The Cloudflare tunnel token, Cloudflare API token and git token inside customer_configs.config_json now hold the
05 §16.2 seal (enc:v1:, OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY). Old rows sealed once at start-up without a config_version bump, then
VACUUM + WAL checkpoint (an UPDATE leaves the old plaintext in a freed block). -unseal-box-secrets opens them too.
Eight tests, each red-proved. Built, not deployed. Audit: documentation/audits/hub-token-seal-2026-10-23/.
Hub: the R-120 golden guard judges only a CHANGED golden selection; offsite_snapshots_vanished /
_unexplained (operator-only, hub-origin) on the 07:10 listing; internal/accesslog writes path-only
lines to /data/access-log, 90 days. Installer: --rotate-recovery-only runs step 4b alone (rides
the next installer tag). 03: the orphan check runs after a failed backup (agent 6545ccc). 02: the
allow-list is empty, appdata_folders (controller v0.329.0). All red-proofed.
- hub: `app_definition_refused` in allowedEventTypes + operatorOnlyEvents (controller v0.328.0's catalog
allow-list refusal); SaveHostRecoveryCredential moves set_at on a re-vault (found live: both rotated hosts
kept their first vault's time); the daily key audit also lists the box's restic snapshots/ read-only over the
login the hub already holds and logs count/newest/oldest (no alarm yet).
- installer (main only, rides the next tag): --uninstall removes /usr/local/sbin/felhom-thin-check (agent
v0.159.0's bundle file); test_hostinstall.py knows it.
- runbook whole-guest-backup-orphan-thin.md: the human repair the agent's new orphan finding points to.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
- Configuration → Access tokens: named, scoped (group read/write), expiring (≤365 d), shown once,
stored SHA-256 only, every use logged by name. Bearer fhp_… on the web surface only; /api/v1 refuses it.
- Route table = the code's single source (web/routes.go), pinned to ServeHTTP's switch; session-only:
secrets shown/minted, deletes/resets, password, tokens.
- R-952 closed: /api/v1 route table names each caller, pinned to the switch; no-credential refusal test.
- Fail-open fixed: an empty operator password served the UI open (main skipped RequireAuth). Live hub never open.
- 05 §17, 04 §6.2, 13, 09 §3 251; register 155→157 (+R-1054, R-1055, R-1056, −R-952); STATUS.
- website: prowlarr-logo.svg (byte copy from felhom.eu-media) — the site gate refused every push.
Not deployed — waits for the operator's yes.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012qRErfCoiTkvDK9N5XHbzb
Security review of 50e47e29: requested_at is the box's clock — a future value is cut to the hub's
now; CustomerDeliberatelyOff now needs every host of the customer held (one machine of two no
longer silences the other), and fails closed on a read error or no host. Both red-proofed.
hosts.deliberate_off_at follows the agent's deliberate_off field (set, then cleared by the first
report of a new boot; one info event each way). While held, every silence alarm is held: host and
node staleness, the 05:00 backup deadlines, off-site and restore-test freshness, the OS alarms and
the kernel notice. After 14 days the usual alarms fire once, naming the power-off. Pages show
KIKAPCSOLVA and the time. Consequence tests with controls; each guard red-proofed.
- S4 / R-242: GoldenVouchChecker - a published golden unvouched for 2 h raises golden_not_vouched (operator only)
- S6 / R-244: the delete cascade de-references app_log_issues; one-time sweep flag -sweep-app-log-residue=count|apply
- S10 / R-266: read_failed storage entry shows "read failed", not 0 %
- S29 / R-250: host-key scan IPv4 first, ~2 min ladder, "safe to press Save again" error
- S30 / R-246: stale_at retired (reader, setter, badge)
- S32 / R-521: storage_reconnected ends the storage_disconnected cooldown on both channels
- S33 / R-402: host page "Last full check (off-site)" line; two wire-gate allowlist entries removed
Each with a test seen failing first. Not built or deployed yet (operator-attended deploy).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Host page "Operator Actions" card: run off-site backup now, run a check now
(fixed job list), stop / extend (1-30 days) a deletion countdown. POST
/hosts/{id}/operator-action validates against the CLOSED list before
storing (unknown -> 400, no row), stores operator_actions(id, customer_id,
action, arg, requested_at, requested_by, done_at, outcome, message), logs
who pressed (channel + address) and bumps the box's intent. The report ACK
lists pending rows as operator_actions until the box's
operator_action_results closes them (matched on id AND reporting
customer); each closed row becomes a hub-minted operator_action event
(stored, never dispatched). Unanswered after 24 h: expired. A customer
RESET cancels pending rows. Wire gate: new root + field-by-field mirror
(controller report.OperatorAction) — needs the controller commit first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
On a pinned tier (the hub holds a CONFIRMED append-only key) the only
legitimate fall of the box's snapshot count is a clean-up window the hub
opened. The checker now compares prev - cur with what the windows closed
since the previous trustworthy report removed (store.RemovedByWindowsBetween,
2 h slack for the in-run count lag); any unexplained fall, even one snapshot,
raises offsite_snapshots_dropped (error) saying 'outside any clean-up window
the hub opened'. A window that cannot say what it removed (timeout, still
open) explains anything: no alarm, one INFO line. Non-pinned tiers keep the
half-rule. Untrustworthy reports: unchanged (no alarm, baseline kept).
Red tests: r435_pinned_drop_test.go (3 fail with the pinned rule disabled;
WindowExplainsFall fails when windows are ignored), r435_windows_between_test.go.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
KernelDue / KernelNotify (09-20 h Budapest, one per 20 h, max 3, registered
address, only an accepted mail counts) / os_update.kernel {kver, tonight}
(no mail, no step) / layer kernel ingest + operator events / Approve kernel
set after every ring-0 box booted it healthily after a night stage / two
System page cells. 11 §5.11 written; §5.10 status corrected (proven).
Installer uninstall knows the two GRUB generators (unreleased).
Evidence: audits/kernel-lane-2026-10-07/ (red-proofs, boot timing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
A reinstall mints a new PBS key K while R-241 keeps the restic password, so
the supersession rule (restic sha only) overwrote the only copy of the old K
and every pre-reinstall whole-guest archive became unopenable for good. The
current row is now also retained when the key fingerprint changes (case and
space ignored; an empty fingerprint is unknown, not a change).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
After a guest rebuild the hub (set-only claim, by design) said "Claimed" while the box showed its
first-run setup page. The latest report's `claimed` field is now shown; hub-claimed + box-not-claimed
renders an amber warning. No claim state is changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Opens the four sealed box-secret columns back to plaintext (all or nothing; keeps api_key_hash;
idempotent; counts only in the log) and exits before any start-up sealing, so hub 0.137.0 can run on
the database again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
hosts.api_key, customer_configs.api_key / retrieval_password and host_pbs_secrets.value now hold the
R-821/R-133 seal (enc:v1:, OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY). The two API keys get an api_key_hash lookup twin
(SHA-256, backfilled keyless in migrate()), so box authentication never needs the sealing key; a row
with no hash is matched on its plaintext only while it is plaintext. SealLegacyBoxSecrets seals legacy
rows at start-up (idempotent, non-fatal). A sealed value that does not open sets SecretsUnreadable:
serve/compare paths answer 500, saves refuse the record, the PBS token is not burned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Part A evidence (migration spike, sftp-written repo through the pinned rclone key) and the hub
red-proofs under documentation/audits/offsite-lock-build-2026-10-03/. Manifest bump follows after
the image is built and Secret/offsite-secret-key exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Allowlisted, not operator-only, seeded for new households and added
once (add-only) to every existing enabled_events row. mail.event entries
in hu and en name the app from details.stack_name. Per-app cooldown on
both the operator and the household leg.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The hub has written every customer e-mail in Hungarian whatever the box was set
to. The box has published its language since controller v0.247.0; nothing read
it. Now it does.
Nothing an operator reads changes. The Hungarian mails are byte-identical, and
that is a diff rather than a reading: 56 goldens per language captured from
v0.117.0 BEFORE any string moved, and all 56 Hungarian ones pass unchanged after
every sentence was routed through the new bundle.
- internal/i18n: flat bundle, 79 keys, hu authoritative + hu fallback, ceiling 0.
- customerMessages/severityLabels are DERIVED from the bundle, so a sentence is
written in one place and all 40+ tests that read those maps still work.
- Language order: last reported -> created-with -> hu. reports.language defaults
to EMPTY, never hu: "never told us" is not "chose Hungarian".
- message_customer on POST /api/v1/event, additive and optional forever, for the
sentences the box composes and the hub cannot translate.
- The bind page is per-language, and its `expired` state stays Hungarian: it is
the state an unknown token lands in, so rendering a real English customer's
token in English would make the LANGUAGE answer what the TEXT refuses to.
Two defects found inside the release:
- R-581: the newest report was picked by received_at, which has SECOND
granularity, so same-second reports tied and the winner was arbitrary. Ordered
by the autoincrement id now. GetCustomers() still has the shape - row open.
- R-582: the English copy-guard stems, ported word for word from Hungarian,
convicted 141 honest sentences. The English claim is a phrase with a modal.
R-555 closed: the language allowlist entry is out of wire_contract_gate.py.
hub_copy_gate.py follows the sentences into the bundle - without that it would
have scanned four files that no longer hold any customer text and reported
success. Three new decoys incl. an innocent control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Operator ruling 2026-09-13. Above the vouched golden, a floor saved with a
declared MinAgent is served under the same agent comparison; an undeclared
one is still held beyond the golden. The declaration is stored beside each
floor as FLOOR=MINAGENT so it never carries to a later floor. Both floor
forms require min_agent above the golden (flash floor_needs_min_agent,
nothing stored). The Hosts page and the API log name the source.
Vouch path and R-120 gate untouched. Scenarios A-E tested; red-proofs A
and C in documentation/audits/rulings-r472-r475-2026-09-13/.
oobDegraded tested five things and the sixth never arrived.
The agent has emitted `operator_key_configured` on every heartbeat since v0.72.0 — the SAME version
that introduced the `oob` stanza carrying it — and store.HostOOBRow mirrored five of the agent's
eight OOB fields. With no field for it, encoding/json discarded the fact on arrival, so a box with
felhom-sshd active, reachable, a valid config and a configured peer reported `ok` with NO OPERATOR
KEY INSTALLED AT ALL. Not a wrong answer: an answer to a question nobody was asking.
`operator_peer_configured`, which the hub did read, only says the peer IP is in desired-state — that
OOB is MEANT to work, not that entry is possible.
Now decoded: operator_key_configured, plus wg_handshake_age_s and healed_at. The last two ride the
ALERT TEXT and are deliberately NOT in the predicate — widening a check beyond the fact that is now
arriving is how a check stops being read.
SCENARIO F, decided on a measurement rather than a preference. operator_key_configured decodes as a
POINTER: nil = the agent never said, reported distinctly and never as ok. The version gate was
rejected because the field and its stanza shipped in the SAME agent version (v0.72.0), so a stanza
without the field cannot come from any released agent; the fleet is 0.113.0/0.127.0 and the vouched
floor is 0.127.0. Handled explicitly anyway and pinned, because "cannot happen" is a claim this
project has been burned by.
THE MESSAGE NAMES THE FAULT. oobDegradedReason is the single source for both predicate and text, so
the alert can never name a different fault from the one that fired. The old form derived it
separately and had a vocabulary of two — unreachable, or config invalid — with no way to say the key
is missing. The operator reads this at 07:00.
TESTS DRIVE THE DECODE BOUNDARY. Every hub OOB test before this built a HostOOBRow by hand, and a
test written that way CANNOT SEE A FIELD THAT NEVER DECODES — which is how this held a green suite
for five weeks. The pre-existing fixture oobReport() also omitted the field, so those scenarios ran
against a report shape no released agent produces (same family as R-262). Both fixed.
Red-proofs, 8 expected outcomes and 0 wrong, each with the mutation asserted applied: dropping the
field returns the false ok; an unconditional check alerts a healthy box; unknown-as-ok restores the
silent pass.
G-1 CLOSED — scripts/wire_contract_gate.py shipped as ranked, built BEFORE the fixes and seen
failing on 40 fields (documentation/tests/wire-contract-gate-2026-08-08/BEFORE.md). Two instrument
defects the control caught first: a substring false negative (grep -F healed_at matched
privsep_healed_at) and treating dr_recipe as wholly opaque when its top-level sections ARE decoded
through an allow-list that already cost offsite_restic (R-122).
The prompt for this session said "465 emitted tags, eight unreachable". Checked against the repo:
R-260 said "at least eight DECISION-BEARING facts", never eight tags. The real count is 40.
R-260 CLOSED (class gated, sharpest instance fixed). R-247 CLOSED (controller v0.209.0). R-264
MINTED and OPEN — the 21 facts with no consumer, allowlisted with reasons so that gating the class
could not be mistaken for deciding them. Still open and named: R-246, R-255..R-259, R-261..R-263,
and C7's test-comment half.
Capability map checked: it claims OOB access is implemented, never monitored, so no row was untrue;
what was untrue sat one layer down and the row now records it.
repo_gates --fast: all 8 OK. go build/vet/test green in hub, run separately from this commit.
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