R-216, the hub half. ResolveManagedFloor's own comment says it exists to "never push a
controller past the agent it depends on", and it compared against ArtifactManifest.MinAgent
— which by ITS own comment describes the GOLDEN's controller. publish-train-rules.md rule 3
states the rule about the FLOOR's controller. Measured live: golden 0.192.0 / MinAgent
0.113.0, floor 0.200.0, agent 0.120.0 — served, and the box was pushed onto a controller
needing agent 0.125.0.
A floor ABOVE the vouched golden is now HELD with its own reason (HeldBeyondGolden), reusing
Part D's dashboard visibility. Nobody types a number twice: the vouched MinAgent keeps its
meaning, the guard stops applying it to versions it does not describe. An uncoupled release
is untouched; an unparseable golden degrades rather than gating.
R-222: the report ACK's escrow object gains superseded_present / superseded_at, counting only
rows that actually carry an identity blob. One boolean and one timestamp, for one message.
No read path — that link is still unbuilt.
Red-proof: removing the floor-above-golden branch reproduces the campaign's measurement.
New internal/offsiteheal, the sibling of pbsdrheal: it acts ONLY on the state the
box declares, sustained across two distinct reports, re-staging the stored
credential before ever minting a new one. A healthy box is a pure no-op; it never
blind-timer-reissues and never re-runs a provisioning step.
RESTAGE IS POSSIBLE because the stored value survives a consume — established from
the schema and ConsumeOneTimeSecret (which stamps consumed_at and nothing else),
not inherited from the PBS analogy, and pinned by a test that asserts the SAME
value comes back.
reportHasOffsite is TIGHTENED to require enabled:true. Its comment asserted that
presence == applied-on-the-box, and the declaration deliberately breaks that
premise; left alone it would have read a request for help as proof the tier was
applied. Provably a no-op for every report shape that existed before, because an
attached object has always carried enabled:true.
R-192's guard half is CLOSED BY REPLACEMENT: the delivery checker's counting
inference read the OLDEST 500 reports after a consume — all predating a rebuild,
which is why demo-hp sat stranded for 108 reports under a confident regressed-shape
verdict. A declaration outranks both inferred shapes, and the checker stands down
with a record so the two mechanisms cannot double-issue.
No escrow ceremony is ever run or requested: credential automatic, key
customer-present.
ReissueCredentials marked the escrow stale on every re-issue, on precautionary
grounds — the box's re-apply MIGHT mint a fresh repository password. It usually
does not. A stale flag withholds restic_pw_sha256 from the ACK, which stops the
controller's auto-confirm, which leaves EscrowState pending, which makes
OffboxRunnable false: every off-site backup refused on a box whose key was never
in doubt — and the customer told to re-run the one ceremony that would have
superseded the key just recovered.
The case it guessed at is measured elsewhere: the controller's Scenario-F
re-check compares the sealed hash against the live repo password on every ACK
(and the mark was BLINDING it by emptying that hash), and R-197's
offsite_repo_key_changed fires on a proven difference across a supersession.
offsite_reissued is unchanged. MarkEscrowStale is kept without a caller so a
future EVIDENTIAL writer has the mechanism, with a test pinning it live.
TestReissue_InvalidatesEscrow is replaced by its exact inverse.
R-198 — host_escrow_superseded shipped with `blob` (the K-escrow / PBS datastore key) and
identity_blob was added to host_escrow LATER, never here. The offsite restic REPOSITORY
password lives in identity_blob. So demoteCurrentEscrowTx -- whose own comment calls it "THE
ONE escrow row-copy routine" -- retained the whole-guest key and silently dropped the off-site
data key, which is the secret the retention was built to preserve. And because the copy happens
as the new blob overwrites the old, the destroying act was the ESCROW CEREMONY: the exact thing
a rebuilt box tells its customer to run, on a card promising in Hungarian that the old backups
stay recoverable. Both demo boxes crossed that line on 2026-08-04.
- identity_blob added to the table (CREATE + additive ALTER) and carried in the shared copy
routine, so BOTH callers are fixed at once: re-escrow and host-delete demotion.
- ListSupersededEscrow reads it back; store.HostEscrow gains IdentityBlob.
- CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity is the census of who the fix protects.
- Nothing is backfillable: pre-v0.93.0 retained rows have no blob and their sources are gone.
- Tests assert the CONSEQUENCE (a retained row can still yield a repo password), which is why
the pre-existing retention test stayed green for two months asserting the mechanism.
R-197 — SaveHostEscrow returns the hash it replaced; the escrow PUT raises
offsite_repo_key_changed (warning, operator-only, edge-triggered) when both hashes are known and
differ. No hash value travels. Severity chosen for the world v0.93.0 creates: with the identity
blob retained, a changed key is "this history now depends on an older recovery code", not a loss.
R-192 (half) — the stuck alert now reports the two shapes it actually covers, burned and
regressed, each stating its own measurement; the regressed text withdraws the Re-issue
recommendation. Every self-heal refusal leaves a notification_log row with its reason. The
guard's logic is unchanged; its 500-oldest-reports scoping stays OPEN and the window is named in
the alert text so the limitation travels with the number. offsite_delivery_stuck and
offsite_credential_restaged are added to operatorOnlyEvents -- neither was registered and neither
has a customerMessages entry, which is not a block.
R-196 — five comments (not the three the spec expected) claimed ReissueCredentials rotates the
restic repo password. It resets the PROVIDER password and cannot touch the repo password, which
is generated on the box. All five corrected; the staleness mark documented as precautionary. The
BEHAVIOUR stays open.
Not in this release: R-199, R-200, R-201 remain open -- the chain that hands the key back is
still unassembled. Part 5 hit its gate; the orphan card is untouched (R-202).
Part 4 (ships): `david` — a prospective customer with hosts=0, host_deletions=0,
reports=0 — e-mailed an expected_dbdump_missed ERROR at 03:00 UTC three mornings
running. The existing down-skip could never cover it: it reads the staleness
checker's state, which is seeded from a query over the `reports` table, so a
customer that never reported has no state at all and GetState() returns "" rather
than "down". store.HasEverBoundHost (hosts row OR host_deletions tombstone) is
consulted once per customer at the top of the deadline loop. The discriminator is
"was a host EVER bound", never "has a report arrived" — a box installed and never
heard from is a real fault and keeps alarming. Fail-OPEN on a read error. Red-proof
observed: removing the guard fails with `got [expected_dbdump_missed]`, verbatim the
event david sent.
Parts 0-3 (spike, NO production code for R-193/R-192):
audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md establishes that the one-shot
provider password is the RECOVERABLE secret and the restic repository password is the
irreplaceable one — and that a guest rebuild mints a fresh one, orphaning the previous
off-site history. Measured without touching a box, by comparing
host_escrow.restic_pw_sha256 against host_escrow_superseded: BOTH demo boxes changed
(demo-hp 15 snapshots / 40.9 MB, demo-felhom 36 snapshots / 1.14 GB). demo-felhom's
"lucky" 76-second recovery restored delivery and not the repository, silently, for 13h.
ReissueCredentials does NOT rotate the restic password (R-39's record and two hub
comments are wrong -> R-196); candidate (b) is not implementable against a
zero-knowledge escrow; candidate (a) already exists as F3 and is wired to the wrong
event. Ends in ranked options and an unanswered question for the operator.
R-195 SHIPPED; R-196 + R-197 filed; R-192 + R-193 updated, neither closed.
processOperator's cooldown no longer returns bare. It dropped the event BEFORE
LogNotification, so a suppressed operator alert and an event that never happened
were indistinguishable — from the operator's side and from the hub's own records.
Measured 2026-08-03: nine recovery_unit_capture_failed events arrived, two were
mailed, seven left no row anywhere. That is why the defect took a day to get the
right way round: there was nothing to read.
A suppressed operator event now writes a `suppressed` row carrying the message
and the key that suppressed it. This applies to EVERY operator event, not only
the one that exposed it. It does NOT change the cooldown's duration or semantics.
backup_run_failures: the per-run digest. In allowedEventTypes AND in
operatorOnlyEvents — allowlisting alone does not make an event operator-only,
and FormatCustomerEmail falls back to the raw English message rather than
blocking. A test demonstrates a customer with the type enabled receiving nothing.
recordOnlyEvents: a third routing class — stored and recorded, never mailed.
recovery_unit_capture_failed moves here: it is the record, the digest is the
notification. A register rather than downgrading severity to info, which would
relabel a genuine failure as informational everywhere it is queried.
cooldownRunSuffix: a sibling of cooldownTierSuffix, not a branch inside it, so
tier keeps byte-identical semantics and R-97a's tests are untouched. It makes
the cooldown effectively inert for the digest, which is the intent — a digest is
already rate-limited by construction; the refresh sweep sends no run_id and so
stays under the ordinary hourly cooldown.
The email renders as a list, not a JSON blob. An absent space reading renders as
unavailable, never as zeros.
store.New opened the DB with `?_journal_mode=WAL&_busy_timeout=5000`, which is
mattn/go-sqlite3 syntax. The driver is modernc.org/sqlite, whose applyQueryParams
reads only _pragma/_time_format/_time_integer_format/_txlock/_inttotime and
IGNORES anything else WITHOUT AN ERROR. So the hub ran in rollback-journal mode
with busy_timeout=0 for its entire life while its own source said otherwise.
Surfaced as a false HOST STALE banner: in rollback-journal mode a reader excludes
a writer, so rendering an operator page blocks a host report; the hub 500s, the
agent waits its full 15-minute interval without retrying, and staleness fires at
30 minutes — two collisions is a false alarm plus an operator email. 13 collisions
in one pod lifetime; the alarm fired twice on 2026-08-02 for a host that was up
two days and reconciling throughout.
The observable that proved it: a 128 MB /data/hub.db with no -wal/-shm beside it
while the DB was open.
Fix: ?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)&_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)&_txlock=immediate.
_txlock=immediate is not optional — database/sql's Begin() is DEFERRED, so a
read-then-write tx must upgrade its lock and a failed upgrade is
SQLITE_BUSY_SNAPSHOT, which busy_timeout does NOT retry; this store has 10+
db.Begin() sites and they are all write paths.
Every test asserts what the DATABASE reports, never the DSN string — a string
test would have passed for the whole life of the bug. Red-proof: restoring the
shipped DSN reproduces journal_mode="delete", the missing -wal, and the live
"database is locked (5) (SQLITE_BUSY)".
Operational consequence handled: a WAL DB cannot be copied by taking hub.db
alone — a bare `cat` opens cleanly and silently omits the newest writes. The
break-glass retrieval in operations/nodes.md used exactly that; it and the
recovery-inventory note are now WAL-aware.
The golden's version IS the controller it bakes (build-golden.sh:345 defaults
GOLDEN_VERSION to the controller tag), so a golden behind the newest deployed
controller means every FRESH install lands on stale application code. On the R-120
occurrence that stale code shipped a customer-facing falsehood: a box from the
0.185.1 golden told a customer whose backup drive had fallen out that the backup was
on the same disk as the system -- false, the drive was gone -- and offered a
different drive as the remedy.
WHY A GATE, NOT A REMINDER. The gap has opened three times: R-111 (golden's agent 17
releases behind), R-115 (agent built and deployed, never published), R-120 (this).
The first two were closed by re-baking and remembering; remembering then failed
again. R-29 is the standing proof that a check nobody runs is worse than none because
it reads as coverage -- hostinstall_gates.py sat RED and uninvoked across three
version bumps and hub_confirm_gate.py has never run at all. So the property that
matters is not whether a check exists but whether it BLOCKS.
- Wired into handleSetArtifacts (internal/web/configs.go), immediately before the
only write, on the sole UI path to SetArtifactManifest -- it runs on every vouch
without anyone choosing to. A script in scripts/ would have been a fourth orphan.
- It REFUSES (operator ruling, 2026-07-30), with a flash naming the remedy.
- Signal: store.NewestReportedControllerVersion() over reports.controller_version,
SEMVER-compared in Go -- MAX() in SQL ranks 0.99.0 above 0.186.0, a pair this
fleet has shipped. No outbound call, no new credential.
- Fail-open in exactly two deliberate cases: an empty golden field (clearing the
manifest is legitimate) and an unknown fleet version (a new hub must vouch its
first golden).
NEAR-MISS RECORDED: the first draft read guests.controller_version, a column that
exists in the schema and that NOTHING writes -- it would always have seen "" and
failed open, i.e. inert, this gate's own failure shape. Caught by grepping for a
writer before trusting the column.
Blind spot stated rather than papered over: a controller no box has ever run is
invisible to this signal. Not the failure that has bitten -- all three instances were
deployed-newer-than-baked.
4 tests through the PRODUCTION handler over httptest, never an injected seam. The
refusal asserts both the flash and that the manifest was NOT written, because a gate
that redirects and saves anyway reads as enforcement while providing none. Red-proof:
deleting the block makes the stale golden vouchable and both assertions fail.
ROADMAP R-29's audit list now records this as the FIRST enforced gate, so the
contrast with its three orphans is kept rather than lost. The orphans are unchanged.
Suite rc=0 read separately from this commit.
Third instance of one class (hub v0.12.0, v0.73.0, this), fixed as a class.
On 2026-07-26 03:00 UTC expected_backup_missed fired on demo-felhom, demo-hp
and drill-r50 at once; the demo-felhom one reached the CUSTOMER channel
claiming "newest backup is 176h0m0s old". Nothing was wrong — three vzdump
archives were on disk. Cause: the agent backup store is in-memory, so the
R-50 fleet restart emptied `backups` until the next run, and the hub read
empty as "no backup exists".
- assessBackupFreshness returns OK/UNKNOWN/MISSED instead of `missed bool`;
absence is UNKNOWN until it outlives an anchored window. Still pure.
- store.GetHostReportsSince + monitor.newestBackupEvidence read the hubs own
retained history (bounded 7-day lookback, early-exit on fresh evidence) —
"when did I last SEE evidence of a backup?" The anchor was free: the hub
already retains 90 days. No agent change, no new persisted state.
- store.GetFirstHostReportAt anchors absence at first contact, reusing the
existing 26h threshold as the grace (no new knob, the v0.73.0 shape).
- Deferrals logged + counted; reason strings kept distinct.
- backupStaleAfter untouched; landmine recorded (a weekly PBS snapshot would
alarm six days in seven) and owned by R-82.
Tests 493->508. Red-proofs A/B/C observed and restored; A reproduces the live
message verbatim. Replayed the real 03:00 reports (600/417/77 rows): all
three now silent.
Source: documentation/audits/DIAG-backup-missed-2026-07-26.md
Completes the hub half of R-39's fleet fix on top of the generation core (c484aa2).
pbsdrheal gains an auth_failed TRIGGER — a new trigger in the existing machine, not a
new machine. A box whose credential PBS rejects escalates to a fresh mint, never a
re-stage (which would re-feed the secret PBS just rejected), through the EXISTING damper:
a 401 flap must not become a secret-minting chain. With the generation stamp this closes
the loop end to end — agent proves the 401, hub re-keys, generation advances, descriptor
hash moves, agent re-consumes.
consumed_at honesty gauge: a staged secret still unconsumed past a 15-minute grace while
the box reports `applied` is surfaced with its own event. That is the exact 2026-07-18
fingerprint and a disagreement no single tier can see alone. Deliberately a SURFACE, not
a heal — auto-re-issuing on it would mint a second secret on top of an unconsumed one,
which is the mint/consume race R-39(a) already recorded. One event per distinct report,
and an honestly-stuck box does not double-report (its unconsumed secret is the symptom
being healed, not a contradiction).
R-50b(a): ArtifactManifest.WrapperSHA256 + operator field + host-page drift surface. The
PBS wrapper is root-owned 0755 and the pinned sudoers vector, yet installed unversioned
from raw/branch/main and absent from every manifest. Agents >=0.91.0 report the installed
hash; a mismatch is surfaced. An unknown on EITHER side reads as quiet, never as drift —
lighting every host amber on rollout day is how a warning becomes background noise. The
delivery channel itself stays R-50b(b)/(c).
Compatibility unchanged: safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown JSON key dropped); the re-arm
and auth-honesty guarantees need agent >=0.91.0, so MinAgent moves only after the fleet
has self-updated.
Tests: auth_failed escalate/debounce/recovery-forgets-streak; honesty gauge incl. grace
window, the restage edge (consumed_at deliberately NULLed), consumed-never-alarms, and
honest-stuck-no-double-report; wrapper drift incl. both unknown directions. Red-proof run
at the assertion level: removing the auth_failed arm fails the escalation tests with
reissues=0.
The fleet half of R-39. An ep0 credential re-issue re-keys the SECRET of an existing
token, so token_id, fingerprint, datastore and namespace all come back byte-identical.
The agent re-applies on the descriptor's CONTENT HASH, so a re-issue was invisible to a
converged box: it short-circuited, never consumed the fresh secret, and served a revoked
credential while reporting `applied` — the N100 failure of 2026-07-18.
host_pbs_secrets gains a monotonic per-host `generation`, advanced by every fresh MINT and
by nothing else, stamped into the descriptor as `secret_generation`. That is now the only
field a re-key moves, and it is what re-arms the agent.
DEVIATION FROM SPEC, deliberate: the brief said to return "the new row's id (int64) …
no schema change". There is no row id — host_pbs_secrets is keyed by host_id and UPSERTed
last-write-wins, so a new row never exists, and created_at collides for two mints in the
same second. An additive counter column is the only monotonic source; it uses the repo's
existing idempotent ALTER-TABLE idiom.
RestageHostPBSSecret deliberately does NOT advance it: a re-stage re-arms the SAME secret,
the descriptor content genuinely has not changed, and a bump would cause a pointless agent
refetch loop (that method's own contract says so).
Also corrects a comment that asserted the re-issue refreshes the descriptor "with the NEW
token_id/fingerprint". That is false for a re-key, and believing it is why the descriptor
was never expected to be identical in the first place.
omitempty is load-bearing: a zero generation must not start emitting a new key into every
pre-existing descriptor, which would itself be a fleet-wide spurious re-apply.
Compatibility: agents below 0.91.0 drop the unknown JSON key and behave exactly as today —
inert, not breaking (Scenario C).
Tests: store-level monotonicity + per-host isolation + restage-leaves-it-alone; descriptor
byte-change, omitempty, and sibling-key round-trip; and a FLOW-level test driving
ReissuePBSDR against a fake that models a real re-key. Red-proof run at the assertion
level (not the compiler): commenting out the stamp makes the flow test fail with both
byte-identical blocks printed.
Let a customer bind their own freshly-installed appliance without the
operator: operator "Send self-bind link" mints a 7-day tokenized
capability link, emailed (Hungarian, sibling sender) to the customer, who
opens a public /bind/<token> page and proves two factors — the console
pairing code shown on the box screen + their retrieval passphrase — and
the hub stages the bind via the same BindAppliance (provenance
customer_selfbind). The box's ~30s appliance poll delivers.
Viktor's three rulings verbatim: console pairing code (no appliance list
ever rendered), operator-sent tokenized link, 5-attempt lockout ->
"call support". Wrong code == wrong passphrase (one generic failure, no
oracle, both factors compared unconditionally); expiry falls back to
operator-bind unchanged.
THE TRAP: one public prefix /bind/, exempt from auth+CSRF at both /login
gate sites via a single isPublicBindPath predicate (tight trailing-slash
match; ServeMux ..-cleans; handler rejects '/' in token). 9 tests
(Scenarios A-F + F1/F2); 4 red-proofs verified red-then-green (lockout,
oracle, widened-prefix, single-active). GC verdict: no appliance GC ->
the 7-day TTL stands alone. Controller/agent untouched; R-27b deferred.
Green: full hub build/vet/test (17 ok) + bash -n + hub confirm gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp
A generic ISO carries NO customer secret. The box registers itself at the hub
as an unclaimed appliance; the operator binds it to a customer; the hub delivers
the customer-id + retrieval passphrase ONCE; day-0 completes via the slice-A path.
Hub (v0.62.0):
- store/appliance.go: appliance_registrations keyed by (uuid, mac_set) — MAC set
is the tiebreaker (duplicate SMBIOS UUIDs); token stored as sha256 only.
Idempotent register (sticky-discard), atomic one-shot delivery, bind/discard.
- api/appliance.go: POST /appliance/register (the one unauth endpoint, per-IP
rate-limited, 256-bit token); GET /appliance/poll (404 no-oracle / 204 unbound
/ 200 deliver-once / 410 delivered). Passphrase read live, never logged.
- web/appliances.go: Hosts-page "Unclaimed appliances" section + BIND (customer
picker, host count display-only) + DISCARD; SSH host-key fingerprints; events.
- Red-proofs: one-shot delivery + register idempotency (both proven red);
404-no-oracle, sticky-discard, bind staging, render. Green + confirm gate.
Scripts (v1.19.0):
- felhom-bootstrap.sh: ONE unit, TWO modes. Direct (env has customer/passphrase)
= slice-A path, byte-identical, only branched around. Pairing (generic) =
register + poll (RestartSec=30 is the poll timer); on delivery write the env
0600 and fall through to direct. Secrets + token shredded on success.
- build-felhom-iso.sh --pairing: generic secret-free ISO, -generic filename,
manifest mode=pairing. profiles/generic.profile (new).
- test/bootstrap-modes.sh: Scenario D (direct = zero appliance calls) + pairing
register/poll + delivery handoff — all green in a debian container.
- DeleteHost(deleteEscrow) demotes current host_escrow into host_escrow_superseded (copy-before-delete, same tx), spares existing; one shared demoteCurrentEscrowTx (reused by SaveHostEscrow). F-14 provenance/gate unchanged.
- DeleteCustomerConfig now purges both escrow tables for all the customer's hosts incl. already-deleted (F-14 provenance UNION) — the one true purge point.
- Wording: checkbox/refusal/Danger-zone → demotion. S6b OBSOLETE. Red-proofs TestDeleteHost_Demotes + TestDeleteCustomer_Purges + wording guard.
F2 claim re-issue on clean-slate re-enroll (ReissueForReenroll, host-enroll mint path,
single-bump, reset code; hub never stores the password so fork B). F3 offsite re-issue on
re-enroll (ReissueOffsiteForCustomer, same machinery as the manual button). 2.3 escrow honesty
(red-proofed): re-issuing offsite marks the escrow stale (MarkEscrowStale), withholds the
mismatched restic hash from auto-confirm, DR checklist shows stale not done. Events:
claim_reissued_reenroll / offsite_reissued / escrow_stale.
Controller + scripts unchanged (source contradicted both premises): the controller reads escrow
prereqs live from the agent; the installer can't know the descriptor-provisioned storage id. F4
root fix is agent-side -> ROADMAP R-22; demo unblocked live (Part 0 ACL grant). VALIDATION doc
F2 erratum + F3/F4 dispositions. Green gate + Scenario-C red-proof pass.
hub v0.54.0: change operator login password from the Configuration UI
Adds a "Login password" card on /configuration. The password was previously
settable only via the hub-config ConfigMap (auth.password_hash) + redeploy.
- store: hub_settings key operator_password_hash + Get/SetOperatorPasswordHash
- server: passwordHash field -> configPasswordHash (seed); new
effectivePasswordHash() (DB override wins, else seed) is now the single
source for the CSRF gate, RequireAuth, and handleLogin
- POST /configuration/password (handleChangePassword): requires current
password, 8-72 byte new + confirm, bcrypt cost 10, persists DB override;
existing sessions kept valid; ConfigMap stays the break-glass reset path
- UI: current/new/confirm form + inline mismatch pre-check + 6 flashes
- tests + red-proofs: override precedence, happy-path via handleLogin,
wrong-current rejection, mismatch/too-short/no-op, template render
- docs: CHANGELOG, README (auth+config), REUSE, REPORT
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LbMm4T7Ayzs1unB9pN6Uqd
@
Every DeleteHost writes a provenance row INSIDE the cascade tx: host_id,
customer_id, deleted_at, escrow_acked. escrow_acked = ack given over a
PRESENT escrow row (acknowledged destruction, not a vacuous checkbox).
LatestHostDeletion(customer) serves the F-14 gate — newest record only,
so an old acked deletion never whitelists a newer un-acked one. No
backfill by design: pre-record deletions stay on the manual path.
Red-proof: dropping the in-tx INSERT fails TestDeleteHost_ProvenanceRecord
("no deletion record written") + the part-2 scenario-A test.
- host_detail_body.html: {{define}}'d body sections extracted from
host_detail.html; the standalone page is now chrome + the sub-template
- hosts.go: hostDetailData(host, r) view-model builder extracted from
handleHostDetail (reused by both surfaces)
- store: ListHostsByCustomer (host_id order; the Host tab is a list by
design - N hosts for a future HA cluster)
- customer Host tab renders one host_detail_body per host + cross-link;
empty state when no host is enrolled
- tests: TestTemplates_CustomerHostTab(+_Empty), TestListHostsByCustomer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vvz1NCu22p8dGkRCpeX9re
Additive host_escrow migration; SaveHostEscrow/HostEscrow gain the hash
(NULL-safe for legacy rows); GetEscrowStatusForCustomer joins hosts;
the report ACK gains escrow:{identity_blob_present,restic_pw_sha256,
created_at} (omitted without a row). Contract test mirrors the agent's
v0.79.0 emit struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
New HostDiskChecker on the 60s sweep alerts the operator when a Proxmox host root
filesystem crosses warn (90%) / crit (95%). Born/persistent (a disk already full at
hub restart alerts on cycle 1); distinct host_disk_* event types from the guest disk_*;
critical band maps to severity error (the dispatcher only routes warning/error).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxLA1mZurFq9kt8hneFeCs
Companion to felhom-agent v0.44.0. New monitor.HostCapabilityChecker (sibling of
HostStalenessChecker) reads the capabilities snapshot from the latest host report and emits
agent_capability_degraded/recovered (operator-only, 1h cooldown) on ok<->degraded transitions
for any Critical capability. store.GetHostCapabilities (MAX(id), no migration). Goldens mirror
the new capabilities field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EPZ4GJ8L5Jqf8UiPwbn1kt
Operator sets a minimum controller version (FLOOR), per-customer defaulting to a
global floor; the report ACK returns the effective floor + latest_version so the
controller auto-updates to the floor when below it (latest stays the opt-in button).
- store: min_controller_version column + hub_settings global floor + Effective/
Get/SetGlobal/SetMin resolution + config/env DEFAULT_MIN_CONTROLLER_VERSION
- handler: report ACK {min_controller_version, latest_version}; LatestVersionProvider
- web: global floor editor + per-customer override form + Floor column (English)
- tests: floor resolution + ACK + render; override-precedence red-proof verified
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FSZmmSFVzGwEzhYmxbkgBK
New POST /api/v1/host-enroll (handleHostEnroll): X-Retrieval-Password authed,
body {customer_id} -> {host_id, api_key}. Mint-once-reuse (201 first, 200
reuse) so re-running the host-bootstrap never orphans a running agent's key;
auth checked before any mint. Backed by new Store.GetHostByCustomer
(ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 1, idx_hosts_customer).
GET /config/{id} and global-key POST /admin/hosts left untouched. Exact-match
route (path == "/host-enroll") to avoid the /hosts/ prefix collision.
Tests: host_enroll_test.go (mint/reuse/401-no-mint/404/400) + GetHostByCustomer
store test; companion red-proof verified always-mint fails the reuse assertion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TtXesNa2LGbMmE4DNL6SE7
DR recipe slice (hub half), grounded in SPIKE-dr-recipe-2026-06-16. The hub
receives two additive dr_recipe halves on the existing report paths (agent
storage/guest/PBS on host-report; controller customer/apps on the controller
report), stores them PLAINTEXT in a DEDICATED dr_recipe table keyed by customer
(each half preserves the other), and AssembleDRRecipe stitches them into one
operator-readable recipe (ignore-unknown + version-skew tolerant).
View: a DR-recipe panel on the customer page + GET /customers/{id}/dr-recipe.json
download (operator-auth, no secrets to redact). Plaintext-at-rest is correct —
the recipe is the clean inverse of the retired infra-backup.
Tests: store round-trip (each half preserves the other), assemble-matches-golden,
ignore-unknown + version skew, partial halves, no-secrets sweep. Manifest tag
bumped to v0.13.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase-1 of SPIKE-infra-backup-2026-06-15. The infra-backup mechanism was dead
since slice 8C yet stored plaintext customer secrets at rest (app-secret key,
restic password, Cloudflare tokens) — a zero-knowledge violation — and its
absence made the daily expected_backup_missed email fire for healthy customers.
- Repoint monitor.CheckBackupDeadlines backup half to the agent host-report's
PBS snapshots (+vzdump): alarm only on no-backup / >26h stale / verify failed.
Keep the db_dump half. No host-report → no backup alarm (liveness owns that).
New store.GetLatestHostReportJSON. Tests incl. a companion that fails pre-fix.
- Remove the infra-backup endpoints, store methods/types, and operator panel;
/recovery now returns config_yaml only.
- migrate(): DROP infra_backup_versions/infra_backups + VACUUM (+wal_checkpoint)
to physically reclaim the plaintext pages, gated on table existence.
Flagged out-of-scope: exposed creds need operator rotation; legacy reports table
holds historical plaintext restic_password rows (separate leak, not purged here).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add DELETE /hosts/{id}/jobs/{job_id} (per-host self-scoped, idempotent) so the
agent clears a job after executing or terminally rejecting it. The hub stores
the operator-signed blobs opaquely (no signing key — cannot forge or open);
the agent verifies + executes. Doc 03 §4/§6/§9 updated (operator-signed path
live; 8C wipe completes; 10B done).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Serve operator intent to authenticated hosts: PUT /admin/hosts/{id}/desired-state
(global key) bumps desired_generation; GET /hosts/{id}/desired-state + /jobs are
per-host self-scoped; the host-report envelope now carries the real generation +
has_signed_ops. New signed_jobs table + store methods. Desired-state stored/served
opaquely (agent owns the schema). Cross-repo golden (envelope + desired-state)
byte-identical with felhom-agent; doc 03 §4/§9 updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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