felhom.eu/REPORT-campaign10.md

# REPORT — Campaign 10, two-storage adversarial soak (2026-07-31)

Follows `REPORT-campaign7/8/9.md`. Root `REPORT.md` is another session's (hub v0.85.0) and was not
clobbered — same shared-clone reasoning as `REPORT-iso-release.md`.

**Full audit + evidence:** `documentation/audits/CAMPAIGN-10-two-storage-soak-2026-07-31.md`,
`documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/`.

## The sentence that matters

**Phase A passed every gate. Phase B ran to 39 consecutive cycles with the full atom set — past the
"drift at the thirty-eighth" depth the brief asked for. 66 restores, 66 correct discriminators. No
resource leak over 13.5 h. Two findings: R-156 and R-157.**

## What was established

- **Venue** — VM 311 on demo-hp (Tier 0), 200 G system + 2 × 50 G data, scratch storage at the
  `/mnt/nvme-1tb` **mount root** (a subdirectory would have emitted `storage_disconnected` for demo-hp
  all night — the exact signal I1/I2 discriminate).
- **Baselines, all read fresh.** controller `main` 0.188.0, **golden 0.188.0 (not behind)**, agent
  0.119.0 published+vouched, hub 0.86.0, ISO **1.26.1** (`f3cc86d5…`, round-trip verified live).
  The brief's ISO assumption (v1.25.0) was ~90 minutes stale; its "no baked SSH key" claim is R-129.
- **Isolation gate — both denials captured, each with a positive control.** The PBS control **failed
  first**: four clean-looking 403s were worthless because the token was denied on its own datastore
  too (PBS token privilege separation). Fixed, re-run, denials stand.
- **A1** fresh install from the **published** ISO. 1.26.1 is a public release image — verified against
  its bytes that it has no auto-install path — so it was driven blind via screendump + `sendkey`
  through the Terminal UI. Caught the Hungarian-keymap trap before typing the root password, which
  would otherwise have been mangled and locked the box out.
- **A2** claimed for real; discriminator flipped `dashboard not yet claimed` → `authentication required`.
- **A3** both drives enrolled through the **real** endpoint; `mentes` accepted as backup target via
  the offer flow, ending `degraded:false / target:felhom-backup` — the I5/I6 healthy baseline.
  Four apps healthy spanning both sides of D5's split (4 × `type: secret`, 1 × `type: password`).
- **A4** discriminators seed and read back across all four apps; rallly's over the path
  `DATABASE_URL` actually names, not the trusted socket that produced D5's false pass.

## Phase B — the soak

Three passes: run 1 (27 cycles, 6 atom families, 0 violations), run 2a (10 cycles, **stopped
deliberately** — two violations were harness defects), run 2b (**39 cycles, 12 atom families**).
1 461 invariant checks in total.

- **I7 is the headline: 66 restores across both passes, 66 correct discriminators.** Never stale,
  never empty. Run 2b added an `I7-SKIP` verdict so a check with unmet preconditions is recorded as
  skipped rather than silently green — it fired once.
- **I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I10, I11: zero violations in either pass**, including the abort-in-place
  variants and 330 secret-class assertions covering both sides of D5's split.
- **`I1-under-load` 5/5**: the backup target pulled **while a backup was running** still produced
  `backup_target_absent` and a clean recovery.
- **R-117's Q7 case holds** — a filesystem aborted *in place* (device still present) surfaces via
  `bound_under_parent=false`, the gate stops the app on the dead namespace, and the storage page names
  it. That is the case R-117's spike called "the worse half".
- **RTO (Tier 1, rallly, 66 MB):** run 1 median **42.0 s**, run 2b median **41.4 s** over 38 restores
  — two independent passes agreeing to 0.6 s. **S band's lower end only**; nothing extrapolates to M
  or L. **RPO not measured.**
- **No resource leak.** 9 457 samples of 19 metrics over 13.5 h: controller and agent RSS flat, fds
  flat, and **no orphaned volumes, images or containers** despite dozens of redeploys, kills, reboots
  and hard resets. The only curve with real slope is the **agent journal, 194 → 463 MB (~20 MB/h)** —
  bounded by journald, but a lot of logging.
- Every atom and invariant was **proven by hand before automation**; the runner asserts nothing that
  was not first observed live.
- **A Phase A gap was caught before the run:** no app had `HDD_PATH`, so all data sat on the system
  disk and I3 could never have fired. calibre-web was deployed onto `adatok` first — otherwise the
  soak would have produced green cycles that tested nothing cross-drive.
- **Two violations were my harness, not the product**, and run 2a was stopped for them: a seed that
  never landed became a fake "stale restore", and a real one would have looked identical. Fixed and
  red-proofed before restarting.

## Findings

- **R-156 (new)** — **papra's data is neither persisted nor backed up, and it reports healthy.** The
  template mounts `papra_data:/app/data`; the app writes `/app/app-data/db/db.sqlite`. The volume is
  empty and root-owned (the image is `-rootless`, so the app cannot even write there), the real DB
  sits in the container's writable layer, and the healthcheck only probes the HTTP port. Its
  Tier-1/Tier-2 backup is real, verifiable, and contains nothing. Not fixed.
- **R-157 (new)** — **bootrecon's start-once sweep misses the boot orphan it exists to recover.** Two
  mechanisms. **A:** the container is left `Exited`, the sweep runs ~5 s after controller start while
  docker is still restoring, sees "no boot-orphaned apps", and never re-checks (3 occurrences,
  intermittent ~50%). **B:** the interruption leaves the stack with **zero containers**, which is
  exactly the signature bootrecon deliberately skips as a user's Stop — and in that state the deadapp
  check reported **`0 currently down`** while a `deployed: true` app was not running, i.e. silent on
  every channel. A settle-condition fix closes A and leaves B open. Not fixed.
- **Tier 3 could not be isolated, so it was not run.** Offsite hard-requires the DR tier
  (`configs.go:1300`), and the DR tier only provisions on ep0 (per-endpoint allocation deferred,
  `hub/README.md:260`). Both are recorded deliberate positions, so **no R-n minted**. The campaign
  therefore touched neither ep0 nor the Storage Box — stronger isolation than asked for, obtained by
  not running the tier. Cost: all Tier-3 atoms, I8, and the Tier-3 RTO/RPO rows.

## What did not run

**12 of the brief's ~13 atom families ran** (run 1 covered 6; run 2b added abort-fs-in-place,
kill-agent-mid-backup, hard-reset-mid-write, reboot-VM, both concurrency atoms and fill-drive).
Previously reported as 6 of 12 — that was run 1 only.

**Superseded detail:** Still not run: **Tier-3 backup/restore** (§3, structurally un-isolatable) and **I8**. **I9** was not
automated — cited from the tester-gate run on this same controller 0.188.0, not re-claimed.
`kill_controller` is still not literally "mid-backup"; the dedicated concurrent backup+detach atom
covers that case properly. The run-1 flaw where `reboot` never interleaved with a detach was fixed.

**Depth reached: 39 consecutive cycles**, past the brief's "thirty-eighth", with c34–c39 clean on
every invariant. Beyond 39 is untested, not proven clean.

## Teardown — OWED, nothing removed

Still intact: the rig is reusable for the atoms that did not run. VM 311, `c10-scratch`, PBS datastore
`felhom-c10` + user/token, restic subaccount `u629488-sub4`, and **hub customer `c10-soak` (disposition:
DELETE)** are all outstanding, with commands in the audit §9. Named explicitly because R-131 is four
orphaned scratch customers left by exactly this omission.