felhom.eu/REPORT.md

# felhom.eu — task reports

> **Overwrite** this file with a summary of the most recent task only (uniform with the other repos; not cumulative). The cumulative hub history lives in [hub/CHANGELOG.md](hub/CHANGELOG.md); the scripts history lives in [scripts/CHANGELOG.md](scripts/CHANGELOG.md).

## TASK GL-7 — customer page: passphrase hardening + install-command generator (hub v0.36.0) — 2026-07-09

**Shipped:** felhom.eu `844fbfa7` (code) + `02c748eb` (manifest bump); **hub v0.36.0 LIVE** on k3s
(ArgoCD app `felhom` Synced/Healthy, rollout confirmed, live image `felhom-hub:0.36.0`,
`Listening on :8080`). felhom.eu only — agent + host-install untouched. Two coupled, security-first
changes to the operator customer page, plus the Peti tester agreement.

### Part 1 — passphrase hardening (the security win, ships first)

The per-customer retrieval passphrase was in cleartext **twice**: the visible `#retrieval-pw` node
and baked into the Option-3 debug curl's `X-Retrieval-Password:` header (a copyable command carrying
the secret). Now:
- `#retrieval-pw` renders a **masked bullet run by default**, with a **Reveal** (`toggleSecret`) and
  a **copy** (`copySecret`) control; the value lives in `data-secret` (the page's existing reveal
  model — the value still ships in the DOM, unchanged from before).
- The Option-3 command carries a **`<YOUR-RETRIEVAL-PASSWORD>` placeholder** — the secret is never in
  a copyable command block.
- A **zero-secret-in-DOM** reveal-on-demand fetch is a deliberate future follow-up, explicitly NOT
  scoped here (kept the change tight and reviewable).

### Part 2 — interactive install-command generator

The three hard-coded install `<code>` blocks became a **client-side builder** (vanilla JS — no
framework, CDN, or network call) that assembles a live-updating command from form controls:
- Emits **only real host-install v1.12.0 flags** in a **download-then-run** shape (never `curl | bash`).
- CustomerID prefilled from the server (`pageData.ScriptVersion` + `data-customer-id`); a **byo**
  selection **requires** `--cores`/`--memory` (client-side enforcement via `.gen-req` + a `gen-msg`
  prompt); caps/mode are placeholders, never silent defaults.
- **Graceful JS-off static fallback**: the Option-1/2 code nodes retain a
  `--customer-id … --mode <appliance|byo>` command.
- **Curated control surface** (mode/cores/memory/vmid/node/acl-storages/operator-pubkey-file/
  preserve-state-from + skip-provision/dry-run/preflight-only/allow-new-leaf). The **seven
  dangerous/operator-only flags** (`--force`, `--rotate-recovery`, `--enable-oob`, `--remove-golden`,
  `--uninstall`, `--adopt-pool`, `--rescope-acl`) are **never offered as controls**.

`configs.go`: `const hostInstallVersion = "1.12.0"`; `pageData.ScriptVersion` added + populated.
`style.css`: `.gen-controls`/`.gen-radios`/`.gen-radio`/`.gen-check(s)`/number-inputs/`.gen-msg`
(dark palette, 2px radius).

### Part 3 — tests (green gate passed on committed source)

- **`TestTemplates_PassphraseHardened`** — the secret is NOT in the Option-3 command (placeholder is),
  `#retrieval-pw` is masked-by-default (bullet-entity run), `data-secret` populated, reveal+copy
  controls present. **Red-proof:** revert the Option-3 block to `{{.Config.RetrievalPassword}}` → the
  "not-in-command" / masked assertions fail.
- **`TestTemplates_InstallGenerator`** — every curated control id renders, script version +
  `data-customer-id` present, the JS-off static fallback command present, and **none of the seven
  excluded flags appear anywhere on the page**.
- `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./internal/web/` → **ok** on the committed source (`844fbfa7`).

### Part 4 — deploy (GitOps)

Built `felhom-hub:0.36.0` on 180 from the pushed source, bumped `manifests/hub.yaml` (0.35.0→0.36.0),
ArgoCD hard-refresh + sync → Synced/Healthy, `deploy/hub` rolled out, live image + startup log
confirmed. **Gotcha caught:** the first build produced a stale image because the Part-1/Part-2 commits
were committed locally but not pushed before building (`build.sh` pulls origin) — fixed by pushing
first, then rebuilding.

### Part 5 — tester agreement + closeout

`documentation/pilot/PETI-tester-agreement.md` written: the BYO trust boundary (break-glass/OOB/WG
all OFF, non-root agent, pool-scoped token, TLS+per-guest-token local API), the honest limitations
(no offsite backup yet; physically-removable-drive caveat F2; pool-reassert-bring-up-only F7;
`:53`-must-be-free F6), exit rights (uninstall keeps drives/data/hub-record), Peti's box facts
(80c/128 GB → caps **12/32768**, `sajatfelhom.hu` tunnel re-point), the byo install command, and the
onboarding sequence (preflight → install → **G9 password-set** → tunnel → **backup-green**).
GO-LIVE-PACKAGE updated: GL-7 ✔; **G9/G10 → done**, **G11 → done** (with the one open pilot question
folded into the agreement's pre-install checklist); decision log + open-questions updated.

### The one remaining pilot question (owned by the agreement)

Peti's **local backup TARGET** — `felhom-pbs` is unreachable from his LAN, so the default
`--acl-storages "local local-lvm felhom-pbs"` is wrong for him. Confirm at onboarding **whether his
box has a second disk/pool**: if yes it becomes the `--acl-storages` backup target (real local
resilience); if no, backups share the guest's pool (degraded — one drive failure loses both, must be
stated to him). Changes only the `--acl-storages` value, nothing structural.

### Verification note

The hub UI is operator-password-gated — CC cannot log in, so per the repo policy UI changes are
verified via the render tests (both green) plus the deploy checks (image/rollout/startup log), not a
live browser session.