4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	6362bb6cb6	hub v0.103.0 — a host can read the packages we kept for it (R-311) ... ListSupersededEscrow had zero production callers for nineteen days. It is the only reader of a retained identity_blob, so the retention shipped in v0.93.0 was material the product could not reach - proven on the fixture 2026-08-12, where a code that opens a retained package was answered as a code that opened nothing. New GET /api/v1/hosts/<id>/escrow/retained: self-scoped exactly as the current-row GET, same recovery-mode gate, same audit event written BEFORE the bytes leave, capped at 16. Rows with a NULL identity_blob are WITHHELD and returned as unopenable_count. They retain the PBS key, not the repository password, so they can never open what the caller is asking about; serving them would have the agent try packages that cannot succeed and would let the screen claim an earlier package is openable on exactly the boxes the original defect hurt. The count is returned because their existence is load-bearing and underivable. The trade, stated rather than waved through: the hub still cannot read any of it - sealed bytes in, sealed bytes out, no decrypt path, no recovery code ever held. What widens is volume, bounded by self-scope, the recovery-mode gate and the cap. The response is a NAMED TYPE, not a map, so the wire-contract gate can resolve it; the wire is declared as a fourth ROOT and the gate now checks 182 tags rather than 174. A positive control shows that check is name-presence, not decodability - filed as R-315 rather than reported as coverage. Six tests through the real endpoint; four red-proofs asserted applied.	2026-08-12 18:43:07 +02:00
admin	3bf62b95bb	fix(gate): the wire-contract search shelled out to grep and read its failure as a finding ... CI convicted ALL 174 checked tags while the pre-push hook was green. Cause, read from the run log rather than guessed at the second attempt: the search used `grep -rnE --include=…`, and the CI runner's image carries python3 and git and deliberately little else — its grep does not support `--include`, so stdout was empty and the gate read empty as "the tag is absent". That is a gate silently treating a tool failure as a finding, which is worse than no gate, and it is exactly the error-swallowing this repo forbids. A green from it would have been just as untrustworthy as the red. Fixed by removing the dependency, not by working around it: the search is now pure Python — one token index per receiving repo, built in a single pass, no subprocess. Faster too (one walk instead of ~350 greps), and unreadable-file / empty-repo cases now exit 2 INCONCLUSIVE rather than reporting absence. THE BEFORE CAPTURE WAS RE-VERIFIED, NOT RE-GENERATED — the stronger claim. All 40 fields recorded in BEFORE.md were re-tested against the new implementation: agree=40, disagree=0, i.e. exactly the four this session fixed are now present and the other 36 still absent. The number 40 stands under both implementations; only the mechanism changed. The whole-token property survives by construction — a token index treats `healed_at` and `privsep_healed_at` as distinct tokens. This is the THIRD instrument defect this gate's own controls caught before it was trusted, after the substring false negative and the dr_recipe over-opacity. The first two were caught by re-finding the known instances; this one by the CI-versus-hook disagreement the workflow's alarm mail explicitly says outranks whatever the push was for.	2026-08-08 09:10:59 +02:00
admin	b080ecf411	hub v0.99.0 — the hub can see whether the operator can get in (R-260); G-1 gate closes, R-247 closes ... oobDegraded tested five things and the sixth never arrived. The agent has emitted `operator_key_configured` on every heartbeat since v0.72.0 — the SAME version that introduced the `oob` stanza carrying it — and store.HostOOBRow mirrored five of the agent's eight OOB fields. With no field for it, encoding/json discarded the fact on arrival, so a box with felhom-sshd active, reachable, a valid config and a configured peer reported `ok` with NO OPERATOR KEY INSTALLED AT ALL. Not a wrong answer: an answer to a question nobody was asking. `operator_peer_configured`, which the hub did read, only says the peer IP is in desired-state — that OOB is MEANT to work, not that entry is possible. Now decoded: operator_key_configured, plus wg_handshake_age_s and healed_at. The last two ride the ALERT TEXT and are deliberately NOT in the predicate — widening a check beyond the fact that is now arriving is how a check stops being read. SCENARIO F, decided on a measurement rather than a preference. operator_key_configured decodes as a POINTER: nil = the agent never said, reported distinctly and never as ok. The version gate was rejected because the field and its stanza shipped in the SAME agent version (v0.72.0), so a stanza without the field cannot come from any released agent; the fleet is 0.113.0/0.127.0 and the vouched floor is 0.127.0. Handled explicitly anyway and pinned, because "cannot happen" is a claim this project has been burned by. THE MESSAGE NAMES THE FAULT. oobDegradedReason is the single source for both predicate and text, so the alert can never name a different fault from the one that fired. The old form derived it separately and had a vocabulary of two — unreachable, or config invalid — with no way to say the key is missing. The operator reads this at 07:00. TESTS DRIVE THE DECODE BOUNDARY. Every hub OOB test before this built a HostOOBRow by hand, and a test written that way CANNOT SEE A FIELD THAT NEVER DECODES — which is how this held a green suite for five weeks. The pre-existing fixture oobReport() also omitted the field, so those scenarios ran against a report shape no released agent produces (same family as R-262). Both fixed. Red-proofs, 8 expected outcomes and 0 wrong, each with the mutation asserted applied: dropping the field returns the false ok; an unconditional check alerts a healthy box; unknown-as-ok restores the silent pass. G-1 CLOSED — scripts/wire_contract_gate.py shipped as ranked, built BEFORE the fixes and seen failing on 40 fields (documentation/tests/wire-contract-gate-2026-08-08/BEFORE.md). Two instrument defects the control caught first: a substring false negative (grep -F healed_at matched privsep_healed_at) and treating dr_recipe as wholly opaque when its top-level sections ARE decoded through an allow-list that already cost offsite_restic (R-122). The prompt for this session said "465 emitted tags, eight unreachable". Checked against the repo: R-260 said "at least eight DECISION-BEARING facts", never eight tags. The real count is 40. R-260 CLOSED (class gated, sharpest instance fixed). R-247 CLOSED (controller v0.209.0). R-264 MINTED and OPEN — the 21 facts with no consumer, allowlisted with reasons so that gating the class could not be mistaken for deciding them. Still open and named: R-246, R-255..R-259, R-261..R-263, and C7's test-comment half. Capability map checked: it claims OOB access is implemented, never monitored, so no row was untrue; what was untrue sat one layer down and the row now records it. repo_gates --fast: all 8 OK. go build/vet/test green in hub, run separately from this commit.	2026-08-08 08:47:02 +02:00
admin	560f0d4451	G-1: a gate for the dropped field — built first, and seen failing on 40 ... Campaign 12 ranked this first of eight gating candidates. It is built BEFORE the fixes it finds, because last night an off-the-shelf tool for a neighbouring class (deadcode, for C6) was made to prove itself first and found NEITHER of the two defects it was meant for. A gate nobody has watched fail has not been shown to work. scripts/wire_contract_gate.py, registered in repo_gates.py as --fast (no network, no container, so it runs in BOTH the pre-push hook and CI — the R-29 constraint). THE TEST. For every json tag reachable from a declared wire ROOT, does that literal tag occur anywhere in the receiving repo's production Go or templates? A tag occurring nowhere cannot be decoded by any struct, named OR anonymous. That last clause is why a string test is used instead of comparing struct to struct: Campaign 12's first attempt paired types by shape and false-positived badly, because the hub decodes one report through several ad-hoc anonymous structs. RESULT ON TODAY'S TREE: 210 tags checked across 3 declared wires, 51 skipped (generic / opaque / allowlisted), 40 CONVICTED. Captured verbatim in documentation/tests/wire-contract-gate-2026-08-08/ BEFORE.md, which is deliverable 1 of this session. The prompt for this session said "465 emitted tags, eight unreachable". Checked against the repo rather than quoted: R-260's wording was "at least eight DECISION-BEARING facts", not eight tags in total. The real count on the three declared wires is 40, and R-260's own census already listed more than eight. Recorded because this prompt's own rule 6 says not to quote a document as source. TWO THINGS THE CONTROL CAUGHT, both before the gate was trusted: 1. A SUBSTRING FALSE NEGATIVE. `grep -F healed_at` also matches `privsep_healed_at`, so a genuinely dropped field read as received — and R-260 named healed_at, so its absence from the output was the tell. Now a whole-token regex; healed_at is convicted. 2. dr_recipe IS NOT WHOLLY OPAQUE. The hub stores each half as json.RawMessage and re-emits nested shapes verbatim, so the LEAVES are genuinely not on this wire. But the TOP-LEVEL SECTION KEYS are decoded by hostHalfShape/appHalfShape, and those are ALLOW-LISTS: a section an emitter adds is silently dropped until named in both. That already cost `offsite_restic` (R-122). So the gate is opaque BELOW depth 1, not opaque — the sections are checked and pass. Self-test: `--selftest` plants an unreachable tag on a real root in a throwaway copy and asserts conviction. Verified: exit 1, planted tag named. Blind spots are in the module docstring AND in the gate's own output, because Campaign 12's C1 guard turned out blind to one of the three shapes it was written for: generic tag names are not checked; reachability of a NAME is not use of a VALUE; only declared ROOTS are covered, and the hub's desired-state (served as raw stored JSON, no typed emitter) and the agent local API are NOT. Allowlist entries carry a stated reason. A quiet exclusion is a dropped field with paperwork. Not pushed alone: the fixes follow in the next commit so main is never red on this check.	2026-08-08 08:28:53 +02:00