Compare commits
1 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 admin
|
b0b269b28d |
@@ -213,6 +213,22 @@ local and skippable, and only CI is neither.
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- **Website** auto-deploys via git-sync; just push to `main` (live in 1–2 min). Website changes go
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through `repo_gates.py` above (it runs `site_gates.py`); new pages go into that gate's `PAGES`
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list. Emergency edits: https://files.felhom.eu. All `website/` HTML is **UTF-8 with BOM** — preserve it.
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- **THE INSTALLER DOES NOT (R-110, 2026-08-03).** `manifests/webpage.yaml` runs **two** git-syncs:
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the website from `main` as above, and `/scripts/` from the tag **`installer-v<SCRIPT_VERSION>`**.
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Pushing `scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` therefore changes nothing that any machine downloads —
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which it used to, within thirty seconds, for the one artifact that runs as **root on a virgin box**.
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- **To publish:** cut `installer-v<new SCRIPT_VERSION>`, bump the `--ref` in `webpage.yaml`
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(both the sidecar and the init container), commit, and sync. `hostinstall_gates.py` gate 6
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fails if the manifest stops naming an `installer-v…` tag or if the website stops tracking `main`.
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- **To roll back:** move the tag back to the previous commit and wait ~30 s. **No ArgoCD sync and
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no deploy** — git-sync picks up a moved tag on its next period, measured live on 2026-08-03 in
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both directions. That is the emergency lever; fix forward with a new version afterwards.
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- **Do NOT pin the website to the tag.** The sparse-checkout used to cover `/website/` and
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`/scripts/` in one sync, and pinning that would turn every copy edit into a release.
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- The **URL never carries a ref** (`https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh`), so
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`felhom-bootstrap.sh` and the hub's day-0 command follow the tag with no edit — do not add one.
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- The installer's own sixteen run-time fetches are pinned separately, to `raw/tag/v$ART_AGENT_VER`
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in the **agent** repo (R-183) — they are the agent's configs, not this repo's.
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- **Manifests** are GitOps via the `felhom` app — commit to `main`, then deliberate sync.
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## Key patterns
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+26
@@ -97,6 +97,32 @@ not provide, and the fourth of those found on live hardware rather than by revie
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no run scope, so a refused app re-alerts on every status refresh (measured: a second identical alert
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pair 13 s after the run's). Pre-existing in v0.192.0; R-181 changed neither caller.
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**S-15 — publishing is an act, not a side-effect of pushing (2026-08-03, R-110 + R-115 + R-183).**
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Two rulings, one shape: something became live because someone pushed, not because anyone decided.
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- **The installer.** `/scripts/` now git-syncs the tag `installer-v<SCRIPT_VERSION>`; the **website
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keeps tracking `main`** in a second sync, because pinning both would make every copy edit a
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release. Publish = cut the next tag + bump the manifest `--ref` + sync. **Roll back = move the tag
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back**, which takes ~30 s and needs no ArgoCD sync at all — git-sync v4.4.0 follows a moved tag,
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and that half was measured before the manifest was touched because the whole model rests on it.
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- **The sixteen run-time fetches were NOT what the spec described** — sixteen, not nine, and from
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`felhom-agent`, not this repo — so no tag here could cover them. They are pinned to
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`raw/tag/v$ART_AGENT_VER` instead, which is strictly better: the agent's configs now come from the
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same ref as the agent binary being installed. That closed a real skew (**R-183**), not just a
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channel.
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- **The URL needed no change**, and that is worth knowing rather than re-deriving: it never carried
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a ref, so both producers follow the tag automatically — and no hub change means no hub bump.
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- **The agent.** `scripts/release-agent.sh` is THE release path: build → tag → publish → **verify by
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an independent download**. It does not vouch. `check-published-versions.py` refuses a `v<semver>`
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tag with no downloadable package, and **CI now runs the full gate set** rather than `--fast`,
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without which that gate would have been registered and never run.
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- **The gate's invariant is not the one specified, and P-C is why:** the hub manifest and Gitea's
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package listing are both **401** anonymously; the package download and the tags api are not. So CI
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can ask *is this installable* but not *what is vouched*. The residue is **R-184**.
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- **Neither gate asserts "the newest version is published."** That would go red on the very push
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that bumps a version, before publishing — and a gate that fails on the normal path is one people
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learn to ignore.
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**S-11 — D-c's routing, and why R-158's own proposal was overruled (2026-08-02, R-167 SHIPPED).**
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Decision D-c splits two signals by AUDIENCE, and the split is the ruling: **a fill warning is the
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CUSTOMER's** (they can free space, delete files, add a drive) and **a per-app backup capture failure
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@@ -1,216 +1,200 @@
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# REPORT — R-181 (the reserve guards the write that fills the disk) + R-156 (papra) + two operator rulings
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# REPORT — publishing becomes an act, not a side-effect (R-110, R-115) + R-182 measured, R-183/R-184 filed
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**Date:** 2026-08-03 · **Repos:** `felhom-controller` (v0.192.0 → **v0.193.1**), `app-catalog-felhom.eu`, `felhom.eu` (docs only — **no hub change, no hub version bump**)
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**Date:** 2026-08-03 · **Repos:** `felhom.eu` (installer **v1.22.0 → v1.23.0**), `felhom-agent` (**no bump**)
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**Nothing was built** — no image, no binary, no golden. **Hub stays v0.89.0.**
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## 1. Baselines — re-read on arrival, all matched §1
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## 1. Baselines — re-read on arrival, both matched §1
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| Repo | `main` @ arrival | Version | Shipped |
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| Repo | @ arrival | Version | Result |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `felhom-controller` | `4be6467b501b` | v0.192.0 | **v0.193.0 `fef07c3`** → **v0.193.1 `6c43bf6`** |
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| `app-catalog-felhom.eu` | `7cb58ecdf8e7` | n/a | `122bbee` |
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| `felhom.eu` | `6b5d64c1fa73` | hub v0.89.0 | docs only, **no bump** |
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| `felhom.eu` | `8360f940bfb2` | hub v0.89.0, `SCRIPT_VERSION="1.22.0"`, **0 tags** (confirmed) | installer **v1.23.0**, first tag `installer-v1.23.0` |
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| `felhom-agent` | `9dfd89cb947e` | v0.120.0 | **unchanged** — scripts and gates only |
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All three clean (`git status --porcelain` empty, `HEAD == origin/main`) before every build.
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## 2. Part 0 — the R-182 measurement, and it REVERSED the row
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## 2. The fix
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Filed yesterday as *"the reserve re-alerts on every status refresh"* — **too many** alerts, observed
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at the sending end. Measured at the **receiving end**, it is the opposite.
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**One admission verdict per app per run** (`controller/internal/backup/admission.go`), taken before
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that app's **first** write and consulted by all three legs — DB dump, volume dump, unit capture. The
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three write under one per-app root (`appbackup.RecoveryUnitPath`), which is what makes one verdict
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able to cover them honestly.
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Method: the hub's SQLite copied **with its `-wal`** (4 MB and newer than the db — copying `hub.db`
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alone would have read stale data, the exact trap this project recorded before), freshness confirmed by
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the newest `notification_log` row post-dating the session.
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- **Lazy, not run-wide.** App A's dump can put app B under the reserve; a run-start verdict reads a
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disk that no longer exists. **Never re-decided between an app's own legs** — that is the split being
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closed. **Reset per run.**
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- **Ahead of `DumpAppVolumesSafe`**, which stops the stack as its first act, so a refused app is never
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bounced. **After** the volume-less check, which has no write to gate.
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- **Exactly one operator alert per refused app per run.** Leg order unchanged.
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- **Size term added:** *would this app's write cross the reserve?* — estimated from its previous
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`.sql` + `.tar`. **No history → headroom-only**, or the first backup becomes the one that can never
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happen; the alert says so when that applies.
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**9 `recovery_unit_capture_failed` events received today → 2 operator emails sent.**
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## 3. Files
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| time | apps refused (events in) | operator emails out |
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|---|---|---|
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| 06:40:03 | privatebin, opengist | **opengist only** |
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| 08:59:46/47 | opengist, privatebin | **privatebin only** |
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| 08:59:59 | privatebin, opengist | **none** |
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| 09:03:00 | opengist | **none** |
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| 09:07:06 | privatebin, opengist | **none** |
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| File | |
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**Cause, confirmed at source:** the operator cooldown key is
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`customerID + ":" + eventType + cooldownTierSuffix(details)` (`dispatcher.go:268`, 1 hour hardcoded).
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`RecoveryUnitFailureDetails` carries **`app`** and **no `tier`**, so the suffix is empty and the key
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holds **no app identifier**. The first refused app takes the slot; every other app's refusal for the
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next hour is dropped — and dropped **before `LogNotification`**, so it leaves **no row on any
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channel** and cannot be audited afterwards.
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This is **R-97a's failure mode in a second event type**; that row's own comment states it
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(*"`felhom-pbs` failing at 09:00 would swallow `local` failing at 09:20"*). `cooldownTierSuffix` was
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written narrow on purpose; `recovery_unit_capture_failed` simply never opted in.
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**A correction I owe on yesterday's report.** It said *"one `recovery_unit_capture_failed` per app,
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HTTP 200"*. That was true of what the **controller pushed**, and a reader would take it as *the
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operator was told about each app* — which is false. The gap between an accepted event and a sent
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email is the whole of this row.
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**Nothing was changed** (§8.5). R-182 is re-scoped with the evidence and the fix shape.
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## 3. Probes
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| | Question | Method | Verdict |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| **P-A** | does git-sync v4.4.0 follow a tag, and notice a **moved** one? | throwaway `docker run` git-sync against this repo, tag moved under it | **PASS both halves** — `update required … local:fb65202 remote:8360f94` → `updated successfully`, one period (~20 s) |
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| **P-B** | does Gitea serve `raw/tag/<tag>/<path>`? | one fetch on a throwaway tag | **PASS** — HTTP 200, byte-identical to `raw/branch/main` |
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| **P-C** | can CI read the package registry? | anonymous fetches | **PARTIAL, and it changed the gate's design** — package **download** 200 (and **404** for a fake version, so it discriminates), **tags** api 200; package **listing** api **401**, hub artifact manifest **401** |
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**Publish model P-A implies:** publishing is **moving the tag**; rollback is **moving it back**, in
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~30 s with no ArgoCD sync and no deploy. Probe teardown: container, sync tree and probe tag all gone
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(`git ls-remote --tags` → 0 at the time).
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## 4. §8.2's three channels — enumerated
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| Channel | Before | After | |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| 1. the served script | `main`, 30 s | **`installer-v1.23.0`** | **MOVED** — `webpage.yaml` split into two syncs |
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| 2. the run-time fetches | `raw/branch/main` | **`raw/tag/v$ART_AGENT_VER`** | **MOVED** — but see below |
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| 3. the URL producers | `main` | unchanged | **NO CHANGE NEEDED** — and that is a finding, not an omission |
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**Channel 2 was not what the spec described, and the spec's mechanism for it was unimplementable.**
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There are **sixteen** fetches, not nine, and they come from **`felhom-agent`**, not `felhom.eu` — so
|
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no tag on this repo could ever have covered them, and §8.1's *"derive the tag from `SCRIPT_VERSION`"*
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was impossible for them. Raised before building; operator ruled to pin them to **the agent version
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being installed**, which the installer already resolves from the hub manifest and already sha-verifies.
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That is strictly better than any installer-derived tag: binary and configs now come from one ref.
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**Channel 3 needed no change because the URL never carried a ref** —
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`https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` is path-based; the ref lives in the manifest. So
|
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`felhom-bootstrap.sh` and the hub's day-0 command follow the tag automatically. **No hub template
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change ⇒ no hub bump**, so §1's rule was never in tension and the STOP it anticipated never arose.
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## 5. The tag convention
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- **Shape:** `installer-v<SCRIPT_VERSION>` in `felhom.eu` (prefixed so it cannot be read as a hub,
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agent, controller or golden version); `v<semver>` in `felhom-agent` (that repo versions one thing).
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**No new constant in the installer** — channel 2 derives its ref from `$ART_AGENT_VER` at run time,
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and channel 1's ref lives only in the manifest.
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- **Publish:** cut `installer-v<new SCRIPT_VERSION>`, bump the `--ref` in `webpage.yaml` (sidecar *and*
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init container), commit, sync.
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- **Roll back:** move the tag back to the previous commit — takes ~30 s, **no ArgoCD sync, no deploy**.
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## 6. Scenario A — proven by HTTP
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A real commit was pushed to `main` (a marker comment in the installer) **without moving the tag**, and
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three sync periods were allowed to pass so "unchanged" means "had every chance to change":
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```
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website tree (main): .worktrees/6a82719… <- ADVANCED to the new commit
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scripts tree (tag): .worktrees/bee6848… <- STAYED
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sha256 before push: 2f859555382c4c69c18c48dccd8d8b132ffd49b4dbe4e03e5dbb192e8d883555
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sha256 after push: 2f859555382c4c69c18c48dccd8d8b132ffd49b4dbe4e03e5dbb192e8d883555
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marker present at the served URL? 0
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https://felhom.eu/ -> HTTP 200
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```
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Both halves of the split in one observation: the site still tracks `main`, the installer does not.
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## 7. Scenario B — publish and rollback, both directions
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| act | result |
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|---|---|
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| `controller/internal/backup/admission.go` | **new** — the gate, the memo, the estimator |
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| `controller/internal/backup/admission_test.go` | **new** — 11 tests |
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| `controller/internal/backup/backup.go` | run scope + gates in the DB and volume legs |
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| `controller/internal/backup/recovery_unit.go` | `floorVerdict` size-aware; capture leg via `admitApp` |
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| `controller/internal/backup/capture_floor_test.go` | 3 call sites updated for the new signature |
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| `controller/README.md`, `REUSE.md`, `CHANGELOG.md` | |
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| `app-catalog-felhom.eu/templates/papra/docker-compose.yml` | mount moved to `/app/app-data` |
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| tag moved `bee6848 → 6a82719` | scripts tree moved in **~40 s**; served `sha256 ea2b4aa9…`; **marker present** |
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| tag moved back `→ bee6848` | scripts tree back in **~40 s**; served `sha256 2f859555…` — **exactly** the pre-publish sha; **marker gone** |
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## 4. Tests — 28 packages `ok`, `rc=0` (read separately from any commit)
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`https://felhom.eu/` returned 200 throughout. The marker commit was then reverted, and the tag moved
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to `main`'s head — a **byte no-op**, verified by the served sha not changing.
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All 11 new tests pass, plus the pre-existing floor suite. Refusal assertions are **sha256 tree
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fingerprints before and after**, never log lines — the defect being fixed *is* a log line the tree
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contradicted.
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## 8. Files, commits, tags
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The DB leg cannot run without Docker (`DiscoverDatabases` shells out), so its gate is pinned by an
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**AST walk** of `backup.go` asserting `admitApp` precedes `DumpOne`. `strings.Contains` is
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insufficient: a commented-out call still contains the string.
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**`felhom.eu`** — `bee6848` (installer + gate + manifest), `6a82719` (Scenario A marker), `e79a20b`
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(marker removed), plus the docs commit below.
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`scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` · `scripts/hostinstall_gates.py` · `scripts/CHANGELOG.md` ·
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`manifests/webpage.yaml` · `CLAUDE.md` · `CONTEXT.md` · `STATUS.md` · `REPORT.md` ·
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`documentation/backlog/{OPEN-ITEMS,ROADMAP}.md` · `documentation/architecture/00-capability-map.md`
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### Red-proofs — each demonstrated failing, then restored
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**`felhom-agent`** — `dd2d1fe` (release path + gate + CI), `0db7766` (REPORT).
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`scripts/release-agent.sh` **(new)** · `scripts/check-published-versions.py` **(new)** ·
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`scripts/agent_gates.py` · `.gitea/workflows/gates.yml` · `CLAUDE.md` · `CHANGELOG.md` · `REPORT.md`
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||||
|
||||
**Tags created:** `felhom.eu/installer-v1.23.0` (the first tag this repo has ever had) and
|
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`felhom-agent/v0.120.0` (retroactive, at `cd6e267` — the commit the published binary was built from;
|
||||
`configs/` is byte-identical there and at `main`, so nothing depended on the choice).
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|
||||
## 9. Tests and red-proofs
|
||||
|
||||
| Check | Result |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `felhom.eu` `repo_gates.py --fast` | all 5 gates OK |
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||||
| `felhom-agent` `go build ./... && go vet ./...` | OK |
|
||||
| `felhom-agent` `go test ./...` | **29 packages ok, rc=0** (read separately from any commit) |
|
||||
| `agent_gates.py --fast` | `published` correctly **SKIPPED** (hook must not fail on a network blip) |
|
||||
| `agent_gates.py` (full) | both OK |
|
||||
|
||||
**Red-proofs, each demonstrated failing then restored:**
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Mutation | Result |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | **Both** dump-leg `admitApp` gates removed (= exactly v0.192.0) | Scenario A **RED** — *"the VOLUME leg ran for a refused app"*; with the leg assertions temporarily made non-fatal, the **tree fingerprint changed** too. Also red: Scenario C, Scenario D, and the AST wiring test (which named the DB leg specifically) |
|
||||
| 2 | The entire size term removed from `floorVerdict` (both its thresholds) | Scenario D **RED** — 0 alerts where 1 was required |
|
||||
| 3a | The reserve removed entirely | Scenario F **PASSED — recorded honestly.** The specified mutation does not exercise the assertion: removing the reserve makes every app write, which overwrites and adds but **deletes nothing**, so a deletion-watching test correctly stays green |
|
||||
| 3b | A prune injected into the refusal path | Scenario F **RED** — this is the mutation that proves the test watches deletion |
|
||||
| 4 | Floor moved above the warning band (90% / 6 GiB) | `TestFloorSitsBelowTheCriticalWarningBand` **RED** |
|
||||
| C | one of the sixteen fetches reverted to `raw/branch/main` | **RED** — gate 6a *and* 6b both fired |
|
||||
| D | assertions 6a **and** 6b removed (every guard the test covers), same bad installer | **zero** mentions of the regression — the guards are what catch it |
|
||||
| 6c | the manifest before the split | **RED** on its own, before I fixed it — the gate was demonstrated red by the real pre-change state |
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||||
| F | `v9.9.9` tagged and not published | **RED**, `binary NOT downloadable (HTTP 404 …)`, rc=1 |
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||||
| F′ | the gate **deregistered** from `agent_gates.py`, same bad state | **rc=0, "all agent gates OK"** — restored → `CONVICTED: published`, rc=1 |
|
||||
|
||||
Every mutation removed **every** guard its test covers (#1 removed both dump-leg gates, not one).
|
||||
**Scenario F measured on real CI, not inferred.** Runs **69** and **70** are on the *same commit*
|
||||
`0db7766`: **success** before `v9.9.9` existed, **failure** after pushing it. One variable. This also
|
||||
retrospectively explains runs 67/68. **One deliberate CI failure email reached the operator — that was
|
||||
this proof, not an incident.** I could not read CI's own step log: the jobs endpoint needs a Gitea API
|
||||
token, and the only credential available (`~/.docker/config.json`) is a registry password that the API
|
||||
rejects — so the controlled before/after replaced the log rather than an assumption standing in for it.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Live validation — demo-hp guest 9201 (Tier 0), the method that found the defect
|
||||
## 10. No version bumps, nothing built
|
||||
|
||||
**Method:** endpoint-level — `POST /api/debug/backup/dbdump`, the exact endpoint the debug UI button
|
||||
calls, which runs the production `RunDBDumps`. No browser on DooPlex.
|
||||
`felhom-agent` **v0.120.0** unchanged (no Go code changed). Hub **v0.89.0** unchanged (no hub file
|
||||
touched). The installer's `SCRIPT_VERSION` **did** go 1.22.0 → 1.23.0 — the installer is not in §12's
|
||||
no-bump list, its behaviour changed materially, and the tag derives from it. No image, binary or
|
||||
golden was built.
|
||||
|
||||
**The instrument was re-proven before use.** demo-hp's thin pool is 53.93 GiB, so a real fill of a
|
||||
70 G volume would exhaust it and corrupt every guest. A 5 GiB `fallocate` step moved guest `df`
|
||||
1.2G → 6.2G while thin-pool `data_percent` held **36.83 → 36.83** — zero blocks allocated. Re-checked
|
||||
at every step of the fill.
|
||||
## 11. Register
|
||||
|
||||
### Headroom term — 08:59:46, 906 MB free / 99% used
|
||||
|
||||
| Observable | Result |
|
||||
| ID | Outcome |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Tree fingerprint before | `TREE_SHA=111d1760c18d3440f700634ab325f8b8` (10 files; opengist's tar **182,272 B** — R-181's own "before" figure) |
|
||||
| Tree fingerprint after | **`111d1760c18d3440f700634ab325f8b8` — identical** |
|
||||
| Volume dumps written | **0** (baseline run at 08:58 wrote 2) |
|
||||
| `Stopping <app> for safe volume dump` | **absent** — and this is evidence, not an absence, because that line **is** present in the 08:58 baseline |
|
||||
| Operator alerts | one `recovery_unit_capture_failed` per app, severity `error`, HTTP 200 |
|
||||
| **R-110** | **CLOSED — SHIPPED** (installer v1.23.0), both-channels condition honoured, though not in the shape the ruling assumed |
|
||||
| **R-115** | **CLOSED — SHIPPED** (`release-agent.sh` + `check-published-versions.py`, no bump) |
|
||||
| **R-182** | **RE-SCOPED — the direction reversed** by Part 0's measurement; still open, now correctly described |
|
||||
| **R-183** | **NEW, and CLOSED the same session** — binary and configs came from two different refs |
|
||||
| **R-184** | **NEW, open** — nothing stops the hub vouching a version that was never released |
|
||||
|
||||
Free space restored → re-run at **09:01:33**: both apps captured normally.
|
||||
**IDs established free:** `^| \*\*R-183\*\*` / `^| \*\*R-184\*\*` in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` → **0 rows** each;
|
||||
all other hits are this session's own code and changelogs (forward references I wrote). `R-185` → 0
|
||||
hits anywhere and remains free.
|
||||
|
||||
### Size term — 09:03:00, proven separately
|
||||
## 12. Observations — noticed, documented, NOT acted on
|
||||
|
||||
Reproducing the original sequence: a real 2 GiB file planted in opengist's volume, backed up so its
|
||||
**previous** tar became **2,147,666,432 B** (the exact live figure), then the filesystem set to
|
||||
**91% used / 2.9 GB free — both headroom terms deliberately clear**.
|
||||
1. **The gate cannot see what is vouched** — filed as R-184 rather than papered over. Closing it needs
|
||||
either a hub credential in CI (operator's call) or a check at vouch time in the hub (better: fails
|
||||
closed where the mistake is made, needs no new credential).
|
||||
2. **A suppressed operator alert leaves no row at all.** The cooldown returns before `LogNotification`,
|
||||
so the hub's own records cannot distinguish "never happened" from "held back". Recorded inside
|
||||
R-182 because it is what made that row take a day to get the right way round.
|
||||
3. **`on: [push]` fires CI for tag pushes too.** Useful (it is how Scenario F was measured), but it
|
||||
means a tag push runs the full gate set — worth knowing before anyone adds an expensive gate.
|
||||
4. **`felhom.eu` CI still runs `--fast`.** Correct today, since all its gates are network-free; if a
|
||||
network gate is ever added there, that workflow needs the same change the agent's just got.
|
||||
|
||||
- **opengist refused `(size)`** — *"this app's last backup was 2.0 GB and writing it again would cross the reserve"*
|
||||
- **privatebin ADMITTED and dumped normally** — the term is per-app, not a global halt
|
||||
- Tree unchanged; 1 volume dump instead of 2
|
||||
## 13. Teardown
|
||||
|
||||
### One honest correction to the "app not stopped" claim
|
||||
|
||||
`StartedAt` on both apps *did* move, 26 s **after** the refusal. It was the **quiesce loop** for the
|
||||
whole-guest PBS backup, which my fill had broken — not the app-data path. Its own backoff logic then
|
||||
behaved correctly (*"deferring its next quiesce by 15m so the apps are not stopped again for a backup
|
||||
that cannot succeed"*). The app-data claim rests on the **absence of the `Stopping … for safe volume
|
||||
dump` line**, which is the line that appears when that leg bounces an app.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. The `du` measurement (§Part 1.3) — measured, then rejected
|
||||
|
||||
**66 timed runs** on demo-hp guest 9201, `docker run --rm -v <vol>:/v alpine du -sb /v`:
|
||||
**median ~355 ms per volume, range 341–404 ms** — on volumes holding **tens of KB**. The cost is
|
||||
container start-up, not the walk, so it does not shrink for small apps and only grows for real ones.
|
||||
|
||||
**Rejected**, on two grounds beyond the number: `docker run` needs the writable layer, so the
|
||||
measurement mechanism can fail under exactly the disk pressure the reserve exists to handle; and the
|
||||
previous-dump estimate measures the **artifact that will be written** rather than the live volume,
|
||||
which is the truer predictor. The previous-dump estimate stands.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. The refusal message as shipped, and what it guarantees
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[WARN] [backup] App backup REFUSED for opengist (headroom) — refused: backing up this app would
|
||||
leave the filesystem below the reserve (reserve: 97% used or 1.0 GiB free; the filesystem is already
|
||||
below it, before this app's estimated 178.0 KB write) — /mnt/sys_drive: 64.3/68.7 GB used (94%),
|
||||
0.9 GB free; NO database dump, NO volume dump and NO recovery-unit capture was written for it, the
|
||||
previous unit is untouched and NOTHING was deleted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**It guarantees, for that app in that run:** no DB dump, no volume dump and no capture were written;
|
||||
every file under `backups/primary/<app>` is byte-identical; the app was not stopped; nothing anywhere
|
||||
was deleted; exactly one operator alert was sent. All five verified by fingerprint above.
|
||||
|
||||
**The wording was not weakened to fit the behaviour** — the behaviour moved so the wording became
|
||||
true. What was *added* is the bound term (`headroom` / `size`) and the estimate.
|
||||
|
||||
**v0.193.1 — found by this very proof run.** The estimate was rendered fixed to two-decimal GiB, so
|
||||
opengist's real **178 KB** printed as `estimated 0.00 GiB write`, which reads as *no estimate was
|
||||
available* — the opposite of what happened. Shipped the same session because it is the same defect
|
||||
class the whole task is about. Re-verified live after redeploy: `estimated 178.0 KB write`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. papra (R-156, last leg)
|
||||
|
||||
**Precondition checked, not inherited** — both boxes were wiped and rebuilt today, so the 2 August
|
||||
evidence was re-measured: `docker ps -a` (**including stopped**) on **both** demo guests → no papra;
|
||||
hub `/hosts` → exactly two enrolled hosts (`demo-felhom-8363b5`, `demo-hp-bb76ea`), **zero** papra.
|
||||
|
||||
**Decided from the image, not the README:** `WORKDIR=/app`, `DATABASE_URL=file:./app-data/db/db.sqlite`,
|
||||
`DOCUMENT_STORAGE_FILESYSTEM_ROOT=./app-data/documents`, `PAPRA_CONFIG_DIR=./app-data` — and
|
||||
**`/app/data` does not exist in the image at all**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Departure from the task's stated preference order, stated because it was deliberate.** Option (1)
|
||||
(reconfigure the app to write to `/app/data`) *was* available — all three paths are env-settable. Not
|
||||
taken: it enumerates data paths, so a fourth added upstream would silently escape to the writable
|
||||
layer again — this defect re-armed and invisible. Mounting the app's own data **root** captures every
|
||||
current and future path by construction.
|
||||
|
||||
**Gate output — the arbiter, run in both directions:**
|
||||
|
||||
- fixed → `papra CLEAN`, with the self-test passing on that run: *"prober flags the R-156 signature and clears a correct template — trustworthy"*
|
||||
- reverted to `/app/data` (red-proof on the **real template**, not just the canary) → `BROKEN`: *"mount /app/data is NOT writable by the app's own uid=999"*, *"DATA in the writable layer at /app/app-data/db (db_signature=True, e.g. ['db.sqlite'])"*, *"declared volume /app/data is EMPTY"*
|
||||
- `catalog_gates.py papra` (full, not `--fast`) → **rc=0**, all three gates OK
|
||||
|
||||
**Two operational findings about the gate:** it needs **root** (it reads `/var/lib/docker/volumes`,
|
||||
mode `drwx--x---`; as a normal user its own canary fails UNDETERMINED and it correctly refuses a
|
||||
verdict — fail-closed working as designed), and it hardcodes scratch path `/srv/felhom-gate`, created
|
||||
on DooPlex. Unscoped it deploys all 53 templates; that run was aborted after 10 minutes and its
|
||||
`volgate-*` scratch projects were cleaned up.
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. §3's correction — confirmed in passing, not chased
|
||||
|
||||
`restore_points.go:57-59` takes the manifest's mtime and then `newestArtifact` over the `.sql` and
|
||||
`.tar` files, so **the newest of the three wins**. The restore point does **not** show a stale
|
||||
timestamp. Confirmed and dropped, as instructed.
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Register
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Change |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| **R-181** | **CLOSED — SHIPPED** (v0.193.0 + v0.193.1), with the live evidence above |
|
||||
| **R-156** | **CLOSED** — all three apps fixed |
|
||||
| **R-110** | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR → **READY**, ruling attached: **option (b), tag-tracked**, and it must cover **both** channels (the `/scripts/` git-sync *and* the nine files fetched from `raw/branch/main`) or it only half-works |
|
||||
| **R-115** | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR → **READY**, ruling attached: **mechanism (b)**, a build-side gate refusing to deploy or vouch an unpublished version; the third instance (agent v0.120.0) would have silently downgraded both demo boxes while reporting success |
|
||||
| **R-182** | **NEW.** ID established free: `grep -ro "R-182\b"` over `documentation/` and `*.md` → 2 hits, both prose in `REPORT.md` recording it as *"checked and left unused"*; `R-183` → 0 hits and remains free |
|
||||
|
||||
**R-165** is collapsed to CLOSED/PROVEN-LIVE in `ROADMAP.md`; the capability map's local-backup row
|
||||
moves to **PROVEN-LIVE, both halves**, because the live fill proved the fixed behaviour for **both**
|
||||
reserve terms.
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Observations — noticed, documented, NOT acted on
|
||||
|
||||
1. **R-182 (filed).** The periodic status refresh (`GetFullStatus` → `captureAllRecoveryUnits`) runs
|
||||
with no admission scope, so a refused app re-alerts on every poll — measured live: a second
|
||||
identical alert pair 13 s after the run's. **Pre-existing in v0.192.0**; R-181 changed neither
|
||||
caller. Its mitigation is a *comment* claiming the hub owns cooldown — which is exactly the
|
||||
"invariant asserted in a comment with no test pinning it" shape, so verify at the hub before
|
||||
scoping.
|
||||
2. **A reserve refusal does not make the run fail.** The DB and volume legs record `SKIP`, not `FAIL`,
|
||||
so `lastDBDump.Success` stays true and the customer-facing status does not turn red. Deliberate and
|
||||
consistent with v0.192.0 (the capture refusal never set it either), and the operator alert is the
|
||||
signal — but it means "backup succeeded" and "every app was backed up" are not the same statement.
|
||||
3. **`UnitSpace.UsedPercent` and `df` disagree** — `df` reported 99% where the alert said 94%, because
|
||||
`df`'s figure accounts for ext4 reserved blocks and the floor's does not. Harmless here (the
|
||||
free-byte term bound), but a percent-term threshold is being compared against a number the operator
|
||||
cannot reproduce with `df`.
|
||||
4. **The whole-guest PBS backup fails when the volume is near-full**, pushing
|
||||
`whole_guest_backup_failed` (severity `error`). Expected under a deliberate fill, and its backoff
|
||||
behaved correctly; noted because it is collateral any future fill test will also produce.
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Teardown
|
||||
|
||||
Fill file removed; the planted 2 GiB file removed; a final backup regenerated a correct 178 KB tar;
|
||||
`pct fstrim 9201` returned 67.5 GiB and the thin pool settled at **29.43%**, *below* its 36.83%
|
||||
baseline. The backups tree is byte-identical to the pre-test fingerprint. Guest helper scripts and the
|
||||
credential file `shred`-ed. `volgate-*` scratch compose projects removed; the unrelated 9-day-old
|
||||
`jarr-*` containers on DooPlex were left untouched. papra is **not** left deployed.
|
||||
|
||||
No `--no-verify` was used on any push; the `felhom-controller` pre-push hook ran and reported
|
||||
`gates OK` on both pushes.
|
||||
Probe container, probe sync tree and probe tag (`probe-r110-delete-me`) removed; the red-proof tag
|
||||
`v9.9.9` deleted (`git ls-remote --tags` → only `v0.120.0`); the Scenario A marker reverted from
|
||||
`main` and the installer confirmed byte-identical to the published tag; the throwaway in-cluster curl
|
||||
pod removed; the hub DB copy is scratch-only and holds no secret material in any committed file.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,34 +27,51 @@ time, and an app switched off deliberately stayed off every time.
|
||||
also delete it. A daily snapshot is armed as a stopgap, and we have never restored from that copy.
|
||||
*(R-95, R-87)*
|
||||
|
||||
**A full disk emails you repeatedly instead of once.** When the reserve refuses an app's backup you
|
||||
are told once by the backup run — correctly — but the page showing backup status re-checks on a timer
|
||||
and sends the same message again each time. Not new: as old as the reserve itself, and seen only
|
||||
because we watched the alerts closely while proving the fix below. Harmless if the hub already
|
||||
collapses repeats — which a comment claims and nobody has checked. *(R-182)*
|
||||
**A full disk tells you about ONE app and silently swallows the rest.** Yesterday this was written
|
||||
down the wrong way round — as *too many* emails. Measuring the receiving end reversed it: of nine
|
||||
refusals the machine reported today, **two emails were sent**. When two apps are refused in the same
|
||||
second you are told about one of them, and the other leaves no trace anywhere — not an email, not
|
||||
even a line in the log saying it was held back. So a second app can be going unbacked-up while you
|
||||
have already been told the problem is handled. It is the same fault we fixed once before for
|
||||
whole-machine backups, in a second place that never opted into the fix. *(R-182)*
|
||||
|
||||
## What shipped recently
|
||||
|
||||
**The backup partition is gone, and both demo machines run on the new shape.** Wiped and rebuilt on
|
||||
3 August and taken through the whole customer journey — set up, install an app, back it up, restore
|
||||
it. One storage area instead of two; the space a backup can use went from 19 GB to 65 GB on the small
|
||||
machine and 45 GB to 233 GB on the big one. Three reboots each, correct every time. The two were
|
||||
rebuilt deliberately differently — one from a local copy of the image, one by the ordinary customer
|
||||
route with the published fingerprint checked — so the disk shape and the delivery route are both
|
||||
proven, rather than one proven twice. Their previous demo apps and data are gone; that was the point
|
||||
of a wipe, and you approved it. *(R-165, R-178)*
|
||||
**Pushing the installer no longer publishes it.** The script that runs as root on a brand-new
|
||||
machine was copied from the main branch and served within thirty seconds, so pushing it *was*
|
||||
publishing it, with no staging and no way back but another push. It now comes from a **labelled**
|
||||
version: publishing is moving the label, and undoing it is moving the label back — about half a
|
||||
minute, no deploy. The website is untouched by this and still updates in thirty seconds, because a
|
||||
typo fix must never need a release. Proven by actually doing it: a real push changed nothing that
|
||||
anyone downloads, moving the label published it, moving it back restored the previous bytes exactly.
|
||||
|
||||
**What replaced the wall — and it now watches the right moment.** The wall was quietly doing a second
|
||||
job: keeping a runaway backup from eating the space the machine needs to keep running. That job is now
|
||||
explicit, and as first built it was checked too late — the big write happened first, unchecked, and
|
||||
only the small write after it was refused, while the message still promised your last good copy was
|
||||
untouched. **Fixed and proven on 3 August.** The machine now decides once, per app, **before it writes
|
||||
anything at all**, and that one answer covers all three steps: a refused app writes nothing, is not
|
||||
restarted, and the promise is now literally true — checked by fingerprinting every file before and
|
||||
after. It also stopped being blind to size, so an app is no longer waved through at 96% full and then
|
||||
allowed to write two gigabytes. Proven by deliberately filling a demo machine, once for each way it
|
||||
can refuse. Nothing is ever deleted to make room: every app has only one local copy, so "delete the
|
||||
oldest" would always mean destroying some other app's only copy. *(R-181)*
|
||||
**The catch that would have made it cosmetic was found and covered.** While it runs, the installer
|
||||
fetches sixteen more files — not nine, and from the *agent's* repository, not the website's. They now
|
||||
come from the same version of the agent the machine is installing. That closed a real fault nobody
|
||||
had noticed: a new machine was getting the agent's tested program and its untested settings files, in
|
||||
one install, from two different places. *(R-110, R-183)*
|
||||
|
||||
**Releasing the agent now publishes it, in one command.** Putting a built agent where a new machine
|
||||
can download it was a step someone had to remember, and it was forgotten three times in five days —
|
||||
the last time leaving both demo machines running a version nobody could download, so a rebuild would
|
||||
have quietly installed the *older* one and reported success. There is now one command that builds,
|
||||
labels, publishes and then **downloads it back to check** — and a check that refuses to stay quiet if
|
||||
a released version cannot actually be fetched. Proven by making CI fail on purpose and then go green
|
||||
again on the same code. *(R-115)*
|
||||
|
||||
**The backup partition is gone and both demo machines run on the new shape** — wiped, rebuilt and
|
||||
taken through the whole customer journey on 3 August, by two deliberately different routes so the disk
|
||||
shape and the delivery route are both proven. The space a backup can use went from 19 GB to 65 GB on
|
||||
the small machine and 45 GB to 233 GB on the big one. Their previous demo apps and data are gone; that
|
||||
was the point of a wipe, and you approved it. *(R-165, R-178)*
|
||||
|
||||
**What replaced the wall now watches the right moment.** The wall was quietly keeping a runaway
|
||||
backup from eating the space the machine needs to run. As first built, that replacement was checked
|
||||
too late — the big write happened first, unchecked — while still promising your last good copy was
|
||||
untouched. Fixed and proven on 3 August: the machine decides once, per app, **before it writes
|
||||
anything**, and that one answer covers all three steps, so a refused app writes nothing, is not
|
||||
restarted, and the promise is now literally true. It also stopped being blind to size. Nothing is ever
|
||||
deleted to make room. *(R-181)*
|
||||
|
||||
**The last of the three apps that never saved their data is fixed.** Installed nowhere, so nothing was
|
||||
stranded — checked on both demo machines and in the fleet list rather than assumed. Proven by the check
|
||||
@@ -75,24 +92,27 @@ step — but it notices quickly and tells you. *(R-29, R-161, R-168, R-169)*
|
||||
|
||||
## What we're working on
|
||||
|
||||
- **Now:** both of today's items are done — the reserve and the last unsaved app. Your two decisions
|
||||
are written down and are ours to build.
|
||||
- **Next:** building those two — moving the installer onto a labelled version so publishing is one
|
||||
step you can undo, and a check that refuses to install a version nobody can download *(R-110, R-115)*.
|
||||
- **Now:** nothing outstanding from today — the reserve, the last unsaved app, and both of your
|
||||
decisions are all built and proven.
|
||||
- **Next:** the alert that tells you about one app and swallows the second *(R-182)*.
|
||||
- **After:** the off-site copy that the machine making it can still erase *(R-95, R-87)*.
|
||||
|
||||
## Waiting on you
|
||||
|
||||
- **A job, not a decision: the hub password needs changing.** A diagnostic command printed it into a
|
||||
session log; nothing suggests anyone else saw it. *(R-132)*
|
||||
- **Nothing else.** You settled both open questions on 3 August — the installer moves onto a labelled
|
||||
version, and a check will refuse to install a version nobody can download. Both are written down and
|
||||
are ours to build. *(R-110, R-115)*
|
||||
- **Nothing else.** Both decisions you took on 3 August are now built and proven. One small question
|
||||
will come back later: the automatic check cannot see which version you have told machines to
|
||||
install, only which ones exist — closing that either needs a password given to the build server or
|
||||
a check inside the hub itself. Filed, not urgent. *(R-184)*
|
||||
|
||||
## Changed since last update
|
||||
|
||||
- **2026-08-03** — The reserve now guards the step that fills the disk, and its promise is true; the
|
||||
last app whose data was never saved is fixed. Both proven on a demo machine, not just in tests.
|
||||
- **2026-08-03** — Publishing became something you do rather than something that happens: the
|
||||
installer and the agent both moved onto labelled versions with a way back, and a check now refuses
|
||||
a release nobody can download. Earlier the same day: the reserve now guards the step that fills the
|
||||
disk and its promise is true, and the last app whose data was never saved is fixed. All proven on
|
||||
real machines, not just in tests.
|
||||
Earlier the same day: both demo machines wiped and rebuilt from the new base image and taken through
|
||||
set-up → install an app → back it up → restore it, with the backup space ceiling gone and measured.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -102,10 +122,6 @@ step — but it notices quickly and tells you. *(R-29, R-161, R-168, R-169)*
|
||||
the hub's own database is in no automatic backup** — it holds every machine's emergency password.
|
||||
Filed, not yet fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
- **2026-08-02** — Boot recovery finished; six hard resets, everything back every time. Two instances
|
||||
of the same hole — starting an app whose external drive was missing — were found by reading the code
|
||||
and fixed the same day.
|
||||
|
||||
- **2026-08-02** — Thirteen mechanical checks had built up and nothing ran most of them; two were
|
||||
failing quietly. Fixed. Decided the same day: the 20 GB backup partition goes away; and only this
|
||||
machine and the tester's box are protected, every other box may be broken or reinstalled freely.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Appliance day-0 install: golden image → first boot → auto-confirm (zero clicks) → claimable box | installer, agent, hub, golden | **PROVEN-LIVE** (nested VM) | `DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12`, `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` | First firing on real customer hardware pending → R-1 |
|
||||
| BYO install: `--mode byo`, mandatory caps, host-mutation disclosure, coexistence guards | installer v1.15+, agent | **PARTIAL** | `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` (demo box); GL-8 coexistence fixes | Peti clean-slate reinstall on proxmox2 is the first real BYO run of the current path → R-1 |
|
||||
| **The installer is PUBLISHED, not pushed — the artifact that runs as root on a virgin box is served from a version-controlled ref, and rolling back is one act** | scripts **v1.23.0** + `manifests/webpage.yaml` (R-110, operator ruling option (b)) | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | `scripts/CHANGELOG.md` v1.23.0 + `REPORT.md`. **Proven by HTTP against the real URL, not from a pod's filesystem.** *Scenario A:* a real push to `main` without moving the tag left the served script **byte-identical** (`sha256 2f859555…`), and a marker comment planted in that very commit was **absent** from the served bytes, while the website tree advanced to the new commit in the same observation — both halves of the split in one measurement. *Scenario B:* moving the tag published in **~40 s** (`sha → ea2b4aa9…`, marker present) and moving it back restored **exactly** the pre-publish sha. `https://felhom.eu/` returned 200 throughout. *P-A, measured BEFORE the manifest was touched because the model rests on it:* git-sync v4.4.0 follows a tag **and notices a moved one** (`update required … local:<old> remote:<new>` → `updated successfully`) | **Two syncs, deliberately: the WEBSITE still tracks `main`.** Pinning both would turn every copy edit into a release, which makes the release meaningless and the site slow to fix. **Publish** = cut `installer-v<SCRIPT_VERSION>` + bump the manifest `--ref` + sync; **roll back** = move the tag back, which needs **no ArgoCD sync and no deploy**. Continuity is structural rather than lucky: both trees are seeded by init containers so a fresh pod is not Ready until the tag is checked out, and `maxUnavailable` rounds to 0 on one replica, so a failed scripts-init leaves the OLD pod serving — the failure direction is *no update*, never *no `/scripts/`*. **The URL never carried a ref**, so the bootstrap script and the hub's day-0 command follow the tag with no edit and **no hub change**. The installer's own sixteen run-time fetches are a separate channel pinned to the AGENT's version (**R-183**), because they are the agent's configs and not this repo's — leaving them on `main` would have made the whole change cosmetic |
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| Bare-metal Felhom ISO (blank hardware → zero-touch auto-install → first-boot `host-install`); selectable UEFI loader; **universal secret-free / operator-bind** mode | scripts v1.19.0 (`scripts/iso/`) + hub v0.62.0 + assistant container | **PROVEN-LIVE on TWO different boards** (N100 2026-07-18; HP t740 2026-07-21) | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — the full chain on real metal in a single pass:** the generic reusable pairing ISO (v1.20.0, `--loader mkimage`, SB off) booted the cheap AMI board that F1 had blocked, installed unattended, and the box **self-registered as an unclaimed appliance at 16:17:14 — the same second it first booted** (`appliance_registrations` id=3), then bound → credential-delivered → day-0 SUCCESS 16:32:32 → floor-lifted to current. **F1 is closed on physical hardware.** Prior nested legs: slice A `SPIKE-baremetal-iso-2026-07-16` (build gate, disk-filter fail-safe, stub→host-install fetch); slice B RUNBOOK-B (shim boots+installs OVMF SB-enforcing + SeaBIOS; `--loader mkimage` boots+installs SB-off; mkimage SB-enforcing **FAILS** `Access Denied`; surgery byte-identical); **slice C (2026-07-17): the GENERIC secret-free ISO** — box self-registers as an unclaimed appliance (`POST /api/v1/appliance/register`, one-shot poll delivery, 404-no-oracle — all live-verified through the public ingress), operator binds on the Hosts page, hub delivers credentials once; bootstrap harness proves direct(zero-appliance-calls)/pairing/delivery; artifact proven secret-free (baked env = hub URL only) | **F1 loader caveat:** `--loader mkimage` fixes cheap AMI firmware that can't USB-boot the stock GRUB — UNSIGNED → **Secure Boot must be OFF**; default `shim` keeps SB. **Slice C bind is operator-password-gated** (CC stages, Viktor binds) → the live boot→register→bind→day-0 composition + physical N100 boot fold into the supervised rehearsal (R-1). Customer-facing **self-bind page = R-27 slice 1 SHIPPED (hub v0.66.0, 2026-07-17)** — see the dedicated self-bind row | **Second board, 2026-07-21 (demo-hp, HP t740 / Ryzen V1756B / AMI M42):** the whole chain ran on virgin hardware in one pass — armed install → self-registration as an unclaimed appliance → operator bind → day-0 → running guest 9201 + agent 0.92.1 as `demo-hp-bb76ea`. **The shim loader booted with Secure Boot ENABLED**, which retires the assumption that Felhom installs need SB off — that was an N100-firmware workaround. The exact-serial disk filter took the system SSD and left the box's 1TB NVMe untouched/unenrolled on hardware it had never seen. Two failures filed rather than smoothed over: **R-59** (no DHCP → the installer baked a static fallback instead of aborting) and **R-61** (baked root password unknowable → no console access).
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| Box survives a wrong-NIC install: hub-unreachable first boot → legible Hungarian console screen (NIC table + remedy) + NIC sweep self-heal (bounded DHCP + hub probe per NIC, success-only persist), and the baked root password is operator-knowable (`<iso>.rootpw.txt`) | scripts v1.24.0 (`scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh` `network_gate`/`sweep_nics`, `build-felhom-iso.sh` rootpw emission) | **PROVEN-LIVE (nested drill — nested ≠ metal: metal proof rides the next real multi-NIC install)** | `audits/SPIKE-firstboot-nic-sweep-2026-07-22.md` — dead-NIC install from the virgin v1.24.0 ISO baked the 192.168.100.2 fallback (WITH a dead default gateway), the R-59 screen painted on the console (screendump captured), and after the cable move the box swept to the working NIC, re-leased and **self-registered at the hub unaided in under a minute**; the drill also caught + fixed the stale-fallback-route trap (flush before the bounded dhclient) and verified the emitted rootpw against the installed box's shadow hash | R-59 ships as a first-boot gate, not an install-time abort (recorded deviation — the fallback is the auto-installer's own, initrd hook out of scope); sweep is structurally first-boot-only (`state.json` gate + unit done-flag condition); a box past install-start gets the screen but its interfaces are never touched |
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| Customer claim: one-time emailed code → customer sets own password (bcrypt, operator never sees it) | controller v0.122, hub v0.50 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM) | `DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12` §10/F-4 (gate ON via real edge; claimed, code consumed) | Never executed by a non-Viktor human → R-3. **Deliverability (R-4), gmail half DONE 2026-07-18:** the rehearsal's claim email was the first sent under the tightened DMARC `p=quarantine` and **landed in the gmail Inbox, not spam** (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`). **freemail.hu remains Viktor's open half.** (Dropped mis-cited `CAMPAIGN-4` F-C — that is the escrow-claim 502, not password claim) |
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
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| ID | Item | Size | Status | Notes / map rows flipped |
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|----|------|------|--------|--------------------------|
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| R-115 | **Publishing is a remembered step — forgotten within eight hours of being documented as forgettable** | M | **READY** — operator ruling 2026-08-03: **mechanism (b), a build-side gate that REFUSES to deploy or vouch an unpublished version.** THIRD instance the same day (agent v0.120.0 deployed to both boxes while unpublished; a documented-path reinstall would have silently downgraded them and *succeeded*). CC's to build | A box installs the agent from a Gitea generic package the hub explicitly vouches, never from git. Nothing in the build, deploy or session-end path publishes or checks that a version was published, so **"deployed" and "installable" are independent states that drift silently**. **Instance 1 — R-111** (morning): 17 agent releases v0.97.0–v0.113.0 stranded; a new customer would have installed without the whole R-82 tiered-backup arc plus F-CRIT-2 and F-REBOOT. Found only because the E-2d Phase 0 gate happened to look. **Instance 2 — agent 0.114.0** (same afternoon): the R-113 fix, built and pushed at `b58d7bc`, deployed to felhom-pve, never published — which blocked Session C, since a fresh drill box would have installed 0.113.0 and proven the bug rather than the fix. **The finding is the RECURRENCE, not either instance** — both are fixed. R-111 named this leg in its own text (*"decide whether publishing joins the release train rather than staying a remembered step"*) and closed SHIPPED without it; it recurred the same day, which is the evidence that **a note is not a mechanism**. **Class: → R-29, one layer up** (a control that exists and is never walked) — deliberately NOT given a second ID. **Filed as its own item rather than reopening R-111** because R-111's finding (the channel *was* stale) is closed and verified end-to-end by the E-2d install, while the process defect that caused it is a distinct problem with a distinct fix and a distinct owner. **Operator's decision, mechanisms first:** (a) publish as a step in the build/release path so deployed and installable cannot diverge; (b) a gate that refuses to deploy an unpublished+unvouched version — strongest, fails closed; (c) a session-end checklist entry; (d) accept manual + a pre-Session-C verification. **(a)/(b) are mechanisms, (c)/(d) are reminders — and R-29's whole finding is that reminders do not hold.** No code written when filed, by design |
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| R-115 | ~~**Publishing is a remembered step — forgotten within eight hours of being documented as forgettable**~~ | M | **CLOSED — SHIPPED 2026-08-03** (`release-agent.sh` + `check-published-versions.py`, no version bump). Releasing now builds, tags, publishes and **verifies by an independent download** in one act; a `v<semver>` tag with no package fails the gate, and **CI runs the full gate set** so it actually runs. Red-proof measured on real CI: same commit, green before a tagged-unpublished version existed, red after. Residue → **R-184** | A box installs the agent from a Gitea generic package the hub explicitly vouches, never from git. Nothing in the build, deploy or session-end path publishes or checks that a version was published, so **"deployed" and "installable" are independent states that drift silently**. **Instance 1 — R-111** (morning): 17 agent releases v0.97.0–v0.113.0 stranded; a new customer would have installed without the whole R-82 tiered-backup arc plus F-CRIT-2 and F-REBOOT. Found only because the E-2d Phase 0 gate happened to look. **Instance 2 — agent 0.114.0** (same afternoon): the R-113 fix, built and pushed at `b58d7bc`, deployed to felhom-pve, never published — which blocked Session C, since a fresh drill box would have installed 0.113.0 and proven the bug rather than the fix. **The finding is the RECURRENCE, not either instance** — both are fixed. R-111 named this leg in its own text (*"decide whether publishing joins the release train rather than staying a remembered step"*) and closed SHIPPED without it; it recurred the same day, which is the evidence that **a note is not a mechanism**. **Class: → R-29, one layer up** (a control that exists and is never walked) — deliberately NOT given a second ID. **Filed as its own item rather than reopening R-111** because R-111's finding (the channel *was* stale) is closed and verified end-to-end by the E-2d install, while the process defect that caused it is a distinct problem with a distinct fix and a distinct owner. **Operator's decision, mechanisms first:** (a) publish as a step in the build/release path so deployed and installable cannot diverge; (b) a gate that refuses to deploy an unpublished+unvouched version — strongest, fails closed; (c) a session-end checklist entry; (d) accept manual + a pre-Session-C verification. **(a)/(b) are mechanisms, (c)/(d) are reminders — and R-29's whole finding is that reminders do not hold.** No code written when filed, by design |
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| R-116 | **The drive-absent alarm and its recovery are a mismatched pair — generic on the way out, specific on the way back** | S | idea — **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-29** | Absent fires `storage_disconnected`; return fires `backup_target_restored`. `backup_target_absent` never fires at all (count 0 across a full Session-C run), so an operator gets an alarm they cannot match to its recovery — exactly what `notifyDriveReturned`'s own comment forbids. Root cause: `notifyDriveAbsent` (`intermediary.go:635-646`) branches on `isTarget[a.Path]` with `a.Path` the GUEST path, and `driveTargetByPath` (`:602-616`) builds it as `out[GuestPath] = d.BackupTarget` — but **the drive is TWO `/disks` rows and the flag and the guest path sit on different ones**: the `felhom-backup` storage row has `BackupTarget: true` (`felhom-agent/internal/localapi/disks.go:211`) and gets a guest path only while classified user-data, while the registry union row has the guest path and **never assigns `BackupTarget`** (`disks.go:265-267`). Absent ⇒ the flagged row loses its guest path ⇒ the union row writes `false` ⇒ generic. On return the rows rejoin ⇒ specific. v0.184.1 fixed the KEYING, not this. **Only reachable because R-113 made the gate fire at all.** Fix likely agent-side; decide the repo first. Blocks E-2's C5. Evidence: `audits/SESSION-C-2026-07-29.md` §5 |
|
||||
| R-113 | **The drive-absent gate cannot fire on device loss — E-2b's alarm is wired to an unreachable condition** | M | idea — **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-29** | `planDriveGates` (`felhom-controller/internal/web/intermediary.go:216-262`) treats a path as present by OR-ing in `d.BoundUnderParent`, which the agent derives from `GuestSeesMount()` — *"is this path a mount target in the guest's `/proc/<pid>/mountinfo`"* (`internal/localapi/disks.go:210`). The raw drive mount is a **device-bound systemd unit** and dies with the device; **the agent's own bind under the shared parent is not device-bound and its mountinfo entry outlives the device**, so the gate reads it as present and `notifyDriveAbsent` is never called. Live on a fresh box: target drive hot-detached, agent said `enrolled drive absent by UUID` every 20 s for 4½ min, controller logged **0** `[gate]` lines, hub received **zero** events — neither `backup_target_absent` nor the generic `storage_disconnected`. Not a virtualisation artefact (device-bound-mount vs manual-bind is the same on metal); caveat: SCSI hot-detach, physical unplug not staged. **Sixth instance of seam-built-but-never-wired — E-2b wired the seam to a condition that cannot occur.** Evidence: `audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md` §5.2 |
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| R-112 | **E-2's degraded banner and offer have no UI consumer — correct endpoint, invisible to the customer** | S | idea — **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-29** | `GET /api/storage/backup-target` returns byte-exact Hungarian copy (verified on a live box), and nothing in the product asks for it: `grep 'backup-target'` across every `*.html`/`*.js`/`*.css` → **0 hits**; no template references `OfferPath`/`Degraded`/the copy; `resolveBackupTargetState` and `degradedMessageFor` are consumed **only** by the JSON handler, with **no page handler injecting the state**. Decisive contrast: the templates fetch **18 distinct `/api/storage/*` endpoints** — `backup-target` and `backup-target/assign` are the only two with zero references. The handler's own comment calls itself *"the dashboard's source for the degraded banner and the offer"*. v0.185.1 shipped as *"the offer endpoints were mounted where nothing routed to them"* and fixed the **mount**, stopping one layer short of the **render**; its test pins dispatch, not reachability. **Fifth instance of the class. Fix R-114 first** — wiring this alone starts showing customers a wrong message. Evidence: `audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md` §5.1 |
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@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Self-resolves the moment the target answers (the storage read succeeds, sees the
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| R-97 | **The whole-guest backup tier has NO failure signal to the hub — `internal/quiesce` never notifies** | S | **SHIPPED (controller v0.177.0 + hub v0.78.0, 2026-07-27)** — **R-97a:** `quiesce.TierNotifier`, a seam (not an import) wired by an init-only setter, edge-triggered on the R-88 breaker ARMING so a failing tier is reported once per run rather than once per retry; recovery rides `recordSuccess`'s existing bool. **NEW operator-only event types** `whole_guest_backup_failed`/`_recovered` — deliberately NOT `backup_failed`, which carries a customer Hungarian template AND sits in demo-felhom's live `enabled_events`, so reusing it would have emailed the CUSTOMER about a backup they cannot act on while it was still retrying. The recovery joins `recoveredPairedDownTypes` because its `info` severity would otherwise be dropped by `severityNotifies` — the operator would hear it break and never hear it heal. **The hub's operator cooldown was keyed `customerID:eventType` alone**, so one tier would have masked the other for an hour; now narrowly extended with a `tier` suffix taken from the event details, leaving every other event type unchanged. **R-97b:** a suppression window keyed to the quiesce CYCLE (not a state test — v0.164.0's `!= StateStopped` filter cannot see an app caught MID-RESTART, which is exactly how BookStack alarmed), consumed at the same single derivation point `classifyRunStates`. Grace = **180 s**, derived from the deploy flow's 120 s health timeout and Mealie's 60 s `start_period`; it **expires**, so an app that genuinely fails to come back still alarms. **PROVEN LIVE end-to-end with a control:** the new type POSTs 200 from inside guest 9201 while a bogus type 400s, and `notification_log` shows **1 operator row, 0 customer rows**. The quiesce→notify link itself is unit-proven only. | On 2026-07-27 three whole-guest backups failed and three quiesce cycles stopped and restarted every customer app stack, and **not one `backup_failed` event reached the hub.** It is not the allowlist — the hub already carries `backup_failed` and `backup_completed` (they are emitted by the controller's *app-data* backup path). The cause is that **`internal/quiesce` does not import `internal/notify` at all**: the tier R-82 built has no route to the hub, so a whole-guest backup can fail indefinitely in silence. The loop's only trace was `app_start_failed` — **info** severity, **Hungarian**, on the **customer** channel — telling the customer BookStack was down (it had been caught mid-restart by the third cycle) without saying why, during an outage the system itself caused. So the one signal that did fire was both the wrong tier and the wrong story. **Shape:** emit `backup_failed`/`backup_completed` from `quiesceAndPollTiers` naming the TIER, operator-tier; and decide whether a quiesce-induced restart should suppress `app_start_failed` the way controller **v0.164.0**'s deliberate-stop filter does — an app the backup stopped on purpose is not a fault. R-88's breaker bounds the repetition but changes nothing about the silence |
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| R-95 | **The restic offsite tier's credential CAN DELETE — R-89's "parallel question", now ANSWERED** | M | idea — established read-only 2026-07-27 | **The exposure closed on the weekly PBS tier is fully open on the daily restic tier**, which holds the customer's actual documents and photos and is the only tier that survives losing the box. Established without mutating anything: **(1) Identity** — a per-customer *subaccount* on `storage-box-pool-1` (box 611714, bx11, `u629488`): `u629488-sub1` home `felhom-demo-felhom`, `sub2` peti-felhom, `sub3` demo-hp, each labelled `felhom-customer`. Auth is an **SSH key stored ON THE BOX** (`…/felhom-controller-data/_data/data/offbox/ssh_key`, 0600, beside `repo_password` + a pinned `known_hosts`) — customer-side, not hub-side, so a compromised guest holds it. **(2) Read-write: YES** — the API reports **`readonly=False` on all three subaccounts**, and it is not merely latent: the controller runs `restic forget --group-by host,tags --keep-daily 7 --keep-weekly … --prune` **from the box** (`backup/offbox.go:984`, also `:1070`). Delete rights are exercised on every run. **(3) Append-only: NO, and not expressible** — the repo is built as `sftp:` (`offbox.go:482`); restic's append-only mode requires the **REST server** backend, which plain SFTP cannot provide. **(4) A zero-code mitigation exists and is unused:** the box type carries `snapshot_limit=10` and the API reports `snapshot_plan=null` with **0 snapshots** and `size_snapshots=0`. Hetzner Storage Box snapshots are taken **server-side, outside the SFTP namespace** — an SFTP subaccount cannot delete them — so they are a genuine immutability layer at no extra cost and with no code change. **Rule once for both tiers, per R-89.** Options, cheapest first: enable a snapshot plan (operator click, immediate); split backup-write from prune so pruning runs somewhere the box cannot reach; or move the repo to restic's REST server with `--append-only`. Flips the capability-map row for offsite immutability |
|
||||
| R-94 | ~~A hand-synced version constant drifts, and the gate that would catch it is never run~~ | XS | **CLOSED — SHIPPED hub v0.87.0, 2026-08-02** | Closed by **deleting** the label rather than deriving it: the Setup command fetches the installer at run time from a 30 s-git-synced website (R-110), so no build-time value in the hub can be true. `hostinstall_gates.py` gate 1 inverted to pin the ABSENCE of a version literal; the tautological `render_test.go` assertion deleted (demonstrated passing at `9.9.9`). Detail: `OPEN-ITEMS.md` R-94 |
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| R-110 | **`main` is the installer's publish channel — there is no staging** | S | **READY** — operator ruling 2026-08-03: **option (b), the channel moves to a TAG**, so publishing is moving the tag and rollback is moving it back. **Must cover BOTH channels** — the nginx `/scripts/` git-sync AND the nine files the installer fetches from `raw/branch/main` — or it only half-works. CC's to build | `manifests/webpage.yaml` git-syncs `/scripts/` from `--branch=main` on a `--period=30s`, and nginx serves that working tree directly (`location /scripts/`, `root /usr/share/nginx/html/current`). So pushing `scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` **is** publishing it: within thirty seconds it is what every subsequent `felhom-bootstrap.sh` fetch (`scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh:96`) and every operator-run day-0 command (`customer_unified.html:563`, `:1262`; `runbooks/day0-install.md` C.1) receives. **There is no tag, no pinned-version path, no staging copy and no rollback other than another push** — for the one artifact that runs as **root on a virgin box**, the most privileged thing Felhom ships. **Two consequences worth stating plainly:** E-2d is not a gate *before* exposure — 1.22.0 has been the live installer since it hit `main` on 2026-07-29, so the proof run confirms what customers already receive rather than clearing it for release; and the precaution the old R-94 row recorded ("do not point every new box at an installer that has never run") **was never available to take**, because nothing points boxes at a version. **Open question for the operator, not a defect to fix blind:** should `/scripts/` serve a pinned release — a tag-tracked git-sync ref, or a versioned directory (`/scripts/1.22.0/…`) with the hub's generated command naming a version — or is `main`-tracking the accepted shape for a one-operator product where the alternative is a release ritual nobody performs? **Exposure today is zero** (no boxes are installing), which is exactly why it is cheap to decide now. Whichever way it goes, it decides whether R-94 leg (a) makes the label a *fact* (derived from the served script) or keeps it a *claim*. Flips no capability-map row — the map states what the platform does, and this changes nothing about that |
|
||||
| R-110 | ~~**`main` is the installer's publish channel — there is no staging**~~ | S | **CLOSED — SHIPPED 2026-08-03** (installer v1.23.0). `/scripts/` syncs `installer-v1.23.0`; the website still tracks `main`. Proven by HTTP: a push to `main` left the served bytes byte-identical, moving the tag published in ~40 s, moving it back restored the exact prior sha. The run-time fetches turned out to be **sixteen from the agent repo**, not nine from here — pinned to the agent version instead → **R-183** | `manifests/webpage.yaml` git-syncs `/scripts/` from `--branch=main` on a `--period=30s`, and nginx serves that working tree directly (`location /scripts/`, `root /usr/share/nginx/html/current`). So pushing `scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` **is** publishing it: within thirty seconds it is what every subsequent `felhom-bootstrap.sh` fetch (`scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh:96`) and every operator-run day-0 command (`customer_unified.html:563`, `:1262`; `runbooks/day0-install.md` C.1) receives. **There is no tag, no pinned-version path, no staging copy and no rollback other than another push** — for the one artifact that runs as **root on a virgin box**, the most privileged thing Felhom ships. **Two consequences worth stating plainly:** E-2d is not a gate *before* exposure — 1.22.0 has been the live installer since it hit `main` on 2026-07-29, so the proof run confirms what customers already receive rather than clearing it for release; and the precaution the old R-94 row recorded ("do not point every new box at an installer that has never run") **was never available to take**, because nothing points boxes at a version. **Open question for the operator, not a defect to fix blind:** should `/scripts/` serve a pinned release — a tag-tracked git-sync ref, or a versioned directory (`/scripts/1.22.0/…`) with the hub's generated command naming a version — or is `main`-tracking the accepted shape for a one-operator product where the alternative is a release ritual nobody performs? **Exposure today is zero** (no boxes are installing), which is exactly why it is cheap to decide now. Whichever way it goes, it decides whether R-94 leg (a) makes the label a *fact* (derived from the served script) or keeps it a *claim*. Flips no capability-map row — the map states what the platform does, and this changes nothing about that |
|
||||
| R-128 | **`ISO_VERSION` "aligns with SCRIPT_VERSION" was a comment nothing evaluated** | XS | **CLOSED — iso v1.26.0, 2026-07-31** | Closed by **correcting the claim, not asserting it**: the ISO is frozen while `felhom-host-install.sh` is fetched at run time from `main` (R-94/R-110), so an assertion would invent a constraint. `build-felhom-iso.sh:45-52`. Full reasoning in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` |
|
||||
| R-154 | **`[first-boot]` is automated-install-only, and nothing in the tree said so** | XS | **CLOSED — iso v1.26.0, 2026-07-31** | A PVE property, measured with a same-image control (`audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-3-2026-07-31.md` §2); recorded at `scripts/iso/pkg/build-deb.sh:6-11`. Superseded in practice by the `.deb` delivery route |
|
||||
| R-155 | **`iso-repack.sh` refused any ISO without `auto-installer-mode.toml`** | XS | **CLOSED — iso v1.26.0, 2026-07-31** | **Narrowed, not deleted** — unchanged for `FELHOM_MENU=single` (`iso-repack.sh:121-128`), does not apply to `release` where the file's absence *is* gate G1. Do not remove it wholesale |
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user