zone.
Filed R-133..R-138: duplicate domains accepted; hub/controller zone-resolvers
disagree on depth; CSRF skipped on the no-cookie path; __Host- rename (one line,
preconditions verified met); geo-WAF rules zone-scoped and non-namespaced (four
cross-tenant faults, blocks shared-zone onboarding); shared-zone cf_api_token is
a zone-wide DNS-write capability on a customer's box.
Nothing created: no customer, DNS record, tunnel, route or code change.
admin
9e079c7883
