Files
felhom.eu/REPORT.md
T
admin 0c843286a2 slice 10B: signed-op job completion (DELETE clear-job) (hub v0.10.0)
Add DELETE /hosts/{id}/jobs/{job_id} (per-host self-scoped, idempotent) so the
agent clears a job after executing or terminally rejecting it. The hub stores
the operator-signed blobs opaquely (no signing key — cannot forge or open);
the agent verifies + executes. Doc 03 §4/§6/§9 updated (operator-signed path
live; 8C wipe completes; 10B done).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 20:14:32 +02:00

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# felhom.eu — task reports
> **Overwrite** this file with a summary of the most recent task only (uniform with the other repos; not cumulative). The cumulative hub history lives in [hub/CHANGELOG.md](hub/CHANGELOG.md).
---
# REPORT — Slice 10B (hub half): signed-op job completion (hub v0.10.0) (2026-06-10)
## Type
TASK (CC-implemented). The hub half of slice 10B. Pairs with `felhom-agent` v0.16.0 (the signing CLI
+ verify-and-execute machinery + the storage-wipe consumer).
## What changed (hub)
Small by design — the hub stores + serves the operator-signed blobs **opaquely** (it holds no signing
key, can neither forge nor open them; the agent verifies + executes). 10B adds the **completion** path.
### Store + API
- **`DELETE /api/v1/hosts/{host_id}/jobs/{job_id}`** (per-host key, **self-scoped**; global key may
clear any) — the agent calls it after executing OR terminally rejecting a job. Idempotent. Store:
`DeleteSignedJob`.
- Reused unchanged from 10A: `POST /admin/hosts/{id}/jobs` (operator enqueue), `GET /hosts/{id}/jobs`
(agent fetch), `has_signed_ops` envelope flag. The signed blob stays opaque on the wire (a base64
`{op_blob_b64, sig_armored}` envelope) — **no jobs-wire golden change**.
## Tests (green)
- `DELETE …/jobs/{id}` self-scoped (host A cannot clear host B's job → 403) + idempotent.
## Docs
- Doc 03 §4 (the operator-signed path is LIVE: gate → pending op → offline signature → verify
(pinned key / nonce-burn / expiry / host + durable-id anti-retarget) → execute; key floor: not in
the hub, not in the agent), §6 (the 8C data-bearing wipe now completes via 10B), §9 slice table
(**10B done**; 10C escrow-consumption spike-validated, 10D DR capstone pending).
## Security framing (why the hub stays minimal)
The hub is deliberately a dumb queue here: it cannot forge a signed op (no key) and the agent never
trusts a queued blob until the pinned-key verify passes. A **compromised hub queuing a forged blob is
rejected** by the agent (tested in felhom-agent). That is the whole point of the offline-key design.
## Pending
- Build + deploy hub v0.10.0 (+ agent v0.16.0) and live-validate the full loop on the demo: a
data-bearing wipe → `pending_signature` → offline-signed → queued → agent verifies + wipes the
device; replay + non-pinned-key rejected.