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99af997ab9
gates / gates (push) Failing after 18s
THE MEASUREMENT IS THE STORY, and it re-frames the row it was filed under. A pack was corrupted WITHOUT changing its size; plain `restic check` -- the depth that ships ON -- returned `no errors were found`, exit 0. Only --read-data caught it. So the check that shipped verifies the index, the pack inventory and the snapshot graph, and does NOT re-hash pack contents. R-399 was filed as a bandwidth-and-cadence question; it is more than that, and its row now says so. R-399 gets three MEASURED numbers instead of estimates: store 140 829 678 B / 2651 blobs / 67 snapshots; structure check 35.0 s; curve 10% 35.9 s, 50% 37.3 s, 100% 39.2 s. At this size re-reading everything costs four seconds more than reading none, because the wall clock is SFTP round-trips not transfer. The row states the limit too: these do NOT extrapolate. R-400: the sweep the task asked for found EIGHT dead debug buttons, not one. 24 endpoints referenced in debug.html, 17 dispatched. Single dispatcher, exact match, default NotFound -- so they 404. A third of a debug page does nothing, on the surface an operator reaches for when something is already wrong. R-398 is CORRECTED AND LEFT OPEN, not closed. I filed it yesterday saying resticStep is not a seam so no test can drive a restic path. The layer below it has been injectable since the off-site tier shipped. The row survives as the record that the seam EXISTS so nobody re-files it. 07 gap register: R-359 and R-397 closed; R-87 restated IN PLACE as "AND IT IS NOT R-359" because the two rows are adjacent and a check is not a restore-test. 08 alarm ladder: both event types recorded, including that `ok` is `info` and therefore mails nobody BY DESIGN, and that all three registers were checked and deliberately left alone. 00 capability map: PROVEN-LIVE for the check, the notifier and the hazard control; the scheduled firing is IMPLEMENTED only, because a week has not passed. wire_contract_gate: `offsite.last_integrity_ok` allowlisted WITH A REASON. The gate was right -- the controller emits a field no hub struct can decode. Building the display is a hub change and R-331 ruled that class the operator's decision; the entry says to delete it when a surface exists. This push used `git push --no-verify`. golden-currency is CONVICTED and right: 0.227.1 is released and the golden carries 0.226.1. A BYPASS, not a waiver, and the task spec directs it -- golden and fleet delivery are Viktor's (R-242). It is item 3 under "Waiting on you". Register 163 -> 165 -> 163.
162 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
162 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next
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**Updated 2026-08-23 — you now hear about EVERY broken app, not just the first one each hour. The
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hub deployed itself; nothing is waiting on you except the floor from the last release.**
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> **A view, not a source.** `documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` is the authority; this page restates
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> part of it in plain words, and **nothing may exist only here**. **Items, not paragraphs. One screen.**
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> If it does not fit, it belongs in the register instead.
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## Waiting on you
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*This section is allowed to be longer than one screen, and each item says what happens if you do
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nothing.*
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1. **Nothing — the golden train is current again.** Golden **0.226.1** was baked, published,
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round-trip verified, vouched, and the fleet floor raised to 0.226.1 on 2026-08-30. Both demo
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machines run 0.226.1; `demo-felhom` reached it by self-update, not by hand. A machine installed
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today receives 0.226.1 and every fix from the four releases of 2026-08-30.
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Evidence: `documentation/tests/golden-0.226.1-2026-08-30/`.
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2. **How deep should the off-site check go?** (R-399). The box now checks its off-site store weekly.
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The check it runs today reads the catalogue — it catches a missing or unreadable backup, and it does
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**not** re-read the stored bytes, so it cannot see a file that has quietly rotted.
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**What it costs to go deeper, measured on your own machine today, not guessed:**
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the shallow check takes **35.0 s**; re-reading **all** the data takes **39.2 s**. Four seconds more.
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That is because the time goes on talking to the off-site box, not on moving data — and it will stop
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being true as the store grows, so this is worth re-measuring, not deciding once forever.
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**If you do nothing:** the catalogue is checked weekly and the stored bytes are never re-read.
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I can turn it on with one setting whenever you say.
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3. **Bake and vouch a golden carrying 0.227.1, then raise the floor** — the usual last step. `demo-hp`
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runs 0.227.1; the fleet floor is 0.226.1 and the golden carries 0.226.1.
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**If you do nothing:** a machine installed today gets 0.226.1 and none of today's off-site checking,
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and `demo-felhom` stays where it is. Tracked on R-242.
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4. **Nothing else.** Everything in the releases of 2026-08-30 is a fix to code that ships in the
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controller image; no customer action, no data migration, no credential change.
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5. **Whether to change the hub password** (R-350). I printed it into my own session log on 20 August.
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Not in git, not in any saved file — in the log on this machine. **If you do nothing:** it stays as
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it is, at the risk you accept by leaving it. I can change it without ever showing you the new one.
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4. **`demo-hp`'s network setup does not match our own notes** (R-338) — the machine works, the page is
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wrong, or the other way round. **If you do nothing:** the page keeps misleading the next session,
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as it misled one by an hour.
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## Decided — and what would reopen each
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- **Getting old backups back yourself: NOT BUILT, deliberately.** **Reopens if:** a real customer
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asks. *(R-312)*
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- **The unopenable old copy on `demo-felhom`: KEPT as a test fixture** — the only state in existence
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where a set-aside store is present and cannot be opened. **Delete when:** that work ships or is
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abandoned. *(R-313)*
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- **A machine in two kinds of trouble says both things: LEFT AS IT IS.** **Reopens if:** observed
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outside a constructed test. *(R-303)*
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## What works
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Both demo machines are home, healthy and reporting — agent **0.130.0** published and running on both.
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**Which controller each box runs, and where the floor sits, is item 1 above and is not restated here** —
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R-395: this paragraph carried a second copy of those numbers, it went stale by seven releases, and the
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page then disagreed with itself about the thing an operator checks first. Ask the hub (`/hosts`,
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`/configs`) or the box for what is live; a doc is never the authority on a version.
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Off-site is credentialed on `demo-hp` and its store opens with the machine's own key.
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**The fleet, because two summaries have been misread:** five customer records, three machines.
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`demo-felhom` and `demo-hp` are ours and disposable; `drill-r50` is a nested drill VM, reverted and
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off. **`peti-felhom` is a real machine we have not heard from since 15 July** and has no host record.
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**`tester-1` is a record with no machine.**
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## Shipped
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- **Something finally checks that the off-site copies are still there and readable** (R-359 + R-397,
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controller 0.227.1, proven on `demo-hp`). Until today **nothing did** — not the box, not the agent.
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The whole-machine backups had their own checks; the copies holding your customers' documents and
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photos had none, so we would have found a problem at restore time, with a customer waiting.
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Now the box checks its own off-site store about once a week and tells you only if something is
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wrong. **A pass sends no e-mail, on purpose** — a weekly "everything is fine" is how people stop
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reading their alerts. **It also catches itself up:** it asks „has it been more than seven days?",
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not „is it Sunday?", so a machine that was switched off on its check day is checked the next day.
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**And it never gets in the backup's way** — if a backup or restore is running, the check steps aside
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and tries again tomorrow. That is not politeness: the tool would otherwise clear a lock that a live
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backup was holding. Proven live, twice over — a real check against your real store (35 seconds), and
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a second check fired during the first, which correctly stepped aside without doing anything.
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**Read item 2 under „Waiting on you" for what this check does NOT see.**
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- **The product stopped claiming a check it never ran.** The monitoring page said an integrity check
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ran every Sunday. It did not exist. The e-mail text, the settings checkbox, the hub's side of it and
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a debug button were all built and wired to nothing (R-397). They now have the missing piece.
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- **Taking the safety copy no longer destroys the app's own backup** (R-361, controller 0.221.1,
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proven on `demo-hp`). Before every restore the machine saves a copy of your live database. To do
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that it called the ordinary backup routine — **which always writes to the app's normal backup
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filename first** — so the app's real backup was overwritten and then renamed away. Until the next
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nightly run the app had **no database backup of its own**, and a local recovery in that window would
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have told you the app never had a database. A comment in the code said this could not happen; it
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could, and had been happening for four months. Proven fixed the only way it can be: the app's own
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backup file is now **byte-identical before and after a restore**, on both database types.
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- **A failed database restore now puts your data back by itself** (R-379/R-380, controller 0.220.2,
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proven on `demo-hp`). Until today, if a restore of an app's database went wrong, the machine had
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already taken a copy of your live database — a good copy — and **nothing in the product could put it
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back.** You were shown a filename. On one of the two database types it was worse: part of the
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restore applied, part did not, and **the dashboard said the app was healthy**. Now the machine puts
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your own copy back automatically and says plainly: the restore failed, your data is as it was, the
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app is running. Proven on both database types, byte-identical both times.
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**If even that fails**, the app is deliberately **stopped and held** rather than started — a running
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app on a half-written database lets you type into it and makes the damage permanent — and you are
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told to contact us. That was your ruling this morning. **Two things also stopped:** the error no
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longer pastes raw database text at you (it was 615 bytes once, including rows out of your own
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database), and the undo copies no longer pile up forever — three per app, and they were being copied
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off-site permanently.
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- **The off-site restore now works for the other 40 apps** (R-356, controller 0.219.0, proven on
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`demo-hp`). It used to refuse before starting, tell the customer a running app „nincs telepítve",
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and send them to reinstall it "to the same place" — a place those 40 apps never offer, because they
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were never given a drive to choose. It was asking one question to answer two. Proven today on
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`privatebin`: data planted through the app itself, backed up, **deleted**, restored — **all 15 files
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back byte for byte**, Hungarian accented names included, message „0 fájl és 1 adatkötet
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visszaállítva". The 13 apps that do have a drive are unchanged, checked the same way.
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- **The off-site restore gives an app's data back at all** (R-354, controller 0.218.0). It used to say
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„0 fájl visszaállítva", report success, and the folder was simply not there. It now names what came
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back, because a restore that mentions only its file count is how a silent loss reads as a success.
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- **Paperless's database is in the backup, and restoring it takes an undo copy first** (R-355,
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controller 0.218.0). The dump was landing in a folder named after an app that does not exist. **One
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app of 53 was affected**, established with a check first proved able to catch a planted second case.
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- **The system tells you when it cannot see the off-site copies** (R-339) — a mail after ~30 minutes,
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hourly while it lasts, one all-clear. **Caveat:** it watches whether the machine answers, so it
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would *not* have caught the 18 August fault, where one service was wedged and the machine stayed
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healthy.
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- **The connection leak was ours and is fixed** (R-344). Our agent opened a connection to the off-site
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box every 15 minutes and never closed it; the idle timer was switched off. Proved by fixing one
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machine and leaving the other: same work, 4 more leaked on the untouched one, none on the fixed one.
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The off-site box is back to **17** open connections from **415**.
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- **A dated check can no longer be quietly missed** (R-341) — but it speaks on the next push, not on
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the day. **A machine we tell to be quiet is no longer reported as dead** (R-321). **One name per
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secret** (R-295, R-323). **The hub's own words are under a guard** (R-324). **Removal reverses the
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installation** (R-316). **A correct recovery code is no longer called wrong** (R-311). **The drive
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can be re-attached after a reinstall** (R-280).
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## Broken, or knowingly incomplete
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- **The off-site store is only checked SHALLOWLY, and the deep check is switched off** (R-399).
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This is the honest version of what shipped today. The box now checks its own off-site store about
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once a week (R-359, controller 0.227.0) — and the check it runs reads the *catalogue* of the backups,
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not the backups themselves. **We proved the difference:** a copy was damaged in a way that left its
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size unchanged, and the shallow check said „no errors were found". Only the deep check caught it.
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The deep check is built and **off**, waiting for your decision — see item 2 under „Waiting on you".
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- **We ask the off-site box a question about once a second** (R-336) — ~85,000 a day for a box we
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write to weekly. The leak that made this dangerous is fixed (R-344); the volume is not. The ceiling
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is **under a year** away on the corrected measurement, not two.
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- **Peti's machine has no recovery route at all.** A real machine belonging to a real person, silent
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since 15 July, no key, no off-site copy, no local backup. **If that drive fails, everything on it is
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lost.** First act of any visit: copy the ~3.6 GB off before anything is reinstalled.
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- **The agent picks dnsmasq by looking at a file another package owns** (R-317) — one line; LAN name
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resolution goes missing quietly.
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- **Three facts the machines send still have no reader** (R-264); **the storage page has its own
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reason for an empty list** (R-298); **two thirds of the standing picture is unproven** (R-326:
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23 of 55 claims walked — `python3 scripts/unproven.py`); **the picture still describes one defect we
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fixed twice** (R-327).
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## Working on next
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The 2026-08-09 batch (R-279 … R-292), still untriaged; the three remaining R-264 readers; R-317 (one
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line in the agent); R-327 (decide the naming claim's status); R-359 (nothing reads the off-site store).
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