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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
164 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
164 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
# Runbook — out-of-band secrets (felhom-system)
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**Model:** out-of-band `kubectl` + this runbook (DECISION model **A**). Secret *values* are **never**
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committed to git. The manifests in `manifests/` carry only **placeholders + comments** that point here.
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The live values live in the operator's out-of-band store (password manager / escrow) and in the cluster
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as Secrets created imperatively with the commands below.
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> The `felhom` ArgoCD app syncs the **entire** `manifests/` dir, so any Secret committed there is
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> re-applied on every sync. Secrets that must stay out of git are therefore created as objects that are
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> **not present in `manifests/`** (ArgoCD does not manage them), e.g. `Secret/resend-api` below.
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---
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## Resend API key — `Secret/resend-api`
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**What uses it (live consumers):**
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| Consumer | How it reads the key |
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|----------|----------------------|
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| `hub` (`Deployment/hub`) | env `RESEND_API_KEY` ← `secretKeyRef: resend-api/RESEND_API_KEY`; the hub binary's `RESEND_API_KEY` env override fills `notifications.resend_api_key` (the committed ConfigMap field is an empty placeholder). |
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| `contact-mailer` (`Deployment/contact-mailer`) | env `RESEND_API_KEY` ← `secretKeyRef: resend-api/RESEND_API_KEY`. |
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| `healthchecks` (**not currently deployed**) | when deployed, wire `EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD` to `secretKeyRef: resend-api/RESEND_API_KEY`; do **not** inline the value into `felhom.secret.yaml`. |
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| Gmail "Send mail as" (`info@` / `admin@felhom.eu`) | external — the key is the SMTP password; updated manually in Gmail settings, **not** in the cluster. |
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**Where the value lives out-of-band:** the operator's password manager, entry "Felhom Resend API key
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(app-relay + alerts)". Send-scoped. **Never** written to a file on a host, the guest, or any commit.
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### Create / rotate the Secret
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The key is available as the `RESEND_API` env var in `kisfenyo`'s shell on the build host
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(192.168.0.180). It is exported from `~/.bashrc`, so it is present in an **interactive** shell
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(`bash -ic`) but **not** in a plain non-interactive `ssh host 'cmd'`.
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Create (or update) the Secret without ever echoing the value — render the Secret YAML in the
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(non-sudo) interactive shell where `$RESEND_API` is set, and pipe it into `sudo kubectl apply`:
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```bash
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# on 192.168.0.180, as kisfenyo:
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bash -ic 'kubectl create secret generic resend-api -n felhom-system \
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--from-literal=RESEND_API_KEY="$RESEND_API" \
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--dry-run=client -o yaml' | sudo kubectl apply -f -
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```
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Then roll the consumers so they pick up the new value:
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```bash
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sudo kubectl -n felhom-system rollout restart deploy/hub deploy/contact-mailer
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sudo kubectl -n felhom-system rollout status deploy/hub deploy/contact-mailer --timeout=120s
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```
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### Verify a consumer can send
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- **contact-mailer:** submit the website contact form at <https://felhom.eu> (or, if `DEBUG=true`,
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`curl -X POST https://felhom.eu/api/debug/test`) → mail arrives at `info@felhom.eu`.
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- **hub:** trigger a notification (or the dispatcher test path) → mail arrives.
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- **Gmail:** send a test from `info@felhom.eu` → delivers.
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### Rotating away from a compromised key (ordered — load-bearing)
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1. Create the **new** send-scoped key in Resend; store it out-of-band; set `RESEND_API` on host 180.
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2. Run the create-Secret + rollout above with the new value.
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3. Update Gmail "Send mail as" SMTP password to the new key.
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4. **Verify every consumer sends on the new key** (above) — do this **before** step 5.
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5. Only then: **delete the old key** in Resend. Re-verify one consumer still sends afterwards.
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> Never delete the old key before step 4 passes — a premature delete breaks live mail.
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---
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## Operator/global bearer key — `Secret/report-api`
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The hub API's global bearer (`api.report_api_key`) — the operator's own key (e.g. `felhom-ops
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… -hub-key`), distinct from the per-customer/per-host keys the hub generates itself. It was
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COMMITTED in `manifests/hub.yaml` until v0.53.0 (flagged in the 0.81/0.113 and 0.85/0.120
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publish runbooks, incl. a Phase-D screenshot exposure); the manifest now carries a
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`secretKeyRef` and `scripts/manifest_bearer_gate.py` blocks reintroduction. **The git-history
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copy stays alive until the value is ROTATED** — de-git alone kills nothing.
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**What uses it (live consumers of the GLOBAL key):**
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| Consumer | How it reads the key |
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|----------|----------------------|
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| `hub` (`Deployment/hub`) | env `REPORT_API_KEY` ← `secretKeyRef: report-api/REPORT_API_KEY` (v0.53.0 env override fills `api.report_api_key`; the ConfigMap field is an empty placeholder). **Not `optional:`** — a missing Secret fails Ready by design. |
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| Operator tooling (`felhom-ops keys upload -hub-key …`, runbook curl probes in break-glass.md / offsite-endpoint.md) | typed per-invocation from the out-of-band store — nothing machine-persisted. |
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| ~~`felhom-controller` repo `controller.yaml.example`~~ | carried the LITERAL as example text (never a live consumer) — scrubbed 2026-07-13. |
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Per-customer (`customer_configs.api_key`) and per-host (`hosts.api_key`) keys are hub-generated
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and **unaffected** by a global-key rotation — no customer box breaks.
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**Where the value lives out-of-band:** the operator's password manager, entry "Felhom hub
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global bearer (report_api_key)".
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### Create the Secret (pre-deploy for v0.53.0 — same value, no rotation yet)
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Create it with the CURRENT value **before** syncing the v0.53.0 manifest (the pod refuses to
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start without it). Render on the build host without echoing the value (file-to-file, the
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operator-present rule):
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```bash
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# on 192.168.0.180, as kisfenyo — put the current key in a 0600 temp file first (no echo):
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kubectl create secret generic report-api -n felhom-system \
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--from-file=REPORT_API_KEY=/dev/stdin < /path/to/keyfile \
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--dry-run=client -o yaml | sudo kubectl apply -f -
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shred -u /path/to/keyfile
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```
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### Rotation (supervised — operator GO required; ordered, load-bearing)
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1. Mint the new key into a 0600 file: `openssl rand -hex 32 > keyfile` (no terminal echo).
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2. Re-run the create-Secret pipe above with the new file; store the value out-of-band.
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3. `sudo kubectl -n felhom-system rollout restart deploy/hub && sudo kubectl -n felhom-system rollout status deploy/hub --timeout=120s`
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4. **Verify before declaring the old key dead:**
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- a customer box still reports (per-customer key — proves rotation touched nothing it shouldn't);
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- an operator call with the NEW key succeeds (e.g. an authed `GET /api/v1/…` probe);
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- the SAME call with the OLD key returns 401 — only now is the git-history copy dead.
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5. Update the password-manager entry; note the rotation date in the publish-runbook disposition.
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---
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## Off-site password sealing key — `Secret/offsite-secret-key` (hub v0.127.0, decision 69, R-821)
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**What uses it:** `hub` env `OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY` (64 hex characters = 32 bytes). It seals every Storage Box
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sub-account password in `one_time_secrets.value`; the hub's key registrar opens them to write box keys.
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**Required** — the pod does not start without it.
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**Create (once, before the first v0.127.0 sync) — the value never touches a file or the terminal:**
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```bash
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sudo kubectl -n felhom-system create secret generic offsite-secret-key \
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--from-literal=OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
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```
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**If it is lost:** the sealed passwords cannot be opened. Nothing on the boxes breaks (their keys are installed);
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the registrar and the daily check fail with `offsite_key_audit_failed`. Recover per customer with the hub's
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**Re-issue offsite credentials** button (the provider resets the password; the hub seals the new one). Keep a copy
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in the operator's password manager if a Re-issue round is not acceptable.
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**Rotation:** not built. A new key cannot open the old rows; rotate by setting the new key and pressing Re-issue
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for every off-site customer.
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---
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## DooPlex PBS — the ep0 copy (decision 70, 2026-10-03)
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Not k8s Secrets — PBS's own private files on DooPlex, never in git:
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| File | Holds | Created |
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|---|---|---|
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| `/etc/proxmox-backup/remote.cfg` (root:backup 0640) | ep0 API token `root@pam!dooplex-sync` (base64, PBS format) | from the token's one-time output, file → file |
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| `/etc/proxmox-backup/notifications-priv.cfg` (root:root 0600) | the Resend API key, as the SMTP password of target `felhom-operator` | from `$RESEND_API`, file → file |
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**Rotating the Resend key (§ above) must also rewrite `notifications-priv.cfg`**, or the ep0-copy failure mails stop
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silently. Rotate the ep0 token with `proxmox-backup-manager user generate-token` on ep0 (delete the old) and rewrite
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`remote.cfg`. See `runbooks/ep0-datastore-copy.md`.
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---
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## Other committed secrets (tracked, NOT yet de-gitted — backlog)
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`manifests/felhom.secret.yaml` still commits other plaintext secrets (`healthchecks-config` `SECRET_KEY`
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/ `SUPERUSER_PASSWORD`, `umami-config`, `gitea-creds`). These are **out of scope** for the Resend
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rotation but are the same hygiene problem; de-git them the same way (out-of-band `Secret/...` +
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placeholder) when touched. Tracked here so the gap is visible.
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