Pairs with agent v0.119.0 and is useless without it.
A managed box's LAN IP was not shown anywhere in the hub, because nothing
reported it — the host report carried no address of any kind. The only IP
reachable from the UI at all was the WireGuard one, on /offsite's peer table
keyed by pubkey, so an operator could go peer->host and never host->peer, which
is the direction anyone actually asks in.
The host page grows a Network card: every routable address the box holds, one row
per (interface, address), plus a WireGuard row. On demo-felhom that is vmbr0
192.168.0.162/24 and tailscale0 100.70.170.35/32 — with the PVE web console at
https://<the LAN address>:8006, the thing the operator wanted and could not get.
WireGuard is rendered as TWO facts, deliberately. WGAssignedIP is the hub's own
allocation (wg_peers, authoritative desired state); WGConfirmed is whether the box
reports actually holding it. Showing the allocation alone would make a peer that
was never applied look healthy — the same shape as reading a timestamp that
records an attempt as if it recorded a result.
The split is keyed on the ALLOCATION, not the interface name: wg-felhom is the
agent's current unit name, and a UI keyed on that string would silently
mis-render the day it changes.
An old agent renders UNKNOWN, never "no addresses". Below agent 0.119.0 the field
is absent from the wire, and an absent signal is not a negative result — the page
says so and names the version needed. Rendering an empty list there would have
stated something false about the host.
No new store table and no new ingest path: the report is already stored opaquely
and GetWGPeerForHost already existed with no UI consumer. This is parse + render.
The report fixture in the tests is the REAL wire — the addresses block copied out
of `felhom-agent --selftest=hub` on demo-felhom running 0.119.0.
Tests 559 -> 566; four red-proofs (inert view-model, unconditional confirmation,
the old-agent branch, and the drift case) each run, observed failing, reverted.
The credential existed and was not reachable when it was wanted. Every box has
had a strong random root@pam password since TASK G1, vaulted in the hub at day 0
and used for real during the sshd incident — but the only way to read it back was
a hand-written curl carrying the global operator key, a secret kept out-of-band.
In practice the PVE web console on a demo box felt locked.
The host page grows a Console access card: presence + username + set_at by
default, Reveal fetches the plaintext on demand for 60 s with a Copy button.
Masking clears the JS variable, and also fires on a second click and on
visibilitychange. A host with nothing vaulted says so, and says why.
The secret is NEVER rendered into the page, and that constraint shapes the
change. The render path uses a new store.GetHostRecoveryMeta whose struct and
SELECT both omit the secret column, so it is structurally incapable of carrying
one. The plaintext crosses the wire only in the response to POST
/hosts/{id}/reveal-recovery-credential (Cache-Control: no-store, CSRF-gated at
the ServeHTTP level; POST precisely so that gate applies and so no secret is
retrievable by URL alone). Deliberately NOT the customer page's data-secret
widget, which embeds the plaintext on every load.
A delivered reveal writes one recovery_credential_revealed event on the host's
customer timeline (info, source hub, Hungarian) via SaveEvent alone — no
dispatcher, nobody emailed, the log_tail_requested shape. Two reveals write two
events: the register records accesses, not states. A 404 is not an access. An
unbound host reveals fine and writes no event; the [INFO] hub line, carrying the
username and a length only, is then the record.
The global-key API path is untouched by design — it is the route for when the
hub UI itself is broken, and coupling it to the session layer would delete the
independence that makes it a fallback.
Recorded as a real trade: the hub session password alone now unlocks console root
fleet-wide, where retrieval previously also needed the global key. Accepted for a
single-operator, HU-geo-fenced hub that already stores these passwords in
plaintext at rest (CONTEXT.md ruling S-4). The plaintext-at-rest half is filed as
R-133 — every hub DB backup is a fleet-wide console-credential dump.
Tests 550 -> 559; four red-proofs (page leak, audit event, CSRF gate, route
order) each run, observed failing, and reverted. The route-order proof is a seam
test driving ServeHTTP: a handler-level test cannot see that defect, because the
handler is correct and simply never runs.
Completes the hub half of R-39's fleet fix on top of the generation core (c484aa2).
pbsdrheal gains an auth_failed TRIGGER — a new trigger in the existing machine, not a
new machine. A box whose credential PBS rejects escalates to a fresh mint, never a
re-stage (which would re-feed the secret PBS just rejected), through the EXISTING damper:
a 401 flap must not become a secret-minting chain. With the generation stamp this closes
the loop end to end — agent proves the 401, hub re-keys, generation advances, descriptor
hash moves, agent re-consumes.
consumed_at honesty gauge: a staged secret still unconsumed past a 15-minute grace while
the box reports `applied` is surfaced with its own event. That is the exact 2026-07-18
fingerprint and a disagreement no single tier can see alone. Deliberately a SURFACE, not
a heal — auto-re-issuing on it would mint a second secret on top of an unconsumed one,
which is the mint/consume race R-39(a) already recorded. One event per distinct report,
and an honestly-stuck box does not double-report (its unconsumed secret is the symptom
being healed, not a contradiction).
R-50b(a): ArtifactManifest.WrapperSHA256 + operator field + host-page drift surface. The
PBS wrapper is root-owned 0755 and the pinned sudoers vector, yet installed unversioned
from raw/branch/main and absent from every manifest. Agents >=0.91.0 report the installed
hash; a mismatch is surfaced. An unknown on EITHER side reads as quiet, never as drift —
lighting every host amber on rollout day is how a warning becomes background noise. The
delivery channel itself stays R-50b(b)/(c).
Compatibility unchanged: safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown JSON key dropped); the re-arm
and auth-honesty guarantees need agent >=0.91.0, so MinAgent moves only after the fleet
has self-updated.
Tests: auth_failed escalate/debounce/recovery-forgets-streak; honesty gauge incl. grace
window, the restage edge (consumed_at deliberately NULLed), consumed-never-alarms, and
honest-stuck-no-double-report; wrapper drift incl. both unknown directions. Red-proof run
at the assertion level: removing the auth_failed arm fails the escalation tests with
reissues=0.
A generic ISO carries NO customer secret. The box registers itself at the hub
as an unclaimed appliance; the operator binds it to a customer; the hub delivers
the customer-id + retrieval passphrase ONCE; day-0 completes via the slice-A path.
Hub (v0.62.0):
- store/appliance.go: appliance_registrations keyed by (uuid, mac_set) — MAC set
is the tiebreaker (duplicate SMBIOS UUIDs); token stored as sha256 only.
Idempotent register (sticky-discard), atomic one-shot delivery, bind/discard.
- api/appliance.go: POST /appliance/register (the one unauth endpoint, per-IP
rate-limited, 256-bit token); GET /appliance/poll (404 no-oracle / 204 unbound
/ 200 deliver-once / 410 delivered). Passphrase read live, never logged.
- web/appliances.go: Hosts-page "Unclaimed appliances" section + BIND (customer
picker, host count display-only) + DISCARD; SSH host-key fingerprints; events.
- Red-proofs: one-shot delivery + register idempotency (both proven red);
404-no-oracle, sticky-discard, bind staging, render. Green + confirm gate.
Scripts (v1.19.0):
- felhom-bootstrap.sh: ONE unit, TWO modes. Direct (env has customer/passphrase)
= slice-A path, byte-identical, only branched around. Pairing (generic) =
register + poll (RestartSec=30 is the poll timer); on delivery write the env
0600 and fall through to direct. Secrets + token shredded on success.
- build-felhom-iso.sh --pairing: generic secret-free ISO, -generic filename,
manifest mode=pairing. profiles/generic.profile (new).
- test/bootstrap-modes.sh: Scenario D (direct = zero appliance calls) + pairing
register/poll + delivery handoff — all green in a debian container.
- DeleteHost(deleteEscrow) demotes current host_escrow into host_escrow_superseded (copy-before-delete, same tx), spares existing; one shared demoteCurrentEscrowTx (reused by SaveHostEscrow). F-14 provenance/gate unchanged.
- DeleteCustomerConfig now purges both escrow tables for all the customer's hosts incl. already-deleted (F-14 provenance UNION) — the one true purge point.
- Wording: checkbox/refusal/Danger-zone → demotion. S6b OBSOLETE. Red-proofs TestDeleteHost_Demotes + TestDeleteCustomer_Purges + wording guard.
The parallel session's git add -A swept the v0.47.0 Part-4 WIP mid-red-proof:
hosts.go landed with the RED-PROOF 2 mutation (deleteEscrow := true), i.e. the
escrow acknowledgement bypassed. This restores the real gate; the swept store/
template/test files were captured in their correct final state (full go test
green). Red-proofs 1/2/5 all ran and FAILED as required before this point.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vvz1NCu22p8dGkRCpeX9re
- host_detail_body.html: {{define}}'d body sections extracted from
host_detail.html; the standalone page is now chrome + the sub-template
- hosts.go: hostDetailData(host, r) view-model builder extracted from
handleHostDetail (reused by both surfaces)
- store: ListHostsByCustomer (host_id order; the Host tab is a list by
design - N hosts for a future HA cluster)
- customer Host tab renders one host_detail_body per host + cross-link;
empty state when no host is enrolled
- tests: TestTemplates_CustomerHostTab(+_Empty), TestListHostsByCustomer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vvz1NCu22p8dGkRCpeX9re
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