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- OPEN-ITEMS: all three rows closed with their measurements. R-189 records the migration consequence seen live (a pre-R-189 record has no tier and is not reportable, so upgrading does not retroactively make an old proof visible). R-188 records both directions demonstrated and the fixture cleaned up. R-186 carries the before/after sha values including the CGO_ENABLED discrepancy. The priority list states explicitly that R-185 is the one left open from that group and that this session did not touch it. - capability map: the restore-proof row now says the evidence path itself had a gap — the proof reached the hub only because no restart intervened — and what closed it. - CONTEXT: S-19 (a proof is durable and reportable, a failure is neither, and why) and S-20 (the release ordering, what each step protects, and how a binary is verified). - STATUS: rewritten for the operator, back to one screen.
84 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
84 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
# STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next
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**Updated 2026-08-03.**
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> **A view, not a source.** `documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` is the authority on open work; this
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> page restates part of it in plain words, and **nothing may exist only here**. **Not `CONTEXT.md`**,
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> which is technical state written for Claude Code — keep the two separate. **Maintenance:** update
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> at the end of every session in which something shipped, broke, or was decided. One screen; cut
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> items rather than extend it.
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## What works right now
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A blank machine boots the Felhom disc, installs itself unattended, and is claimed by the customer,
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who sets their own password. They install apps from a catalogue of fifty-three, share files over the
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home network, and open apps from a launcher or a shared link. Backups run on their own to three
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places — the machine's drive, a second drive, and an encrypted off-site copy — and a customer can
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restore files and app data from the drive alone. Apps come back after a power cut: hard-reset the demo
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box six times, everything returned every time, and an app switched off deliberately stayed off.
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Proven end to end on real hardware.
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## What's broken
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- **The off-site copy can be erased by the machine that made it.** The credential that writes it can
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also delete it. A daily snapshot is armed as a stopgap, and we have never restored from that copy.
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*(R-95, R-87)*
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- **Nothing else open that affects a customer.** The three faults that were on this list yesterday —
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the reserve watching the wrong step, the last app whose data was never saved, and the alert that
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told you about one app and swallowed the rest — are all fixed and proven on a real machine.
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## What shipped recently
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- **Three ways the alarm system was misreporting its own work — all fixed.** None of them ever risked
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data. **(1)** When the machine proved a backup restores, that result could vanish if the agent was
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restarted in the following quarter-hour — and yesterday's change made the gap a week rather than a
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day, because the machine correctly refuses to re-prove an archive it has already proven. It is now
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written to disk with the result and survives. This was caught happening, not predicted: a real
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14.5 GB off-site restore passed and left no record at all. **(2)** Every release had about a
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fifty-fifty chance of emailing you a failure for a release that worked; the version tag is now
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published after the binary, and a new check catches the opposite mistake so nothing is traded away.
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**(3)** A released binary can now be rebuilt by anyone and checked against the fingerprint you
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approve — until today, rebuilding produced different bytes. *(R-189, R-188, R-186)*
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- **Each backup is now proved, instead of the clock being obeyed.** The machine used to re-test a
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backup every twenty-four hours on a timer that restarted whenever the software was updated, so the
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test happened at an arbitrary time and a fresh backup could sit unproven while an old one was
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re-checked. Now a copy is tested once, about a day after it is made, and not again until there is a
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newer one — so the daily copy is proved daily and the weekly off-site copy weekly, each on its own.
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The alert that says "this copy has not been proved lately" learned each copy's own rhythm in the
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same change; without that it would have started complaining every night about a system that is
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working. *(R-86)*
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- **A failed backup now tells you about every app, once**, with every failure written down whether or
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not it is emailed, and a message the machine decides not to send now leaves a record saying so.
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*(R-182)*
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## What we're working on
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- **Now:** nothing outstanding.
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- **Next:** proving the off-site *app-data* copy can actually be restored — the one tier nothing
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tests unattended. Most of the machinery it needed arrived with the restore-test change below.
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*(R-87)*
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- **After:** the off-site copy that the machine making it can still erase. *(R-95)*
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## Waiting on you
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- **A job, not a decision: the hub password needs changing.** A diagnostic command printed it into a
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session log; nothing suggests anyone else saw it. *(R-132)*
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- **One small question, not urgent.** The automatic check cannot see which version you have told
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machines to install, only which ones exist. Closing that needs either a password given to the build
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server or a check inside the hub itself. *(R-184)*
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- **Nothing else.** The question about whether the off-site endpoint counts as protected is
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**settled — it does**, and the machine list now says so instead of asking.
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## Changed since last update
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- **2026-08-03** — Fixed three ways the alarm system misreported itself: a proof of a working backup
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that could vanish on a restart (seen happening), a release that emailed a failure for a release
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that worked, and a released binary nobody could rebuild and check. *(R-189, R-188, R-186)*
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- **2026-08-03** — Backups are now proved one at a time, each about a day after it is made, instead of
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on a timer; the "not proved lately" alert learned each copy's own rhythm so it does not complain
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about a healthy weekly copy. You settled that the off-site endpoint is protected, and the machine
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list records it. One thing found while testing: on the small demo machine the agent cannot see its
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own local backups at all — a permission that was never granted — so that copy has never been
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test-restored there. Written down, not yet fixed. *(R-86, R-185)*
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