- audits/linetest-2026-10-27/: the hold failed four times as built (qBittorrent drains ~14 s), the fix 710ceac, the test
through the hold on 0.346.0-rc.1 (94.5 Mbit/s, the limit back exactly), teardown.
- audits/release-2026-10-27/: builds, agent release + signed updates, per-box and global floors, box walk.
- 09 §3 decisions 269 (R-1250 fix the same day) and 270 (R-1218 live proof waived); D55's window result in 268.
- 08 §: the drain-wait design line. STATUS, CONTEXT, register (223 -> 214).
- 08 §10: built (controller 5bd03ad, hub 7e57e824, commit only); putback_pending as on the wire; as-built notes
- audits/d53-held-apps-2026-10-26: live proof on 9202 against a test hub (3-min grace), red-proofs, teardown
- R-1291 BUILT (not released); R-1298 filed (9202's orphan holds + PrivateBin leftover)
- test_gate_decoys.py: the register-shape cases also run the script and assert its exit code — R-1297's decoy 2
showed an inert main() passed every case (9 cases red with it now)
- audits/r1297-ci-trim-2026-10-26: runners, times, decoys
Every catalog app installed, used, backed up, removed keeping data, reinstalled, restored and removed with data on a
fresh box from the public ISO (demo-hp VM 9360, Tester4), endpoint-level. Worst: a reinstall's capture rewrites the
kept unit so its restore breaks the app (R-1269, P2), the restore still reports success (R-1270, P2), and „use my kept
data" loaded another box's future-dated database (R-1271, P2). Drill catalog fixes for the morning list (n8n usage
data; OpenGist 256M, proven by a cgroup probe). VM 9360 and LXC 9361 destroyed; hub host Tester4-aa9466 left for the
operator. REPORT-catalog-sweep-2026-10-24.md.
R-232 dated note + a dated check for tonight's sweep; R-934 closed (the disk was pulled
2026-10-23); R-1250 fixed on main, live proof on demo-hp with a real seed; 08 §9 item 5.
Evidence audits/dooplex-alarms-2026-10-24/.
Spike: per-app normal levels on three boxes (19-31 days), the off-site push as a line measure (a lower bound),
qBittorrent/Transmission/Plex explainers measured on 9202, a tc ceiling measured (not built). Live on 9202 with
0.342.0-rc.1: limit set; real seed explained; CPU burner and the hidden flood alarmed once each and cleared once;
the household's limit left alone. Teardown: apps removed, 9202 back on 0.341.0, receiver 9471 destroyed.
The Cloudflare tunnel token, Cloudflare API token and git token inside customer_configs.config_json now hold the
05 §16.2 seal (enc:v1:, OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY). Old rows sealed once at start-up without a config_version bump, then
VACUUM + WAL checkpoint (an UPDATE leaves the old plaintext in a freed block). -unseal-box-secrets opens them too.
Eight tests, each red-proved. Built, not deployed. Audit: documentation/audits/hub-token-seal-2026-10-23/.
Read-only audit of whether the hacked Plex pod on DooPlex (HM-040, 2026-10-17 -> 10-23) reached Felhom's
secrets. Two no-login doors existed (the Longhorn NFS export and the Longhorn API); neither was used:
nfsd accepted 0 new connections in the window (positive control), no off-schedule Longhorn backup or volume.
Evidence in documentation/audits/plex2shell-felhom-impact-2026-10-23/. The NFS export was narrowed from *
to 10.42.0.0/16 on the operator's yes (host change, not in git). 13-threat-model.md: attacker j and one
boundary row. STATUS: verdict, the P1, one do item.
On 2026-10-19 09:24 the public path to Gitea failed once and the sidecar exited (max-failures defaults to 0).
Anonymous in-cluster fetch proven first (main and installer-v1.34.0 resolve to the public hashes).
The first draft (5121536f, unpushed) re-issued the claim code and the off-site login on a
reuse whose old box was stale or switched off. A security review flagged it: the caller
holds only the household's retrieval passphrase, and both re-issues are operator
session-only actions (05 section 17.5, 09 decision 252, R-1055/R-1059). Now the reuse
path classifies the old box and re-issues nothing: gone -> host_reinstall_over_old_host
(warning, mailed to the operator: delete the old host and re-run, or re-issue by hand);
live -> host_reenroll_while_live (info). The mint path after the operator's delete is
unchanged and still re-issues. The once-per-silence record and the claim engine comment
edit are reverted. 05 section 8, README and CHANGELOG updated; tests red-proved.
R-1150: the agent's localapi:backup-cadence-cap is a separate per-host state in
HostCapabilityChecker: alone it raises whole_guest_backup_refused (warning, plain text,
agent reason in details) and whole_guest_backup_refusal_cleared (info); other critical
caps keep agent_capability_degraded/_recovered unchanged. New types operator-only and
hub-origin only (not in allowedEventTypes: the suspected controller must not post them).
agent_capability_degraded/_recovered join operatorOnlyEvents (the checker's "never the
customer" claim was configuration only).
R-1154: handleHostEnroll's reuse path re-issues (claim code + off-site login) when no
controller wait is open and either deliberate_off_at is held or both the host report and
the controller report are older than alerting.stale_threshold (wired from main); once per
silence (host_reenroll_reissued record, also written at mint); a live box gets nothing
re-issued and the skip is recorded (host_reenroll_not_reissued). 05 section 8 [DESIGN].
Tests red-proved; go build/vet/test green.
Golden 0.329.0 baked at the floor's version, NOT vouched. Hub 0.158.0 built, NOT deployed.
Sunday rotation: no duplicate bake of an unvouched golden at the floor's version.
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