AssembleDRRecipe's hostHalfShape/appHalfShape are ALLOW-LISTS, not the
forward-compat their comment advertised: a section an emitter adds is silently
discarded until it is named in both the shape struct and AssembledRecipe. No
error, no log, no failing test.
R-122 (found this session): that already happened and shipped. The controller
has emitted offsite_restic since fork-4 — the offsite recovery LOCATION — the
hub stored it for all three real customers, and appHalfShape never listed the
key, so no delivered recipe has ever contained it. It stayed green because the
fixture drAppHalf is hand-written and omits the field.
R-109: the agent's new backup_target is a new top-level host-half section and
would have been dropped identically, making the fix read as shipped while
changing nothing an operator can see.
3 tests built on halves read verbatim out of the live dr_recipe table, plus
2 red-proofs (each mutation asserted to have landed). vet rc=0, suite rc=0, 17 ok.
Registers: R-106 + R-109 dispositioned; R-105/R-106 were READY in ROADMAP with
no OPEN-ITEMS row (→ R-123, registered); R-124 filed on the "root" spelling.
R-117 row → SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE (agent v0.117.0), with the full validation in
audits/R117-v0117-2026-07-30.md.
Both dead states detected on real hardware through the shipped predicate:
RETURN raw 8:32 /dev/sdc | bind 8:16 shutdown → stale-device, usable false
IN-PLACE both 252:11 emergency_ro, raw unit active → filesystem-aborted, usable false
healthy → live
340-497us per call. No block I/O proven by strace (only /proc/self/mountinfo,
0 statfs) — the Part 1 CLAUDE.md fence applied to its own first consumer. No
regression through the real pipeline: the live backup-target drive reads
bound_under_parent=True via GET /disks with the controller's own credential, with
32 gate lines in 3 min as the positive observable and zero spurious transitions.
The ruling asked for in §2.2 is recorded in full and flagged for overrule:
Aborted must NOT self-heal. A re-bind lands on the same dead superblock and the
call site runs every 20s, so repairing would be an infinite silent retry that
masks the state. It surfaces instead. No operator decision was taken quietly —
the reasoning is that it routes an already-broken state into the existing gate,
event types and Hungarian copy, so no new concept reaches the customer.
R-121 filed: a box's installed agent can sit releases behind the vouched one and
nothing notices. demo-hp ran 0.113.0 against a vouched 0.116.0 through the whole
R-116/R-117 arc. Confirmed at source that R-120's gate cannot catch it — it
compares goldenVer against NewestReportedControllerVersion(), i.e.
golden-artifact vs fleet-CONTROLLER. MinAgent is protective, not an alarm, and
0.113.0 equalled the floor. Fourth instance of the drift family.
Also filed: R-117g (an aborted filesystem is never cleared automatically by
design, so it alarms until a human acts, with no guided recovery) and R-117h
(StablePathForRaw hardcodes the parent, so the repair path cannot be exercised on
hardware without writing into a live customer guest's namespace).
Two record items, banked before any Go file is opened.
1. CLAUDE.md gains a standing rule beside the seam-wiring rule: a health check
issues no block I/O. A probe that touches a wedged device enters
uninterruptible sleep, survives SIGKILL, and cannot be recovered until the
device returns or the host reboots — so `systemctl restart` hangs too. A
timeout protects the caller's control flow and nothing else. Liveness is
decided from /proc and kernel state.
Measured in the R-117 spike §6.3: D state 3m50s after kill -9; a buffered
write with no fsync blocked too (O_CREAT needs journal access); statfs and
getdents returned HEALTHY on a namespace that EIOs every byte.
Repeated as a one-line pointer in felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md, because health
checks are written in that repo and felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md does not load in an
agent-only session — a standing rule that does not load where it binds is the
inert-seam shape applied to a rule.
2. The R-116 row gains the clause the spike recommended but did not apply. Its
verdict stands and every input to the pairing fix is configuration-derived.
But the over-correction window's degraded:false was read off a drive whose
bind was dead, so it evidences "the gate did not over-fire", not "the drive
was healthy". The two RETURNED lines remain a genuine positive observable, so
rule 3 is still satisfied. Nothing else about the row changed.
Completes the spike once the venue came back. Q4's hang case and teardown are
now measurements, not plans.
Against a dmsetup-suspended device (I/O queues instead of returning EIO):
- P1 (devno compare) and P2 (ext4 abort flags) completed in 364us / 206us.
They read /proc, so no block device is involved.
- statfs and getdents completed and reported HEALTHY — on a wedged device they
do not even hang. R-117b confirmed in a second failure mode.
- EVERY probe that touches the device blocked, including a buffered write with
no fsync: the O_CREAT metadata path needs journal access
(wchan=do_get_write_access). There is no cheap-and-safe write probe.
- The blocked process survived SIGTERM AND SIGKILL (stat=D,
wchan=folio_wait_bit_common, still alive 3m50s after kill -9) and died only
when the device was resumed. So `systemctl restart felhom-agent` would hang,
leaving the agent unrecoverable until the device returns or the host reboots.
The thread count does not reveal the leak (5->5, 5->6).
Filed as R-117f. A timeout protects the caller's control flow and nothing else,
so "the fix must issue no block I/O" is now a fence rather than a preference —
the thread-leak hypothesis the probes were built to test turned out to be the
weaker half of the result.
Teardown done, all three layers: guest 9301 destroyed, r117scratch removed, both
dm and both loop devices gone, scsi_debug unloaded, local back to 37.02% against
a 37.00% session start. Fences re-verified AFTER teardown: 9201 running,
drill-r50 stopped, local-lvm 38.84% byte-identical, felhom-backup content
unchanged, live /mnt/felhom-drives intact with both submounts, agent active.
Layer 3 genuinely empty — 9301 had no NIC and ran no controller.
Trap recorded: a suspended dm device must be resumed BEFORE any umount, or the
teardown blocks on the same uninterruptible sleep.
Both halves of the R-113 conjunction are path-presence tests: GuestSeesMount
(intermediary.go:276) and isHostMountpoint (:394) compare field 5 of a mountinfo
line and never read field 3, so neither can see that the bind and the raw mount
name different devices. Measured BoundUnderParent=TRUE over a namespace that
EIOs on every read and write.
Reproduced 3/3 on a purpose-built scratch LXC on demo-hp; predicates evaluated
by a throwaway probe calling the real localapi code from d4eb259.
Three results that change the shape of the fix:
- Q7: a bind can die in STEADY STATE with no detach/return cycle. The gate
produces no action and nothing is emitted on any channel. A Return-branch fix
cannot reach this half, and a devno comparison does not detect it.
- Q6/R-117d: AttachDrive's normalize leg already performs the repair, and three
call sites already invoke it - including the controller's Return branch before
it restarts apps. All defeated by one early return at :235. Unblock the
existing path; do not add a new one.
- Q1: the device-node change is a CONSEQUENCE, not a precondition. The stale
bind pins the dead superblock, forcing the returning device onto a new number.
Control test: released, the letter is reused.
Not established: the hang case. Venue and probes built, run lost to a site
internet outage; the thread-leak hypothesis is not claimed as a result.
Teardown of the spike venue is owed - commands in the findings doc; nothing
fenced was touched and no hub-side record was created.
Half 1, the artifact: golden 0.186.0 baked, published, vouched, and proven on a REAL
day-0 on demo-hp (not the fixture, per the rule committed in Part 1). With the target
detached, the fresh box's endpoint returned the TargetAbsent copy -- "A rendszermentés
meghajtója nem érhető el — amíg vissza nem csatlakoztatod..." -- with offer_path
absent entirely. The day-old read on the 0.185.1 golden had returned the false
system-disk message plus an offer of the other drive. That is the customer-visible
defect closed.
Half 2, the mechanism: operator ruled REFUSE, shipped as hub v0.82.0 and DEPLOYED.
Proven live by re-attempting the original mistake -- vouching the stale 0.185.1 golden
now yields HTTP 303 flash=golden_behind_fleet plus [WARN] artifact vouch REFUSED, and
the manifest reads back unchanged at 0.186.0. Refused AND unwritten, against the real
fleet signal rather than a unit fixture.
Recorded on R-29's audit list as the first ENFORCED gate beside its three orphans, so
the contrast is kept rather than lost. The orphans are unchanged -- this proves the
pattern is available, not that the backlog moved.
Teardown all three layers: VM 9402 purged, r120-images removed with the space measured
back, hub layer gate-blocked on ONLINE with the command recorded. Last session's sess-e
was deleted this run, discharging its recorded layer 3.
The golden's version IS the controller it bakes (build-golden.sh:345 defaults
GOLDEN_VERSION to the controller tag), so a golden behind the newest deployed
controller means every FRESH install lands on stale application code. On the R-120
occurrence that stale code shipped a customer-facing falsehood: a box from the
0.185.1 golden told a customer whose backup drive had fallen out that the backup was
on the same disk as the system -- false, the drive was gone -- and offered a
different drive as the remedy.
WHY A GATE, NOT A REMINDER. The gap has opened three times: R-111 (golden's agent 17
releases behind), R-115 (agent built and deployed, never published), R-120 (this).
The first two were closed by re-baking and remembering; remembering then failed
again. R-29 is the standing proof that a check nobody runs is worse than none because
it reads as coverage -- hostinstall_gates.py sat RED and uninvoked across three
version bumps and hub_confirm_gate.py has never run at all. So the property that
matters is not whether a check exists but whether it BLOCKS.
- Wired into handleSetArtifacts (internal/web/configs.go), immediately before the
only write, on the sole UI path to SetArtifactManifest -- it runs on every vouch
without anyone choosing to. A script in scripts/ would have been a fourth orphan.
- It REFUSES (operator ruling, 2026-07-30), with a flash naming the remedy.
- Signal: store.NewestReportedControllerVersion() over reports.controller_version,
SEMVER-compared in Go -- MAX() in SQL ranks 0.99.0 above 0.186.0, a pair this
fleet has shipped. No outbound call, no new credential.
- Fail-open in exactly two deliberate cases: an empty golden field (clearing the
manifest is legitimate) and an unknown fleet version (a new hub must vouch its
first golden).
NEAR-MISS RECORDED: the first draft read guests.controller_version, a column that
exists in the schema and that NOTHING writes -- it would always have seen "" and
failed open, i.e. inert, this gate's own failure shape. Caught by grepping for a
writer before trusting the column.
Blind spot stated rather than papered over: a controller no box has ever run is
invisible to this signal. Not the failure that has bitten -- all three instances were
deployed-newer-than-baked.
4 tests through the PRODUCTION handler over httptest, never an injected seam. The
refusal asserts both the flash and that the manifest was NOT written, because a gate
that redirects and saves anyway reads as enforcement while providing none. Red-proof:
deleting the block makes the stale golden vouchable and both assertions fail.
ROADMAP R-29's audit list now records this as the FIRST enforced gate, so the
contrast with its three orphans is kept rather than lost. The orphans are unchanged.
Suite rc=0 read separately from this commit.
The golden baked controller 0.185.1 -- confirmed from the golden's OWN record
(drill/bake-0.185.1.log:1 and :330) and from build-golden.sh:345, which derives
GOLDEN_VERSION from the controller tag. 0.185.1 predates R-114 + R-112, so every
freshly installed box told a customer whose backup drive had fallen out that the
backup was on the same disk as the system (false) and offered a different drive as
the remedy.
Baked golden 0.186.0 from main's controller in the DooPlex bake fixture: overlay2 OK,
3 mounts included, FATAL 0, exclusions 0, 618 MB, upload HTTP 201, GOLDEN_SHA256
b760ac6a33e70700..., token-leak grep 0, GL-1 teardown with drill.qcow2 back to
virgin.
Three observables, quoted as returned: PUBLISHED (anonymous GET -- what the installer
does -- 200 / 648930639 bytes / sha identical to the bake); VOUCHED (manifest read
BACK, not the 303); RESOLVED BY A CONSUMER (Artifact manifest served for customer
sess-f, golden=0.186.0). Floor NOT touched per publish-train rule 2 -- it is a
separate form and min_controller_version still reads 0.156.0. MinAgent left 0.113.0
because 0.186.0 declares it unchanged.
Proven on a REAL day-0 on demo-hp, not the fixture, per the rule committed in Part 1:
VM 9402 from the v1.25.0 ISO -> Controller elindult (0.186.0), box confirms
felhom-controller:0.186.0 + agent 0.116.0. A fresh box now runs 0.186.0 where it ran
0.185.1.
The procedure was NOT unwritten: RUNBOOK-manual-build.md:101-115 documents it and
build-golden.sh carries its own usage and publishes to Gitea itself. One
documentation-integrity finding: that runbook says to use the RECORDED qemu line and
not reconstruct, while the line it cites is itself labelled reconstructed, the
canonical one never having been saved.
NOT done and not claimed: the TargetAbsent/empty-offer_path endpoint capture (the
claim gate runs before auth with no Bearer escape -- R-119's fourth instance), and
the Part 3 mechanism, which awaits the operator ruling. Recommendation and exact
wiring recorded in the audit rather than built.
VM 9402 + r120-images + customer sess-f retained pending that read, with teardown
commands recorded. Previous session's sess-e layer-3 is now DISCHARGED -- it aged to
STALE and the cascade completed, full residue purge logged.
The events leg the previous commit reported as not-reached is now done. The operator
relayed the claim code (the only route: bcrypt-hashed hub-side, emailed only), the
two storage paths were registered through the real POST /api/storage/register, and
the cycle ran on the fresh box:
07:20:04 backup_target_absent (error) Cel meghajto <- TARGET, specific
07:22:34 backup_target_restored (info) Cel meghajto <- its matching pair
07:24:04 storage_disconnected (error) Adat meghajto <- NON-target, generic
07:25:34 storage_reconnected (info) Adat meghajto
All four at the hub; gate fired in 3 s. Two matched pairs, correctly discriminated
-- and discrimination is proven NON-trivially for the first time, since both prior
runs had the target itself emit the generic event. Over-correction passes on a
positive observable, with two RETURNED lines proving the gate was ticking.
00-capability-map row F: PARTIAL -> PROVEN-LIVE with the evidence and the caveat.
R-120 filed: the golden bakes controller 0.185.1, which PREDATES R-114 + R-112, so
a freshly installed box shows the customer the WRONG absent-target message --
observed live on the drill box: the generic "the backup is on the same disk as the
system" copy (false; the target is a drive that vanished) plus an offer of the other
drive as the remedy. That is E2D 5.3's exact payload, still reachable on any new
install. R-115's class one layer up -- R-111 closed by re-baking the golden, 0.186.0
then shipped, the golden did not move, and the gap reopened silently; this time the
stale artifact carries a customer-facing falsehood in exactly the state R-116 now
alarms about correctly.
Teardown recorded for all three layers, hub layer gate-blocked with the command.
audits/R116-v0116-2026-07-30.md + the R-116 register row.
WHAT PASSED, on real hardware. Agent 0.116.0 published (independent registry GET
verified the bytes), vouched, and installed UNAIDED by a fresh box -- "Artifact
manifest served for customer sess-e (agent=0.116.0 golden=0.185.1)", host
sess-e-5d4427 ... 0.116.0 ONLINE. Real day-0 on a nested PVE on demo-hp (per
runbooks/target-selection.md, which sent this run there rather than to the DooPlex
fixture the previous run used), both drives enrolled through the real endpoints,
device loss a real hot-detach.
Captured live, absent state: the target is now ONE row carrying backup_target:true
AND guest_path:/mnt/felhom-drives/cel with mount_path:"", so
isTarget[/mnt/felhom-drives/cel] = TRUE -- it was false through v0.115.0. RETURNED
gives true as well, so the pair matches. All three guards pass from the same
payload: R-114 preserved (no row combines the flag with a non-empty mount_path),
no over-correction (bound_under_parent:false), and discrimination at the payload
layer (the non-target carries the flag on no row) -- the thing neither prior run
could show.
WHAT DID NOT HAPPEN, and is not claimed. No backup_target_absent or
backup_target_restored event was observed on the wire. planDriveGates iterates
registered StoragePaths and the drill controller has none ([WARN] Storage paths:
no storage paths registered); every storage route answers 401 "dashboard not yet
claimed". The claim code is bcrypt-hashed and emailed-only, and
handleSelfBindLinkSend (selfbind_mint.go:139-161) renders a flash and never the
token, so no operator-side route exists. A gen-2 code was re-sent; the drill VM,
its storage and customer sess-e are DELIBERATELY RETAINED with teardown commands
recorded, so the leg finishes without a rebuild. Reported as not-reached rather
than as a third trivial pass.
R-119 filed: the claim gate makes drive-gate legs unreachable to CC by design, and
has now stopped three sessions at the same wall -- needs a ruling (operator-scoped
test affordance, or a documented prerequisite step), not a fix.
R-117 reproduced on real hardware with a read/write probe (EIO both directions
while /disks reports attached + bound_under_parent:true) and §5 records how it
colours the reattach leg. R-118's symptom vanishes incidentally on this one row;
R-118 is NOT fixed.
sess-c and sess-d verified GONE (404, absent from both tables) -- cleared by the
operator using the previously recorded commands, not by this session.
The absent-state /disks payload was captured on a genuine device loss, after a
present-drive control run proved the query works (Part 5's three attempts failed
on token extraction, and its control returned 0 rows).
The answer is theory #1 -- "the registry-union row writes false" -- which was
raised, declared wrong and retracted. The retraction was the error.
Absent state returns 4 rows, not 3. The drive appears twice and the two facts the
controller needs sit on different rows: the Observe row has backup_target:true but
mount_path:"" and guest_path:"", so it contributes no key to driveTargetByPath;
the registry-union row owns /mnt/felhom-drives/<name> and omits BackupTarget from
its struct literal (disks.go:301-306) => false. The union row is not deduped
because seen is keyed on MountPath (:290-295), the one field the absent state
empties, and its own MountPath comes from the systemd .mount unit FILE
(registry_known.go:40-75), which never reads the mount table.
Theory #2 (the basis of the shipped v0.115.0) is false on both halves; #3 is false
too. v0.115.0 is provably inert: StablePathForRaw("") returns "".
Also files the read path verbatim -- the token plaintext lives only in
bootstrap.json on the Proxmox host; the agent's store keeps hashes only.
New: R-117 (READY M, outranks R-116) -- a returned drive's guest bind is a DEAD
mount (EIO both ways) while /disks reports attached + bound_under_parent:true, so
the gate restarts the customer's apps onto it and reports healthy with no alarm.
R-118 (READY XS) -- an absent drive's union row advertises the root filesystem's
capacity as its own.
Docs only. No code written, nothing built or published; v0.115.0 untouched.
Both demo boxes read-only; drill fixture restored to virgin.
A fresh box running the fully shipped stack -- agent 0.115.0 from the Day-0
manifest plus controller 0.185.1 from the vouched golden, no hand-deploy -- still
fired the GENERIC storage_disconnected on detach and the SPECIFIC
backup_target_restored on return. backup_target_absent count 0. Identical to
Session C. The v0.115.0 fix changed nothing observable.
Part 4's three positive observables were all obtained before the run (registry
newest 0.115.0, hub vouches 0.115.0, felhom-pve running 0.115.0 clean), so the
publish step forgotten twice was not forgotten a third time, and the box
demonstrably installed the fix under test.
Discrimination FAILS: the target itself produced the generic event, so the two
cannot be told apart regardless of the non-target leg -- which was therefore not
staged. Reported as a fail, not as Session C's trivial pass.
Over-correction guard PASSES: 0 ABSENT lines with the drive present, target
degraded:false.
THE HONEST PART. The fix targets a shape that does not occur live, and which
shape does occur is NOT ISOLATED. With the drive detached PVE reports the
storage inactive with zeroed fields -- a shape the unit fixture did not model.
Three attempts to read the real /disks payload failed on token extraction across
the ssh -> guest -> container layers, and a present-drive CONTROL query also
returned 0 rows, proving the query was broken rather than the payload. Without
that control this run would have recorded a third false mechanism, after "the
union row writes false" (wrong, corrected yesterday) and "no row carries the
guest path" (unverified). The leading hypothesis -- an inactive storage reaching
Observe with an empty MountPath, so StablePathForRaw returns "" -- is consistent
with the pvesm output but is NOT evidence and is recorded as such.
Next session's first job is a working /disks read, with a present-drive control
run FIRST, before any further code.
agent v0.115.0 is published, vouched and INERT. Not reverted: reverting is
itself a change, the runbook forbids fixing mid-run, and the code is tested and
harmless.
Capability-map row F stays PARTIAL, now citing the re-test.
Teardown clean: pvesm status after == before (local-lvm 38.83%), guest 9201 and
drill-r50 untouched. Customer sess-d pending the usual ONLINE-ages-to-DOWN gate.
Unconditional and three sessions overdue, so it commits before any code is
touched — E-2d itself stopped at Phase 0 and banked nothing.
E-2d row: 822 words -> 121, and the contradiction resolved. Its State read
CLOSED — PARTIALLY PROVEN while the cell's final sentence read "This row stays
OPEN only for the residue"; a reader could not tell which. It is CLOSED, with
R-116 the single named open leg.
Nothing unique was binned. Three facts existed ONLY in that cell and are moved
into audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md as a new §1a: the local-lvm fence figures
with the 888 GB nvme alternative, the exactMount subdirectory caveat and why the
subdirectory is nonetheless the safe placement (no durable_id collision), and
the ISO/PAIRING -> DIRECT fall-through derived at source with its line
citations. drill-r50's blocked status was already in both audits.
Capability map: it had ZERO rows for the backup-target work — grep gives 0 hits
for backup_target and one for "E-2" that is a campaign date string. Three
scenario rows added, at today's honest status, not the value hoped for later:
C. Protection & recovery — installer Case A/B, DEGRADED recorded not hidden
PROVEN-LIVE, cites E2D-fresh-vm C1+C2
D. Storage & devices — the offer, and that registration confers no role
PROVEN-LIVE, cites SESSION-C C4 + the decline path
F. Notifications & monitoring — the absent-target alarm and its pairing
PARTIAL, cites SESSION-C C5, leg named, -> R-116
Row F is PARTIAL today per the doc's own strict enum (a leg not exercised live
is PARTIAL with the leg named, never PROVEN-LIVE). A later session may flip it;
this commit must not.
Full ISO/PAIRING run on a fresh nested box. Agent 0.114.0 came from the Day-0
manifest -- the SHIPPED binary -- so C5 tested the real artifact. Controller
0.186.0 hand-deployed after install per the §3.1 ruling; the vouched golden
bakes 0.185.1, so C3/C4 prove the code not the shipped golden, and that lag is
filed against R-115 rather than a new ID.
R-113 PROVEN: detach 18:43:50, gate fired 18:43:54 -- four seconds, where E-2d
measured zero over 4.5 minutes -- and SetDisconnected was reached. It fired on
exactly the shape that defeated it: raw /mnt/mentes NOT mounted while the bind
/mnt/felhom-drives/mentes still read /dev/sdb[/felhom-data].
R-114 PROVEN: with the target absent the page rendered the absent copy, the
system-disk copy 0 and the offer block 0. Both of E-2d's falsehoods are gone.
R-112 PROVEN: the banner reached a customer's page for the first time. Healthy
renders nothing, proven POSITIVELY -- idle delta 0 /backup/tiers calls, page
load delta +1, single caller, so the seam ran and chose silence.
C5 FAILED on a fourth, separate defect. The alarm fires but as the GENERIC
storage_disconnected, while the recovery is the SPECIFIC backup_target_restored
-- a pair an operator cannot match, which is what notifyDriveReturned's own
comment forbids. backup_target_absent count 0 across the run. Root cause: the
drive is TWO /disks rows and BackupTarget and GuestPath sit on different ones;
absent they separate, on return they rejoin. v0.184.1 fixed the keying, not
this. Only reachable because R-113 made the gate fire at all. Filed as R-116.
Mirror + over-correction guard PASS: non-target drive -> storage_disconnected,
backup_target_absent 0; both drives present -> 0 ABSENT lines and the target
stayed healthy. Caveat recorded: the mirror passes trivially because the target
also produced the generic event.
E-2 and E-2d CLOSED as partially proven with R-116 the one named open leg, per
the runbook's §9 rule decided in advance rather than mid-run.
Capability map NOT touched: it has no E-2 rows at all, so nothing could move to
PROVEN-LIVE. Creating them is a design act, not a validation act.
Teardown clean: pvesm status after == before (local-lvm 38.78%), guest 9201 and
drill-r50 untouched. Customer delete attempted and correctly refused while the
host still reads ONLINE; command recorded for once it ages to DOWN.
R-114: new BackupTargetState.TargetAbsent separates configured-and-gone from
never-configured. Degraded keeps its meaning so the wire contract is unchanged;
TargetAbsent answers which problem, because the remedies are opposite. Copy is
verbatim the hub's backup_target_absent email. The offer is suppressed on the
branch itself, not left to firstOfferableDrive's Disconnected skip -- that flag
comes from R-113 in another repo and this state must be right without it.
R-112: the state finally has a consumer. Server-rendered on /backups via
backupsHandler -> backupTargetView -> backups.html, not a 19th JS fetch. The
view is nil for healthy and unknown so those render nothing at all.
SEAM PROVEN LIVE by a DIFFERENTIAL positive observable rather than by an absent
banner: idle 8s produced 0 new /backup/tiers agent calls; each /backups load
produced exactly +1, and that call has a single caller. The demo box is healthy
and correctly rendered nothing, which matches its real state but is a negative
and so proves nothing about wiring on its own.
MinAgent unchanged at 0.113.0 -- R-114 reads BackupTarget/MountPath/GuestPath/
Role, none of which R-113 altered. demo-hp is not held.
Session C scope unchanged: neither fix touches the agent, so the leg awaiting
proof is still device loss -> gate Stop -> SetDisconnected ->
backup_target_absent on the wire. One rebuild validates all three.
PART 1 — Session C unblocked.
Agent 0.114.0 (the R-113 fix) was built, pushed and deployed but never
published, so a fresh drill box would have installed 0.113.0 and proven the bug
rather than the fix. Published from the clean tree at b58d7bc via
scripts/publish-agent.sh; sha 5e4c15ebee2d7583d57301d1f7c9cc7d4276262966bf738b05e34653bfd18c31,
verified by an INDEPENDENT round-trip GET (http=200, sha match, binary
self-reports 0.114.0), and the hub manifest read back after the write.
Deliberately NOT done, each with a reason:
- No golden bake. The golden bakes the CONTROLLER, not the agent, and
host-install fetches them as separate generic packages (:1945 / :2573). Golden
0.185.1 is current, so there is no new-agent-against-old-golden risk.
- min_agent NOT raised, stays 0.113.0. It expresses what the CONTROLLER requires
of the agent, and controller v0.185.0 declares MinAgent 0.113.0 — which
0.114.0 already satisfies. Raising it to 0.114.0 would have been a false claim
AND would have held demo-hp and drill-r50. No box is held; no §3 STOP fired.
- Global controller floor NOT raised (v0.156.0), per R-111's reasoning.
- wrapper_sha256 preserved verbatim; re-checked against configs/felhom-pbs-apply
before and after — no drift both times.
demo-hp RULING: left on 0.113.0. The R-113 fix is not live-validated, so putting
it on a second box widens exposure for no proof, and Session C's nested box
takes its agent from the manifest, not from demo-hp's host agent. Move the fleet
once, after Session C.
PART 2 — R-115 opened (WAITING-ON-OPERATOR).
The finding is the RECURRENCE, not either instance: publishing is a remembered
step, and it was forgotten within eight hours of R-111 documenting it as
forgettable. Filed as a new ID with a back-pointer rather than reopening R-111,
because R-111's finding (the channel WAS stale) is closed and verified
end-to-end, while the process defect that caused it is a distinct problem with a
distinct fix and owner. Class cross-linked to R-29 (a control that exists and is
never walked) WITHOUT minting a second ID for it. Options are stated as the
operator's decision, with mechanisms (build-step, deploy gate) separated from
reminders (checklist, manual) — R-29's whole finding being that reminders do not
hold. No code written, by design.
R-111 gains a deferred-leg-recurred line; its shipped evidence is untouched and
it is NOT reopened. R-113 records that Session C is now unblocked.
BoundUnderParent is now a CONJUNCTION: bound under the parent AND the drive's
raw host mount still mounted. The raw mount is the device-bound systemd unit
that dies with the device; the agent's own bind is not, which is why the bind
outlived the device and the gate could never fire.
Conjunction deliberately, not replacement: the device half alone would regress
boot ordering (raw mounts early, bind lands ~18s later — that window must keep
reading absent), so existing behaviour is byte-identical and only the
unreachable case is closed. Unknown is never absent.
Controller UNCHANGED, no MinAgent bump — BoundUnderParent has exactly one
functional consumer (planDriveGates:226). A new DevicePresent bool was rejected:
absent-from-JSON decodes to false, so every drive on an older agent would have
read ABSENT and stopped its apps.
+6 tests (208->214), 4 red-proofs run and reverted. Deployed to demo-felhom and
the over-correction guard verified in production: raw mount present, drive still
reads present, 10/10 apps untouched, no gate action, no false alarm. demo-hp
deliberately left on 0.113.0 (the spec scoped deploy to felhom-pve).
SESSION C BLOCKER recorded on the row: the hub Day-0 manifest vouches agent
0.113.0, so a fresh drill box would install WITHOUT this fix and validate
nothing. Publish + vouch 0.114.0 first — R-111's trap in the same shape.
The delete was correctly refused at four successive gates while the host still
read ONLINE (acknowledgements -> typed confirm_id -> expect_hosts stale-preview
-> "host is ONLINE"). Rather than force it, the run waited for the destroyed
host to age to DOWN; delete-impact then reported deletable:true and the
documented cascade ran:
host deleted (escrow demoted to retained custody), tenantsync deprovisioned,
PBS tenancy deprovisioned, claim reset to unclaimed, residue purged
(reports=5 app_telemetry=5 notif_prefs=1 appliance_registrations=1)
Verified after: 0 occurrences of "e2d" anywhere on the hosts page; demo-felhom
and demo-hp ONLINE on agent 0.113.0; drill-r50 and peti-felhom unchanged;
demo-hp carries only guest 9201 and VM 300.
Scoping checked rather than assumed: the single purged appliance_registration
was this run's own appliance (810d10c5, bound to e2d-fresh). The unrelated stale
2026-07-25 appliance (206c8838 / QWA-WJE) was NOT touched by the cascade — the
operator removed it separately.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: the drill-cleanup WATCHING row is removed (done, not open).
- audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md §8 + REPORT-e2d.md: teardown recorded as
complete, with the cascade output and the appliance-scoping note.
Full ISO/PAIRING route on a nested PVE VM on demo-hp, after R-111 was fixed
earlier in the session. Bind -> running controller in 3m35s. The install fetched
the artifacts published an hour before and restored the golden baked 20 minutes
before, so the publish train is proven end to end on a real install.
C1 PROVEN: "felhom-host-install v1.22.0", "Day-0 provision SUCCESS", guest 9201
running, bootstrap unit wrote its done-flag and self-disabled. This retires E-2's
"installer-logic-tested, not install-tested".
C2 PROVEN: both DEGRADED warning lines verbatim, backup.local_backup_target=local,
no felhom-backup storage created, and the install did not abort.
C3/C4 PARTIAL and C5 FAILED — three findings, none fixed:
R-112 (P1): E-2's degraded banner and offer have NO UI CONSUMER. The endpoint
returns byte-exact copy; grep 'backup-target' across every html/js/css is 0 hits
and no page handler injects the state. Templates fetch 18 distinct /api/storage/*
endpoints; these two are the only ones with zero references. v0.185.1 fixed the
router mount and stopped one layer short of the render. Fifth instance of
seam-built-but-never-wired.
R-113 (P1): the drive-absent gate CANNOT FIRE on device loss. planDriveGates
reads presence from BoundUnderParent = "is this path in the guest's mountinfo".
The raw mount is a device-bound systemd unit and dies with the device; the
agent's own bind is not device-bound and outlives it, so the gate sees "present"
forever. Live: agent reported the drive absent every 20s for 4.5 minutes, the
controller logged 0 [gate] lines, the hub received zero events -- neither
backup_target_absent nor the generic storage_disconnected. Sixth instance of the
class: E-2b wired the seam to a condition that cannot occur.
R-114: on target-drive loss the message claims the backup is on the system disk
(false) and offers the drive that just vanished. Invisible only because of R-112,
so it must be fixed BEFORE R-112 is wired.
Also filed as a second instance under R-110 rather than a new ID: host-install
fetches nine files from raw/branch/main and the hub vouches a sha for one;
E-2a's wrapper is installed 0755 to /usr/local/sbin, root-fenced in sudoers,
validated only by bash -n.
C4 is fully proven at API level: decline path (registration confers no role),
restart_required:true, agent did NOT self-restart (in-flight check performed and
recorded first), E-2a wrapper created the storage at the drive's own mountpoint,
and healthy renders nothing.
Teardown: VM destroyed, scratch storage removed, pvesm status after == before
(local-lvm 38.77%), guest 9201 and drill-r50 untouched. Hub records for e2d-fresh
remain -- delete correctly refused at four gates, finally "host is ONLINE";
deletable once it ages to DOWN. Command recorded in OPEN-ITEMS.md.
capability-map NOT touched: the customer-facing legs are broken rather than
proven, and the map has no E-2 rows at all.
Found and fixed the same day. The channel was 17 agent releases stale — a box
installed today would have received agent 0.96.0 and controller 0.161.0.
- agent 0.113.0 built from the clean tree @ 58b598b and published via
scripts/publish-agent.sh; sha 5f3247f756cb658e…, round-trip GET verified.
- golden 0.185.1 baked on the nested drill VM embedding controller 0.185.1;
sha dba00f3e845c415e…. Bake clean: Result=success, overlay2, all 3 mounts
included (rootfs+mp0+mp1), 0 FATAL/exclusions, HTTP 201, token-leak grep 0.
GL-1 teardown: guest 9100 purged, secrets shredded, drill disk restored to
the virgin snapshot. Log saved to drill/bake-0.185.1.log.
- Hub Day-0 manifest: agent and golden moved TOGETHER in one POST so the
manifest never vouched a new agent against an old golden. min_agent
0.93.0 -> 0.113.0, which is what controller v0.185.0 declares. Zero fleet
impact, verified: all three enrolled hosts already run agent 0.113.0.
wrapper_sha256 preserved verbatim (re-checked, no drift).
- The global controller floor was deliberately NOT raised: the golden now
bakes 0.185.1, so a fresh box needs no self-update.
This unblocks E-2d C3/C4/C5, which the Phase 0 gate had blocked.
No VM created, no install run, no box touched. The run stopped at the Phase 0
gate per runbook §3, before provisioning.
felhom-host-install.sh does not install what is on main. resolve_artifacts()
(:423-436) reads the hub-vouched manifest and fetches Gitea GENERIC PACKAGES
(agent :1945, golden :2573). Gitea's newest are agent 0.96.0 and golden 0.161.0;
the hub manifest selects exactly those; the global floor v0.156.0 is below the
golden's 0.161.0 so nothing self-updates. A fresh box therefore lands on agent
0.96.0 + controller 0.161.0 against main's 0.113.0 / 0.185.1. Agent 0.113.0
reached both demo boxes by direct deploy and is not in the channel at all.
Claim impact, each pinned to its introducing commit:
- C1 (real rc=0 1.22.0 install) and C2 (Case B natural) — ACHIEVABLE, not run;
both are installer-side and host-install is served at 1.22.0.
- C3 — BLOCKED: banner + GET /api/storage/backup-target are controller v0.185.1
(cdaeb36), copy v0.185.0 (3f7cf2a). Unblocks cheaply by raising the hub floor
to >=0.185.0; measured fleet impact nil (both demo boxes already 0.185.1).
- C4 — BLOCKED: needs controller v0.185.1 + agent v0.113.0 (58b598b).
- C5 — BLOCKED: needs controller v0.184.0 (c1a63de) + agent v0.112.0.
Filed R-111 (P1): 17 unpublished agent releases (v0.97.0-v0.113.0) strand the
entire R-82 tiered-backup arc plus F-CRIT-2 and F-REBOOT, so a new customer's
box installs without them. Mirror of R-110, not a duplicate.
- audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md — all four Phase 0 answers recorded so a
resumed run does not re-derive them (cadence 30s; hot-detach available; ISO
present; local-lvm fence re-measured at 38.77%, unchanged).
- OPEN-ITEMS.md — R-111 opened; E-2d re-stated, NOT closed.
- ROADMAP.md — R-111 under P1.
- capability map NOT touched: nothing was proven live.
The §5.1a operator STOP is retired — HUB_PW is in ~/.config/credentials and hub
auth was verified, so CC can bind on a resumed run.
Closes the record-hygiene rider. Part 3 of the spec (documenting a
ROADMAP/OPEN-ITEMS state convention) is deliberately NOT done — its stated
evidence is false; see REPORT-record-correction-2026-07-29.md.
- CONTEXT.md:540 — "scripts/hub_confirm_gate.py enforces" was present tense
about a gate invoked by nothing. Now says it asserts but is not enforced
(R-29). Third instance of the class after :564 and configs.go:27.
- REUSE.md:62 — same claim, "enforces zero". The RULE stays (never native
confirm()/prompt() is correct guidance and this is a reuse-reference row);
only the enforcement claim changes, and it now says the rule holds only as
long as you keep it.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md:4 — root REPORT.md is the overwritten per-session file;
REPORT-<topic>.md is the non-clobbering sibling form (CLAUDE.md:82-87), of
which 14 exist. The prohibition on durable content living only there stays.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md:55 — "Why the READY rows rank this way" promised a complete
ordering and listed 5 of ~15 open rows. Scoped to TOP, with a half-sentence
saying it is deliberately not a full ordering. No row added to the list.
hub/internal/web/configs.go:27 left alone (R-94 leg (b), needs a hub build).
No gate wired, run or fixed. Documentation only, no version bump, no CHANGELOG.
d4c07873 filed "hostinstall_gates.py is invoked by nothing" as a novel
observation. It is not novel — R-29 already names the class (green gates are
enforced nowhere; one sat RED for 16 releases while every REPORT said green),
and R-29 was missing from OPEN-ITEMS.md entirely, having never been carried
across the 2026-07-27 register rebuild. An open item about work not getting
done was absent from the page that decides what gets done.
Ruling on whether R-29 is the right home for a non-design-v2 gate: YES. Its
title says design-v2, but its own audit list already spans mount-safety,
secrets and dedup gates across four repos, and its part (b) — "the systemic
half is the real item" — is about the enforcement mechanism, which is
gate-agnostic. hub_confirm_gate.py is already on its list and sits in the same
scripts/ directory. No new ID minted; R-29's own text forbids it, and this is
the third re-raise it has absorbed.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: open R-29 (READY, S(a)/M(b)), with the orphan evidence and
the two separable parts R-29 already defines.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: R-94 leg (b) now points at R-29 as its class.
- ROADMAP.md:158: audit list extended with hostinstall_gates.py (RED today,
1.19.0 != 1.22.0) + hub_confirm_gate.py verified orphan. Entry not rewritten.
- ROADMAP.md:147: cited a non-existent R-164 — it means controller v0.164.0.
- CONTEXT.md:564: asserted in the present tense that the version cross-check is
"gated by scripts/hostinstall_gates.py". It exists, is red, and runs nowhere.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: READY #1/#3/#4 markers dropped — they duplicated ranked-list
positions and the gap was left by the row merged in d4c07873.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: E-2d citation :322-341 widened to :322-343; the invocation it
describes is at :343, two lines outside the old range.
- backlog/README.md: two-line lead naming OPEN-ITEMS.md and ROADMAP.md.
- REPORT-record-correction-2026-07-29.md: the report CLAUDE.md:82-87 requires
for both commits. Root REPORT.md (E-2 increment 1) untouched.
No gate wired, fixed, run or deleted — that is R-29 part (b), its own task.
Documentation only. No version bump, no CHANGELOG entry, no box touched.
The 2026-07-29 R-94/E-2d finding was written from an unverified claim and was
false. `felhom-bootstrap.sh:96` fetches the installer from the WEBSITE, not the
hub; the website git-syncs /scripts/ from main on a 30s period; every install
since 1.22.0 hit main this morning already runs 1.22.0. Confirmed by live fetch.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: merge the two duplicate R-94 rows into one, retract the false
framing, re-scope to what it actually is (a drifting hand-synced constant plus
two pieces of dead safety equipment), unblock it from E-2d.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: de-rank R-94 in the ranked list — the "high-consequence" reason
was the false claim in its most load-bearing form.
- OPEN-ITEMS.md: E-2d — the ISO is the STRONGER proof route, not an obstacle.
Phase 0 question answered at source: PAIRING falls through to run_direct in
the same invocation (:495-499), so it reaches the identical installer call.
- ROADMAP.md:149: same retraction; the original diagnosis (a hand-synced
constant in a second repo drifts every time the first ships) survives.
- ROADMAP.md + OPEN-ITEMS.md: new R-110 — main is the installer's publish
channel and there is no staging, tag, pinned path or rollback, for the one
artifact that runs as root on a virgin box. Operator ruling, not a defect.
- day0-install.md C.1: one sentence recording the same about the fetch URL.
Documentation only. No version bump, no CHANGELOG entry, no code, no box touched.
Space checked on the t740 -- NOT a blocker, with one constraint: the VM disk must
not go on local-lvm. That thin pool is over-subscribed (144G allocated against a
54G pool) on a box running a live customer guest, and a full thin pool corrupts
every guest on it. local has 23.7G on pve-root. Use /mnt/nvme-1tb (888G free).
Confirmed the ISO does NOT bake felhom-host-install.sh -- it ships
felhom-bootstrap.sh, which fetches the installer FROM THE HUB. Since the hub
serves 1.19.0, a fresh ISO install today would run the pre-E-2 installer and
exercise neither Case A nor Case B. So R-94 must be bumped only AFTER a real
1.22.0 run, not before -- which is the ordering already decided.
drill-r50 stays blocked and was restored to its r50pre state: the agent upgrade,
the added disk and the moved backup target from this session are all reverted.
Live: hub 0.81.0, agent 0.113.0, controller 0.185.1 on both demo boxes;
host-install 1.22.0 (script; no reinstall performed).
E-2a wrapper proven live as root on demo-hp: F-1 subdirectory refused, F-2
unmounted path refused, root device refused, idempotent re-apply is a no-op,
repointing refused -- 0 stray storages. The agent PVE role was NOT widened.
Scenario E proven live on BOTH boxes: healthy renders nothing, no message key.
Records three defects I introduced and caught: unreachable routes (mounted
outside /api/storage/, caught by the first live call), a hollow test exposed by
its own red-proof, and another gofmt-realignment no-op.
Not live-proven: the degraded banner and offer acceptance (both boxes healthy),
backup_target_absent end-to-end, Case A/B on a real install, drive-loss recovery.
hub 0.81.0, agent 0.112.0, controller 0.184.1 live on BOTH demo boxes.
E-2c: eject/decommission of the backup-target drive refused 409 on both boxes,
drives unmoved. E-2b: the never-called disconnect seam is wired, with the target
case raising the specific backup_target_absent.
Records the keying bug caught before deploy (a.Path is the GUEST path, so the
target branch was unreachable -- 0.184.0 superseded, never deployed) and states
plainly that backup_target_absent is NOT proven end-to-end live: proving it needs
a live enrolled drive to go absent.
Parts 2/3/4 and E-2a remain open; Peti risk stays parked.
E-2 is partially shipped (hub v0.81.0 + controller Part 1). Filing the rest so a
foundation with no UI cannot quietly become a sixth seam-built-but-never-wired.
E-2 remaining: installer Case A/B, the offer + agent-side move, the degraded
banner, the controller half of the signal, red-proofs E/F, live validation.
Phase 0 INVERTED the emphasis: the installer has no drive-enrollment step,
so the common case at install is system-drive-only and Part 3 (drive added
later) is the PRIMARY path, not Case A.
E-2a the move needs a root-fenced wrapper -- the agent holds neither
Datastore.Allocate at /storage nor Permissions.Modify, and its sudoers has
no pvesm and no pveum. Use the guarded-wrapper pattern; do NOT widen the
agent's PVE role.
E-2b NotifyStorageDisconnected/Reconnected are defined and called NOWHERE, so a
drive going absent emits no event at all. Hub side is already plumbed, so
wiring needs no hub change.
E-2c E-1 put the whole-guest backups on a drive POST /disks/eject will eject
(RoleForStorage returns user-data for a local-dir on a non-system device).
Guard the eject specifically -- reclassifying the drive RoleBackup would
block legitimate ejects, since it is also the enrolled user-data drive.
PETI peti-felhom deliberately NOT migrated; drive failure there is offsite-only
recovery. Accepted until the operator's reinstall; re-evaluate if that
slips past ~2026-09-01.
Supervised operational run. No code, no version bump, nothing deleted.
Primary backup tier on both demo boxes moved from `local` (a dir storage on
/var/lib/vz -- the SAME physical device as the guest) to `felhom-backup`, a dir
storage on each box's secondary drive:
demo-hp /mnt/nvme-1tb uuid:91d2dc2d-... archive 2,256,044,492 B
demo-felhom /mnt/hdd_1 uuid:47a3361a-... archive 5,957,878,962 B
Both proven end to end via the real UI path: archive lands on the secondary
drive (df delta matches the archive byte-for-byte), restore-test auto-selects it
and passes with mount_parity: ok, and freshness survives an agent restart with
an empty in-memory store -- so the age can only have come from the new storage.
Phase 0: the target is CONFIGURATION, not converged (the sole writer of
agent.json touches only escrow.pbs_storage_id and preserves unknown keys), so
the runbook's STOP did not fire. No consumer hardcodes "local" on the backup path.
Findings:
- F-1 the storage path must BE the mountpoint; a subdirectory fails exactMount
and the target reports disconnected permanently (observe.go:321)
- F-2 --is_mountpoint 1 is load-bearing; proven live, an unguarded storage on a
non-mounted path reports active with the ROOT filesystem's free space and
had already created dump/ on pve-root -- a silent retarget onto the very
device this change escapes
- F-3 FelhomAgentStore is granted per storage path; without it every backup
403s. felhom-host-install.sh must issue it for new installs
- R-109 (new) the DR recipe records no backup target, and each box now carries
two content=backup dir storages, one live and one frozen
- R-105 narrowed and TRACED: dr_recipe drives was [] fleet-wide because the
enrolled drives were never PVE storages, so isUserDataDrive never saw
them. Both boxes now populate drives; SMART on the backup drives too
Absent-drive behaviour today is fail-loudly with no silent retarget (PVE half
live-proven; agent half source-traced). That is NOT the intended fall-back-and-
alarm design -- filed as E-2 with the honest single-drive label.
Reported in full in the record: the agent was restarted with a felhom-pbs backup
in flight, producing a spurious tier failure. The backup had in fact succeeded
(PVE task OK, 6,264,034,053 B snapshot) and the spurious failure reached no
channel -- R-84 ground truth superseded it.
Outstanding: full drive-loss recovery (needs physical access) and the agent half
of the absent-drive behaviour.
Replaces the 2026-07-14 DRAFT entirely - it was verified against controller v0.132.0,
51 versions stale, while being cited as authoritative. Now verified against controller
0.183.0 / agent 0.110.0 / hub 0.80.0 / catalog 4252121. NOT ratified.
Every statement is labelled [DESIGN] (a decision from the architecture discussion) or
[FACT] (file:line, live output, or a citation to _recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md).
Phase 0 verified D5's premise and it FAILED. Ten read surfaces were checked; nine are
clean (SMB under both namespace shapes, FileBrowser for local drives, .fab import and
download, /api/debug/*, all three ServeFile sites, registering the backup dir as a
drive). One is not: FileBrowser binds a NETWORK share at its ROOT while local drives
are userdata-scoped, and no IsNetwork() filter guards the deploy dropdown, the per-app
migrate targets, or handleStorageMigrateApp. So an app namespace - and under D5 its
plaintext secrets - can land somewhere a browsing surface serves with download:true.
Not a leak today (the unit's app.yaml is secret-stripped); it becomes one under D5.
D5 is therefore written as a BLOCKED target, not as settled. -> R-108
Core artifact is the failure -> recovery matrix (15 rows). RTO cells carry only
measured durations; 12 are blank and each blank is listed explicitly as a finding.
RPO cells carry the configured cadence that bounds RPO, labelled as such - no RPO has
ever been measured from an incident and none is invented.
The 7/53 vs 9/43/1 Tier-2 coverage counts are both recorded, unresolved; neither adopted.
Coupling (S-1): capability map section C now cites the matrix instead of restating
routes; ROADMAP gains R-102..R-108; OPEN-ITEMS gains only the in-flight R-108 plus
C9-F1b/F3/F4 -> R-n cross-references; CONTEXT records D1-D6 as standing ruling S-3.
No code, no version bump, no deploy, no box touched.
Phase 0 sized C9-F1 properly before anything was designed: 43 of the 53 catalog apps have NO
subtree the Tier-2 restore can read (not 2), 9 are covered only for their file legs and never
their database or volumes, 1 is stateless. The asymmetry is Tier-2's alone — Tier-1 and offsite
both restore the unit and replay volume dumps, so BookStack always had a working restore and
only this button lied.
Shipped: the restore refuses BEFORE stopping the app and names the action that does work; a run
that proceeds claims only what it EXAMINED and discloses that the database and volumes are not
covered. C9-F2 alarms after a 5-minute sustained-restarting threshold, set above the 120s deploy
timeout, Mealie's 60s start_period and R-97b's 180s grace; StateRestarting is deliberately NOT
added to IsDownState.
Live: silent through ten 30s samples then app_start_failed at 5m25s, heartbeat now reads
"1 currently down" where Campaign 9 recorded 0; a real deploy stayed silent; bookstack refused
with its uptime unbroken; paperless re-restored 43/43 byte-identical, 16/16 docs clean.
Filed, not fixed: C9-F1b (route to the Tier-1 restore — its own task because it puts a
destructive operation behind a non-destructive button) and C9-F4 (nothing reads the Tier-2
copy's recovery-unit/ mirror, so the second local copy that exists for drive loss is unreachable
by any customer action — potentially larger than C9-F1).
Phase A is the headline and it passed on live hardware, through the real endpoints the UI
posts to: a customer who deletes files — or their entire app data directory — gets everything
back byte-identical, and the app works afterwards (paperless served the restored bytes over
its own API at the exact pre-deletion sha256). A1's two non-destruction promises both hold.
Three defects, recorded not fixed:
C9-F1 (HIGH) the Tier-2 restore button is offered for apps it can never restore, takes a
real outage, and reports "nothing was missing" — indistinguishable from a
genuine result, while 156 MB of that app's data sits unread in the same copy.
C9-F2 (HIGH) an app in a crash loop never alarms on any channel; StateRestarting is in no
down-set, so F-OBS's own heartbeat printed "0 currently down" for 9 minutes.
C9-F3 (MEDIUM) an interrupted offsite run leaves a lock the self-heal cannot reach; the tier
is dead until a human unlocks and the operator is told "unknown reason".
This answers Phase C item 8.
Two candidates were deliberately NOT filed: a recovery-unit poisoning the catalog sync healed
in ~3 min, and a snapshot_id that is documented as logging-only. Reporting either would have
been reporting an artifact.
Stopped at the end of Phase B (plus D10), then full recovery — both boxes healthy, real
cadences, offsite tier proven working again, no leaked scratch guests, peti untouched.
D11's approved staleAfter compression turned out not to be a knob; reported, not worked around.
F-LEAK's first fix (pool adoption) was refuted live and is recorded as such. R-100 is
F-CRIT-2's defect class on the hub for the restic tier: isStale reads only LastRun, which
the controller writes unconditionally on failure. Investigated, not fixed.
Both marked SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE in OPEN-ITEMS and the campaign doc. All three
of Campaign 8's alarm findings are now closed (F-CRIT-1, F-CRIT-2, F-A1).
Adds the standing rule earned by this arc to the versioned workspace CLAUDE.md:
a comment asserting an invariant needs a test pinning it, or it is a wish — with
all six shipped-false-guarantee instances catalogued, and the corollary that a
test should assert the CONSEQUENCE (does the alarm fire?) not the MECHANISM
(does suppression expire?).
F-CRIT-2 marked SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE: NewestArchiveTime now counts only
plausibly-complete entries (measured 1 MiB floor), verified by replaying
campaign fault 2 on demo-hp in both directions.
Files two follow-ups:
- R-99: prune never REMOVES phantoms. It does NOT count them toward keep-last
(dry-run kept 2 real + the phantom), so there is no retention/data-loss bug —
but they accumulate one per aborted upload.
- F-CRIT-1: filed READY-HIGHEST. Campaign 8's other HIGH finding, untouched by
this fix.
Seam sweep: TieredBackend was the FIRST, not the only one. BackupArchiveLister
has the identical silent-degrade shape and a worse blast radius (it degrades to
the pre-R-84 in-memory-only behaviour), and no compile-time witness existed in
production code anywhere in either repo. No defect found, so no version bump and
no deploy — the witnesses are guards, proven by breaking a signature and watching
go build fail where it previously passed.
Live outage: age_state=unknown captured on real hardware for the first time, with
demo-felhom's local tier genuinely due throughout — the controller deferred and
zero app stacks were stopped. The R-88 breaker did NOT arm and no
whole_guest_backup_failed travelled, because felhom-pbs was not due; recorded as
conditions-did-not-arise rather than claimed as coverage.
Post-boot: the volume changed device name (sdb->sda) across the reboot and the
mount survived only because fstab uses by-id. That was never tested before.
R-88b closed (agent v0.105.0 + controller v0.178.0) — age_state gives 'unknown'
its own representation, with empty meaning legacy rather than unknown so the
first-backup valve keeps working on un-upgraded boxes.
R-97 note updated: hub v0.79.0 (R-97c) replaced a FALSE operator-only comment
with a real register — the comment claimed a guarantee the code did not provide.
Standing rule 4 (R-96): a recommendation that is not followed gets one line
saying why. Added to the live CLAUDE.md and this versioned copy — the live file
is not in a git repo, so committing to it alone would leave the rule as durable
as the chat it came from.
READY re-ranked: R-95 now leads.
R-97 collapsed to its shipped one-liner in ROADMAP and closed in OPEN-ITEMS.
PROMPT-TEMPLATE N.5 now names FOUR coupled artifacts instead of two: the
capability map, ROADMAP, the owning architecture doc (ruled as S-1 in CONTEXT.md
but never reflected in the template CC actually reads, so it bound nobody), and
OPEN-ITEMS.md. Tasks must now report which register rows they opened, closed or
re-ranked.
Ops: R-90 swap done (interim; CX33 still blocked), R-95 mitigation armed but zero
snapshots taken so it moves to WATCHING rather than closed, R-91 gate still not
satisfied. CONTEXT.md datastore path corrected to /mnt/pbs-datastore.
R-88 split: Part 1 (the failure breaker) SHIPPED in controller v0.176.0 and live
on both boxes; Part 2 (unknown != never) stays OPEN and is agent-side.
Phase 0 established the root cause at source: newestArchiveOn's (time.Time, bool)
signature cannot represent 'unknown', so a storage read ERROR collapses into a
positive 'no successful backup recorded yet'. The errored and genuine-never paths
are byte-identical on the wire, which is why Part 2 cannot be done controller-side.
R-97: the whole-guest backup tier has no failure signal to the hub at all —
internal/quiesce never imports internal/notify, so three failed backups and three
app-stack outages produced zero backup_failed events. Its only trace was a
customer-tier Hungarian app_start_failed for an app the backup itself had stopped.
Read-only triage found work that was agreed or discovered but never given an id:
R-95 restic offsite credential CAN delete — answers the parallel question R-89
raised and left open. Per-customer subaccounts report readonly=False, the
controller runs forget --prune from the box, and the sftp: backend cannot
express append-only. Storage Box snapshots (snapshot_limit=10, plan=null,
0 used) are server-side and SFTP cannot delete them — an unused zero-code
mitigation.
R-94 hub pins hostInstallVersion 1.19.0 while host-install ships 1.20.0, so a
hub-driven install still gets the pre-R-82 backup default.
R-90 ep0 has no swap at all and OOM'd today; gates R-86.
R-91 the pre-migration 13 GB datastore copy still occupies ep0's root disk.
R-92 PBS-DR gauge granularity. R-93 drill-r50 fixture tension.
R-96 two standing rules agreed in chat and never committed (the third, N.5's
third leg, IS committed at CONTEXT.md:8).
Open state was spread across ROADMAP, CONTEXT.md, four audits/, three runbooks,
per-session REPORT.md files and a chat log. This is the one page to read first:
every row has a state (BLOCKED/READY/WAITING-ON-OPERATOR/WATCHING) and an owner,
and the READY rows are ranked with reasoning.
R-88 is the recommended next task — quiesce's nil-age fail-open stops every app
stack every 5 minutes with no backoff and bypasses the maintenance window, and
its trigger (a PBS read failure) is live given ep0's demonstrated OOM.
CONTEXT.md now records that OPEN-ITEMS.md is authoritative and that REPORT.md is
overwritten per session.
Supervised runbook execution. No code, no version bump.
The felhom-pbs tier had reported `job errors` on EVERY demo-hp backup
since the tier was created on 07-26, while the data landed correctly
every time: `DatastoreBackup` grants Datastore.Backup but not
Datastore.Prune, so the box's keep_last=2 prune was denied.
Operator ruling: retention is a COMMERCIAL attribute owned by the hub;
ep0 executes. Box tokens therefore stay write-only - a compromised box
must not be able to delete its own offsite backups. No grant was widened
and felhom-tenantsync.sh is unchanged (the ruling makes it correct).
Increment 1:
- boxes stop attempting prune. allowPBSPrune is DERIVED
(`!t.Primary && t.KeepLast > 0`), so keep_last: 0 on the PBS tier
disables both the --prune-backups value and the gate in one config
edit, and the tier stays armed. Verified prune_pbs_allowed=false on
both boxes with no tier REJECTED line.
- per-namespace prune jobs on ep0, keep-last 2, daily 03:30 UTC
(05:30 CEST), dry-run gated. demo-hp 3->2, demo-felhom untouched,
chunk count unchanged (prune removes indexes, not chunks).
Write proof CLOSED: 08:25:47 job errors -> 09:37:29 TASK OK, snapshot
2026-07-27T09:37:29Z, chunks 9787->9813, prune step absent entirely.
Driven through POST /api/guest-backup/trigger (the UI path), not
--selftest and not raw vzdump. Hub gauge evidence explicitly NOT
satisfied - the delta is below its 0.1 GB display granularity.
GC scheduled sun 04:30 UTC and deliberately NOT run: every chunk still
carries a fresh atime from the migration copy, so a run today would
reclaim nothing. verify-new enabled per operator ruling, turning an
inert hub alarm live.
Legacy demo-felhom-01 namespace deleted with its two ACL entries and its
token (operator ruling, confirmed twice) so nothing dangles.
R-89 records the target architecture and carries the unanswered parallel
question: does the restic key on storage-box-pool-1 have DELETE rights?
If so the daily app-data tier has the identical exposure and append-only
is the equivalent answer.
ep0 is Etc/UTC, not CEST - corrected in the record.
Corrects two wrong severity readings with evidence from the box and the code.
The PBS outage was ~15 min (07:00-07:18 UTC), caused by a global OOM at 06:58:12:
proxmox-backup-proxy peaked at 3.2G on a 3.8G box and a concurrent 1.9G rsync
tipped it over. Root SSH to that box works from DooPlex via the public IP, not
from felhom-pve via the tunnel IP — the documented path I failed to try first.
R-88: internal/quiesce has NO failure limiter, backoff or breaker; the loop
stopped after three cycles only because PBS recovered. Verified additionally that
scheduledRunAllowed (quiesce.go:476-478) returns true whenever lastAgeSecs is nil,
so the same missing value that makes every poll due also bypasses the time-of-day
gate — the cycles ran outside the [04:30,08:30) window. Fixing the due-verdict
without fixing the nil-age bypass would leave the hole open.
Measured on demo-felhom while the offsite PBS service was down: the controller
re-polls /backup/due every ~5 min, still gets 'due' (storage unreachable + cold
store), and runs the FULL quiesce cycle each time — all four customer app stacks
stopped and restarted for a backup that cannot succeed. ~19 s of app downtime per
cycle, unbounded. The first entry called this bounded and event-only; it is an
availability fault.
Observed live on demo-felhom 2026-07-27 07:02:57 UTC: an agent restart while the
offsite PBS service was down produced a doomed vzdump at that tier. R-84's
read-error fallback to the in-memory record is correct alone but empty after a
restart, so "cannot read the storage" resolved to "no backup has ever been
taken" = due. Same class R-81 fixed in the hub, one layer down in the agent:
unreachable must be UNKNOWN, not resolved.
The unattended offsite restore-test on demo-felhom passed: 14.46 GB archive,
duration_s=635.07 (10m35s), then it rotated to the local tier. Persisted state
confirms the credit: {"felhom-pbs": "2026-07-27T06:14:42Z"}.
CORRECTION: I estimated ~2 hours for this restore. It took 10m35s. I derived
the estimate from a download rate measured during the FAILED attempt, which was
running under contention; the real link does ~1.4 GB/min. I then used that wrong
figure to raise a design concern — that the heavy-op gate would block backups
for hours on this box — which at 10 minutes largely evaporates. An estimate
extrapolated from a degraded measurement is not a measurement.
The SPEC's closing risk note is corrected in place, with the original left
visible for the lesson.
R-86 (NEXT, operator ruling 2026-07-27): backup-ALIGNED restore-test scheduling
— test a tier ~1 day after ITS OWN backup. R-85 schedules on a free-running
interval, which cannot express 'the day after the PBS backup': any fixed offset
drifts, so alignment would be luck. Shape: trigger from the tier's own last
successful backup rather than a clock. Interim in force: 302400s (3.5d), which
lands each tier ~weekly — the cadence half of the ruling, not the alignment half.
R-87: the restic app-data offsite tier is NEVER restore-tested. R-85 covers
whole-guest vzdump tiers only; the agent has no restic surface. That is arguably
the tier that matters most — the only one that survives losing the box AND
carries the customer's app data, since the whole-guest snapshot excludes the
bind-mounted drives. Exactly the state PBS was in before R-85.
REPORT.md: the full R-80 -> R-85 arc, including a section on the seven mistakes
I made and the two recurring shapes behind them (inferring behaviour from an
artifact instead of the code that consumes it; reading a result without its exit
code). Records demo-felhom's restore-test as IN FLIGHT at close, with the manual
recovery step if the deferred restart watcher does not complete.
Hub gate green (17 packages, rc=0).
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