admin
8dab40c7a7
gates / gates (push) Successful in 27s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
54 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next
|
||
|
||
**Ready for the first real tester (Tester-2): yes. You confirmed the tunnel route and the connect mails (2026-09-30).**
|
||
|
||
**Updated 2026-10-01 (afternoon). Both demo boxes run controller 0.285.0 and host agent 0.138.0. Hub 0.126.0. New installs get golden 0.285.0 with agent 0.138.0.**
|
||
|
||
**Tester-2 — read only, from the hub.** The customer record exists. Tester-2's box has not registered yet.
|
||
|
||
## Decisions I took myself (you may reverse them)
|
||
|
||
- **wger: a stranger now locks only the name they try, for 5 minutes.** Before, ten wrong tries locked out every
|
||
household member for 30 minutes. Tested: the other member could still log in; the targeted one was back in after
|
||
7.5 minutes. Short on purpose: in wger, every try during a lock restarts it, also the household's own.
|
||
- **BookStack and Grafana: no change.** Their locks are already short: 1 minute and 5 minutes, measured.
|
||
- **mealie stays on the 1-hour lock**, as you said.
|
||
|
||
## What I measured
|
||
|
||
- **Behind the tunnel, every visitor looks like the same address** to an app. So an app that locks "by address" locks
|
||
out everyone at once (that was wger). Apps cannot see who is who. I did not change this box-wide: the easy way would
|
||
let a stranger fake an address. Written down.
|
||
- **Old controller versions in the registry:** no automatic rule removed them. Someone ran a clean-up script by hand
|
||
on 22–23 August, when the registry disk was full. Nothing runs it on a schedule.
|
||
- **An installed app takes a new setting** at its next restart, update or night backup — not by itself.
|
||
|
||
## What else I found
|
||
|
||
- wger runs a development web server, not a production one. Written down.
|
||
- The design document says the tunnel runs on the host. It runs inside the box. One of the two is wrong. Written down.
|
||
|
||
**Rows.** Today (afternoon): 0 closed, 2 narrowed or answered, 3 opened. The list went from 387 to 390 rows.
|
||
|
||
## What needs you
|
||
|
||
1. **calibre-web: a stranger can lock the household out for a day** (40 wrong tries in 14 minutes). There is no setting
|
||
for a shorter lock. Two ways:
|
||
- **A — a secret login name** (recommended): the box makes one at install and shows it on the app page next to
|
||
the password. Strangers cannot aim at it. Cost: the household types a strange name.
|
||
- **B — switch the login limit off:** no lock at all. Cost: no limit on password guessing in the login form.
|
||
If you do nothing: a stranger who knows the name `admin` can keep the household out for a day.
|
||
2. **The registry clean-up script:** today it keeps only the newest 7 versions, about one day of controller releases,
|
||
and it does not protect the versions in use. Two ways:
|
||
- **A — a written rule** (recommended): keep the newest 20 releases, plus every version a golden, the floor or the
|
||
vouched agent names. Change the script to match.
|
||
- **B — keep it as it is:** run by hand when the disk fills.
|
||
If you do nothing: the next manual run can delete a version a box or a backup still needs.
|
||
3. **Smaller:** should apps see each visitor's real address (a bigger build), or do we keep fixing per app? And which is
|
||
right for the tunnel: the design document (on the host) or the build (inside the box)? Nothing breaks if you wait.
|
||
|
||
## Standing steps
|
||
|
||
- **Monthly security re-test: last run 2026-10-01, next due ~2026-11-01.** (You start it with the standing brief.)
|
||
- **Weekly:** the golden bake (around 8 October).
|