Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
admin 91cabdde1b hub v0.93.0: the retention keeps the key it was built to keep (R-198) + three honesty fixes (R-197, R-192, R-196)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 7s
R-198 — host_escrow_superseded shipped with `blob` (the K-escrow / PBS datastore key) and
identity_blob was added to host_escrow LATER, never here. The offsite restic REPOSITORY
password lives in identity_blob. So demoteCurrentEscrowTx -- whose own comment calls it "THE
ONE escrow row-copy routine" -- retained the whole-guest key and silently dropped the off-site
data key, which is the secret the retention was built to preserve. And because the copy happens
as the new blob overwrites the old, the destroying act was the ESCROW CEREMONY: the exact thing
a rebuilt box tells its customer to run, on a card promising in Hungarian that the old backups
stay recoverable. Both demo boxes crossed that line on 2026-08-04.

  - identity_blob added to the table (CREATE + additive ALTER) and carried in the shared copy
    routine, so BOTH callers are fixed at once: re-escrow and host-delete demotion.
  - ListSupersededEscrow reads it back; store.HostEscrow gains IdentityBlob.
  - CountCurrentEscrowWithIdentity is the census of who the fix protects.
  - Nothing is backfillable: pre-v0.93.0 retained rows have no blob and their sources are gone.
  - Tests assert the CONSEQUENCE (a retained row can still yield a repo password), which is why
    the pre-existing retention test stayed green for two months asserting the mechanism.

R-197 — SaveHostEscrow returns the hash it replaced; the escrow PUT raises
offsite_repo_key_changed (warning, operator-only, edge-triggered) when both hashes are known and
differ. No hash value travels. Severity chosen for the world v0.93.0 creates: with the identity
blob retained, a changed key is "this history now depends on an older recovery code", not a loss.

R-192 (half) — the stuck alert now reports the two shapes it actually covers, burned and
regressed, each stating its own measurement; the regressed text withdraws the Re-issue
recommendation. Every self-heal refusal leaves a notification_log row with its reason. The
guard's logic is unchanged; its 500-oldest-reports scoping stays OPEN and the window is named in
the alert text so the limitation travels with the number. offsite_delivery_stuck and
offsite_credential_restaged are added to operatorOnlyEvents -- neither was registered and neither
has a customerMessages entry, which is not a block.

R-196 — five comments (not the three the spec expected) claimed ReissueCredentials rotates the
restic repo password. It resets the PROVIDER password and cannot touch the repo password, which
is generated on the box. All five corrected; the staleness mark documented as precautionary. The
BEHAVIOUR stays open.

Not in this release: R-199, R-200, R-201 remain open -- the chain that hands the key back is
still unassembled. Part 5 hit its gate; the orphan card is untouched (R-202).
2026-08-04 12:56:58 +02:00
admin 4009401f46 hub v0.61.0 + felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0: Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier)
One operator action returns a customer to pre-first-install: all operational
state dies (offsite repo, PBS namespace+backups, DR recipe, one-time secret,
claim state, retained escrow custody); identity + basic config + provenance +
events survive. Sits between host delete and customer Delete.

- store/customer_reset.go: customer_resets journal, live inventory, ack-gated
  purge (never touches identity/provenance/events), DeleteClaim.
- claim.ResetToUnclaimed: delete claim row -> fresh code next onboarding.
- offsite.Deprovision (idempotent) + OffsiteIdentifier + ClearProvisionedDescriptor.
- tenantsync.Deprovision + felhom-tenantsync.sh deprovision op (destroys ns +
  backup groups + token; shared user untouched; idempotent).
- web/customer_reset.go: GET reset -> inventory JSON; POST -> orchestration
  (external teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST; refuse-while-hosts; typed-id +
  separate escrow ack). Amber RESET card distinct from red Danger-zone Delete.
- Red-proofs: ack-gate + partial-failure resumability (both proven red);
  store ack-gating + journal round-trip; offsite idempotency + descriptor clear;
  RESET-card render. Green: build + vet + test.
2026-07-17 13:09:04 +02:00
admin e247dbc1be hub v0.60.0: offsite continuity Part B — superseded-escrow retention (data-first)
- host_escrow_superseded table + SaveHostEscrow retains a different-sha old blob before overwrite (tx); same-sha idempotent (no supersede row); returns superseded bool. ACK/restore read the current row unchanged. CountSuperseded/ListSuperseded; DeleteHost drops retained rows.
- escrow_superseded audit event + operator retained-count on host detail; register offbox_repo_orphaned/reset. Red-proof TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded.
2026-07-17 10:47:50 +02:00
admin 04861a7ed3 hub: F-14 part 2 — gated auto-Reissue on the PBS-DR enable dead-end
pbsdrProvisionAtom, on tenantsync token_exists: consult the customer's
MOST RECENT host-deletion record. escrow_acked=true -> invoke the
EXISTING tenantsync Reissue op, store the audit event (pbsdr_auto_reissue,
hub-source, "Previous key destroyed (acknowledged deletion) - credentials
re-issued automatically."), proceed to secret+descriptor as a normal
provision. No record / un-acked -> the pre-existing refusal, byte-unchanged
(never-silently-re-key law; operator ruling 2026-07-13).
Scenario A test drives the REAL handler path over a REAL escrow-ack delete;
scenario B pins the exact non-effect (zero Reissue calls, no state).
Red-proof: bypassing the gate flips both B subtests to 303 (silent re-key).
2026-07-13 14:44:42 +02:00
admin 448a68237a hub v0.51.0: DR-tier-by-default — per-customer dr_tier flag (default ON, legacy backfill from reality), cascade stages, WG-registration auto-provision hook, offsite-requires-DR guard (F-6 policy), host-page capability chips (inactive=neutral)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NptTCFtu7dz2Ru89qHRagN
2026-07-12 20:37:00 +02:00
admin 2e03de1e0c hub: merge the customer edit page into the Edit tab (v0.48.0 edit-a, part 2)
- Settings tab renamed Edit; embeds config_form_body (.ConfigForm via the
  builder) + Controller Update + Geo + a new Danger zone card holding the
  relocated Block/Unblock/Delete forms (endpoints + confirm() unchanged).
  All cards are SIBLINGS after </form> — never nested in the config form.
- Customer Info header loses the Edit link and Block/Delete forms; only the
  config-less Create Config action stays.
- GET /configs/{id}/edit is a 302 to /customers/{id}#tab=edit; tabs JS gains
  the settings→edit legacy-hash alias.
- Post-action redirects land back on their tab: update/block/unblock/
  offsite-reissue/offsite-freeze/pbsdr-reissue → #tab=edit, regen-password
  → #tab=setup; delete unchanged (/configs).
- handleConfigUpdate gains the server-side twin of the form's required
  fields; the error path re-renders the STANDALONE page with the SUBMITTED
  overrides (B3 red-proof: nil overrides → typed values reset → test FAILS;
  header red-proof: restored header buttons → count=2 → test FAILS; both run).
- Tests: Group A (panel surface, sibling forms, header cleaned by COUNT),
  Group B (B1 302, B2 create unchanged, B3 typed-values, B4/B5 anchor table).
  Amended pins: customer_tabs_test settings→edit; pbsdr_test postUpdate now
  supplies the required fields + FormRendersState asserts the embedded render.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZc5w5jDhFLv6qDC32KN5v
2026-07-12 17:33:07 +02:00
admin ce6a56691e hub v0.44.0: PBS DR tier SLICE 1 — felhom-tenantsync surface (script+client) + hub provisioning flow (consume-once host secret, pbs_dr desired-state descriptor, fail-closed + idempotent, re-issue)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-10 20:49:48 +02:00