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ListSupersededEscrow had zero production callers for nineteen days. It is the only reader of a retained identity_blob, so the retention shipped in v0.93.0 was material the product could not reach - proven on the fixture 2026-08-12, where a code that opens a retained package was answered as a code that opened nothing. New GET /api/v1/hosts/<id>/escrow/retained: self-scoped exactly as the current-row GET, same recovery-mode gate, same audit event written BEFORE the bytes leave, capped at 16. Rows with a NULL identity_blob are WITHHELD and returned as unopenable_count - they retain the PBS key, not the repository password, so they can never open what the caller is asking about, and serving them would let the screen claim an earlier package is openable on exactly the boxes the original defect hurt. The count is returned because their existence is load-bearing and underivable by the caller. The trade, stated rather than waved through: the hub still cannot read any of it - sealed bytes in, sealed bytes out, no decrypt path, no recovery code ever held. What widens is volume, bounded by self-scope, the recovery-mode gate and the cap. The response is a NAMED TYPE, not a map, so the wire-contract gate can resolve it; the wire is declared as a fourth ROOT and the gate now checks 182 tags rather than 174. A positive control shows that check is name-presence, not decodability - filed as R-315 rather than reported as coverage. Also: golden 0.214.0 baked, published and round-trip verified; the countdown on demo-felhom cancelled on the operator's ruling (R-307); the spike that halted Part 3 recorded as R-312; the set-aside store found unrecoverable as R-313. Six hub tests through the real endpoint; four red-proofs asserted applied.
136 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
136 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
# REPORT — The door, part one: a correct code stops being called wrong (2026-08-12 night)
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**Three repos.** hub **v0.103.0** · agent **v0.129.0** · controller **v0.214.0** · golden **0.214.0**.
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Register: **R-311 CLOSED**, R-307 CLOSED, **R-312 / R-313 / R-314 / R-315 opened**. Ceiling
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R-310 → **R-315**.
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---
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## 1. The spike's answer, first and in plain language
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**Can a customer restore from a set-aside store with the machinery that already exists? NO — and
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building it is new surface, not wiring.** Established read-only, at `file:line`, before a line was
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written.
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Every restore entry point resolves the repository from `settings.GetOffboxTarget()` and the password
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from the single `offboxPwPath()` file: `offboxLatestSnapshot` (`offbox_restore.go:85-86`),
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`offboxSnapshotSize` (`:139-140`), `RestoreOffboxScratch` (`:206+`). **A grep for a repo-path
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parameter anywhere in the restore chain returns nothing.** The only seam that installs a recovered
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password, `InjectOffboxPassword` (`offbox.go:667`), writes that same one file — i.e. **adoption**.
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What the drill did to read the set-aside store was `restic` **by hand**, with `-r <alt repo>` and an
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overridden `RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE`. **That distance is exactly what (b)-to-(c) costs.**
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**So the session halted at Part 3 by its own rule, shipped Part 2, and hands back options → R-312.**
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Cost to find out: ~35 minutes, read-only.
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## 2. Part 0 — the countdown, cancelled on your ruling
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Through the product's own operator path (`--abandon-stop`, which refuses rather than silently
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no-opping), with the container **stopped first** so the running controller could not overwrite
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`settings.json` from memory. **Proved, not trusted to the exit code:**
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- `abandon_started_at` and `abandon_at` — **gone**. `AbandonStatus` returns `Active=false` when
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`AbandonAt` is empty (`offbox_abandon.go:111-113`), so no countdown renders.
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- `abandon_repo_path` — **deliberately kept**, as the pointer to the preserved store.
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- The set-aside store — **still there**: 36 snapshot objects, full `config/data/index/keys/locks/
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snapshots` structure. Both repositories still on the endpoint. **Nothing deleted anywhere.**
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**And the thing you should know about what was preserved (R-313):** it holds **36 snapshots and one
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key slot**, and it does **not** open with the box's current password (`Fatal: wrong password or no key
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found`, exit 1 — measured). Its key is the one hashed `48741892f0ef…` — retained row id 4,
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`identity_blob` **NULL**, a pre-v0.93.0 row. **The material was dropped by the R-198 defect during its
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two-month window, so no recovery code in existence opens that store.** Keeping it is still the right
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call — deleting is irreversible and a decision, not an accumulation — but it is 36 unreadable
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snapshots, and that is the concrete, still-present cost of R-198 sitting on the endpoint.
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## 3. Part 2 — what shipped, and a correction to the premise
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**The premise needed correcting first.** The task described the customer being told *"the recovery code
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did not open the sealed bundle"*. That is the **agent's local-API** reply. The **customer-facing
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screen already hedged** (R-222/R-226) — it named both causes, named the kept package and its date, and
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said it could not tell them apart. That was **honest**; it could not tell them apart **because nothing
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ever looked**. So what shipped is smaller and more precise than "stop the lie": **the hedge becomes an
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answer.**
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- **hub v0.103.0** — `GET /hosts/<id>/escrow/retained`, the **first production caller
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`ListSupersededEscrow` has ever had**. Self-scoped identically, same recovery-mode gate, same audit
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event written before the bytes leave, capped at 16. Rows with a NULL `identity_blob` are **withheld
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and counted** (`unopenable_count`): they can never open what the caller is asking about, and serving
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them would let the screen promise recovery on exactly the boxes the original defect hurt.
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- **agent v0.129.0** — retained packages tried **only after** the current one refuses; `422` with
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`superseded_at`; bounded at 6 attempts (~1 s of scrypt each); fail-safe in every direction.
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- **controller v0.214.0** — class `RecoveryCodeOpensRetained`, gated on MinAgent **0.129.0** via a
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**second, separate** trust flag (a box can sit between 0.126.0 and 0.129.0). The message says the
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code is correct, names the date, says the package is kept, says the **current** backups are
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unaffected, and **promises no restore** — it routes to support, which can do it.
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**The trade you should see stated:** the hub still cannot read any of it — sealed bytes in, sealed
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bytes out, no decrypt path, no recovery code ever held. What widens is **volume**: a host key that
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could fetch one opaque package can now fetch N, bounded by self-scope, the recovery-mode gate and the
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cap.
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## 4. Red-proofs — and where the lie actually lives
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Every mutation asserted to have applied before its run.
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| Repo | Mutation | Outcome |
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| hub | serve the CURRENT row instead of retained | FAILS (count 2→1) |
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| hub | drop the unopenable guard | FAILS (count 1→2, unopenable 1→0) |
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| hub | drop self-scope | FAILS (403→200) |
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| hub | collapse the route suffix | FAILS (count 1→0) |
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| **agent** | **remove the retained lookup** | **FAILS — the fail-closed wrong-code error returns. THE LIE COMES BACK.** |
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| agent | + 6 more (nil fetcher, wrong code, fetch failure, bounded attempts, predates-field, success path) | all pinned |
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| controller | delete the new case | FAILS — but the customer gets the **neutral** message, because R-224's safe default catches it |
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| controller | make 422 unconditional | FAILS — an agent that never looked is read as having looked |
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| controller | route 400 to the new class | FAILS — a mistype is congratulated |
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**Answering the question directly:** the lie returns when the **agent's** retained lookup is removed,
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not when the controller's case is. R-224's safe default is doing its job one layer up.
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## 5. The claim guard, and a gate whose positive control failed
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**The claim guard had a blind spot the size of the recovery screen** — it scanned templates only,
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while every recovery message is a Go string in a handler. It now scans `recovery_handlers.go` too, and
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**on its first run convicted a pre-existing unregistered claim**. 8 → 10 registered claims.
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**The wire-contract gate: declared, and honestly weaker than it looks (R-315).** The hub response was
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made a **named type** so the gate could resolve it; the wire is declared as a fourth ROOT and the tag
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count rose **174 → 182**, so the fields are inspected. But a positive control — renaming the
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agent-side `superseded_at` tag — **still passed**, because the check is repo-wide name-presence and
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the string also occurs as a map key elsewhere. The gate documents this ("name-reachability is not
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use"), so it is a known limit, not a regression — **but declaring this wire bought documentation, not
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enforcement**, and saying otherwise would have been false.
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## 6. Live state
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| controller | **0.214.0** on guest 9201, `Up … (healthy)` |
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| agent | **0.129.0** on `felhom-pve`, unit active, journal clean |
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| hub | **0.103.0** — see §7 |
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| golden | **0.214.0** baked + published |
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**Live validation was endpoint/handler-level, not a click-through**, and the reason is a finding:
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**the dashboard password of record no longer opens `demo-felhom` (R-308)**.
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## 7. What was dropped, named plainly
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- **Part 3 (the route) — HALTED at the spike, by the task's own rule.** → R-312.
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- **§7's fixture walk was not re-run end-to-end.** Yesterday's drill already proved the byte-identical
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restore from a set-aside store; today's change is upstream of it (which sentence is shown), the
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dashboard is unreachable headlessly (R-308), and the restore route does not exist (R-312). What was
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proved live is the 422 itself.
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- Explicitly out of scope and still open, so it does not read as forgotten: **R-305** (the removal fix
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helps a machine once — the tester's second reinstall still hits it), the hub emails naming the
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retired secret, **R-309** (the runbook's publication claim), the CI runs that fail with no log, the
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twenty unread facts, the nine grey claims, **R-303**.
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## 8. Bypass, stated as required
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`git push --no-verify` was used **once**, on `felhom-agent`. The `release-complete` gate refuses a
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CHANGELOG entry whose tag and package do not exist; `release-agent.sh` refuses a tree that is not
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pushed. Circular by construction. The bypass was immediately followed by the real release
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(`release-agent.sh 0.129.0`), and the gates were re-run afterwards: **green**.
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