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demo-hp has been emailing daily since 2026-08-03 06:12 UTC that '500 reports
since carry no offbox target — the credential is likely burned'. Measured against
the hub's own data: all 500 of those reports DO carry one. The credential was
consumed 2026-07-23 and applied successfully; the controller reported an offsite
object continuously until 2026-08-03 05:59:21, then it vanished at 06:12:19 and
has been absent for 108 reports. A regressed apply, not a burn.
Two defects. maybeEmitStuck builds its message from ReportsSinceConsume while
hardcoding 'carry no offbox target' and never consults OffsiteReportsSinceConsume,
so the recommended action targets a failure that did not occur. And maybeHeal
refuses SILENTLY on exactly that field ('regressed-apply shape -> operator's
call', a bare return), so there is a daily email with the wrong story, no heal,
and nothing saying why the heal declined.
The underlying condition is real: that box currently has no off-site copy of its
customer app data, since 08:12 CEST on 2026-08-03. What removed it is not
established.
93 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
93 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
# STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next
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**Updated 2026-08-03.**
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> **A view, not a source.** `documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` is the authority on open work; this
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> page restates part of it in plain words, and **nothing may exist only here**. **Not `CONTEXT.md`**,
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> which is technical state written for Claude Code — keep the two separate. **Maintenance:** update
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> at the end of every session in which something shipped, broke, or was decided. One screen; cut
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> items rather than extend it.
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## What works right now
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A blank machine boots the Felhom disc, installs itself unattended, and is claimed by the customer,
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who sets their own password. They install apps from a catalogue of fifty-three, share files over the
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home network, and open apps from a launcher or a shared link. Backups run on their own to three
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places — the machine's drive, a second drive, and an encrypted off-site copy — and a customer can
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restore files and app data from the drive alone. Apps come back after a power cut: hard-reset the demo
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box six times, everything returned every time, and an app switched off deliberately stayed off.
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Proven end to end on real hardware.
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## What's broken
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- **One demo machine has no off-site copy of its app data, and has not since yesterday morning.** The
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second demo machine (`demo-hp`) stopped reporting an off-site backup at 08:12 on 3 August and has
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not reported one in 108 check-ins since. The daily email you are getting about it is right that
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something is wrong, but **its explanation is wrong** — it says the password was never applied, when
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in fact it was applied on 23 July and then stopped working eleven days later. The automatic repair
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declines, correctly, because it can see it is a different problem — but says nothing about why.
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*(R-192)*
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- **The weekly off-site backup reports FAILED although it worked.** It uploads correctly and then
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trips on a tidy-up step it is deliberately not allowed to perform, so the job ends in an error and
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you get an email. The backup itself is safe and on the endpoint. Both demo machines do it; one
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setting per machine fixes it. *(R-191)*
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- **The off-site copy can be erased by the machine that made it.** The credential that writes it can
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also delete it. A daily snapshot is armed as a stopgap.
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*(R-95, R-87)*
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## What shipped recently
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- **The on-machine backup copy has now been proved to restore — by the machines themselves.** Both
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demo machines restored their own on-machine backup into a throwaway machine overnight, booted it,
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checked it and destroyed it, without being asked: 84 and 109 seconds each. Every restore proof we
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had before this was of the *off-site* copy; the copy an ordinary recovery would actually use had
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never been tested on either machine. Both also proved their off-site copy on the same night, one
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after the other rather than at once, which is the machine deciding for itself what to do first.
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*(closes the last open half of R-86/R-185)*
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- **A backup copy the machine was never allowed to read — and could not tell you about.** One demo
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machine kept its whole-machine backups on a dedicated storage area the agent had never been granted
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permission to read. Asked what was there it was told "nothing", while an administrator saw three
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backups. **The permission was one command; the silence was the real fault** — a storage that answers
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"nothing" looks exactly like a brand-new one, which is a normal, healthy state, so that copy had
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never been test-restored and nothing had ever mentioned it. The machine now checks whether it is
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allowed to read each copy it depends on and says so when it is not — the alert reached you by email
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before the permission was granted, which is the whole point. **Both demo machines carried it and
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both are fixed**, and new machines no longer inherit it. *(R-185)*
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- **Three ways the alarm system was misreporting its own work — all fixed.** None of them ever risked
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data. **(1)** When the machine proved a backup restores, that result could vanish if the agent was
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restarted in the following quarter-hour — and yesterday's change made the gap a week rather than a
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day, because the machine correctly refuses to re-prove an archive it has already proven. It is now
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written to disk with the result and survives. This was caught happening, not predicted: a real
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14.5 GB off-site restore passed and left no record at all. **(2)** Every release had about a
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fifty-fifty chance of emailing you a failure for a release that worked; the version tag is now
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published after the binary, and a new check catches the opposite mistake so nothing is traded away.
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**(3)** A released binary can now be rebuilt by anyone and checked against the fingerprint you
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approve — until today, rebuilding produced different bytes. *(R-189, R-188, R-186)*
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## What we're working on
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- **Now:** nothing outstanding.
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- **Next:** proving the off-site *app-data* copy can actually be restored — the one tier nothing
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tests unattended. Most of the machinery it needed arrived with the restore-test change below.
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*(R-87)*
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- **After:** the off-site copy that the machine making it can still erase. *(R-95)*
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## Waiting on you
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- **A job, not a decision: the hub password needs changing.** A diagnostic command printed it into a
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session log; nothing suggests anyone else saw it. *(R-132)*
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- **One small question, not urgent.** The automatic check cannot see which version you have told
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machines to install, only which ones exist. Closing that needs either a password given to the build
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server or a check inside the hub itself. *(R-184)*
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- **Nothing else.**
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## Changed since last update
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- **2026-08-04** — Both demo machines proved their on-machine backup restores, on their own,
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overnight — the copy an ordinary recovery uses, never tested until now. Found while checking: the
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weekly off-site backup reports failure after a successful upload. *(R-185, R-191)*
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- **2026-08-03** — Fixed three ways the alarm system misreported itself: a proof of a working backup
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that could vanish on a restart (seen happening), a release that emailed a failure for a release
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that worked, and a released binary nobody could rebuild and check. *(R-189, R-188, R-186)*
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