Validated wrap->lose->unwrap->restore on a fenced throwaway: the R-recovered key
decrypts a real encrypted snapshot. Pins the PBS-native command sequence (key
change-passphrase --kdf scrypt/none), the pty requirement (F-A1: TTY-only, env var
ignored) + the echo caveat (F-A2: discard pty output so R can't leak), the blob
format/size, and the R format (EFF wordlist, >=128-bit). No K/R/token value recorded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SPIKE-RUNBOOK Slice 7 Phase 0, executed live on demo-felhom. Golden base
(Debian 13 + Docker, nesting=1,keyctl=1, identity-cleaned) built as root@pam,
archived, then token-restored to a throwaway guest and brought up LINK-UP with
the FelhomAgent token (restore/config/resize/start all token-covered).
Key findings:
- MAC reset is UNCONDITIONAL — vzrestore preserves the archived MAC (F1).
- hostname reset is host-side token config (F2).
- machine-id auto-regenerates on first boot (free); SSH host keys do NOT —
ssh.service fails, agent must run ssh-keygen -A guest-side OR bake a first-boot
unit (F3, the one surface-widening design consequence).
- keyctl-through-restore is functional (Docker hello-world in the restored guest);
storage driver overlayfs (F5/F6).
- Settles the §9 / doc-13 identity-reset field list for the provision path.
Verdict: READY to spec the unified bring-up reconcile job (Phase 7.1).
Golden archive kept; both spike guests torn down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Empirical PBS validation before the slice-6 Phase B spec. Records: PBS install on
Debian-13 DooPlex (trixie key ships in proxmox-archive-keyring, no standalone .gpg),
datastore + cert fingerprint, the PBS privsep gotcha (grant role on user AND token),
the encrypted pbs storage + key location (/etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.enc), the snapshot
volid format + native fields (→ PBSSnapshot shape), restore-from-PBS works unchanged,
the verify mechanism (server-side; agent drives it remotely via the PBS API, result read
from snapshot verification.state), no operator-token privilege gap, and zero-knowledge
confirmed (server can't decrypt without the client key). PBS+datastore+storage left up
for Phase B; no secrets committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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