admin
44ec06b50f
Hetzner storage-box provisioning against api.hetzner.com/v1 (NOT .cloud).
internal/hetznerapi (typed client + CloudAPI interface + Fake + WaitAction);
internal/offsite (Provisioner.ProvisionOffsite — idempotent by label, shared
sub-account/dedicated box, transient password, non-secret Descriptor,
fail-closed); one_time_secrets store (single-use Save/Consume); POST
/offsite/consume-password/{id} (customer-key auth, once); config-form Offsite
section → applyOffsite (502+no-save on error) → descriptor in ConfigJSON →
version bump. Token/passwords never logged/committed/in ConfigJSON. Tested vs a
faked Cloud API + fail-closed red-proof. NOT yet live-provisioned (needs the
dedicated-project scoped token; current token can delete ep0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
356 lines
24 KiB
Markdown
356 lines
24 KiB
Markdown
# felhom-hub
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**Central operator dashboard for monitoring and managing Felhom customer deployments.**
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A lightweight Go service that receives periodic reports and structured events from felhom-controller instances, stores them in SQLite, and provides a web dashboard for fleet monitoring. Also serves as the infrastructure backup store for disaster recovery, event-based dead man's switch monitoring, and notification dispatch.
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**Current version: v0.6.3**
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---
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## Architecture
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```
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Customer nodes Central Hub (k3s)
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┌─────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────┐
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│ felhom-controller│──── JSON push ────▶│ felhom-hub │
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│ (every 15 min) │ (Bearer auth) │ │
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│ │ │ ┌─────────────────┐ │
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│ POST /api/v1/ │ │ │ API Handler │ │
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│ report │ │ │ (ingest reports, │ │
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│ host-report │◀── config push ────│ │ host reports, │ │
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│ notify │ (YAML body) │ │ config push, │ │
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│ │ │ │ asset serving) │ │
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│ GET /api/v1/ │ │ └────────┬────────┘ │
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│ assets/* │◀── asset download ─│ │ │
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└─────────────────┘ (Bearer auth) │ ┌────────▼────────┐ │
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│ │ SQLite Store │ │
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Operator browser │ │ (reports, │ │
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┌─────────────────┐ │ │ assets, │ │
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│ Web Dashboard │◀── HTML pages ──────│ │ host_reports, │ │
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│ (hub.felhom.eu) │ (bcrypt auth) │ │ configs, │ │
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└─────────────────┘ │ │ notifications) │ │
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│ └─────────────────┘ │
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│ │
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│ ┌─────────────────┐ │
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│ │ Asset Manager │ │
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│ │ (PVC storage, │ │
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│ │ SHA-256 manifest│ │
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│ │ file serving) │ │
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│ └─────────────────┘ │
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│ │
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│ ┌─────────────────┐ │
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│ │ Web Dashboard │ │
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│ │ (unified customer│ │
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│ │ management) │ │
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│ └─────────────────┘ │
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└────────────────────────┘
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```
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## API Endpoints
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All API endpoints require `Authorization: Bearer <api_key>` (except `/healthz` and `/api/v1/config/{id}`). Auth accepts both the global `report_api_key` and per-customer API keys (generated when creating customer configs).
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### Report Ingest
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| `POST` | `/api/v1/report` | Controller pushes periodic status report (v0.28.0+ includes `app_telemetry` field) |
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| `GET` | `/api/v1/customers` | List all customers with latest report summary |
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| `GET` | `/api/v1/customers/{id}` | Get latest full report for a customer |
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| `GET` | `/api/v1/customers/{id}/history?period=7d` | Get report history |
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The `POST /api/v1/report` handler (v0.4.0+) automatically parses the optional `app_telemetry` JSON array from the request body and stores it in `app_telemetry` / `app_log_issues` tables. Old controllers (no `app_telemetry` key) continue to work unchanged.
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### DR Recipe — secret-free reconstruction recipe (hub v0.13.0)
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The hub assembles + stores + serves the **secret-free DR recipe** (`documentation/audits/SPIKE-dr-recipe-2026-06-16.md`) — the non-secret re-provision plan that complements escrow (keys) + PBS/restic (bytes). It arrives as two additive `dr_recipe` halves on the existing report paths: the **agent's** storage/guest/PBS half on `POST /api/v1/host-report` and the **controller's** customer/apps half on `POST /api/v1/report` (both backward-compatible, ignore-unknown). The hub stores them PLAINTEXT in a dedicated `dr_recipe` table keyed by `customer_id` (`SaveDRRecipeHostHalf` / `SaveDRRecipeAppHalf`, each preserving the other half), and `AssembleDRRecipe` stitches them into one operator-readable recipe (`{recipe_version, customer, guests, pbs, drives, pve_storage, apps}`; sub-sections pass through verbatim, version = max of the two halves). An operator views the panel on the customer page and downloads the assembled JSON at `GET /customers/{id}/dr-recipe.json`. **Plaintext-at-rest is correct here** — the recipe carries only identifiers/intents/sizes/coordinates, never a key/password/token (the boundary is enforced at the controller emitter). This is the clean inverse of the retired infra-backup.
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### Offsite provisioning (SLICE 1, hub v0.37.0)
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On operator enable (config form → **Offsite backup**), the hub provisions the customer's offsite tier against
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the **Hetzner storage-box API at `https://api.hetzner.com/v1`** (NOT `api.hetzner.cloud` — the classic Cloud
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API 404s for storage boxes; shapes measured in `documentation/audits/SPIKE-hetzner-api-provisioning-2026-07-09.md`).
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Two models: **shared** (a sub-account on the pool box) or **dedicated** (its own box). Flow (`internal/offsite`):
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idempotent lookup by label `felhom-customer=<id>` → create (password generated hub-side) → poll the action to
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`success` → **`SaveOneTimeSecret`** (the transient password, single-use) → merge the **non-secret descriptor**
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(`{enabled,type,host,user,port:23,repo_path,quota_gb|box_type}`) into `ConfigJSON` → `ConfigVersion` bump →
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the controller re-pulls. The controller consumes the one-time password at `POST /offsite/consume-password/{id}`
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(customer-API-key auth, single-use) — then installs its key and the hub resets the box password (SLICE 2+).
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**Fail-closed:** a provisioning error returns 502 and saves nothing. **Secrets:** the Hetzner token
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(`HETZNER_TOKEN`, out-of-band) and every generated password are NEVER logged / committed / in `ConfigJSON`.
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**PREREQUISITE for live use:** the token MUST be scoped to a **dedicated Hetzner project** (the current shared
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project token can delete ep0 — spike §6). Absent token → the UI still renders; saving with offsite enabled
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returns "not configured". SLICE 2 (controller apply-bridge), SLICE 3 (escrow auto-confirm), SLICE 4 (soft-quota) follow.
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### Infrastructure Backup — RETIRED (Phase-1, 2026-06-16, hub v0.12.0)
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The Infra Backup mechanism (`POST/GET /api/v1/infra-backup`, the operator panel, the
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`infra_backup_versions` / `infra_backups` tables) has been **removed**. It had been dead since
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slice 8C (the disk-tier backup moved to the host agent), and it stored each version as a **plaintext
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JSON blob** holding the customer's app-secret encryption key, restic password, and Cloudflare tokens —
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a zero-knowledge violation. The retirement migration `DROP`s both tables and `VACUUM`s the DB to
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physically reclaim the plaintext pages. Disaster recovery now rests on the agent's **PBS whole-CT
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snapshot** (the data bytes) plus the generated `controller.yaml` from the recovery endpoint (the
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config); a secret-free **DR recipe** is the later DR slice's job. See
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`documentation/audits/SPIKE-infra-backup-2026-06-15.md`.
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### Recovery (Disaster Recovery)
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| `GET` | `/api/v1/recovery/{customer_id}` | Returns the generated controller.yaml for a customer |
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Auth: `X-Retrieval-Password` header (same per-customer password as config retrieval). Response:
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```json
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{
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"customer_id": "example",
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"config_yaml": "customer:\n id: example\n ...",
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"has_infra_backup": false
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}
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```
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The `has_infra_backup` field is retained as `false` so any old client degrades gracefully to the
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config-only path.
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### Report Response
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The `POST /api/v1/report` response now includes `customer_blocked: true` when the customer's status is "blocked". Controllers use this to detect their standing and enter limited mode after a grace period.
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### Events
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| `POST` | `/api/v1/event` | Controller pushes structured event (27 allowed types, severity: info/warning/error) |
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Events are the primary monitoring mechanism. Each event has: customer_id, event_type, severity, message, details_json, source. Per-customer API keys are validated against the customer_id in the payload. Stored in the `events` table with automatic pruning.
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**Hub-generated events** (source="hub"):
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- `node_stale` / `node_down` / `node_recovered` — dead man's switch from staleness checker (every 60s)
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- `host_stale` / `host_down` / `host_recovered` — host-domain dead man's switch (agent host reports)
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- `agent_capability_degraded` / `agent_capability_recovered` — `HostCapabilityChecker`: an agent's
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required `sudo -n` grant went missing (the non-root cutover class)
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- `host_leaf_changed` — `HostLeafChecker` (`monitor/host_leaf.go`, every 60s): an agent's reported
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local-API **leaf fingerprint** changed (an agent re-key) — proactive, fleet-wide, independent of any
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controller's channel-health check. Trust-on-first-report baseline; empty fp = unknown (never alerts).
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Reads the fp from the latest host-report (`store.GetHostLeafFingerprints`, no schema migration).
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- `expected_backup_missed` / `expected_dbdump_missed` — backup deadline checker (daily at 05:00 Budapest)
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### Notifications
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| `POST` | `/api/v1/notify` | Legacy notification relay (kept for backward compatibility) |
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| `POST` | `/api/v1/preferences` | Controller syncs customer notification preferences (email, enabled_events, cooldown_hours) |
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Notifications are dispatched automatically when events are processed:
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- **Operator channel**: English emails for warning/error events, 1h cooldown per customer:eventType
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- **Customer channel**: Hungarian emails per event type, respects customer preferences and cooldown (default 6h)
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- Email delivery via Resend.com API
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### Customer Config Retrieval
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| `GET` | `/api/v1/config/{customer_id}` | Download generated controller.yaml (auth: `X-Retrieval-Password` header) |
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Config retrieval uses a separate per-customer retrieval password (not the API key). Retrieval passwords are auto-generated as **Hungarian word passphrases** (e.g., `alma-kerék-madár-felhő`) for easy phone-based entry during disaster recovery. The Hub generates a complete `controller.yaml` by deep-merging `controller.yaml.example` (periodically fetched from the Gitea repo) with customer-specific overrides (identity, infrastructure tokens, hub API key, session secret).
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### Host Enrollment (Day-0, option C)
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| `POST` | `/api/v1/host-enroll` | Mint-or-reuse a host credential, body `{customer_id}` (auth: `X-Retrieval-Password` header) → `{host_id, api_key}` |
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The Day-0 first-boot handshake (`documentation/audits/SPIKE-day0-firstboot-handshake-2026-06-26.md`) enrolls a Proxmox host's agent **using the customer's retrieval passphrase only** — the operator-tier global key never enters the field deploy path. `host-enroll` mints the per-host credential on the first call and **reuses it byte-for-byte** on every later call (idempotent — re-running the host-bootstrap never orphans a running agent's key), backed by `Store.GetHostByCustomer`. Auth is checked **before** any mint, so a wrong passphrase never creates a host row. Behaviour: first → `201`, reuse → `200`, wrong/missing passphrase → `401`, unknown customer → `404`, missing `customer_id` → `400`.
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The global-key `POST /api/v1/admin/hosts` (operator/HQ pre-mint) remains as the escape hatch pending the enrollment-cutover lock-down; it and `GET /config/{id}` are unchanged by this endpoint.
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### Assets
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| `GET` | `/api/v1/assets/manifest` | JSON manifest of all assets with SHA-256 checksums |
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| `GET` | `/api/v1/assets/file/{filename}` | Download a single asset file (logo, screenshot) |
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Assets are stored on the Hub PVC at `<dataDir>/assets/`. On first run, assets are seeded from the Docker image (`/usr/share/felhom/assets-seed/`). The manifest includes filename, size, and SHA-256 hash for each file — controllers use this for efficient change detection.
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**Asset types served:** `{slug}-logo.svg`, `{slug}-logo.png`, `{slug}-screenshot-{N}.webp`
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The asset manager (`internal/assets/`) scans the assets directory on startup, builds an in-memory manifest, and serves files with appropriate Content-Type and cache headers. Both endpoints require Bearer token auth (global or per-customer API key).
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### Health
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| `GET` | `/healthz` | Health check (no auth required, returns 503 if SQLite ping fails) |
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## Web Dashboard
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Protected by bcrypt password + session cookie (7-day expiry).
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### Authentication & Session Model (`internal/web/server.go`)
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- Login generates a **cryptographically random 64-char hex session token** stored server-side in a `map[string]*hubSession` (+ `sync.RWMutex`). The old literal `hub_session=authenticated` cookie is gone.
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- Each session also stores a **per-session CSRF token** (separate 64-char hex random value).
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- Cookie attributes: `SameSite=Lax`, `Secure` (when TLS), `HttpOnly`, 7-day `Max-Age`.
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- `RequireAuth` middleware validates the session token with `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare` and redirects to `/login` on failure.
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- `CleanupSessions(ctx)` goroutine runs hourly to purge expired sessions.
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### CSRF Protection (`internal/web/server.go`)
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Synchronizer-token CSRF protection on all browser POST/DELETE/PATCH operations:
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- CSRF validation block runs at the top of `ServeHTTP` before routing.
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- Skipped when: no session cookie present (API/Basic-Auth path); or safe methods (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS).
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- Token read from `_csrf` form field or `X-CSRF-Token` request header.
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- On failure: JSON `{"ok":false,"error":"CSRF token missing or invalid"}` for `/api/` paths; HTTP 403 text otherwise.
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- Template delivery: `csrfToken(r)` and `csrfField(r)` helpers inject `CSRFToken` and `CSRFField` into every render data struct via `configs.go`. Templates use `{{.CSRFField}}` in forms and `csrfHeaders()` JS helper for fetch calls.
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### Pages
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- **Dashboard (`/`)** — Fleet overview table showing all customers with live status and event count badges (error+warning in last 24h). Config-only customers (no reports yet) appear as "PENDING" with gray badge. Blocked customers are hidden. Auto-refreshes every 60 seconds.
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- **Customers (`/configs`)** — Customer management list. Shows all customers (both managed and manual), their status, controller version, and config type (MANAGED/MANUAL). Blocked customers shown grayed-out with BLOCKED badge.
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- **Fleet App Analytics (`/apps`)** — Fleet-wide app telemetry overview (v0.4.0+). Shows all deployed apps across all customers with deployment count, avg/P95 memory, catalog estimate/limit accuracy indicators, and 24h error/warning badge counts. Sortable columns (deployments/memory/errors), 24h/7d/30d time period selector.
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- **App Detail (`/apps/{name}`)** — Per-app drill-down page with Chart.js memory trend (avg + peak lines, catalog limit dashed line), per-customer breakdown table, and known log issues table (severity, message, occurrence count, affected customers, first/last seen). Shows suggested mem_limit from P95×1.2 rounded to 32 MB.
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- **Unified Customer Detail (`/customers/{id}`)** — Single page per customer combining config management and live monitoring. Auto-refresh toggle (localStorage-persisted, enabled by default) replaces the previous hardcoded 60s meta-refresh. Adapts content based on available data:
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- **Managed + reporting:** Full view — config info, system metrics, storage, containers, backup status, events timeline (last 50, severity filter), credentials, setup commands, YAML preview, controller update, notifications (with channel column), history
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- **Managed + no reports yet:** Config info, credentials, setup commands, "Waiting for first report" indicator
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- **Manual (report-only):** System metrics, storage, containers, backup, with "Create Config" button to convert to managed
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- **Config Form (`/configs/new`, `/configs/{id}/edit`)** — Create/edit customer configurations with identity, infrastructure tokens, and monitoring overrides. Legacy Monitoring UUIDs section collapsed by default with deprecation notice. CF API token requires **Zone DNS:Edit** (ACME) and **Zone WAF:Edit** (geo-restriction) permissions.
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### Customer States
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| State | Dashboard | Customers List | Detail Page |
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|-------|-----------|----------------|-------------|
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| **Active + reporting** | Shown with live status | MANAGED + status badge | Full unified view |
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| **Active + no reports** | Shown as PENDING (gray) | MANAGED + no status | Config + "waiting for report" |
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| **Manual (report-only)** | Shown with live status | MANUAL + status badge | Reports + "Create Config" button |
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| **Blocked** | Hidden | Shown grayed-out, BLOCKED badge | Blocked banner + Unblock button |
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### Customer Actions
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| Action | Description |
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|--------|-------------|
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| **Block/Unblock** | Toggle blocked status — blocked customers are hidden from dashboard and notifications are suppressed, but reports are still accepted and stored |
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| **Push Config** | Generate YAML from Hub config and POST it to the controller's `/api/config/apply` endpoint (requires controller URL from reports) |
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| **Pull Config** | Import controller's current config into Hub — fetches live YAML via `GET /api/config`, extracts identity and override fields, updates Hub's stored config |
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| **Show Diff** | Compare Hub-generated config with controller's live config — shows per-key differences in a color-coded table (value-based comparison, ignores key ordering and volatile fields) |
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| **Create Config** | Auto-create a managed config from a manual customer's report data, then redirect to edit form |
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| **Trigger Update** | Instruct controller to self-update to the latest version |
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| **Delete** | Remove customer config (customer reappears as manual if reports continue) |
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### Status Logic
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- **OK (green):** report < 30 min old, health = ok
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- **WARN (yellow):** 30-60 min stale or health = warn
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- **DOWN (red):** > 60 min stale or health = fail
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- **DISABLED (gray):** controller monitoring paused
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- **PENDING (gray):** config exists but no reports received yet
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- **BLOCKED (gray):** customer blocked by operator
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## Data Storage
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SQLite with WAL mode. Tables:
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| Table | Purpose |
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|-------|---------|
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| `reports` | Full JSON reports with denormalized fields for dashboard queries |
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| `events` | Structured events from controllers and Hub (type, severity, message, details, source) |
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| `customer_notifications` | Email, enabled event types, cooldown hours per customer |
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| `notification_log` | Send/skip/fail history for notifications with channel (operator/customer) |
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| `customer_configs` | Pre-configured customer settings, retrieval passwords, per-customer API keys, status (active/blocked) |
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Retention: configurable (default 90 days), daily prune at 04:30 Budapest time.
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### PVC Asset Storage
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App assets (logos, screenshots, branding) are stored on the PVC at `<dataDir>/assets/`. On every startup, the Hub compares SHA-256 checksums between the image seed (`/usr/share/felhom/assets-seed/`) and the PVC, updating any changed files. This means redeploying the Hub image with updated assets automatically propagates changes without PVC deletion.
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A manual "Refresh Assets from Image" button is available on the **Configuration** page (`/configuration`) for triggering a re-seed + manifest rebuild on demand.
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## Configuration
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```yaml
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# hub.yaml
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auth:
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password_hash: "" # bcrypt hash for dashboard login (empty = no auth)
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api:
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report_api_key: "" # Bearer token for API auth
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notifications:
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resend_api_key: "" # Resend.com API key for email
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from_email: "monitoring@felhom.eu"
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operator_email: "" # Operator alert recipient
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operator_enabled: true # Enable operator email notifications
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retention:
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max_days: 90
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prune_schedule: "04:30"
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alerting:
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stale_threshold: "30m" # Customer considered stale after this duration
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registry:
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image: "gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller"
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username: "" # Gitea registry credentials
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token: ""
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check_interval: "30m" # How often to check for new controller versions
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template_interval: "1h" # How often to refresh controller.yaml.example
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server:
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listen: ":8080"
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data_dir: "/data" # SQLite database location
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```
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## Deployment
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Runs on k3s (Kubernetes) in the `felhom-system` namespace:
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- **PVC:** 1GB Longhorn volume for SQLite database + app assets
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- **Resources:** 64Mi-256Mi memory, 50m-500m CPU
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- **Ingress:** `hub.felhom.eu` with TLS (cert-manager)
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- **Geo-restriction:** Hungary only (nginx annotation)
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```bash
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# Build and push (on 192.168.0.180)
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cd ~/build/felhom-hub
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./build.sh v0.3.8 --push
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# Build script auto-syncs app assets from website/assets/ into the image
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# Deploy (ArgoCD managed — update manifests/hub.yaml image tag, commit+push)
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git pull && kubectl apply -f manifests/hub.yaml
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# Check
|
||
kubectl logs -n felhom-system -l app=hub --tail 20
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**Note:** `kubectl set image` alone does NOT persist — ArgoCD reverts it. Always update `manifests/hub.yaml` and apply.
|
||
|
||
The Dockerfile includes `COPY assets/ /usr/share/felhom/assets-seed/` which bakes app assets into the image as a seed for the PVC. The build script copies `*-logo.svg`, `*-logo.png`, and `*-screenshot-*.webp` from the website repo's `assets/` directory.
|
||
|
||
## Background Services
|
||
|
||
| Service | Schedule | Description |
|
||
|---------|----------|-------------|
|
||
| **Staleness checker** | Every 60s | Detects controllers that stopped reporting. Generates `node_stale` (>30min), `node_down` (>60min), `node_recovered` events |
|
||
| **Backup deadline checker** | Daily 05:00 Budapest | Detects missing backup/db-dump events since midnight. Generates `expected_backup_missed`, `expected_dbdump_missed` events |
|
||
| **Report/event prune** | Daily 04:30 Budapest | Deletes reports and events older than retention period (default 90 days) |
|
||
| **Registry version check** | Every 30min | Checks Gitea registry for new controller image tags |
|
||
| **Template refresh** | Every 1h | Fetches latest `controller.yaml.example` from Gitea |
|
||
| **Asset seeding** | On startup | Compares SHA-256 checksums and updates changed assets from Docker image seed |
|
||
|
||
## Internal Packages
|
||
|
||
| Package | Purpose |
|
||
|---------|---------|
|
||
| `internal/api` | REST API handler (report ingest, config, events, assets, notifications) |
|
||
| `internal/web` | Web dashboard (session auth, customer management, fleet overview) |
|
||
| `internal/assets` | PVC asset manager (manifest generation, SHA-256 checksums, file serving, image seed) |
|
||
| `internal/configgen` | Shared YAML config generation (deep-merge template + customer overrides) |
|
||
|
||
## Dependencies
|
||
|
||
- `golang.org/x/crypto` — bcrypt for password hashing
|
||
- `gopkg.in/yaml.v3` — YAML config parsing
|
||
- `modernc.org/sqlite` — Pure Go SQLite (no CGo)
|