Found by the operator, in the way that matters: it cost a real login.
The v0.84.0 Console access card shipped its Copy button DISABLED until a Reveal.
Clicking it did nothing, silently, so the clipboard kept whatever was already in
it — another host's console password from an earlier reveal. That got pasted into
demo-hp's PVE login, which failed with no explanation: the box logged a plain
`password check failed for user (root)`, the credential was never at fault, and
nothing on screen said the copy had not happened.
A copy button that silently no-ops is worse than no copy button. The operator
cannot tell "copied" from "did nothing", and the stale value left behind is a
VALID secret for a DIFFERENT machine — so the failure looks like a stale
credential and sends you diagnosing the wrong thing.
Copy now works without revealing, and that is the safer default rather than a
concession: the secret goes straight to the clipboard and never renders on
screen, so it cannot be shoulder-surfed or caught in a screenshot. Reveal remains
for when it must be read.
Three silent-failure branches closed, all in the same eight-line function:
- not yet revealed -> was a disabled no-op; now fetches and copies
- navigator.clipboard absent -> was silently skipped; now shows it and says why
- writeText() REJECTED -> promise was ignored, so the operator believed it
copied; now shows it and reports the refusal
The success path names the host ("Copied demo-hp-bb76ea's root@pam password"),
because the clipboard is fleet-wide and every box has a different console
password — "copied" alone cannot say for WHICH box, which is the confusion that
produced the incident.
One retrieval path, shared: the endpoint is defined once (data-reveal-url) and
read back with getAttribute, so Copy cannot drift onto a different, unaudited URL
than Reveal. Server-side is unchanged — both buttons hit the same CSRF-gated
endpoint and both write the same recovery_credential_revealed event, which is
correct: the register records accesses, and a copy is an access.
Tests 566 -> 568. Red-proof: re-adding `disabled` reproduces the shipped bug.
Pairs with agent v0.119.0 and is useless without it.
A managed box's LAN IP was not shown anywhere in the hub, because nothing
reported it — the host report carried no address of any kind. The only IP
reachable from the UI at all was the WireGuard one, on /offsite's peer table
keyed by pubkey, so an operator could go peer->host and never host->peer, which
is the direction anyone actually asks in.
The host page grows a Network card: every routable address the box holds, one row
per (interface, address), plus a WireGuard row. On demo-felhom that is vmbr0
192.168.0.162/24 and tailscale0 100.70.170.35/32 — with the PVE web console at
https://<the LAN address>:8006, the thing the operator wanted and could not get.
WireGuard is rendered as TWO facts, deliberately. WGAssignedIP is the hub's own
allocation (wg_peers, authoritative desired state); WGConfirmed is whether the box
reports actually holding it. Showing the allocation alone would make a peer that
was never applied look healthy — the same shape as reading a timestamp that
records an attempt as if it recorded a result.
The split is keyed on the ALLOCATION, not the interface name: wg-felhom is the
agent's current unit name, and a UI keyed on that string would silently
mis-render the day it changes.
An old agent renders UNKNOWN, never "no addresses". Below agent 0.119.0 the field
is absent from the wire, and an absent signal is not a negative result — the page
says so and names the version needed. Rendering an empty list there would have
stated something false about the host.
No new store table and no new ingest path: the report is already stored opaquely
and GetWGPeerForHost already existed with no UI consumer. This is parse + render.
The report fixture in the tests is the REAL wire — the addresses block copied out
of `felhom-agent --selftest=hub` on demo-felhom running 0.119.0.
Tests 559 -> 566; four red-proofs (inert view-model, unconditional confirmation,
the old-agent branch, and the drift case) each run, observed failing, reverted.
The credential existed and was not reachable when it was wanted. Every box has
had a strong random root@pam password since TASK G1, vaulted in the hub at day 0
and used for real during the sshd incident — but the only way to read it back was
a hand-written curl carrying the global operator key, a secret kept out-of-band.
In practice the PVE web console on a demo box felt locked.
The host page grows a Console access card: presence + username + set_at by
default, Reveal fetches the plaintext on demand for 60 s with a Copy button.
Masking clears the JS variable, and also fires on a second click and on
visibilitychange. A host with nothing vaulted says so, and says why.
The secret is NEVER rendered into the page, and that constraint shapes the
change. The render path uses a new store.GetHostRecoveryMeta whose struct and
SELECT both omit the secret column, so it is structurally incapable of carrying
one. The plaintext crosses the wire only in the response to POST
/hosts/{id}/reveal-recovery-credential (Cache-Control: no-store, CSRF-gated at
the ServeHTTP level; POST precisely so that gate applies and so no secret is
retrievable by URL alone). Deliberately NOT the customer page's data-secret
widget, which embeds the plaintext on every load.
A delivered reveal writes one recovery_credential_revealed event on the host's
customer timeline (info, source hub, Hungarian) via SaveEvent alone — no
dispatcher, nobody emailed, the log_tail_requested shape. Two reveals write two
events: the register records accesses, not states. A 404 is not an access. An
unbound host reveals fine and writes no event; the [INFO] hub line, carrying the
username and a length only, is then the record.
The global-key API path is untouched by design — it is the route for when the
hub UI itself is broken, and coupling it to the session layer would delete the
independence that makes it a fallback.
Recorded as a real trade: the hub session password alone now unlocks console root
fleet-wide, where retrieval previously also needed the global key. Accepted for a
single-operator, HU-geo-fenced hub that already stores these passwords in
plaintext at rest (CONTEXT.md ruling S-4). The plaintext-at-rest half is filed as
R-133 — every hub DB backup is a fleet-wide console-credential dump.
Tests 550 -> 559; four red-proofs (page leak, audit event, CSRF gate, route
order) each run, observed failing, and reverted. The route-order proof is a seam
test driving ServeHTTP: a handler-level test cannot see that defect, because the
handler is correct and simply never runs.
Completes the hub half of R-39's fleet fix on top of the generation core (c484aa2).
pbsdrheal gains an auth_failed TRIGGER — a new trigger in the existing machine, not a
new machine. A box whose credential PBS rejects escalates to a fresh mint, never a
re-stage (which would re-feed the secret PBS just rejected), through the EXISTING damper:
a 401 flap must not become a secret-minting chain. With the generation stamp this closes
the loop end to end — agent proves the 401, hub re-keys, generation advances, descriptor
hash moves, agent re-consumes.
consumed_at honesty gauge: a staged secret still unconsumed past a 15-minute grace while
the box reports `applied` is surfaced with its own event. That is the exact 2026-07-18
fingerprint and a disagreement no single tier can see alone. Deliberately a SURFACE, not
a heal — auto-re-issuing on it would mint a second secret on top of an unconsumed one,
which is the mint/consume race R-39(a) already recorded. One event per distinct report,
and an honestly-stuck box does not double-report (its unconsumed secret is the symptom
being healed, not a contradiction).
R-50b(a): ArtifactManifest.WrapperSHA256 + operator field + host-page drift surface. The
PBS wrapper is root-owned 0755 and the pinned sudoers vector, yet installed unversioned
from raw/branch/main and absent from every manifest. Agents >=0.91.0 report the installed
hash; a mismatch is surfaced. An unknown on EITHER side reads as quiet, never as drift —
lighting every host amber on rollout day is how a warning becomes background noise. The
delivery channel itself stays R-50b(b)/(c).
Compatibility unchanged: safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown JSON key dropped); the re-arm
and auth-honesty guarantees need agent >=0.91.0, so MinAgent moves only after the fleet
has self-updated.
Tests: auth_failed escalate/debounce/recovery-forgets-streak; honesty gauge incl. grace
window, the restage edge (consumed_at deliberately NULLed), consumed-never-alarms, and
honest-stuck-no-double-report; wrapper drift incl. both unknown directions. Red-proof run
at the assertion level: removing the auth_failed arm fails the escalation tests with
reissues=0.
- DeleteHost(deleteEscrow) demotes current host_escrow into host_escrow_superseded (copy-before-delete, same tx), spares existing; one shared demoteCurrentEscrowTx (reused by SaveHostEscrow). F-14 provenance/gate unchanged.
- DeleteCustomerConfig now purges both escrow tables for all the customer's hosts incl. already-deleted (F-14 provenance UNION) — the one true purge point.
- Wording: checkbox/refusal/Danger-zone → demotion. S6b OBSOLETE. Red-proofs TestDeleteHost_Demotes + TestDeleteCustomer_Purges + wording guard.
- host_detail_body.html: {{define}}'d body sections extracted from
host_detail.html; the standalone page is now chrome + the sub-template
- hosts.go: hostDetailData(host, r) view-model builder extracted from
handleHostDetail (reused by both surfaces)
- store: ListHostsByCustomer (host_id order; the Host tab is a list by
design - N hosts for a future HA cluster)
- customer Host tab renders one host_detail_body per host + cross-link;
empty state when no host is enrolled
- tests: TestTemplates_CustomerHostTab(+_Empty), TestListHostsByCustomer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vvz1NCu22p8dGkRCpeX9re
admin