v0.100.x removed the serialisation: 26.2s -> ~9.85s mean. What remained was one Gitea package SEARCH
per dropdown at 0.20-3.8s depending on load, which concurrency cannot help.
Memoised for 60s IN MEMORY. The TTL was ruled by the operator against the workflow that cares: a
bake-and-vouch session publishes an artifact and comes straight here to select it, so a minute is
short enough not to be noticed and long enough that every reload in that session is instant.
NOT persisted. Gitea IS the store for both the version list and the sha; a copy in hub_settings would
be a second source of truth that can drift from the registry it describes, and the operator reads the
sha here to confirm what they are about to vouch. An in-memory cache dies with the process and can
never be mistaken for a record.
A failed resolve is NOT cached — a blip must not pin an empty dropdown for a minute. But an empty
list from a package that genuinely has no versions IS cached, because 'we found nothing' and 'we
could not look' are different answers (CONTEXT S-39, applied to a list instead of a figure).
THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS GOT THAT WRONG: the comment said only successful resolves were cached and
the code cached the empty list anyway. TestArtifactChoices_FailureIsNotCached caught it before it
shipped — which is the argument for writing the test that asserts the comment, and the same class
this session spent the day closing.
go build/vet/test green, go test -race clean, run separately from this commit.
Follow-up to the fan-out, and the reason for it is worth recording: THE FIRST FIX DID LESS THAN THE
ARITHMETIC PREDICTED. Concurrency took the page from 26.2s to ~11-18s, not the ~2s expected, so the
gap was chased instead of declared closed.
What it found: the slowest single call on the page is not a per-version sha lookup at all, it is the
PACKAGE SEARCH (/api/v1/packages/admin?type=generic&q=...), measured in-cluster at 1.1-2.2s each
against ~0.24s for a file's metadata. Per-version fan-out cannot touch it — there is one search per
package and they ran in series.
The two dropdowns are independent, so they now resolve side by side, overlapping both searches and
both fan-outs. go test -race clean on the new concurrent paths.
Gitea's latency on this box is load-dependent and varies 2-4x between samples, so the CHANGELOG
quotes a range rather than a single pair of numbers.
MEASURED, NOT GUESSED: GET /configuration -> HTTP 200 in 26.2s.
The reasonable guess was that it hashes the artifacts on page load. It does not, and the code already
said so: Gitea stores each package file's sha256 and gitea.FileSHA256 reads it as metadata — "a cheap
metadata call, the artifact bytes are never downloaded". The cost was never CPU.
IT WAS LATENCY x COUNT. artifactChoices made ONE SERIAL round-trip per version, for two packages,
capped at 20 each: 2 x (1 version list + 20 sha lookups) = 42 sequential requests at ~0.6s each out
through the public ingress. 42 x 0.6 = 26s, which is what the clock said.
1. The sha lookups now run CONCURRENTLY, bounded at 8 in flight. Order preserved by writing into a
slot rather than appending — the dropdown is newest-first, and a scrambled sha would show the
operator a hash belonging to a DIFFERENT artifact. A failed lookup still drops that version only.
2. The client talks to Gitea IN-CLUSTER (http://gitea.gitea-system.svc.cluster.local:3000,
overridable via GITEA_API_URL). Measured from the hub pod: 0.11s against 0.26-1.16s, because the
public path adds DNS, the ingress hop and a TLS handshake to each of the 42. Plain HTTP is safe
ONLY because it never leaves the cluster network — the registry token rides the Authorization
header, so this must not point at a public host without TLS. Unreachable -> the existing graceful
degradation to manual text entry, unchanged.
DELIBERATELY NOT DONE: caching the sha in the hub's own database. That was the other half of the
proposal and it is the wrong shape. Gitea already IS the store; a copy in hub_settings would be a
second source of truth that can drift from the registry it describes — and the operator reads exactly
this value to confirm what they are about to vouch, so a stale one would be a confident wrong answer.
The same reasoning golden_currency_gate.py already records for the vouched version. With the fan-out,
a cold load needs no cache to be fast.
The cap stays at 20 and now bounds the FAN-OUT too, not just the rendered list.
Tests pin order (and that each sha belongs to its own version), per-version failure isolation, and
THE CONCURRENCY ITSELF — a wall-clock assertion plus an in-flight counter, so a fast run cannot be
luck, and an upper bound so a large package list cannot stampede Gitea. Red-proof: reverting to the
serial loop takes 861ms where the concurrent one takes 150ms, and the test fails naming the
26-second page.
go build / go vet / go test ./... green (18 packages), run separately from this commit.
The credential existed and was not reachable when it was wanted. Every box has
had a strong random root@pam password since TASK G1, vaulted in the hub at day 0
and used for real during the sshd incident — but the only way to read it back was
a hand-written curl carrying the global operator key, a secret kept out-of-band.
In practice the PVE web console on a demo box felt locked.
The host page grows a Console access card: presence + username + set_at by
default, Reveal fetches the plaintext on demand for 60 s with a Copy button.
Masking clears the JS variable, and also fires on a second click and on
visibilitychange. A host with nothing vaulted says so, and says why.
The secret is NEVER rendered into the page, and that constraint shapes the
change. The render path uses a new store.GetHostRecoveryMeta whose struct and
SELECT both omit the secret column, so it is structurally incapable of carrying
one. The plaintext crosses the wire only in the response to POST
/hosts/{id}/reveal-recovery-credential (Cache-Control: no-store, CSRF-gated at
the ServeHTTP level; POST precisely so that gate applies and so no secret is
retrievable by URL alone). Deliberately NOT the customer page's data-secret
widget, which embeds the plaintext on every load.
A delivered reveal writes one recovery_credential_revealed event on the host's
customer timeline (info, source hub, Hungarian) via SaveEvent alone — no
dispatcher, nobody emailed, the log_tail_requested shape. Two reveals write two
events: the register records accesses, not states. A 404 is not an access. An
unbound host reveals fine and writes no event; the [INFO] hub line, carrying the
username and a length only, is then the record.
The global-key API path is untouched by design — it is the route for when the
hub UI itself is broken, and coupling it to the session layer would delete the
independence that makes it a fallback.
Recorded as a real trade: the hub session password alone now unlocks console root
fleet-wide, where retrieval previously also needed the global key. Accepted for a
single-operator, HU-geo-fenced hub that already stores these passwords in
plaintext at rest (CONTEXT.md ruling S-4). The plaintext-at-rest half is filed as
R-133 — every hub DB backup is a fleet-wide console-credential dump.
Tests 550 -> 559; four red-proofs (page leak, audit event, CSRF gate, route
order) each run, observed failing, and reverted. The route-order proof is a seam
test driving ServeHTTP: a handler-level test cannot see that defect, because the
handler is correct and simply never runs.
POST /configs/{id}/delete now runs hosts -> RESET -> purge behind three
acknowledgements, a typed customer-id, a stale-preview check and the
ONLINE-host refusal (every gate before any write, so a refusal has zero
side effects). The shallow handleConfigDelete is gone.
Two invariants are asserted, not just commented: ruling 3 is preserved by
construction (leg 2 never sees a host row) and retained escrow custody is
purged exactly once, in leg 3 (leg 2 runs with purgeEscrow=false).
handleCustomerReset's committed half was extracted as commitCustomerReset;
the standalone RESET path is byte-identical to v0.68.1 and its suite is
untouched. Five red-proofs run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J55BQE1gE2V4ffud5jweGS
Let a customer bind their own freshly-installed appliance without the
operator: operator "Send self-bind link" mints a 7-day tokenized
capability link, emailed (Hungarian, sibling sender) to the customer, who
opens a public /bind/<token> page and proves two factors — the console
pairing code shown on the box screen + their retrieval passphrase — and
the hub stages the bind via the same BindAppliance (provenance
customer_selfbind). The box's ~30s appliance poll delivers.
Viktor's three rulings verbatim: console pairing code (no appliance list
ever rendered), operator-sent tokenized link, 5-attempt lockout ->
"call support". Wrong code == wrong passphrase (one generic failure, no
oracle, both factors compared unconditionally); expiry falls back to
operator-bind unchanged.
THE TRAP: one public prefix /bind/, exempt from auth+CSRF at both /login
gate sites via a single isPublicBindPath predicate (tight trailing-slash
match; ServeMux ..-cleans; handler rejects '/' in token). 9 tests
(Scenarios A-F + F1/F2); 4 red-proofs verified red-then-green (lockout,
oracle, widened-prefix, single-active). GC verdict: no appliance GC ->
the 7-day TTL stands alone. Controller/agent untouched; R-27b deferred.
Green: full hub build/vet/test (17 ok) + bash -n + hub confirm gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp
Makes PBS DR storage visible like the restic pool box (v0.64.0), differentiated. Scoping
correction: restic = subaccounts on the shared Hetzner Storage Box (Hetzner API); PBS DR =
the felhom-offsite PBS datastore on the ep0 endpoint VM (NO Hetzner API). Option A
(Viktor-ruled): a read-only `usage` op on the felhom-tenantsync ep0 forced command (twin of
fingerprint), polled by a new hub checker on the 15-min throttle. READ-ONLY throughout.
Phase-0 (gate PASSED): on ep0 (PBS 4.2.3), df -B1 --output=size,used,avail <datastore path>
yields bytes (39990112256/7627939840/... ~19%), read-only, existing sudo context, no admin token.
- scripts/felhom-tenantsync.sh -> v1.2.0: read-only `usage` short-circuit (df on the datastore
path), no customer_id, no admin token, NO mutation. + a bash harness proving zero mutation.
- tenantsync.Client.Usage() + BoxUsage; unknown-op -> typed ErrUsageUnsupported (graceful).
- monitor.PBSDRBoxChecker: OffsiteBoxChecker clone over a usageReader seam; 15-min throttle,
cached PBSBoxSnapshot, escalation-only pbsdr_box_fill on the "pbsdr-box" scope (operator only,
no SaveEvent), recovery re-arm. Fill only. THREE states: ok / unavailable (ep0 <=v1.1.0,
neutral no-alert) / degraded (exec failed, keep last).
- config: Alerting.PBSDRBoxFill{Warn,Crit}Percent (80/90); built with the tenantsync client,
60s sweep, SetPBSDRBox. Hub deploy INDEPENDENT of the ep0 update (graceful degradation).
- web: /offsite splits into Restic + PBS DR hash tabs (endpoint cards under PBS DR); PBS panel;
the single dashboard tile becomes two gauges (RESTIC pct.ratio, PBS DR pct / n/a).
- runbook offsite-endpoint.md 10: v1.2.0 update steps (no sudoers/authorized_keys change).
Tests: 10 Go + the harness; 3 red-proofs (usage mutation, escalation-only, unavailable-drives-band)
confirmed red then restored. go build/vet/test + bash -n + hub confirm gate all pass.
The operator sees the shared pool box's real state on the hub: total box fill vs
capacity, Σ(shared soft quotas) vs capacity (the oversubscription ratio), per-customer
usage/quota bars, and a box-level operator alert (fill % + oversub ratio) on the existing
dispatcher's operator channel. Per-customer fill alerts already existed; the box-level
aggregate was the gap. READ-ONLY against Hetzner (GET only).
Phase-0 probe (gate PASSED): the live pool box 611714 returns capacity via
storage_box_type.size (1 TiB / bx11) and usage via a stats object (size/size_data/
size_snapshots), all bytes; our token reads it (200).
- hetznerapi: additive StorageBoxType + StorageBoxStats on StorageBox (no existing field/
method changed); fake carries them + a GetBoxCalls counter; golden decode test.
- monitor.OffsiteBoxChecker: OffsiteChecker-sibling for the box; fetch-throttled (1 GET/
15min), cached BoxSnapshot, escalation-only + recovery re-arm. FILL (used/capacity 80/90)
+ OVERSUB (Σ shared+enabled quotas / capacity, 2.0x) — independent. Σ from the ConfigJSON
Descriptor (offsite.ReadDescriptor, new), never the report echo; dedicated+disabled
excluded. Scope "pool-box" -> operator channel only, no SaveEvent. Failed fetch keeps the
last snapshot degraded; missing data never becomes 0% and never transitions a band.
- config: Alerting.OffsiteBoxFill{Warn,Crit}Percent + OffsiteOversubWarnRatio (80/90/2.0
defaults; thresholds pending Viktor's ruling). Constructed in the HETZNER_TOKEN branch,
60s sweep, snapshot handed to the web server.
- web: Offsite-tab panel (fill bar, Σ+ratio, per-customer usage/quota rows) + a compact
dashboard tile; reads the cached snapshot only, never fetches; nil -> "not configured".
Tests: 10 new + 4 red-proofs (throttle, Σ filter, escalation-only, failed-fetch honesty),
all confirmed red then restored. go build/vet/test all pass; hub confirm gate OK.
A generic ISO carries NO customer secret. The box registers itself at the hub
as an unclaimed appliance; the operator binds it to a customer; the hub delivers
the customer-id + retrieval passphrase ONCE; day-0 completes via the slice-A path.
Hub (v0.62.0):
- store/appliance.go: appliance_registrations keyed by (uuid, mac_set) — MAC set
is the tiebreaker (duplicate SMBIOS UUIDs); token stored as sha256 only.
Idempotent register (sticky-discard), atomic one-shot delivery, bind/discard.
- api/appliance.go: POST /appliance/register (the one unauth endpoint, per-IP
rate-limited, 256-bit token); GET /appliance/poll (404 no-oracle / 204 unbound
/ 200 deliver-once / 410 delivered). Passphrase read live, never logged.
- web/appliances.go: Hosts-page "Unclaimed appliances" section + BIND (customer
picker, host count display-only) + DISCARD; SSH host-key fingerprints; events.
- Red-proofs: one-shot delivery + register idempotency (both proven red);
404-no-oracle, sticky-discard, bind staging, render. Green + confirm gate.
Scripts (v1.19.0):
- felhom-bootstrap.sh: ONE unit, TWO modes. Direct (env has customer/passphrase)
= slice-A path, byte-identical, only branched around. Pairing (generic) =
register + poll (RestartSec=30 is the poll timer); on delivery write the env
0600 and fall through to direct. Secrets + token shredded on success.
- build-felhom-iso.sh --pairing: generic secret-free ISO, -generic filename,
manifest mode=pairing. profiles/generic.profile (new).
- test/bootstrap-modes.sh: Scenario D (direct = zero appliance calls) + pairing
register/poll + delivery handoff — all green in a debian container.
GET /api/v1/wait long-poll: the box holds an authed hanging GET; the hub
completes it the instant any operator intent bumps that customer's in-memory
generation, then the box fires its ordinary report and the ACK delivers
everything through the unchanged machinery. 240s hold with a 25s heartbeat
newline defeats the nginx 60s proxy_read_timeout with no ingress annotation;
WriteTimeout lifted per-connection via ResponseController.
- internal/intent: per-customer generation counter + waiter registry
(Bump/Wait/Close), coalescing to latest, race-closer, in-memory by design.
Red-proofs: counter-vs-queue + race-closer (run-fail-reverted).
- api/wait.go: the endpoint (per-customer only; global key 400; A cannot see B).
- web bumps after every intent write (fire-after-commit): config CRUD, claim
resend, offsite re-issue/freeze, password regen, block/unblock, floors
(global bumps all config-managed), controller log-tail + log-bundle.
- main.go: one intent hub shared by web+api; Close() before server.Shutdown.
Pairs with controller v0.140.0 (the long-poll client). Grounding:
documentation/audits/SPIKE-immediate-sync-transport-2026-07-16.md.
hub v0.54.0: change operator login password from the Configuration UI
Adds a "Login password" card on /configuration. The password was previously
settable only via the hub-config ConfigMap (auth.password_hash) + redeploy.
- store: hub_settings key operator_password_hash + Get/SetOperatorPasswordHash
- server: passwordHash field -> configPasswordHash (seed); new
effectivePasswordHash() (DB override wins, else seed) is now the single
source for the CSRF gate, RequireAuth, and handleLogin
- POST /configuration/password (handleChangePassword): requires current
password, 8-72 byte new + confirm, bcrypt cost 10, persists DB override;
existing sessions kept valid; ConfigMap stays the break-glass reset path
- UI: current/new/confirm form + inline mismatch pre-check + 6 flashes
- tests + red-proofs: override precedence, happy-path via handleLogin,
wrong-current rejection, mismatch/too-short/no-op, template render
- docs: CHANGELOG, README (auth+config), REUSE, REPORT
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LbMm4T7Ayzs1unB9pN6Uqd
@
Customer status (dashboard row, /configs list, detail header + strip) is
now worst(controllerDerived, hostStatusOf(each expected host)) via the ONE
staleness definition (Server.hostStatus, hosts.go - shared with the
HostStalenessChecker; no second threshold). Any host down/stale caps the
customer at WARN with a cause chip naming the host ("host down: <id>");
pending (never-reported) hosts worsen only once the customer has reported
(onboarding exclusion). The three previously-inlined controller-status
chains collapse into controllerStatus() (rollup.go). Display + derivation
only - checker alerting untouched.
Live shape pinned (drill-1 / Peti cluster): host down 23h + controller
report minutes old rendered a GREEN row - TestRollup_DeadHostMasking now
fails that exact outcome. Red-proof: short-circuiting foldHostStatus to
controller-only flips C + two D subtests red ("dashboard row is GREEN
over a 23h-dead host").
- /offsite lists ALL wg_endpoints rows as cards (id, address, pubkey, subnet,
PBS addr, peers-in-subnet count) + add/edit/delete forms
- store: ListWGEndpoints (id order) + DeleteWGEndpoint (plain delete; the
peers-in-subnet guard lives in the handler where the refusal is built);
SetWGEndpoint upsert reused, single-expected comment updated
- guards: subnet edit refused 409 while peers sit in the current subnet;
endpoint delete refused 409 while peers sit in its subnet; full form
validation (CIDR, pbs ip in subnet, port 1-65535, pubkey, id charset) -> 400
- peer table gains an Endpoint column (first id-ordered subnet match; em dash
when none); pubkey-change edit gets a type-to-confirm noting pull-based
convergence
- allocation/reconciler/desired-state STAY lowest-endpoint-id (page notes the
deferral); GetWGEndpoint semantics untouched
- tests: E1-E6 incl. guard red-proofs; store list/delete test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vvz1NCu22p8dGkRCpeX9re
Sibling checker over the controller report's offsite object: quota-fill
warn/crit + the silently-stuck staleness detector (escrowed-only,
red-proofed; nil-safe on pre-v0.109 reports; same-second tie-guard).
SetOffsiteFrozen flips ONLY readonly on the exactly-1 labelled sub-account
(SSH preserved); Freeze/Unfreeze buttons — manual only, never automatic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
F4: ReissueCredentials — explicit operator recovery for consumed-password
dead-ends; resets the labelled resource's password (exactly-1 guard,
red-proofed), stores a fresh one-time secret, bumps ConfigVersion.
New hetznerapi.ResetBoxPassword for the dedicated path.
F2: host-key scan retry-with-backoff (~60s ladder, red-proofed) — first
save survives fresh-subaccount DNS lag.
F5: config form disables submits + shows an in-flight notice (the re-click
bait that caused live F1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Endpoint card + peers table (truncated pubkeys with full-value title attr,
bound peers link to /hosts/<id>); Offsite nav link in all 9 page templates;
render tests for endpoint/peers, empty, and not-configured states.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
- static/fonts/: the 4 vendored woff2 (byte-copied from
felhom-controller), embedded (embed.go) and served at /static/fonts/
(font/woff2, immutable) mirroring the chart.min.js pattern. No CDN
before, none now.
- templates/icons.html: 12-symbol Lucide sprite partial (icon_sprite),
included at the top of <body> on all 9 pages ({{template}} — the hub
has no shared layout; per-page include is the minimal shared block).
- statusColor now returns v2 semantic tokens (nominal/warn/crit/
neutral) consumed as class suffixes: ok->nominal, warn+stale->warn,
down+fail->crit, pending+disabled->neutral (a not-yet-provisioned or
deliberately paused customer is a normal fleet state), blocked->warn
(intentional operator cut-off, attention-worthy not an outage),
unknown->neutral. The inline style="color: {{statusColor}}" pattern
is dead: dashboard + customer_unified render a class-based
.status-dot-<token>; statusIcon (constant "●") retired from funcmap
and templates.
- Tests (new; the hub web package had no funcmap/template tests):
TestStatusColorTruthTable over the full enumerated status set —
red-proven vs the old implementation (ok returned "#4ade80") — and
TestTemplatesParseWithFuncmap.
Operator picks a version from a Gitea-populated dropdown; the hub reads that
version's sha256 from Gitea itself (files-metadata API, no artifact download) and
vouches it — no hand-copied checksums. New internal/gitea read-only client
(ListVersions + FileSHA256, unit-tested). Configuration UI: version <select>s +
read-only sha display; handleSetArtifacts derives the sha authoritatively and
refuses the save on a Gitea lookup failure. Degrades to manual text entry without
registry creds. go build/vet/test clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Part A (hub): move the global-floor + Day-0-artifacts cards from the Customers
page to the Configuration tab; routes → /configuration/{global-floor,artifacts};
redirects + flashes to /configuration. Customers page back to list + Add.
Part B: online setup command on the customer page (download-then-run, passphrase
at prompt, not templated); serve /scripts/ from the website (sparse-checkout +
nginx location) so felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh resolves; script
passphrase prompt reads < /dev/tty (works for pipe-to-bash too).
Part C (script): --vmid auto-detect — default 9201 in use + no --force → pick the
next free id from pct+qm and confirm; explicit --vmid stays die-unless-force.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator sets a minimum controller version (FLOOR), per-customer defaulting to a
global floor; the report ACK returns the effective floor + latest_version so the
controller auto-updates to the floor when below it (latest stays the opt-in button).
- store: min_controller_version column + hub_settings global floor + Effective/
Get/SetGlobal/SetMin resolution + config/env DEFAULT_MIN_CONTROLLER_VERSION
- handler: report ACK {min_controller_version, latest_version}; LatestVersionProvider
- web: global floor editor + per-customer override form + Floor column (English)
- tests: floor resolution + ACK + render; override-precedence red-proof verified
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FSZmmSFVzGwEzhYmxbkgBK
DR recipe slice (hub half), grounded in SPIKE-dr-recipe-2026-06-16. The hub
receives two additive dr_recipe halves on the existing report paths (agent
storage/guest/PBS on host-report; controller customer/apps on the controller
report), stores them PLAINTEXT in a DEDICATED dr_recipe table keyed by customer
(each half preserves the other), and AssembleDRRecipe stitches them into one
operator-readable recipe (ignore-unknown + version-skew tolerant).
View: a DR-recipe panel on the customer page + GET /customers/{id}/dr-recipe.json
download (operator-auth, no secrets to redact). Plaintext-at-rest is correct —
the recipe is the clean inverse of the retired infra-backup.
Tests: store round-trip (each half preserves the other), assemble-matches-golden,
ignore-unknown + version skew, partial halves, no-secrets sweep. Manifest tag
bumped to v0.13.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add Configuration page with "Refresh Assets" button
- Replace seedIfEmpty with seedOrUpdate (SHA-256 compare on startup)
- Translate all Hungarian text on Apps pages to English
- Add Configuration tab to all template navigation
- Expand isAssetFile to match favicon patterns
- Add felhom-logo.svg to website assets for the pipeline
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds "Telemetria törlése" button that deletes all telemetry records and
known issues for a specific app. Useful after major app updates when old
data is no longer representative.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add hubVersion template function via closure in web.New(). Version is
passed from main.go (set via ldflags at build time) and displayed in
the footer of all 6 page templates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace broken SHA256 hash comparison with value-based YAML comparison.
Add "Show Diff" button showing per-key differences in a color-coded table.
Add "Pull Config" to import controller's current config into the Hub.
New endpoints: GET /customers/{id}/config-diff, POST /customers/{id}/pull-config.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Replace separate config detail and report detail pages with unified
/customers/{id} page showing both config info and live report data
- Add "blocked" status for customers (hidden from dashboard, notifications
suppressed, still accepts reports)
- Dashboard now shows config-only customers as "PENDING" status
- Customers list: all rows link to /customers/{id}, show BLOCKED badge
- New actions: block/unblock, push config to controller, auto-create
config from report data
- /configs/{id} now redirects to /customers/{id}
- Add config-badge CSS classes for MANAGED/MANUAL/BLOCKED badges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New "Configurations" section lets operators pre-configure customer settings
in the Hub, then docker-setup.sh can download a ready-made controller.yaml
using just a customer ID and retrieval password.
- Store: customer_configs table with CRUD + per-customer API key lookup
- API: GET /api/v1/config/{id} with X-Retrieval-Password auth
- Auth: per-customer API keys alongside existing global key (backward compatible)
- Web UI: /configs list, create, edit, delete, YAML preview, copy-to-clipboard
- YAML gen: deep-merge controller.yaml.example template with customer overrides
- Template fetcher: background goroutine refreshing template from Gitea repo
- Navigation: Dashboard / Configurations tabs on all pages
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hub now tracks controller_url from reports, periodically checks the Gitea
registry for the latest controller image version, and shows a "Trigger Update"
button on the customer detail page that proxies to the controller's self-update
API endpoint using the shared API key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add infra-backup push/pull API for controller DR:
- POST /api/v1/infra-backup — controller pushes infrastructure snapshot
- GET /api/v1/infra-backup/{customer_id} — fresh controller pulls backup
- infra_backups SQLite table with per-customer snapshots
- Customer detail page shows infra backup status card
- README.md with full API docs and DR flow
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- POST /api/v1/preferences: accepts {customer_id, email, enabled_events} from controller
- GetRecentNotifications() store method for last N notification log entries
- Customer detail page: new Notifications section (email, events, recent log table)
- joinStrings template function for event list display
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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